FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MUZAMMIL v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 1564 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Student visa – failure to attend the directions hearing – application for judicial review dismissed – reinstatement – applicable principles – explanation for failure to appear open to scrutiny – whether grounds of review arguable – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.13.03C |
| Applicant: | MOHAMMED MUZAMMIL |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | MLG 1045 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge A Kelly |
| Hearing date: | 3 June 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 3 June 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 13 June 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant: | In Person |
| Solicitor Advocate for the Respondents: | Ms Whittemore |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The application for reinstatement of the proceeding be dismissed.
The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent fixed at $3,737.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 1045 of 2018
| MOHAMMED MUZAMMIL |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By application filed on 19 April 2018, judicial review is sought of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 29 March 2018 affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse an application for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa (visa) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).
On 15…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Muzammil v Minister for Home Affairs and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2019] FCCA 1564
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether to exercise its discretion to reinstate the dismissed application for judicial review. This required the court to consider the applicable principles for reinstatement, specifically the threshold for demonstrating arguable grounds of review, and whether Mr Muzammil had provided a reasonable excuse for his failure to attend the directions hearing. The court also had to assess the applicant's overall conduct and history in the proceedings.
The court applied the principle that an application for reinstatement does not require the same level of satisfaction regarding the grounds of review as a final hearing. Instead, the threshold is whether the grounds of review are "arguable," meaning they are not fanciful, illogical, or devoid of merit, but possess a level of rationality and a basis in the material sufficient for the court to hear full argument. The court noted that this assessment is evaluative and discretionary, guided by the principles in *House v The King*. The Minister argued for dismissal on the basis of an unreasonable excuse for non-attendance. However, the court's detailed examination of the applicant's history revealed a pattern of seeking postponements, including reliance on a grandmother's death where the timing was questioned, and a failure to act on advice for medical treatment. Crucially, the applicant had communicated with the Minister's lawyers indicating an intention to attend the hearing, but then failed to attend without further communication, despite prior engagement.
The application for reinstatement was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The exercise of discretion in favour of an order for reinstatement does not require the court to be satisfied of the grounds of review to the same level as apply at a final hearing of an application for judicial review: CAL15 at [5]. Rather, on an application for reinstatement, the threshold which is applicable to a consideration of the merits of the application is whether the grounds for judicial review were shown to be ‘arguable’: CAL15, [5] citing MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[13] There, Mortimer J stated at [6]:The threshold is whether a ground of review is “arguable”. That means it is not fanciful, illogical, impermissible or devoid of merit, but has a level of rationality and a basis in the material before the Court sufficient for the Court to be satisfied it is appropriate to hear full argument, with the parties having a fair opportunity to prepare for such argument. Thus, at the level of assessing whether a ground is “arguable”, the Court should not expect a ground of judicial review to be fully developed, especially by an unrepresented asylum seeker whose first language is not English. (emphasis added)More recently, in Savrimootoo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[14] Mortimer J referred to CAL15 and affirmed that the discretion to reinstate a proceeding was a broad one. [13] [2015] FCA 1391, [62][14] [2018] FCA 1167, [47]. The assessment of an application for reinstatement, which requires the court to consider whether a ground of review is arguable, is evaluative. As Ryan J observed in MZYEZ, it follows from the principles considered above that the “decision whether or not to reinstate a proceeding is essentially discretionary, and so attracts the application of the principles” stated by Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in House v The King[15]; cf BAL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[16][15] (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505[16] [2018] FCA 792, [10] (Bromwich J). The Minister submitted that the application for reinstatement should be dismissed as the applicant had not provided a reasonable excuse for his failure to attend the directions hearing. It was no part of the applicant’s case that he was not on notice of the directions hearing date and time. Whether a party has been given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case is a question of fact. The present application was commenced in 19 April 2018 and on that date the directions hearing was set down for 15 May 2019. The applicant had been given several reminders of the date of that hearing. I have set out the history of the matter in some detail. I have done so because a number of features emerge from that history, including the following: (1) the applicant has held Student or bridging visas since 2008; (2) the applicant has sought to vacate the hearings before the Tribunal and this court; (3) in seeking a postponement of the Tribunal hearing, the applicant relied upon his grandmother’s death (who had died some four months before the scheduled hearing); (4) his email suggested that his grandmother had died after suffering heart disease for seven months, perhaps creating the impression that her death had been recent; (5) when the Tribunal hearing was rescheduled, neither the applicant nor his migration agent filed any submissions or appeared; (6) on the date the Tribunal dismissed the application for non-appearance, his agent sent him an email advising that an application for reinstatement had to be made within 14 days; (7) no such application was made; (8) on several dates, the Minister’s lawyers reminded the applicant of the directions hearing on 15 May 2019; (9) while the applicant’s grounds for seeking reinstatement and his affidavit relied upon his illness as the basis for his non-attendance, he did not act on the advice given in April 2019 to obtain follow up treatment; (10) on closer scrutiny the applicant had in fact communicated with the Minister’s lawyers advising that: (i) he was travelling to India; (ii) he did not want to be sent short minutes of proposed consent orders; (iii) he had decided to attend the directions hearing on 15 May 2019. Despite his pattern of communicating with the Minister’s lawyers throughout April – May 2019, he did not contact them further seeking to agree on minutes of orders or to advise that he had again changed his mind and would not attend the hearing.