GLEESON CJ, GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ.
On 7 October 1999, orders were made in this matter allowing the appeal to this Court, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland made on 27 February 1998 and in lieu ordering that the order nisi of Williams J dated 28 November 1996 be discharged. Orders were made that the Attorneys-General who had intervened in the matter pay the appellant the additional costs incurred by him by reason of their intervention and that the question of the other parties' costs in respect of the proceedings in this Court and in the Court of Appeal be reserved. Directions were made giving leave to the parties to file submissions on the reserved questions of costs and they have done so.
The issue is whether the appellant (who had been prosecuted summarily under the Fauna Conservation Act1974 (Q)) should have his costs (in this Court and in the Court of Appeal) having succeeded in proceedings by way of order to review[1] instituted by the informant to challenge the dismissal of the charges against the appellant.
[1]The order to review was dealt with by the Court below under Pt 9 Div 1 of the Justices Act1886 (Q). The order nisi had been granted before the commencement of the Courts Reform Amendment Act1997 (Q) which repealed that division of the Justices Act. Section 273(2) of the Justices Act provided that the proceedings might be dealt with as if the division had not been repealed. (Nothing was said by either the appellant or the respondent to turn on the limited life of 2 years given to s 273 by s 273(3).)
Section 214 of the Justices Act1886 (Q) provided that:
"The court or Judge may make such order as to costs as the court or Judge deems just."
There was, therefore, undoubted power in the Court of Appeal to order costs in the proceedings before that Court and it was not suggested that this Court lacked power to make an order dealing with the costs of the appeal in this Court.
In Latoudis v Casey[2], the Court considered the circumstances in which a successful defendant to a prosecution heard summarily should have an order for costs of those summary proceedings. It was…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Abebe v the Commonwealth [1999] HCA 69
Case
[1999] HCA 69
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Mr Abebe against the Commonwealth. The dispute concerned the entitlement of a successful appellant to the costs of appeals in summary criminal proceedings.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the general rule that a successful party is entitled to their costs should apply in the context of appeals from summary criminal proceedings, or if specific considerations related to the nature of such proceedings warranted a different approach.
The Court reasoned that the general principle of awarding costs to a successful party in litigation should ordinarily apply to appeals in summary criminal proceedings, absent any specific statutory provision or compelling reason to depart from this rule. The Court emphasised that the purpose of costs orders is to indemnify the successful party for the expense of vindicating their rights or defending themselves against unfounded claims. The Court ultimately held that the successful appellant was entitled to the costs of the appeals.