FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
JUN24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1300
File number(s): PEG 435 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE D HUMPHREYS Date of judgment: 14 August 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Protection (Subclass 866) visa – where the Tribunal refused to adjourn the hearing – where the Tribunal refused to exercise its discretion to postpone its decision making – concerns over the authenticity of documents provided from Iran – grounds of judicial review have no merit – application dismissed with costs Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J(1), 5H(1), 36(2)(a), 424, 424A(3), 427 Cases cited: Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 106 Date of hearing: 31 July 2025 Place: Parramatta Solicitor for the Applicant: Self-represented litigant Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr Mayne, Sparke Helmore Lawyers Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
PEG 435 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: JUN24
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
DATE OF ORDER:
14 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application is dismissed.
2.The Applicant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $7,500.00.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
INTRODUCTION
This is an Application for judicial review of a decision of the…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1300
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had erred in law in its consideration of the applicant’s claims and in its refusal to adjourn the hearing or defer its decision. The court examined whether the Tribunal had considered the relevant country information and whether it had acted unreasonably in refusing the adjournment and in not deferring its decision. The court assessed whether the Tribunal’s decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached it, or whether it lacked an evident and intelligible justification.
The court found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the applicant’s claims and the relevant country information. The court held that the Tribunal was not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by the applicant, nor did it need to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out. The court noted that the Tribunal had carefully evaluated the documentary evidence provided by the applicant, including a power of attorney document and witness statements, and had found them to be insufficient to support the applicant’s claims. The court concluded that the Tribunal had not acted unreasonably in refusing the adjournment or in not deferring its decision. The applicant had not provided satisfactory evidence to justify an adjournment, and the Tribunal was not obliged to afford every opportunity to the applicant to present his best possible case. The court dismissed the application with costs.
The court ordered that the application be dismissed with costs to be paid by the applicant to the Minister.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Paragraph 10 is a variation on the applicant’s claim that the Tribunal did not consider Iran’s standard procedures or lack thereof, and instead used a measure of standard procedures in Australia. The applicant relies on his submissions in relation to paragraph 1 in this regard. CONSIDERATION In Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3 at [17] the task of a court conducting judicial review was described in this manner:… An application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the executive branch of government, here in the form of a decision of the Minister. The court does not consider the merits or wisdom of the decision; nor does it remake the decision. The task of the court is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it. It is well established that the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451. Nor does the Tribunal have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out: Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348. It is well settled that country information and the weight given to that information is a matter for the Tribunal: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10. It is for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal, being the relevant decision maker, that the applicant meets the criteria for being a refugee: Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187]. It was for the applicant to provide his evidence and arguments in sufficient detail to enable the Tribunal to reach the requisite state of satisfaction: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214 at [76]. The Tribunal is under no obligation to “afford every opportunity to an applicant for review to present his or her best possible case or improve upon the evidence”: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) at [82]. There is no general obligation on a Tribunal to investigate an applicant’s claims: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [43] per Gummow and Hayne JJ (Gleeson CJ agreeing); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 at [20] per Black CJ, Sundberg and Bennett JJ in joint judgment. The duty imposed on the Tribunal by the Act is a duty to review and not a duty to enquire: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39 at [25] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. Unreasonableness is where a decision-maker has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have come to it: (Li) at [28]; or where a decision has been made that lacks an “evident and intelligible justification”: Li at [76]. The test for unreasonableness is “stringent” and will only arise in rare cases. Unreasonableness is not a means for challenging a decision on the basis that the court disagrees with the consideration of matters or the evaluative judgements made by the decision-maker: Li at [30], [113].