CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344

Appeal from: CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1537
File number(s): VID 600 of 2016
Judge(s): MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 11 November 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time and leave to appeal – where tribunal affirmed decision not to grant applicant a protection visa – where applicant’s application for judicial review of tribunal’s decision dismissed upon non-appearance of applicant – where application for reinstatement dismissed – application for extension of time granted – application for leave to appeal against reinstatement decision dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 13.03C(1)(c), 16.05(2)(a)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 426A

Cases cited:

BTR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 892

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries (Inc) [1991] FCA 655; 33 FCR 397

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme [2003] HCA 56; 216 CLR 212

Date of hearing: 11 November 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant did not appear
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms F Batten
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 600 of 2016
BETWEEN:

CAL15

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The time in which the applicant may file an application for leave to appeal is extended to 7 June 2016.

2.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application for leave to appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MORTIMER J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 18 May 2016. On that day the Federal Circuit Court dismissed an application, which it took to be made pursuant to r 16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), to set aside the orders of a Registrar of the Court made in the absence of a party: see CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1537.

  2. The Registrar’s orders were made at a directions hearing on 2 March 2016, at which the applicant failed to appear. In the Federal Circuit Court proceeding, the applicant sought judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1344
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision to deny him a protection visa. The applicant, an unrepresented individual whose first language is not English, argues that he did not receive adequate legal assistance, leading to his non-appearance at the Tribunal hearing and the subsequent dismissal of his application. The court was tasked with deciding whether the Federal Circuit Court's decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal and whether the refusal of leave to appeal would cause substantial injustice to the applicant.

The court examined the applicant's arguments, which included claims of inadequate legal assistance and the Tribunal's failure to adhere to procedural fairness obligations. However, the court found that the applicant had not developed substantive contentions on the alleged errors of law in the Tribunal's decision. The court also considered the applicant's failure to attend the Tribunal hearing, which was clearly prejudicial to his review application. Although the applicant's complaint about his lawyer's conduct might establish a gross failure of professional duty, it did not identify any legal error in the Tribunal's application of the law or failure to adhere to procedural fairness obligations. The court concluded that the Federal Circuit Court's decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal.

The court also considered whether the refusal of leave to appeal would cause substantial injustice to the applicant. While the court acknowledged that the consequences for the applicant's liberty and ability to remain in Australia were substantial, it found that there was no real prospect of success for the appeal. The court noted that the applicant's only avenue for securing a judicial review of the Tribunal's decision was through the appeal process, and the refusal of leave to appeal would deny him access to full judicial review. However, the court ultimately concluded that the refusal of leave to appeal was not attended by sufficient doubt and did not cause substantial injustice.

The court granted the applicant's application for an extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal but dismissed the application for leave to appeal itself. The applicant was also ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the application for leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The time in which the applicant may file an application for leave to appeal is extended to 7 June 2016.

2. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application for leave to appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an application by an individual, referred to as CAL15, for an extension of time and leave to appeal against the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. CAL15 had previously applied for a protection visa but was denied. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirmed the Minister's decision, and subsequently, CAL15 applied for judicial review of the AAT's decision. His application for judicial review was dismissed as he did not appear before the court. Following this, CAL15 applied for reinstatement of his judicial review application, which was also dismissed. CAL15 then filed an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal against the decision to deny reinstatement of his judicial review application.

CAL15 initially applied for a protection visa, which was denied by the Minister. He sought review of this decision by the AAT, which affirmed the Minister's decision. CAL15 then applied for judicial review of the AAT's decision in the Federal Circuit Court. However, he failed to appear for the hearing, resulting in the dismissal of his application for judicial review. CAL15 subsequently applied for reinstatement of his judicial review application, which was also dismissed by the Federal Circuit Court. Following this, CAL15 filed an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal against the decision to deny reinstatement of his judicial review application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

At the hearing the Minister’s counsel properly pointed to the contents of para 14 of the applicant’s second affidavit. That paragraph could be seen as contending that the applicant also feared persecution on the ground of his race or ethnicity as a Sikh. Even if that contention is made, it must be resolved in the same way as the applicant’s seventh contention.CONCLUSION On the basis of the matters raised by the applicant, I am not satisfied that the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. Given that the applicant is unrepresented, unfamiliar with the Australian legal system and a person whose first language is not English (although he is reasonably fluent in English), I have also considered the Federal Circuit Court’s decision independently, and I am not satisfied that there is any other basis on which it might be said to be attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. Her Honour was not presented with any substantive contentions on the three asserted errors of law in the Tribunal’s decision, and so it cannot be said, for example, that her Honour imposed too high a threshold on what was “arguable” about errors in the Tribunal’s decision. This was a situation where nothing at all was really developed by the applicant – through no fault of his own, I hasten to add. Her Honour then did examine the Tribunal decision independently and it is not possible on the evidence before me to say that she did so in a way which was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. The applicant’s failure to attend the Tribunal hearing was clearly prejudicial to the prospects of his review application succeeding. Although he deposes that he was not provided with any real assistance by the lawyer he retained (and, implicitly, that it was this failure by his lawyer which led to him not attending the Tribunal hearing), even if that complaint is sustainable, it does not identify any legal error in the Tribunal’s application of the law to his review, nor does it identify any failure to adhere to the Tribunal’s procedural fairness obligations. If the applicant’s evidence is correct (and it would be beyond the scope of the present leave application to make findings on that issue), it may establish a gross failure of professional duty to the applicant, but even such a gross failure cannot be transformed into a jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal in making its decision on his review. In light of my conclusions about whether the Federal Circuit Court’s decision is attended by sufficient doubt, it is unnecessary to address whether a substantial injustice would occur if leave to appeal were not granted. In one sense, there can be no substantial injustice if the appeal has no real prospect of success. However, securing a judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision is the only avenue open to the applicant to attempt to secure for himself a different outcome on his protection visa application, and the consequences for the application in terms of his liberty and his ability to remain in Australia are substantially dependent on the success of his protection visa application. In that sense, refusing leave to appeal is capable of causing him substantial injustice because it denies him access to full judicial review. If I had reached active consideration of this factor, and there was merit in the applicant’s challenge to the Federal Circuit Court decision, I may have been persuaded there was a sufficient prospect of substantial injustice for leave to appeal to be granted.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court which dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision not to grant him a protection visa. The court noted that the applicant's failure to attend the Tribunal hearing was prejudicial to the prospects of his review application succeeding and that he did not develop any substantive contentions in his application for leave to appeal. The court held that the Federal Circuit Court's decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. The court also noted that the applicant, who is unrepresented, unfamiliar with the Australian legal system and a non-native English speaker, did not raise any substantive contentions on the asserted errors of law in the Tribunal's decision. The court further held that even if the applicant's complaint about his lawyer's failure to assist him was sustainable, it did not identify any legal error in the Tribunal's application of the law or a failure to adhere to the Tribunal's procedural fairness obligations. The court concluded that the consequences of refusing leave to appeal would cause the applicant substantial injustice because it denied him access to full judicial review. However, the court held that it was unnecessary to address this factor as the appeal had no real prospect of success. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the court will not grant leave to appeal where the applicant has failed to develop any substantive contentions and the decision of the lower court is not attended by sufficient doubt.