FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Lucas v Zomay Holdings Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 830
File number: TAD 1 of 2019 Judge: O’CALLAGHAN J Date of judgment: 4 June 2019 Catchwords: CONTRACTS – applicant seeks specific performance of contract – “fourth category” of Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353 – allegation of repudiation
CONSUMER LAW – misleading and deceptive conduct
Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), sch 2 (‘Australian Consumer Law’), s 18
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 440D
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld)
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Tasmania) Act 2010 (Tas)
National Health Act 1953 (Cth), ss 4, 90, 98, 99K, 99L
National Health (Australian Community Pharmacy Authority Rules) Determination 2018 (Cth), s 7, sch 1
Pharmacy Control Act 2001 (Tas), Parts 5A, 6A
Cases cited: Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Tarmoola Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 101
Curnow Consulting Pty Ltd v JPD Media and Design Pty Ltd t/a Durie Design (No 3) [2018] NSWSC 827
Damcevski v Demetriou [2018] NSWSC 988
GR Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 631
Hall v Busst (1960) 104 CLR 206
Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511
Date of hearing: 16 May 2019, 17 May 2019, 20 May 2019 Registry: Tasmania Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 90 Counsel for the Applicant: C Gunson SC and A Walker Solicitor for the Applicant: Rotstein Commercial Laywers Counsel for the Respondents: D Deller Solicitor for the Respondents: Murdoch Clarke ORDERS
TAD 1 of 2019 BETWEEN: WARREN LUCAS
Applicant
AND: ZOMAY HOLDINGS PTY LTD
First Respondent
JEREMY LEWIS HAMPTON
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
O’CALLAGHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 JUNE 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The parties have liberty to apply.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’CALLAGHAN J:
INTRODUCTION
This is a dispute about the sale of a pharmacy business in the Eastlands Shopping Centre at Rosny Park, in Tasmania. The shopping centre, Tasmania’s largest, is on the eastern shore of the Derwent River and is a part of greater Hobart. The shopping centre has about 100 retail businesses including food stores, fashion stores, and one pharmacy.
The pharmacy business, known as Priceline Pharmacy Eastlands, is owned and operated by the first respondent (Zomay). The second respondent (Mr Hampton) is a pharmacist. He is the sole director and the sole shareholder of Zomay.
The applicant (Mr Lucas) is also a pharmacist. He is the Tasmanian State Manager of the “Chemist Warehouse/My Chemist Group”.
Mr Lucas contends that he entered into a legally binding contract for the purchase of the Priceline Pharmacy Eastlands business and he seeks specific performance of it. He…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 830
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the agreement for the sale of the pharmacy business was indeed binding and fell within the fourth category of Masters v Cameron, where the parties intended to be bound immediately, even though further documentation was contemplated. The court rejected the respondents' arguments that the agreement was not binding because it did not expressly state so, that there was no nominee nominated at the time of the agreement, or that the Offer to Purchase was not intended to be legally binding due to further negotiations. Furthermore, the court found that Mr Lucas had not repudiated the agreement, despite amendments he made to the Offer to Purchase at the time of signing.
The court held that the respondents were bound by the agreement for the sale of the pharmacy business to the applicant on the terms alleged in the statement of claim. The court ordered the respondents to specifically perform the agreement, provide the necessary forms and documents for the applicant to obtain approvals from relevant authorities, and pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding. The court also granted the parties liberty to apply for the re-listing of the proceeding at their option.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The parties have liberty to apply.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Fourthly, they contend that, as a matter of discretion, an order for specific performance should not be made in the exercise of the court’s discretion because damages would be an adequate remedy. CONSIDERATIONThe Offer to Purchase is binding In my view, the Offer to Purchase is clearly an agreement that falls within the so-called fourth category of Masters v Cameron. That is to say, the parties intended to be bound immediately, notwithstanding that they contemplated the need for further documentation. I cannot, with respect, accept any of the propositions relied on to the contrary by the respondents. Taking each in turn. First, it is contended that the agreement is not binding because it does not say in terms that it is. That submission cannot be accepted. It amounts to saying that a contract can only be binding if it says so expressly. Acceptance of that notion would wreak havoc on the jurisprudence of the interpretation of contracts. Secondly, it is contended that, when Mr Gibson told Mr Lucas that Mr Hampton he “agreed with everything”, that when read in context it is not signifying agreement to an offer to purchase. I also cannot accept that submission. It is as plain as a pike staff that Mr Gibson, on behalf of the respondents, agreed to each of the changes proposed by Mr Lucas in his email and included in the Offer to Purchase. Thirdly, it is contended that at the time that the Offer to Purchase was drafted, and at 5 November, there was no nominee nominated pursuant to the and/or nominee clause, and because Mr Lucas was “part of the mix”, who he was signing on behalf of and whether or not there would be a nominee “is an issue that needs to be dealt with”. I cannot accept that contention either. The simple fact is that Mr Lucas was the purchaser, and unless and until a nominee is substituted, he remains so. There is no issue “that needs to be dealt with”. Fourthly, it is contended that the Offer to Purchase was at all times headed “Offer to Purchase”. And of course it was. But that fact cannot possibly go to the question of what the parties objectively intended in all the circumstances. Fifthly, it is contended that Mr Hampton never signed the Offer to Purchase in the final form – he only signed it in the original version and that “may have had different consequences”. In the absence of any indication of what those circumstances might be, I must reject that contention too. Sixthly, it is contended that the effect of Mr Lucas amending the Offer to Purchase at the time of his signing it meant that it should be construed as a counteroffer. In circumstances where Mr Hampton clearly confirmed in subsequent emails that he agreed to the amendments, whether or not it was a counteroffer is irrelevant. Seventhly, it is contended that when Mr Gibson sent his 5 November email the PDF of the Offer to Purchase was not included. That circumstance is wholly irrelevant and I reject the contention. Eighthly, it is contended at the time the Offer to Purchase was entered into it was not intended to be legally binding because there was more to be negotiated. I reject that contention. That is the point of the fourth category of Masters v Cameron. The fact that “there is more to be negotiated” of itself is not a ground for declining to recognising an agreement as falling within the category, because it is necessarily so.Mr Lucas did not repudiate