Stambe v Minister for Health (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stambe v Minister for Health (No 2) [2019] FCA 479

File number: VID 1399 of 2017
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 10 April 2019
Catchwords:

REMEDIES – successful challenge to exercise of Ministerial discretion pursuant to s 90A(2) of National Health Act 1953 (Cth) – form of final orders – where second respondent sought orders remitting matter to Minister for reconsideration from date of Court’s orders and setting aside the impugned decision three months from date of Court’s orders – consideration of principles relating to remitter and timing of remitter order – consideration of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; 209 CLR 597 – consideration of matters relevant to exercise of power under s 16 of Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – consideration of nature of powers conferred on Minister under ss 90A and 90B of National Health Act 1953 (Cth) – whether s 90B(5) confers a “duty” on the Minister – consideration of Yu v Minister for Health (No 2) [2013] FCA 367; 216 FCR 188

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 16

National Health Act 1953 (Cth) ss 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 90A, 90B, 90D, 90E, 98, 99AA

Cases cited:

Angelos v Minister for Health [2014] FCA 706; 226 FCR 275

Animals’ Angels e.V. v Secretary, Department of Agriculture [2014] FCAFC 173; 228 FCR 35

Azaria Family Day Care Pty Ltd v Secretary, Department of Education and Training [2018] FCA 1640

BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530

DBE17 v Commonwealth [2018] FCA 1307

Dean-Willcocks v Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board [2006] FCA 555; 59 ACSR 698

Friends of Leadbeater’s Possum Inc v VicForests [2018] FCA 1307

Galaxy Day Care Pty Ltd v Secretary, Department of Education and Training [2018] FCA 1549

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 359 ALR 1

Jadwan Pty Ltd v Department of Health and Aged Care [2003] FCAFC 288; 145 FCR 1

Lewski v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] FCAFC 96; 246 FCR 200

Malu Lamar (Torres Strait Islander) Corporation RNTBC v Findlay (as delegate of the Protected Zone Joint Authority) [2018] FCA 801; 158 ALD 524

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CLV16 [2018] FCAFC 80

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Maman [2012] FCAFC 13; 200 FCR 30

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; 209 CLR 597

Northern Inland Council for the Environment Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Water [2013] FCA 993

Nyangatjatjara Aboriginal Corporation v Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations (No 2) [2006] FCA 675

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476

Plaintiff S297/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 3; 255 CLR 231

Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 479
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Stambe v Minister for Health (No 2), the applicant sought a review of the Minister’s decision to refuse the second respondent’s application for Ministerial approval to supply pharmaceutical benefits under the National Health Act 1953 (Cth). The case was heard by the Federal Court of Australia, which had to determine whether the Minister’s decision was legally sound and whether the orders should be made to remit the matter to the Minister for reconsideration or to set aside the decision. The court also had to consider the appropriate timing for such orders.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Minister’s decision was affected by legal error and what form the final orders should take. The court had to consider whether the Minister had exercised the discretion conferred on them by section 90A(2) of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) lawfully and whether there was a duty on the Minister to grant the approval under section 90B(5) of the same Act. Additionally, the court needed to determine the appropriate timing for setting aside the decision and remitting the matter to the Minister, considering the potential financial and operational impacts on the second respondent.

The court found that the Minister’s decision was indeed affected by legal error and that the Minister had failed to consider all relevant factors. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to remit the matter to the Minister for reconsideration, allowing the second respondent to provide further information or documents. Regarding the timing, the court decided that both the setting aside order and the remitter order should take effect simultaneously, with the remitter order being made immediately after the setting aside order. This approach balanced the need for the Minister to reconsider the decision with the potential economic impact on the second respondent.

The final orders of the court set aside the Minister’s decision with effect from 9 am on 11 June 2019 and remitted the matter to the Minister for further consideration according to law. The court also ordered that the Minister invite the applicant to provide comments, information, or documents relevant to the request. Furthermore, the court ordered that the Minister pay the applicant’s costs, and the second respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 16(1)(a) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), with effect from 9 am on 11 June 2019, set aside the decision of the first respondent made on 1 November 2017 approving the supply of pharmaceutical benefits by the second respondent from premises located at 58 and 60 Pinewood Drive and 399, 401 and 403 Blackburn Road, Mount Waverley in the State of Victoria.

2. Pursuant to s 16(1)(b) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), with effect from 11 June 2019 and immediately after the order in paragraph 1 coming into force, the matter of the second respondent’s application dated 7 June 2017 for Ministerial approval under s 90A(2) of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) to supply pharmaceutical benefits be remitted to the first respondent for further consideration according to law.

3. After the remitter pursuant to paragraph 2 and before deciding whether to substitute the Secretary’s decision not to grant approval to the second respondent to supply pharmaceutical benefits, the first respondent is to advise the applicant of that request conformably with s 90D(1)(b) of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth), and invite him to provide comments on, or information or documents relevant to, the request within such period as the first respondent may specify.

4. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs fixed in the amount of $35,093.33.

5. The second respondent pay the applicant’s costs fixed in the amount of $28,906.67.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, it is appropriate that the Court’s orders provide for remitter of the matter to the Minister. The second respondent does not oppose a form of orders which gives the applicant an opportunity to provide comments, information or documents to the Minister and I am satisfied that, in the circumstances, it is appropriate to make such an order. Timing of orders setting aside the decision The second difficult question is the timing of the order setting aside the Minister’s decision and, as a consequence, the timing of a remitter order. The evidence before the Court in relation to final orders, on behalf of the second respondent, relevantly establishes that the second respondent commenced operating a pharmacy under the banner “TerryWhite Chemmart” at 58-60 Pinewood Drive, Mount Waverley on 5 March 2018, and that it operates as a 24-hour seven day a week pharmacy within the Waverley Family HealthCare Medical Centre. The evidence to which I refer below under the heading “Discretionary considerations as to the timing of the Court’s orders” includes evidence about the contended financial impact on the second respondent if the Minister’s decision is set aside with effect from the date of the Court’s orders, with the consequence that the second respondent would not have operative approval to dispense Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) medicines pursuant to the scheme contained in the National Health Act. That evidence sets out the contended consequences of such a situation for those operating the Waverley Family HealthCare Medical Centre, and for members of the public currently using the services of both the pharmacy and the Medical Centre. The solution proposed on behalf of the second respondent is that the Court should remit the matter immediately to the Minister but, pursuant to s 16(1)(a) of the AD(JR) Act, the Court should set a period of three months before the Minister’s decision is set aside. The second respondent submits that the intervening period would give the Minister an opportunity to reconsider the request for approval while its pharmacy could continue to operate on the basis of what its counsel contended, in effect, to be a “factual” approval. The second respondent submits that such a course is open to the Court, given the breadth of relief available under s 16 of the AD(JR) Act, and the terms and operation of the relevant provisions of the National Health Act. It submits the scheme of the National Health Act distinguishes between an approval “in fact” and “in law”, and that the former can survive and remain in place, allowing a pharmacy to continue lawful operation, even if there is no approval in law which can be recognised because the decision granting approval has been found to be affected by legal error. The various scenarios which might flow from these propositions were the subject of some discussion between the Court and counsel for the second respondent during the supplementary hearing. Counsel appeared to accept the following consequences could flow if the suggested course was adopted:(a)If the Minister decides after two months to refuse the approval, the second respondent submits it would continue to have the benefit (through s 90E of the National Health Act) of the “in fact” approval of 1 November 2017 for another month until the Court’s setting aside order takes effect.(b)If the Minister decides after two months to grant the approval, then the second respondent accepts it has in effect two operative approvals, both of which on its contentions authorise it to dispense PBS medicines. Then, one month later, the “in fact” approval will cease to exist because the Court’s setting aside order will take effect.(c)If, after three months, the Minister has not made a new decision pursuant to the remitter order, then the “in fact” approval will be set aside and there will no basis on which the pharmacy can dispense PBS medicines attracting the subsidy.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Therefore, my conclusion is that the orders setting aside the Minister’s decision and remitting the matter to the Minister for further consideration should both be made in the same order, and take effect at the same time; or, technically, one immediately after the other.Discretionary considerations as to the timing of the Court’s orders Mr Yab’s affidavit evidence deposes to the considerable costs expended on establishing the pharmacy, in terms of fit-out costs, and then the considerable time it took for the pharmacy to break even after commencing trading. His evidence also goes into some detail about the way the pharmacy’s services have been accessed, such as the number of scripts filled by the pharmacy between particular hours and the number of customers who have been accessing the pharmacy outside the hours of 9am to 9pm. The affidavit evidence also sets out what are contended to be the consequences of the pharmacy having to close, referring to matters such as sales of PBS medicines in the area and access of customers to pharmaceutical benefits outside normal business hours, and the likely significant financial impact on the second respondent of having to close the pharmacy. I accept that if the Minister’s approval is set aside with immediate effect on the making of the Court’s orders, the second respondent, through its principal, Mr Yab, will not be authorised to dispense the “drugs” and “medicinal preparations” which fall within the definition of “pharmaceutical benefits” in s 84 of the National Health Act from its premises, and claim a subsidy from the Commonwealth in doing so. The second respondent would not be prevented from dispensing PBS medicines, but would be prevented from claiming the subsidy, thus making them (I infer) more expensive for members of the public, as Jagot J explained in Sigma Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wyeth [2018] FCA 1556; 136 IPR 8 at [64]:A pharmacist may dispense products privately, that is, not through the PBS, even where the products are PBS listed. Prescription products which are not listed on the PBS are dispensed privately. If a pharmacist dispenses a product privately the patient bears the full purchase price of the product as no Commonwealth subsidy is paid under the PBS. I accept that a significant proportion of the pharmacy’s revenue is obtained by the sale of PBS medicines, and therefore, as a consequence of the Minister’s approval being set aside, the second respondent may need to consider whether to continue operating the pharmacy, and if Mr Yab decides to close it, there may be significant economic loss. Although this evidence was untested, there is no objective reason to doubt it has substance. The applicant did not submit otherwise. I also accept Mr Yab’s evidence suggests there may be some loss of services in the area to the general public if the pharmacy closes, although I find the significance of the loss may be difficult to quantify because it is dependent on predictions of human behaviour. People may adapt to changed circumstances in a number of ways. I do not accept the situation would necessarily be as dire as Mr Yab’s evidence, and that of Dr Cunneen, paint it.