Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL
AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS  APPELLANT

AND

SGLB  RESPONDENT

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB

[2004] HCA 32
17 June 2004
A256/2003

ORDER

1.        Appeal allowed.

2.Orders of the Federal Court of Australia made on 11 March 2003, to the extent that they relate to the appeal to that Court from the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 20 December 2002, set aside (save that as to costs).  In place thereof, order that the appeal to that Court against the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court is dismissed.

3.        Appellant to pay the respondent's costs in this Court.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

S J Gageler SC with S B Lloyd for the appellant (instructed by Sparke Helmore)

S Walsh QC with S C Churches for the respondent (instructed by Refugee Advocacy Service of South Australia)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ. For the reasons given by Gummow and Hayne JJ, I agree that the grounds upon which Selway J, in the Federal Court, decided this case against the appellant cannot be sustained. I also agree with what their Honours have said about the procedural aspects of the matter, and with their rejection of an alternative submission made on behalf of the appellant concerning s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in the event that the findings by Selway J of error on the part of the Refugee Review Tribunal were upheld.

  2. In this Court, the respondent relied upon a Notice of Contention, submitting that the decision of the Federal Court should be affirmed but on a ground other than those relied on by Selway J.  The ground was expressed as follows:

    "The Tribunal denied procedural fairness, amounting to jurisdictional error, in refusing the then applicant's request that a psychiatric report be obtained."

  3. I agree with what has been said by Gummow and Hayne JJ, and Callinan J, about the matter of procedural fairness, but I wish to add some comments related to the facts of the case.

  4. In considering whether the Tribunal's refusal of the respondent's request that a further report be obtained involved a denial of procedural fairness, it is important to keep in mind the exact nature of the request, and the context in which it was made.

  5. The proceedings before the Tribunal were the respondent's proceedings, seeking review of an adverse decision by a delegate of the appellant.  In the proceedings before the Tribunal, the respondent was represented by a migration agent, and was also being advised by a barrister.  Although, at one stage, a request was made for the hearing before the Tribunal to be postponed, it was subsequently indicated by the respondent's advisers that he was ready to proceed.

  6. In her reasons for decision, the Tribunal Member recorded the following: 

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Details
Case
[2004] HCA 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs concerning a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal). The dispute centred on whether the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional error in its assessment of the respondent's refugee claim, particularly in relation to his alleged Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The respondent had provided inconsistent evidence regarding his life in Iran and his reasons for leaving, and the Tribunal had considered PTSD as a possible explanation for these discrepancies.

The primary legal issues before the High Court were whether the Tribunal had denied the respondent procedural fairness by failing to order a further psychological assessment, by accepting that the respondent suffered from PTSD without sufficient expert medical advice, and by making credibility findings without assessing the effects of PTSD on the respondent's capacity to give evidence. Additionally, the Court considered whether any alleged errors by the Tribunal fell within the operation of the privative clause in section 474 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth).

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal had not denied the respondent procedural fairness. The Court reasoned that the Tribunal had made considerable efforts to accommodate the respondent during proceedings, including postponing and stopping the hearing when necessary, and providing opportunities for comment. Furthermore, the Court held that there was no obligation on the Tribunal to obtain a psychiatric report, and that the Act did not require it to accede to such a request. The Court found that there was material before the Tribunal, including a history of self-harm and observations of the respondent, which reasonably allowed it to infer PTSD. The Court also determined that the finding of PTSD was beneficial to the respondent, serving as an explanation for his inconsistent accounts, and that the Tribunal was not prevented from making credibility findings in its absence. The Court concluded that the alleged errors identified by the Federal Court did not constitute jurisdictional error and that the Tribunal's conduct did not reveal a failure to observe procedural fairness.

Consequently, the High Court set aside the orders of the Federal Court of Australia, dismissing the appeal to that Court from the Federal Magistrates Court. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs in the High Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Orders of the Federal Court of Australia made on 11 March 2003, to the extent that they relate to the appeal to that Court from the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 20 December 2002, set aside (save that as to costs). In place thereof, order that the appeal to that Court against the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court is dismissed.

3. Appellant to pay the respondent's costs in this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

Notwithstanding that outcome in Plaintiff S157, on one branch of the Minister's argument in the present case, she appeared to attempt to resuscitate that earlier unsuccessful submission. It will be necessary to return to this point later in these reasons.Facts The facts are set out in full in the reasons of Callinan J. We will not repeat them, except to note that the respondent had on various occasions provided inconsistent evidence in respect of his life in Iran and his reasons for leaving Iran.Alleged errors In an unreserved judgment, Selway J held that the Tribunal's decision was flawed by three errors, each said to go to jurisdiction:(1)That there was no evidence before the Tribunal upon which it could be satisfied that the respondent was suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") (the "no evidence" ground)[9];(2)The Tribunal erred in making findings as to the credibility of the respondent where there was no evidence before it which would enable it to assess the effects of PTSD on the credibility of the respondent (the "credibility" ground)[10]; and(3)Having found that the respondent suffered from PTSD, the Tribunal failed to satisfy itself that he could take part in the proceedings (the "competence" ground)[11].The Minister submitted that, contrary to the holdings of Selway J, the Tribunal had not erred in any respect and that, in any event, the errors attributed to it would not have been jurisdictional errors. The Minister's submissions should be accepted.[9][2003] FCA 176 at [15].[10][2003] FCA 176 at [16].[11][2003] FCA 176 at [17]. In this Court, the respondent sought to outflank submissions for the Minister by a contention that the alleged errors found by Selway J also constituted a denial of procedural fairness. This argument is without foundation. The conduct of the proceedings by the Tribunal reveals no failure in its observance of the requirements of procedural fairness. To the contrary, the Tribunal went to great lengths to accommodate the respondent and his concerns. The Tribunal postponed the hearing when requested to do so and promptly undertook the hearing when requested to do so. The Tribunal stopped the hearing when it became apparent that the respondent was agitated. It gave him an opportunity to comment on its concerns after the hearing. In addition, as will later appear from these reasons, there was no obligation on the Tribunal to obtain a psychiatric report. The Act indicated that the Tribunal was not required to accede to any such request by an applicant. It remains then to consider the three errors upon which Selway J based his decision. Each was said to be an error going to jurisdiction. That misconstrued the operation of the Act and the decisions concerning jurisdictional error. It is convenient to postpone the consideration of the detail of his Honour's findings until after a consideration of these fundamental and preliminary concerns.The jurisdiction of the Tribunal Section 36 of the Act provides for a class of visas to be known as "protection visas" and in sub‑s (2) stipulates:"A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:(a)a non‑citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; or(b)a non‑citizen in Australia who is the spouse or a dependant of a non‑citizen who:(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and(ii)holds a protection visa."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The satisfaction of the criterion that the applicant is a non‑citizen to whom Australia has the relevant protection obligations may include consideration of factual matters but the critical question is whether the determination was irrational, illogical and not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds[13]. If the decision did display these defects, it will be no answer that the determination was reached in good faith. To say that a decision-maker must have acted in good faith is to state a necessary but insufficient requirement for the attainment of satisfaction as a criterion of jurisdiction under s 65 of the Act. However, inadequacy of the material before the decision-maker concerning the attainment of that satisfaction is insufficient in itself to establish jurisdictional error.[13]Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 at 1172 [37], 1175 [52], 1194 [173]; cf at 1168 [9]; 198 ALR 59 at 67, 71, 98; cf at 62.The "no evidence" ground To return to the first ground identified in the Federal Court, the "no evidence" ground, nothing in the Act made the question of whether or not the respondent suffered from PTSD a precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction. No question of a "no evidence" ground of jurisdictional error arises. Moreover, in the absence of any finding of PTSD, the Tribunal would not have been prevented from following the same course and disregarding the respondent's previous inconsistent accounts for the purposes of assessing credibility. The finding of PTSD was in fact beneficial to the respondent, being offered as the most favourable explanation available for the respondent's conflicting accounts. In any case, there was material before the Tribunal which allowed it reasonably to infer that the respondent was suffering from PTSD. There was a history of self‑harm of which the Tribunal was aware. There was the Tribunal's own observations of the respondent at the pre‑hearing conference and at the hearing. Further, there were the observations by the respondent's adviser in the letter dated 30 July 2002, and within it extracts from a report by a psychiatrist, Dr Stuart Turner, entitled "Discrepancies and delays in asylum seekers".Credibility The second ground of alleged error amounts to a finding by Selway J that the Tribunal was under a duty to inquire as to the effects of PTSD. This is apparent from his Honour's judgment[14]:"But, having found that the [respondent] was suffering from PTSD there was no evidence before the Tribunal which would have enabled it to assess whether or not any of the evidence the [respondent] gave was reliable. Having (wrongly) diagnosed that the [respondent] was suffering from PTSD it was an error of law for the Tribunal then to proceed to make credibility findings in relation to the [respondent's] evidence without evidence as to what effect the PTSD might have on the [respondent's] capacity to give evidence." (emphasis added)[14][2003] FCA 176 at [16].

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ KIRBY J
What I have said so far is sufficient to dispose of the appeal and obviates the necessity of dealing with any arguments relating to the operation of the privative clause provision in s 474 of the Act[114]. [114]"Decisions under Act are final(1)A privative clause decision:(a)is final and conclusive; and(b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. (2)In this section:privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).(3)A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following:…(i) a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act". The appeal should be allowed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, KIRBY J