FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EPH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 824
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: EPH17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2809 File number: VID 1254 of 2018 Judge: KENNY J Date of judgment: 3 June 2019 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – leave granted
MIGRATION – whether primary judge denied the applicant procedural fairness in failing to adjourn hearing – where applicant did not expressly seek an adjournment – where applicant was a non-English speaking self-represented litigant – where primary judge was informed by the applicant that his solicitor had suddenly withdrawn from the case the day before the hearing – where primary judge did not clarify with the applicant what had happened with his lawyer and whether or not he sought an adjournment – applicant denied reasonable opportunity to present his case – breach of rules of natural justice – duties to self-represented litigants – appeal allowed
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12(1)(a)
Cases cited: ALQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 16
Blazevski v Judges of the District Court of New South Wales (1992) 29 ALD 197
CPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 330
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Hamod v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Jarrett v Westpac Banking Corporation [1999] FCA 425
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; 209 CLR 597
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; 238 FCR 158
Re CSR Ltd [2010] FCAFC 34; 183 FCR 358
Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323
SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; 216 FCR 445
Date of hearing: 28 May 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 39 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Barataraj Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M Hosking Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz ORDERS
VID 1254 of 2018 BETWEEN: EPH17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 JUNE 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 19 September 2018 be granted.
2.The appeal be allowed.
3.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 19 September 2018 be set aside.
4.The proceeding be remitted for trial in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
5.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding in this Court, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 824
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia granted leave to appeal, finding that the primary judge did indeed fail in his duty to ensure procedural fairness. The primary judge did not clarify with the applicant what had occurred with his solicitor's sudden withdrawal from the case the day before the hearing, nor did the judge inquire if the applicant had sought an adjournment. This omission deprived the applicant of a reasonable opportunity to present his case, leading to a breach of the rules of natural justice. The court emphasised the importance of judicial discretion in granting or refusing an adjournment, particularly in cases involving self-represented litigants, and held that the primary judge's failure to exercise this discretion properly constituted an error of law.
As a result, the Full Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the proceeding for trial in the Federal Circuit Court. Additionally, the court ordered that the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia, as agreed or taxed. This decision underscores the necessity for courts to carefully consider the unique challenges faced by self-represented litigants and to ensure that they are afforded procedural fairness in all legal proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 19 September 2018 be granted.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 19 September 2018 be set aside.
4. The proceeding be remitted for trial in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
5. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding in this Court, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister further submitted that even if the Federal Circuit Court did act unreasonably in not granting an adjournment, this is not an appropriate case for a grant of leave because, even if the Federal Circuit Court had granted an adjournment, it would inevitably have reached the same conclusion – that the applicant did not have an arguable case for relief. For the reasons stated below, the Minister did not press this submission at the hearing in this Court.CONSIDERATION In Re CSR Ltd [2010] FCAFC 34; 183 FCR 358 at [5], Keane CJ and Jacobson J observed that “[g]enerally speaking, leave to appeal will be granted where there is a reasonably arguable case that the decision below is affected by appellable error, and a grant of leave is necessary to remedy a substantial injustice”: see also Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399. It is well recognised that an adjournment is a means whereby prejudice to a party – especially an unrepresented party – may be avoided: see Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 at 343 (Deane J). As Kirby P said in Blazevski v Judges of the District Court of New South Wales (1992) 29 ALD 197 at 200, “[i]f a serious injustice has been occasioned by a refusal of an adjournment, and particularly one which can and should be readily corrected, th[e] court may provide relief and in the appropriate case should do so”. Of course, the courts are not required to ensure that a party takes the best advantage of the opportunity to present his or her case. Further, a party to civil litigation, such as the applicant in this case, has no absolute right to legal representation in the sense that a judge is required to adjourn the proceeding if the party has no lawyer: see, for example, Jarrett v Westpac Banking Corporation [1999] FCA 425 at [6] (Heerey J). It may be accepted that the withdrawal of legal representation shortly before a hearing does not mean that a court will always grant an adjournment in the proper exercise of its discretion. Each case depends on the “individual circumstances”: Jarrett at [87] (Mansfield J). It may also be accepted that appellate courts seldom disturb decisions to grant or refuse an adjournment: see Blazevski at 200. Nonetheless, where an adjournment application is made, the Court must exercise its discretion to grant or refuse the application judicially. An appellant’s challenge on an appeal to a refusal of an adjournment is a challenge to an exercise of discretion; and, in this circumstance, the appellant needs to establish a discretionary error of the type referred to in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. In a well-known passage, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ said, in effect, that in order for an appeal against an exercise of discretion to succeed, it must appear that the judge made some error in exercising the discretion. Thus, their Honours stated (at 505):If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so.