Federal Court of Australia
Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3) [2020] FCA 1655
File number: NSD 1891 of 2019 Judgment of: KATZMANN J Date of judgment: 17 November 2020 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — application under s 39B of Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for order quashing decision made under s 34(2) of Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) to revoke Australian citizenship — where applicant convicted of multiple sexual offences against minors and Minister was satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest for him to remain an Australian citizen but Minister precluded by law from making such a decision if satisfied that he would thereby become “a person who is not a national or citizen of any country” — whether Minister’s decision vitiated for jurisdictional error — where applicant was a Ukrainian national when he arrived in Australia and Minister’s Department had obtained some general information about the effect of obtaining Australian citizenship on a person of Ukrainian nationality, whether Minister’s failure to make further inquiries on the subject was legally unreasonable — where Minister failed to provide reasons for decision, whether Minister failed to consider the material before him before making the decision — whether Minister failed to recognise that his power to revoke citizenship was discretionary — where application made 12 years after the decision, whether relief should be refused on discretionary grounds Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AC, 25D, 33(2A)
Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act 1977 (Cth) s 5
Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth)
Australian Citizenship Act 1973 (Cth)
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) ss 34(2), 47
Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1984 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 136
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Explanatory Memorandum to the Australian Citizenship Amendment Bill 1983
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, (opened for signature 30 August 1961, entered into force 13 December 1975), Art 8(1).
Cases cited: Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352
Hinton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 408; 146 ALD 184
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 235
Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 734
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection vSingh (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; 259 ALR 429; 83 ALJR 1123; 111 ALD 15
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Neilson v Overseas projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155
Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd (2018) 264 CLR 1
Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1655
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the Minister’s decision was not legally unreasonable. It was not open to Mr Makarov to succeed on the basis of the Minister’s failure to make further inquiries of the Ukrainian Embassy. The court accepted that there was no requirement for the Minister to make such inquiries. The court also held that the Minister’s failure to provide reasons for his decision did not vitiate the decision. The court held that the Minister was required to engage in an active intellectual process in deciding whether to exercise his power under s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act. However, the Minister’s failure to give reasons did not indicate that he had not engaged in such a process. The application was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For these reasons the answer to the first question is “no”. I am not persuaded that the Minister’s omission to make the inquiries Mr Makarov alleged should have been made rendered the decision to revoke his Australian citizenship legally unreasonable.Did the Minister fail to apply an active intellectual process to the consideration of the matters he was required to take into account before making his decision? Mr Makarov submitted that the Minister’s task under s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act could not be lawfully undertaken without “actively and intellectually” considering “the materials” before him in making his decision and this he failed to do. No clear articulation of what those materials were appeared in the written submissions. Nor were they clearly identified in oral argument. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the materials included the Departmental submission to the Minister, the April 2007 emails between the Department and the Embassy, an extract from the Ukrainian law on citizenship, Mr Makarov’s representations to the Minister made on 14 June 2007 and Ms Malyon’s letter of 20 August 2007. I accept that the Minister was bound to engage in an “active intellectual process” in deciding whether to exercise his power under s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act. That expression derives from the judgment of Black CJ in Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451 at 462, albeit in a different statutory context, but it was applied in a similar statutory context in Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352 at [46]. The decision in question in Carrascalao was a decision under s 501(3) to cancel a visa if the Minister reasonably suspects that the visa holder does not pass the character test and is satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest. As the Full Court observed in Carrascalao at [48], however, “a finding by the Court that the Minister has not engaged in an active intellectual process will not lightly be made and must be supported by clear evidence, bearing in mind that the judicial review applicants carry the onus of proof”. Mr Makarov’s contention that the Minister did not engage in such a process in the present case arises from the Minister’s failure to give reasons or “appropriate reasons”. The respondents did not quarrel with Mr Makarov’s submission that the Minister failed to comply with his statutory obligation to give reasons. They did not suggest that what purported to be reasons answered the statutory description. Nor did they suggest that the Minister adopted the Department’s submissions as his reasons. Rather, the respondents submitted that any failure by Mr Andrews to comply with the obligation to give reasons did not invalidate the decision, relying on s 47(5) of the Citizenship Act. Mr Makarov accepted as much. He noted that in Re Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Palme(2003) 216 CLR 212 the High Court by majority, Kirby J dissenting, held that a provision in similar terms to s 47(5) of the Citizenship Act (s 501G(4) of the Migration Act) operated as intended.