FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Stambe v Minister for Health [2019] FCA 43
File number: VID 1399 of 2017 Judge: MORTIMER J Date of judgment: 29 January 2019 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for review of exercise of Ministerial discretion pursuant to s 90A(2) of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) granting approval to supply pharmaceutical benefits at particular premises – whether procedures required by law to be observed were not observed – whether Minister failed to consider comments, information and documents provided by applicant pursuant to invitation by Minister to do so – where Minister’s consideration informed by Ministerial briefing note – where Minister adopted draft reasons prepared by departmental staff subsequent to exercise of discretion – consideration of availability of inferences concerning which materials read by Minister – in the circumstances, Minister failed to consider materials provided by applicant – application allowed on ground one
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for review of exercise of Ministerial discretion pursuant to s 90A(2) of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) granting approval to supply pharmaceutical benefits at particular premises – whether Minister failed to take into consideration relevant considerations or took into account irrelevant considerations – matters raised by applicant were neither irrelevant nor mandatory considerations – whether Minister’s decision involved an error of law in definition of “community” adopted – no error in definition adopted by Minister – grounds two and three dismissed
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – consideration of scope of Ministerial discretion pursuant to s 90A(2) of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) – interpretation of scope of Minister’s obligation under s 90D(3) of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) to consider comments, information or documents provided by a person at Minister’s invitation
Legislation: Constitution
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(b), 5(1)(e), 5(1)(f), 5(2)(a), 5(2)(b), 13
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37N
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501(3), 501G(1)(e)
National Health Act 1953 (Cth) ss 90, 90A, 90B, s 90D, 99L, Part VII
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) Part IIIA
Cases cited: Anderson v Director-General of the Department of Environmental and Climate Change [2008] NSWCA 337; 251 ALR 633
Assarapin v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority [2016] FCAFC 9; 239 FCR 161
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17; 247 CLR 345
Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 83; 231 FCR 513
Bat Advocacy NSW Inc v Minister for Environment Protection, Heritage and the Arts [2011] FCAFC 59
Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; 252 FCR 352
Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152; [1939] 3 All ER 722
Chetcuti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 477
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the Minister failed to consider the materials provided by the applicant, as required by s 90D(3) of the Act. The Minister had prepared draft reasons for his decision, which were subsequently adopted by him, but there was no evidence to suggest that the Minister had read the materials provided by the applicant before making his decision. The court found that the Minister’s consideration was informed by a Ministerial briefing note, which did not include the applicant’s submissions. The court rejected the argument that the Minister was not legally obliged to read any source material submitted to him before exercising the power under s 90A(2), as the obligation to consider the material was mandatory. The court also dismissed the other two grounds of review, finding that the matters raised by the applicant were neither irrelevant nor mandatory considerations, and that there was no error in the definition of “community” adopted by the Minister.
In conclusion, the court allowed the applicant’s first ground of judicial review, finding that the Minister failed to consider the materials provided by the applicant. The court will allow the parties an opportunity to agree upon appropriate relief, or failing agreement, make submissions on that matter. The court will determine the question of appropriate final orders on the papers.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The parties are to confer and attempt to agree appropriate final orders reflecting the Court’s decision, including as to costs.
2. Any agreed proposed orders are to be filed and served on or before 4 pm on 5 February 2019.
3. In the absence of any agreed proposed orders:
(a) the applicant is to file and serve submissions on appropriate final orders and any further affidavit evidence relevant to the orders sought, together with a proposed form of final order on or before 4 pm on 12 February 2019; and
(b) the second respondent is to file and serve submissions on appropriate final orders and any further affidavit evidence relevant to the orders sought, together with a proposed form of final order on or before 4 pm on 19 February 2019.
4. Subject to any further order, the question of appropriate final orders will be determined on the papers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Therefore, the evidence is that at some time during the day of 1 November 2017, the Minister considered the decision briefing note and decided to exercise his power. I infer from Ms Hurley’s position within the Department, and the way her evidence is expressed, that this evidence is hearsay (as are the reasons, at least as evidence of the Minister’s “consideration”). There is nothing to suggest she was present when the Minister considered the decision briefing note. Ms Hurley has been put forward as an institutional witness to provide relevant documents and an accurate chronology. That is not a criticism of her evidence in any way, but her evidence is not of the kind that could assist the Court in understanding how much time the Minister devoted to the “consideration” of the decision briefing note, or indeed if he “considered”, independently of the contents of the briefing note itself, any of its attachments. “Proper genuine and realistic consideration” The applicant puts in the alternative that the Minister failed to give “proper, genuine and realistic consideration” to his response to the Minister’s invitation. It is unclear whether this alternative also relies on the “procedure” in s 90D(3), or is more of a free standing argument about the need for the Minister to consider material the Minister has sought out, more akin to the approach taken by the Full Court in Carrascalao, which did not rely on a specific statutory provision. An argument framed by the use of this phrase has a somewhat fraught history in previous authorities of this Court. The generally agreed source for the phrase as an approach to judicial review is identified as Gummow J’s reasons for judgment in Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1987] FCA 457; 14 ALD 291, a decision which concerned an allegation of the inflexible application of executive policy. As YL Health Group submits, a ground of review formulated in this way has been held to create a “danger” of giving courts a “general warrant” to examine the procedural and substantive merits of a decision, but by way of language characterised as “of indefinite and subjective application”: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai [2001] FCA 274; 106 FCR 426 at 442 (Heerey, Goldberg and Weinberg JJ). Similar observations were made by the Full Court in Carrascalao, and by Basten JA of the NSW Court of Appeal (Allsop P, as his Honour then was, agreeing) in Swift v SAS Trustee Corporation [2010] NSWCA 182 at [45], quoted with apparent approval by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; 243 CLR 164 at [30]. See also Anderson v Director-General of the Department of Environmental and Climate Change [2008] NSWCA 337; 251 ALR 633 at [54]. In Stirling v Minister for Finance [2017] FCA 874, Tracey J set out many of the relevant authorities, and concluded at [40]:The cases set out above indicate that the phrase “proper, genuine and realistic” may be used, with appropriate caution, to describe the quality of the attention required to be given, by a decision-maker, to mandatory considerations.