Background
Background to the litigation
The sole question raised in this appeal is whether, in allowing an appeal from Katz J, the Full Court of the Federal Court erred in finding reviewable error on the part of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). The Tribunal affirmed a decision by the Delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs that the respondent, Mr Haji Ibrahim, who is a Somali citizen, is not a refugee to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 (together referred to as "the Convention") and, thus, is not entitled to a protection visa pursuant to s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act")[4].[4]The criterion for a protection visa is set out in sub-s (2). For a protection visa to be issued:"the applicant for the visa [must be] a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under [the Convention]."Somalia: background facts Somalia has had no central government since 1991. Various regions have, at various times, come under the control of different clan-based militias and different war lords supported, from time to time, by different clans and sub-clans. Clan allegiances are continuously shifting and, seemingly, this is a persistent feature of Somali life[5]. The clan which is central to this appeal is the Rahanwein which, according to information before the Tribunal, is numerically strong but militarily weak[6]. There was other information before the Tribunal to the effect that, traditionally, the Rahanwein had never been fighters and that some of its members, at least, are "sedentary peasants"[7].[5]See Samatar, Somalia: a Nation in Turmoil, (1991) at 25-26.[6]Prunier, "Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal (1990-1995)", (1996) 15 Refugee Survey Quarterly 35 at 48-49.[7]Prunier, "Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal (1990-1995)", (1996) 15 Refugee Survey Quarterly 35 at 48-49. The shifting clan allegiances and the political anarchy in Somalia have resulted in "the killing, dislocation, and starvation of thousands of Somalis"[8]. The general situation was described by the Tribunal as one of "civil unrest" or "civil war" and the struggle between the various groups in Somalia as "clan warfare". Although the Tribunal's use of these terms is entirely understandable, they, perhaps, fail to convey an entirely accurate picture of the widespread chaos in Somalia or of the tragic consequences for its people.[8]United States, Department of State, Somalia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, published at Convention: persecutionUntil comparatively recent times, the Convention has fallen for application in relation to people who fled persecution that was authorised or condoned by the government of the country concerned[9]. The application of the Convention to persons who have fled a country, such as Somalia, which has no central government and in which it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify any dominant person or group involves the challenge of the unfamiliar.[9]Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, (1991) at 101-105; Kälin, "Refugees and Civil Wars: Only a Matter of Interpretation?", (1991) 3 International Journal of Refugee Law 435; cf von Sternberg, "The Plight of the Non-Combatant in Civil War and the New Criteria for Refugee Status", (1997) 9 International Journal of Refugee Law 169; Okoth-Obbo, "Coping with a Complex Refugee Crisis in Africa: Issues, Problems and Constraints for Refugee and International Law", in Gowlland-Debbas (ed), The Problem of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary International Law Issues, (1996) 7 at 7-17.The Convention defines a "refugee", in Art 1A(2), as any person who:"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country".The difficulty in applying the Convention definition of "refugee" in circumstances such as those in Somalia lies in recognising what, in those circumstances, is involved in the notion of "persecution".It should at once be noted that a person who claims to be a refugee, as defined in Art 1A(2) of the Convention, has only to establish a "well-founded fear of being persecuted". That is usually established by evidence of conduct amounting to persecution of the individual concerned or by evidence of discriminatory conduct, amounting to persecution, of others belonging to the same racial, religious, national or social group or having the same political opinion. And to establish that the conduct in question is "for reasons of" race, religion, nationality, etc, the individual concerned may seek to establish that that conduct is systematic, in the sense that there is a pattern of discriminatory conduct towards, for example, persons who belong to a particular religious group.The Convention does not require that the individual who claims to be a refugee should have been the victim of persecution. The Convention test is simply whether the individual concerned has a "well-founded fear of persecution". Nor does the Convention require that the individual establish a systematic course of conduct directed against a particular group of persons of which he or she is a member. On the contrary, a well-founded fear of persecution may be based on isolated incidents which are intended to, or are likely to, cause fear on the part of persons of a particular race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion.A second matter should be noted with respect to the Convention definition of "refugee", namely, that, as a matter of ordinary usage, the notion of "persecution" is not confined to conduct authorised by the State or, even, conduct condoned by the State, although, as already pointed out, the Convention has, until recently, usually fallen for application in relation to conduct of that kind[10]. Nor, as a matter of ordinary usage, does "persecution" necessarily involve conduct by members of a particular group against a less powerful group.[10]See footnote 9.As a matter of ordinary usage, the notion of "persecution" includes sustained discriminatory conduct or a pattern of discriminatory conduct against individuals or a group of individuals who, as a matter of fact, are unable to protect themselves by resort to law or by other means. That being so, conduct of that kind, if it is engaged in for a Convention reason, is, in my view, persecution for the purposes of the Convention. And that is so whether or not the conduct occurs in the course of a civil war, during general civil unrest or, as here, in a situation in which it may not be possible to identify any particular person or group of persons responsible for the conduct said to constitute persecution.The decision of the TribunalSo far as is relevant to this appeal, the Tribunal found that Mr Haji Ibrahim is a member of the Rahanwein clan and, also, a member of the Dabarre sub-clan and that each is a social group for the purpose of the Convention. It also accepted that his wife had been raped after she and Mr Haji Ibrahim were taken into captivity by members of another clan, the Marehan, when they identified themselves as Rahanwein. And it is implicit in the findings of the Tribunal that there is a real risk that Mr Haji Ibrahim will come to harm at the hands of members of other clans or sub-clans if he is returned to Somalia.The Tribunal accepted that there might be persecution in the context of a civil war, including the civil war in Somalia. However, it held that there was nothing "in the experiences of [Mr Haji Ibrahim], or his clan, the Rahanwein, or his sub-clan, the Dabarre, which could be regarded as part of a course of systematic conduct aimed at members of either group ... for reasons of their membership of the group." The Tribunal concluded that Mr Haji Ibrahim was "not differentially at risk for a Convention reason and that the harm he fears is by reason of the civil unrest in Somalia and not persecution for reasons of his clan membership ... over and above the ordinary risks of clan warfare."Subsequent proceedings: the decision of the Full CourtSo far as is presently relevant, Mr Haji Ibrahim sought review of the Tribunal's decision on the ground that it involved an error of law. The error, it was argued, was in holding that there must be a systematic course of conduct to constitute persecution. The application was dismissed and Mr Haji Ibrahim then appealed to the Full Court. The Full Court allowed his appeal.In the view of the Full Court, the Tribunal erred in the present case "in finding it 'difficult to identify any particular clan or subclan' which could be regarded as the victims of systematic persecution by any other group or groups, or as being subject to a differential impact which is over and above the ordinary risks of clan warfare, [and thus failing] to consider whether, if [Mr Haji Ibrahim] were to return to Somalia, he might be exposed to a real chance of persecution by reason of his membership of the Rahanwein clan."[11] Additionally, the Full Court held that the Tribunal was in error in looking for "systematic conduct"[12], and, thus, impliedly holding that "persecution will not be shown to exist if there is only an isolated incident."[13][11]Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 94 FCR 259 at 265 [22].[12](1999) 94 FCR 259 at 267 [28].[13](1999) 94 FCR 259 at 266 [25].The Full Court set aside the decision of the Tribunal and remitted the matter to it to investigate, in accordance with its decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Abdi "the reasons underlying the [civil] war and the way it is conducted"[14]. [14](1999) 87 FCR 280 at 290 [38].Error of law: discrimination and differential impactIn a number of cases, this Court has emphasised that, for the purposes of the Convention, "[persecution] ... for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" is conduct which is discriminatory on one or other of those grounds[15] and which is sufficiently serious to constitute persecution. In cases where, for example, conduct is aimed at a particular religious group, its discriminatory nature may be so obvious that there is no necessity to characterise it as such or to analyse what is involved in the notion of "discrimination". In a context of shifting clan allegiances and clan warfare, however, discrimination may be difficult to perceive unless the elements of what is involved in that notion are kept in mind.[15]See Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 74 ALJR 775; 170 ALR 553. See also Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379; Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559.Before turning to an analysis of discrimination, it should be noted that it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, in a clan war, the actions of one clan against the members of another are actions which are taken, in the words of Art 1A(2) of the Convention, "for reasons of ... [their] membership of a particular social group", being the group constituted by that other clan. Even so, action of that kind, even if it involves killing and torture, is not persecution for the purposes of the Convention, unless it discriminates in some way against the members of that other clan.It was recently held by the House of Lords, in Adan v Secretary of State for the Home Department[16], that "a state of civil war whose incidents are widespread clan and sub-clan based killing and torture" does not give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for the purposes of the Convention if the "individual claimant is at no greater risk ... than others who are at risk ... for reasons of their clan and sub-clan membership"[17]. Although there is no reference in Adan to discrimination, as such, that notion clearly provides the rationale for the decision in that case. And to the extent that the decision in that case gives expression to a negative test of persecution, I respectfully adopt it.[16][1999] AC 293.[17][1999] AC 293 at 308, 311.In Adan, the House of Lords also stated a positive test with respect to persecution. Lord Slynn of Hadley said that, to establish refugee status, an individual who is caught up in a civil war must "show a well-founded fear of persecution over and above the risk to life and liberty inherent in the civil war."[18] Similarly, Lord Lloyd of Berwick observed that a person claiming to be a refugee "must be able to show ... a differential impact ... he must be able to show fear of persecution for Convention reasons over and above the ordinary risks of clan warfare."[19] And, of course, that was the criterion by which the Tribunal assessed Mr Haji Ibrahim's claim in this case. That criterion is, in my view, deficient, albeit not for the reasons given in Abdi and applied by the Full Court in this case.[18][1999] AC 293 at 302.[19][1999] AC 293 at 311.In Abdi, the Federal Court took a different approach from that taken in Adan. In Abdi, the Federal Court said:"[W]e do not accept that a clan or race based war cannot, without some further and differential degree of risk, amount to persecution in the sense that an individual is selected out for persecution treatment because he is a member of a particular clan. If evidence establishes, for example, that the objective of a war is to harm the opposing party for one or more Convention reasons, then 'persecution' will be made out ... The task of the decision-maker ... must be to investigate the reasons underlying the war and the way it is conducted in order to ascertain whether it is based on a Convention ground or has an objective which is covered by the Convention"[20].And, as earlier indicated, it was on the basis of what had been said in Abdi that the Full Court found error on the part of the Tribunal in this case.[20](1999) 87 FCR 280 at 290 [38].It is convenient now to turn to the concept of discrimination which, as has been pointed out, is an essential feature of persecution for the purposes of the Convention. Discrimination is not simply the different treatment of individuals or of classes of individuals. There are two distinct aspects to discrimination. The first, which needs no elaboration, is the different treatment of people who are not relevantly different[21]; the second is the treatment of people who are relevantly different in a manner that is not appropriate and adapted to that difference[22]. Treatment of the latter kind is usually, albeit inaccurately, referred to as indirect discrimination. And it is usually identified on the basis of its different impact on different groups within the population.[21]See, for example, the discussion by Gaudron J in Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 at 571-572.[22]See Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 at 570-574 per Gaudron J; Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436 at 478 per Gaudron and McHugh JJ.For constitutional purposes, it has been accepted that conduct which does not properly take account of relevant differences constitutes discrimination[23]. The same view should be taken with respect to the Convention in its application in conditions of clan warfare. And on that basis, if an individual can establish that conduct to which all are subject has significantly greater consequences for the group of which he or she is a member, then he or she may well establish a well-founded fear of persecution. And in the case of clan warfare, where war is waged against members of a particular social group, namely a particular clan because they are members of that clan, he or she may well establish a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.[23]See Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 at 572-574 per Gaudron J; Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436 at 478-480 per Gaudron and McHugh JJ.Where, as here, it is necessary to apply the Convention in relation to a country riven by clan wars, it is not sufficient, in my view, to ask whether the person claiming refugee status faces risks "over and above the ordinary risks of clan warfare". That can be illustrated by this case. As already pointed out, there was material before the Tribunal to the effect that the Rahanwein are militarily weak. As I will shortly explain, that may constitute a relevant difference between them and other clans caught up in the struggle in Somalia.It may be that, because the Rahanwein are militarily weak, the consequences of clan warfare are so much greater for them that their plight is properly to be identified as persecution. Or to put the matter another way, the "ordinary risks of clan warfare" for them may be so much greater than for others caught up in the clan-based conflict that they are at risk of persecution for reason of their membership of a particular social group, namely, the militarily weak Rahanwein. However, it does not necessarily follow that, if the Rahanwein are militarily weak, their members are at greater risk than are members of other clans or sub-clans. For example, it may be that the Rahanwein or the Dabarre are able to forge alliances with other clans or sub-clans so that they are at no greater risk than anyone else. These matters should have been but were not investigated by the Tribunal.In addition to asking itself whether the Rahanwein and the Dabarre were the victims of "systematic conduct aimed at [their] members" and whether they were "differentially at risk ... over and above the ordinary risks of clan warfare", the Tribunal should have considered whether clan warfare posed special problems for members of the Rahanwein and the Dabarre over and above those of the other clans caught up in the conflict, such that they are properly to be regarded as being at risk of persecution by reason of their membership of that clan or sub-clan. Only if that further exercise is undertaken, can it be determined whether Mr Haji Ibrahim has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.ConclusionAlthough for reasons which differ from those adopted by the Full Court, that Court was correct in identifying an error of law on the part of the Tribunal. The error is not that identified by the Full Court but it is, nonetheless, an error as to the meaning of the expression "well-founded fear of persecution" in Art 1A(2) of the Convention. The error was in failing to recognise that undifferentiating conduct may constitute discrimination against persons who are different or who are differently circumstanced and, that, if that discrimination is sufficiently serious, it may constitute persecution for the purposes of the Convention.The appeal should be dismissed.Mc