EIO18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

EIO18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1554   

File number(s): SYG 2559 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE ZIPSER
Date of judgment: 24 September 2025
Catchwords:  MIGRATION – judicial review – extension of time application – whether satisfactory explanation for delay - merits of underlying application – extension of time refused
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J, 46, 473GB, 477
Cases cited:

CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2016] FCA 1344

Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3) [2020] FCA 1655

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 276 CLR 579

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 53
Date of hearing: 17 September 2025
Applicant: In person
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr J Fyfe (Minter Ellison)

ORDERS

SYG 2559 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

EIO18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE ZIPSER

DATE OF ORDER:

24 SEPTEMBER 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time lodged on 3 September 2018 is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $4,553.02.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE ZIPSER

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 3 September 2018, the applicant filed an application to extend time, pursuant to s 477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), in which to make an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) dated 10 May 2018.

  2. For the reasons that follow, the application to extend time is dismissed.

    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

  3. In 2013, the applicant, a citizen of Iran, arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival.

  4. On 10 June 2016, the applicant lodged an application for a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV), claiming to fear harm if he returned to Iran.

  5. On 20 November 2017, a delegate of the first respondent, after interviewing the applicant on 8 September 2017, made a decision refusing to grant the applicant a TPV.

  6. On 27 November 2017, the matter was referred to the IAA for review under Part 7AA of the Act (as it then was).

  7. On 10 May 2018, the IAA made a decision affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a TPV.

    IAA’S DECISION

  8. The IAA at [3] summarised the applicant’s claims. The applicant claimed to fear harm because of his non-adherence to Shia Islam, his opposition to…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1554
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of EIO18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the Federal Court of Australia addressed an application for an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration and Asylum Division (IAA) under Part 7AA of the Migration Act. The applicant, a citizen of Iran, had previously sought a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV) based on fears of persecution if returned to Iran due to his religious conversion to Christianity and his opposition to the Iranian regime. The IAA had refused the applicant's TPV application, a decision that was subsequently affirmed by the IAA on 10 May 2018. The applicant filed for judicial review on 3 September 2018, well beyond the 35-day statutory limit for seeking judicial review, thus necessitating an application for an extension of time.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the applicant provided a satisfactory explanation for the substantial delay in filing for judicial review and whether the merits of the underlying application warranted granting an extension of time. The court meticulously examined the applicant's reasons for the delay, considering both factual evidence and the credibility of the applicant's explanations. The applicant cited work commitments and personal circumstances, including a mental health condition, as reasons for the delay. However, the court found several aspects of the applicant's explanations unsatisfactory, including inconsistencies in the applicant's accounts of his financial and residential situations.

In its reasoning, the court emphasised the importance of timely judicial review applications to ensure the integrity of the judicial process and the interests of justice. The court acknowledged the applicant's mental health issues but remained unpersuaded by the applicant's overall explanations for the delay. The court concluded that the applicant's reasons did not justify an extension of time, given the significant delay and the unsatisfactory nature of the explanations provided. The merits of the underlying application were considered but did not sway the court in favour of granting the extension. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the application to extend time is dismissed.FACTUAL BACKGROUND In 2013, the applicant, a citizen of Iran, arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival. On 10 June 2016, the applicant lodged an application for a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV), claiming to fear harm if he returned to Iran. On 20 November 2017, a delegate of the first respondent, after interviewing the applicant on 8 September 2017, made a decision refusing to grant the applicant a TPV. On 27 November 2017, the matter was referred to the IAA for review under Part 7AA of the Act (as it then was). On 10 May 2018, the IAA made a decision affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a TPV.IAA’S DECISION The IAA at [3] summarised the applicant’s claims. The applicant claimed to fear harm because of his non-adherence to Shia Islam, his opposition to the Iranian regime, and because he was baptised as a Christian while living in Australia. The IAA at [4]-[41] considered whether the applicant satisfied the criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. The applicant made claims concerning various interactions with the Iranian authorities, including the Basij, before he came to Australia, and arising from having converted to Christianity while in Australia. The IAA:(a)at [7]-[34] accepted some of the applicant’s claims and rejected others;(b)at [35]-[39] considered whether the applicant might face harm in Iran as a returning asylum seeker who had spent a number of years living in Australia; and(c)at [40] concluded:Based on the applicant’s personal circumstances, I am … not satisfied the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm for any of the above reasons, should he return to Iran. The IAA at [41] concluded that the applicant did not meet the criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. The IAA at [42]-[48] considered whether the applicant met the complementary protection criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The IAA at [48] concluded that the applicant did not meet the criterion in s 36(2)(aa).PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURTJudicial review application and steps up to hearing on 17 September 2025 On 3 September 2018, the applicant lodged an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the IAA’s decision. The application included one ground as follows (as written) (Application): Ground 1: The IAA erred by failing to distinguish the application of section 5J(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to refugee criterion from the complementary criterion1.The decision by the IAA was affected by jurisdictional error as the IAA failed to consider the applicant’s claim that he faces a real risk of significant harm as an apostate under the complementary criterion from [42] of the decision record. The IAA therefore erred by misinterpreting, misunderstanding or misapplying the applicable law by failing to distinguish the application of section 5J(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to the refugee criterion at [32] of the decision record, from the complementary criterion from [42] of the decision record. Particulars The protection claims a) From [3] of the decision record, the applicant is male citizen of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who claims protection in the Commonwealth of Australia (Australia) on the grounds that the “applicant fears the Iranian authorities will detain, interrogate, torture or kill him because: he does not conceal his non-adherence to Shia Islam or his opposition to the Iranian regime; he signed an undertaking not to leave Iran; he has been baptised as a Christian; and would be returning as a failed asylum seeker from Australia.” The refugee criterion a) At [32], the IAA was prepared to accept the applicant attended church for a period in Australia, and was baptised on 8 June 2014; however, based his own evidence that he has no religion, the IAA considered he stopped attending because he is not committed to Christianity, rather than because he feared there were informants in the congregation. Accordingly, the IAA erred by disregarding the applicant’s conduct in assessing whether he has a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran under s.5J(6) of the Act …The complementary criterion b) Under the heading “complementary protection assessment” the IAA failed to consider at all the applicant’s claim that he faces a real risk of significant harm as an apostate under the complementary criterion. The IAA therefore erred by misinterpreting, misunderstanding or misapplying the applicable law by failing to distinguish the application of section 5J(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to the refugee criterion at [32] of the decision record, from the complementary criterion from [42] of the decision record.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 10 May 2018, the IAA made a decision affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a TPV.IAA’S DECISION The IAA at [3] summarised the applicant’s claims. The applicant claimed to fear harm because of his non-adherence to Shia Islam, his opposition to the Iranian regime, and because he was baptised as a Christian while living in Australia. The IAA at [4]-[41] considered whether the applicant satisfied the criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. The applicant made claims concerning various interactions with the Iranian authorities, including the Basij, before he came to Australia, and arising from having converted to Christianity while in Australia. The IAA:(a)at [7]-[34] accepted some of the applicant’s claims and rejected others;(b)at [35]-[39] considered whether the applicant might face harm in Iran as a returning asylum seeker who had spent a number of years living in Australia; and(c)at [40] concluded:Based on the applicant’s personal circumstances, I am … not satisfied the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm for any of the above reasons, should he return to Iran. The IAA at [41] concluded that the applicant did not meet the criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. The IAA at [42]-[48] considered whether the applicant met the complementary protection criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The IAA at [48] concluded that the applicant did not meet the criterion in s 36(2)(aa).PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURTJudicial review application and steps up to hearing on 17 September 2025 On 3 September 2018, the applicant lodged an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the IAA’s decision. The application included one ground as follows (as written) (Application): Ground 1: The IAA erred by failing to distinguish the application of section 5J(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to refugee criterion from the complementary criterion1.The decision by the IAA was affected by jurisdictional error as the IAA failed to consider the applicant’s claim that he faces a real risk of significant harm as an apostate under the complementary criterion from [42] of the decision record. The IAA therefore erred by misinterpreting, misunderstanding or misapplying the applicable law by failing to distinguish the application of section 5J(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to the refugee criterion at [32] of the decision record, from the complementary criterion from [42] of the decision record. Particulars The protection claims a) From [3] of the decision record, the applicant is male citizen of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who claims protection in the Commonwealth of Australia (Australia) on the grounds that the “applicant fears the Iranian authorities will detain, interrogate, torture or kill him because: he does not conceal his non-adherence to Shia Islam or his opposition to the Iranian regime; he signed an undertaking not to leave Iran; he has been baptised as a Christian; and would be returning as a failed asylum seeker from Australia.” The refugee criterion a) At [32], the IAA was prepared to accept the applicant attended church for a period in Australia, and was baptised on 8 June 2014; however, based his own evidence that he has no religion, the IAA considered he stopped attending because he is not committed to Christianity, rather than because he feared there were informants in the congregation. Accordingly, the IAA erred by disregarding the applicant’s conduct in assessing whether he has a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran under s.5J(6) of the Act …The complementary criterion b) Under the heading “complementary protection assessment” the IAA failed to consider at all the applicant’s claim that he faces a real risk of significant harm as an apostate under the complementary criterion. The IAA therefore erred by misinterpreting, misunderstanding or misapplying the applicable law by failing to distinguish the application of section 5J(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to the refugee criterion at [32] of the decision record, from the complementary criterion from [42] of the decision record.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to the merits of the underlying application, one matter considered in Katoa was the degree or extent to which the Court may or should consider the merits of the underlying application. The plurality stated at [17]-[19] that “in determining what is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the purposes of s 477A(2) (or 477(2)), it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a “reasonably impressionistic level”, but “there will be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits”, and ultimately the provision “entrusts to the [Court] the function of identifying and formulating the interests of the administration of justice and how they should be weighed and assessed, including by reference to the merits of the proposed application”.CONSIDERATION Length and reasons for delay The 35-day time frame for the applicant to apply to the Court for judicial review of the IAA’s decision ended on 14 June 2018. The applicant did not apply for judicial review until 3 September 2018, which was 81 days after the expiry of the 35-day time frame. He therefore requires an extension of time of 81 days. The first respondent describes the delay as “significant”: RS [16]. I would describe the delay as “substantial” or “not insignificant”. The applicant provides two reasons for his delay. The first reason covers the period up to 6 July 2018. The applicant explains in the Affidavit that:(a)In May 2018, when the IAA posted its decision to the applicant’s home address in Sydney, the applicant was working in Canberra and continued to work in Canberra up until at least 4 July 2018.(b)On 4 July 2018, the applicant’s employer notified the applicant of his Immi-card expiration. This caused the applicant to contact his migrant agent and ask about his matter in the IAA. On 6 July 2018, the agent contacted the IAA and discovered that the IAA made its decision in May 2018. In relation to this first reason, while I accept the applicant’s explanation, based on the limited information in the Affidavit, the applicant was careless to the extent that he moved from Sydney to Canberra for two months (or longer), and took no steps to arrange for his mail to be checked or forwarded to Canberra, or to notify the IAA of his temporary address in Canberra. The second reason covers the period from 6 July 2018 to 3 September 2018. The applicant states that he “was depressed and penniless and did not know what to do”, he “used to drive [his] car into park and sleep [in the] car”, he “was looking for a lawyer”, he “was at the same time looking for work”, and he eventually met his “current lawyer on 20 August 2018”. This was a reference to the Applicant’s Solicitor. In relation to this second reason:(a)In light of the hospital records tendered by the applicant at the hearing on 17 September 2025, and the applicant’s oral evidence, I accept the applicant had a mental health condition by 2018. However, by this time, the applicant was receiving treatment for the condition, and was taking medication which appeared to be effective.(b)Aspects of the applicant’s explanation are unsatisfactory. For example:(i)I am not persuaded the applicant was “penniless” between 7 July 2018 and early September 2018 if he was employed in Canberra for a period of time up to 6 July 2018.(ii)There is a tension or inconsistency between the applicant’s evidence that he had a “home address” in Sydney but was sleeping in his car.(iii)While the applicant appears to suggest that impecuniosity prevented him from retaining a lawyer until 20 August 2018, first, the applicant does not explain how he was able to retain a lawyer on 20 August 2018 but not before. Second, there is a tension between the suggestion that impecuniosity prevented the applicant from retaining a lawyer, and the fact the applicant had a migration agent. I am not persuaded the applicant was unable to retain a lawyer prior to 20 August 2018.(c)Since the Affidavit was prepared with the assistance of a lawyer, in contrast to an affidavit prepared by an applicant without the assistance of a lawyer, I am not inclined to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt where there are omissions or inconsistencies in the Affidavit.Prejudice to first respondent