FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
EIO18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1554
File number(s): SYG 2559 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE ZIPSER Date of judgment: 24 September 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review – extension of time application – whether satisfactory explanation for delay - merits of underlying application – extension of time refused Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J, 46, 473GB, 477 Cases cited: CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2016] FCA 1344
Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3) [2020] FCA 1655
Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 276 CLR 579
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 53 Date of hearing: 17 September 2025 Applicant: In person Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr J Fyfe (Minter Ellison) ORDERS
SYG 2559 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: EIO18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE ZIPSER
DATE OF ORDER:
24 SEPTEMBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time lodged on 3 September 2018 is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $4,553.02.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE ZIPSER
INTRODUCTION
On 3 September 2018, the applicant filed an application to extend time, pursuant to s 477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), in which to make an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) dated 10 May 2018.
For the reasons that follow, the application to extend time is dismissed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2013, the applicant, a citizen of Iran, arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival.
On 10 June 2016, the applicant lodged an application for a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV), claiming to fear harm if he returned to Iran.
On 20 November 2017, a delegate of the first respondent, after interviewing the applicant on 8 September 2017, made a decision refusing to grant the applicant a TPV.
On 27 November 2017, the matter was referred to the IAA for review under Part 7AA of the Act (as it then was).
On 10 May 2018, the IAA made a decision affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a TPV.
IAA’S DECISION
The IAA at [3] summarised the applicant’s claims. The applicant claimed to fear harm because of his non-adherence to Shia Islam, his opposition to…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read EIO18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1554
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the applicant provided a satisfactory explanation for the substantial delay in filing for judicial review and whether the merits of the underlying application warranted granting an extension of time. The court meticulously examined the applicant's reasons for the delay, considering both factual evidence and the credibility of the applicant's explanations. The applicant cited work commitments and personal circumstances, including a mental health condition, as reasons for the delay. However, the court found several aspects of the applicant's explanations unsatisfactory, including inconsistencies in the applicant's accounts of his financial and residential situations.
In its reasoning, the court emphasised the importance of timely judicial review applications to ensure the integrity of the judicial process and the interests of justice. The court acknowledged the applicant's mental health issues but remained unpersuaded by the applicant's overall explanations for the delay. The court concluded that the applicant's reasons did not justify an extension of time, given the significant delay and the unsatisfactory nature of the explanations provided. The merits of the underlying application were considered but did not sway the court in favour of granting the extension. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to the merits of the underlying application, one matter considered in Katoa was the degree or extent to which the Court may or should consider the merits of the underlying application. The plurality stated at [17]-[19] that “in determining what is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the purposes of s 477A(2) (or 477(2)), it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a “reasonably impressionistic level”, but “there will be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits”, and ultimately the provision “entrusts to the [Court] the function of identifying and formulating the interests of the administration of justice and how they should be weighed and assessed, including by reference to the merits of the proposed application”.CONSIDERATION Length and reasons for delay The 35-day time frame for the applicant to apply to the Court for judicial review of the IAA’s decision ended on 14 June 2018. The applicant did not apply for judicial review until 3 September 2018, which was 81 days after the expiry of the 35-day time frame. He therefore requires an extension of time of 81 days. The first respondent describes the delay as “significant”: RS [16]. I would describe the delay as “substantial” or “not insignificant”. The applicant provides two reasons for his delay. The first reason covers the period up to 6 July 2018. The applicant explains in the Affidavit that:(a)In May 2018, when the IAA posted its decision to the applicant’s home address in Sydney, the applicant was working in Canberra and continued to work in Canberra up until at least 4 July 2018.(b)On 4 July 2018, the applicant’s employer notified the applicant of his Immi-card expiration. This caused the applicant to contact his migrant agent and ask about his matter in the IAA. On 6 July 2018, the agent contacted the IAA and discovered that the IAA made its decision in May 2018. In relation to this first reason, while I accept the applicant’s explanation, based on the limited information in the Affidavit, the applicant was careless to the extent that he moved from Sydney to Canberra for two months (or longer), and took no steps to arrange for his mail to be checked or forwarded to Canberra, or to notify the IAA of his temporary address in Canberra. The second reason covers the period from 6 July 2018 to 3 September 2018. The applicant states that he “was depressed and penniless and did not know what to do”, he “used to drive [his] car into park and sleep [in the] car”, he “was looking for a lawyer”, he “was at the same time looking for work”, and he eventually met his “current lawyer on 20 August 2018”. This was a reference to the Applicant’s Solicitor. In relation to this second reason:(a)In light of the hospital records tendered by the applicant at the hearing on 17 September 2025, and the applicant’s oral evidence, I accept the applicant had a mental health condition by 2018. However, by this time, the applicant was receiving treatment for the condition, and was taking medication which appeared to be effective.(b)Aspects of the applicant’s explanation are unsatisfactory. For example:(i)I am not persuaded the applicant was “penniless” between 7 July 2018 and early September 2018 if he was employed in Canberra for a period of time up to 6 July 2018.(ii)There is a tension or inconsistency between the applicant’s evidence that he had a “home address” in Sydney but was sleeping in his car.(iii)While the applicant appears to suggest that impecuniosity prevented him from retaining a lawyer until 20 August 2018, first, the applicant does not explain how he was able to retain a lawyer on 20 August 2018 but not before. Second, there is a tension between the suggestion that impecuniosity prevented the applicant from retaining a lawyer, and the fact the applicant had a migration agent. I am not persuaded the applicant was unable to retain a lawyer prior to 20 August 2018.(c)Since the Affidavit was prepared with the assistance of a lawyer, in contrast to an affidavit prepared by an applicant without the assistance of a lawyer, I am not inclined to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt where there are omissions or inconsistencies in the Affidavit.Prejudice to first respondent