Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3)

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Federal Court of Australia

Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3) [2020] FCA 1655

File number: NSD 1891 of 2019
Judgment of: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 17 November 2020
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — application under s 39B of Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for order quashing decision made under s 34(2) of Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) to revoke Australian citizenship — where applicant convicted of multiple sexual offences against minors and Minister was satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest for him to remain an Australian citizen but Minister precluded by law from making such a decision if satisfied that he would thereby become “a person who is not a national or citizen of any country” — whether Minister’s decision vitiated for jurisdictional error — where applicant was a Ukrainian national when he arrived in Australia and Minister’s Department had obtained some general information about the effect of obtaining Australian citizenship on a person of Ukrainian nationality, whether Minister’s failure to make further inquiries on the subject was legally unreasonable — where Minister failed to provide reasons for decision, whether Minister failed to consider the material before him before making the decision — whether Minister failed to recognise that his power to revoke citizenship was discretionary — where application made 12 years after the decision, whether relief should be refused on discretionary grounds
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AC, 25D, 33(2A)

Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act 1977 (Cth) s 5

Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth)

Australian Citizenship Act 1973 (Cth)

Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) ss 34(2), 47

Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1984 (Cth)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 136

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Explanatory Memorandum to the Australian Citizenship Amendment Bill 1983

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, (opened for signature 30 August 1961, entered into force 13 December 1975), Art 8(1).

Cases cited:

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352

Hinton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 408; 146 ALD 184

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 235

Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 734

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection vSingh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; 259 ALR 429; 83 ALJR 1123; 111 ALD 15

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Neilson v Overseas projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331

Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155

Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd (2018) 264 CLR 1

Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656

R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration;…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1655
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Victor Makarov sought to have a decision of the Minister for Home Affairs to revoke his Australian citizenship quashed. The Minister had been satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest for Mr Makarov to remain an Australian citizen by reason of his convictions of multiple sexual offences against minors. Mr Makarov was born in the former USSR and, when he was three years old, his family moved to Ukraine. He lived there until 1998 when he emigrated with his family in order to take up a position at the Australian Institute of Music. He was a Ukrainian national when he arrived in Australia. He applied for Australian citizenship and became an Australian citizen on 8 February 2001. He was arrested and imprisoned in late 2004. He was tried on nine charges and convicted of eight: three charges of aggravated indecent assault; two charges of sexual intercourse with a person under authority aged between 10 and 16; and three charges of homosexual intercourse by a teacher of a pupil between the ages of 10 and 16. The following year he was convicted of multiple sexual offences of a similar nature following another two trials. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years. Each of the three trials involved different complainants, all students. Mr Makarov appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The appeals from the convictions entered after the first and second trials were dismissed in consecutive decisions in 2008. The appeal from the convictions entered after the third trial were quashed and new, separate trials were ordered. Mr Makarov was acquitted in both those trials. Before the appeals were heard, the Minister began investigating revocation of Mr Makarov’s Australian citizenship. On 4 April 2007, apparently in response to an inquiry from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship to the Ukrainian Embassy, the Ukrainian Vice Consul, Natalia Lopatina, informed the Department that: Ukrainian citizens who acquired foreign citizenship do not lose Ukrainian citizenship automatically. To lose Ukrainian citizenship, one has to apply accordingly. Mr Makarov’s name was not mentioned in the email or in any of the later emails passing between the Vice Consul and the Department. But it is obvious that the case in question concerned him.

The court held that the Minister’s decision was not legally unreasonable. It was not open to Mr Makarov to succeed on the basis of the Minister’s failure to make further inquiries of the Ukrainian Embassy. The court accepted that there was no requirement for the Minister to make such inquiries. The court also held that the Minister’s failure to provide reasons for his decision did not vitiate the decision. The court held that the Minister was required to engage in an active intellectual process in deciding whether to exercise his power under s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act. However, the Minister’s failure to give reasons did not indicate that he had not engaged in such a process. The application was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondents relied on two affidavits affirmed by Dale Watson, a senior lawyer with the Australian Government Solicitor, on 28 September 2020 and 27 October 2020. None of the deponents was required for cross-examination.The relevant facts Mr Makarov was born in the former USSR in 1953. When he was three years old his family moved to the Ukraine and he lived there until 1998 when he emigrated with his family in order to take up a position at the Australian Institute of Music. It was common ground that, at the time Mr Makarov emigrated from the Ukraine to Australia he was a Ukrainian national, that he applied for Australian citizenship, and that he became an Australian citizen on 8 February 2001. The respondents did not suggest, and there is no evidence to indicate, that at the time the Minister revoked his Australian citizenship he might have been a citizen of any other country. Mr Makarov was arrested and imprisoned in late 2004. The circumstances of his imprisonment are discussed below. He was tried on nine charges and convicted of eight: three charges of aggravated indecent assault; two charges of sexual intercourse with a person under authority aged between 10 and 16; and three charges of homosexual intercourse by a teacher of a pupil between the ages of 10 and 16. The following year he was convicted of multiple sexual offences of a similar nature following another two trials. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years. Each of the three trials involved different complainants, all students: Application of Victor Makarov pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) [2013] NSWSC 1468. Mr Makarov appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The appeals from the convictions entered after the first and second trials were dismissed in consecutive decisions in 2008. The appeal from the convictions entered after the third trial were quashed and new, separate trials were ordered. Mr Makarov was acquitted in both those trials. Before the appeals were heard, the Minister began investigating revocation of Mr Makarov’s Australian citizenship. On 4 April 2007, apparently in response to an inquiry from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship to the Ukrainian Embassy, the Ukrainian Vice Consul, Natalia Lopatina, informed the Department that:Ukrainian citizens who acquired foreign citizenship do not lose Ukrainian citizenship automatically. To lose Ukrainian citizenship, one has to apply accordingly. The recipient of the email, Emma Knapp, acknowledged the response but queried whether the law had changed since 2001 when Article 19.1 of The Law of Ukraine On Citizenship of 18 January 2001 reportedly provided that:The citizenship of Ukraine is lost if a citizen of Ukraine has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of another state after attaining his/her majority. Ms Knapp explained that the reason for the query was that the Department had a case in which a Ukrainian citizen had obtained Australian citizenship in February 2001. Mr Makarov’s name was not mentioned in the email or in any of the later emails passing between her and the Vice Consul. But it is obvious that the case in question concerned him.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the relevant time s 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provided that:Where an Act requires a tribunal, body or person making a decision to give written reasons for the decision, whether the expression “reasons”, “grounds” or any other expression is used, the instrument giving the reasons shall also set out the findings on material questions of fact and refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.The evidence The originating application was supported by an affidavit affirmed by Mr Makarov’s solicitor, Alison Mary Battisson, on 15 November 2019. The principal and immediate purpose of that affidavit was to support the interlocutory order by thwarting the Government’s attempt to remove Mr Makarov from Australia. But that affidavit was not read at the final hearing. Instead, Mr Makarov relied on another affidavit of Ms Battisson dated 14 September 2020 and two affidavits of his own dated 6 and 21 October 2020. The respondents relied on two affidavits affirmed by Dale Watson, a senior lawyer with the Australian Government Solicitor, on 28 September 2020 and 27 October 2020. None of the deponents was required for cross-examination.The relevant facts Mr Makarov was born in the former USSR in 1953. When he was three years old his family moved to the Ukraine and he lived there until 1998 when he emigrated with his family in order to take up a position at the Australian Institute of Music. It was common ground that, at the time Mr Makarov emigrated from the Ukraine to Australia he was a Ukrainian national, that he applied for Australian citizenship, and that he became an Australian citizen on 8 February 2001. The respondents did not suggest, and there is no evidence to indicate, that at the time the Minister revoked his Australian citizenship he might have been a citizen of any other country. Mr Makarov was arrested and imprisoned in late 2004. The circumstances of his imprisonment are discussed below. He was tried on nine charges and convicted of eight: three charges of aggravated indecent assault; two charges of sexual intercourse with a person under authority aged between 10 and 16; and three charges of homosexual intercourse by a teacher of a pupil between the ages of 10 and 16. The following year he was convicted of multiple sexual offences of a similar nature following another two trials. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years. Each of the three trials involved different complainants, all students: Application of Victor Makarov pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) [2013] NSWSC 1468. Mr Makarov appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The appeals from the convictions entered after the first and second trials were dismissed in consecutive decisions in 2008. The appeal from the convictions entered after the third trial were quashed and new, separate trials were ordered. Mr Makarov was acquitted in both those trials.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Makarov accepted that he needed to demonstrate that any error on the part of the Minister was a jurisdictional error. While it was arguable that the Minister’s failure to provide reasons for his decision was a non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of the record, the submission was only faintly put and no attempt was made to rebut the Minister’s submission to the contrary based on the terms of the Citizenship Act and the High Court’s judgment in Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd (2018) 264 CLR 1.Was the Minister’s decision legally unreasonable because he failed to make obvious inquiries of the Ukrainian Embassy? Parliament is taken to intend that any statutory power will be exercised reasonably: see, for example, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li(2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26] and [29] (French CJ), [63] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) and [88] (Gageler J). Thus, a statutory requirement that a public officer must be satisfied of a particular fact or circumstance “imports a requirement” that the state of satisfaction is one that could be reached by a reasonable person: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [122], citing R v Connell; Ex parte The Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd (1944) 69 CLR 407 at 432 per Latham CJ. As the High Court explained in Li and the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection vSingh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44], legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached by a court exercising supervisory powers over a member of the executive or an administrative decision-maker after the identification of an underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process but it can also arise in what French CJ, in Li at [28], referred to as “an area of decisional freedom”. In this latter case, the error “has the character of a choice that is arbitrary, capricious” or lacks “common sense”: Singh at [44] It will be recalled that the obvious inquiry Mr Makarov complained in the Further Amended Originating Application the Minister had not made was an inquiry of the Embassy about whether or not he was in fact a Ukrainian citizen before the Minister made his decision to revoke his Australian citizenship. He did not plead that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable because he failed to make such an inquiry of Mr Makarov, although a submission to that effect was made. The factual foundation for the allegation in the pleading was the Department’s failure to respond to the last email from the Department on 4 April 2007. Mr Makarov’s submission was that the Minster’s decision to revoke citizenship on the basis of the information he had and without following up on the last email was a decision no reasonable decision-maker could have made. His argument, outlined in his written submissions, was as follows:On reading Ukrainian Law Extracts and the April 2007 emails, it should have been immediately apparent to the Minister that:a.The Vice Consul is not, on the face of the April 2007 emails, a Ukrainian lawyer and accordingly is not the appropriate source of information regarding the interpretation of Ukrainian citizenship law. Further, the information provided by the Embassy was of a general, as opposed to specific, nature.b.Article 19.1 contains an express statement suggesting an automatic loss of citizenship in the event citizenship of another state is obtained. There is no reference of a requirement to apply to renounce Ukrainian citizenship. As the email from the Ukrainian embassy suggests, the English translation may well have removed the nuanced reference to the requirement of an application. The inconsistency is immediately apparent. The Minister did not make that inquiry. He could have easily asked the applicant to comment on the issue. He could have easily asked the Embassy to put him in contact with an appropriate lawyer.c.Article 19.3 suggests an automatic loss of citizenship if the person has “used rights or fulfilled obligations provided or imposed on him/her by the foreign citizenship”. Even accepting the explanation of the Embassy that Article 19.1 requires an application by the person to lose citizenship, Article 19.3 was not said to contain the same limitation. The Minister knew that the applicant had had Australian citizenship for at least 6 years prior to making his decision. It would be almost impossible for a person to be a citizen of Australia for that period of time and not use rights afforded by that citizenship. It is apparent from the Department’s Submission and the April 2007 emails that the Minister he did not consider this issue, nor did he make further inquiries.d.Critically, the Embassy’s email … obviously invited further inquiry by the Minister (or staff at his direction). The Department sought clarification from the Embassy as to whether the applicant was still a citizen. In response, the Embassy clearly asked the Department to provide further information regarding the applicant to enable it to perform that request. The evidence does not show a response by the Department. It can be inferred that the Department made no further inquiries.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For these reasons the answer to the first question is “no”. I am not persuaded that the Minister’s omission to make the inquiries Mr Makarov alleged should have been made rendered the decision to revoke his Australian citizenship legally unreasonable.Did the Minister fail to apply an active intellectual process to the consideration of the matters he was required to take into account before making his decision? Mr Makarov submitted that the Minister’s task under s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act could not be lawfully undertaken without “actively and intellectually” considering “the materials” before him in making his decision and this he failed to do. No clear articulation of what those materials were appeared in the written submissions. Nor were they clearly identified in oral argument. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the materials included the Departmental submission to the Minister, the April 2007 emails between the Department and the Embassy, an extract from the Ukrainian law on citizenship, Mr Makarov’s representations to the Minister made on 14 June 2007 and Ms Malyon’s letter of 20 August 2007. I accept that the Minister was bound to engage in an “active intellectual process” in deciding whether to exercise his power under s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act. That expression derives from the judgment of Black CJ in Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451 at 462, albeit in a different statutory context, but it was applied in a similar statutory context in Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352 at [46]. The decision in question in Carrascalao was a decision under s 501(3) to cancel a visa if the Minister reasonably suspects that the visa holder does not pass the character test and is satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest. As the Full Court observed in Carrascalao at [48], however, “a finding by the Court that the Minister has not engaged in an active intellectual process will not lightly be made and must be supported by clear evidence, bearing in mind that the judicial review applicants carry the onus of proof”. Mr Makarov’s contention that the Minister did not engage in such a process in the present case arises from the Minister’s failure to give reasons or “appropriate reasons”. The respondents did not quarrel with Mr Makarov’s submission that the Minister failed to comply with his statutory obligation to give reasons. They did not suggest that what purported to be reasons answered the statutory description. Nor did they suggest that the Minister adopted the Department’s submissions as his reasons. Rather, the respondents submitted that any failure by Mr Andrews to comply with the obligation to give reasons did not invalidate the decision, relying on s 47(5) of the Citizenship Act. Mr Makarov accepted as much. He noted that in Re Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Palme(2003) 216 CLR 212 the High Court by majority, Kirby J dissenting, held that a provision in similar terms to s 47(5) of the Citizenship Act (s 501G(4) of the Migration Act) operated as intended.