Minister For Immigration And Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai
[2001] FCA 274

MIGRATION – protection visa – appeal from single judge setting aside decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – claim of detentions and torture in Sri Lanka – letter from Sri Lankan lawyer purporting to corroborate claims – doubts raised by Minister’s delegate as to authenticity of letter – whether Tribunal should have caused enquiries to be made in Sri Lanka concerning letter – whether failure to give “proper, genuine and realistic consideration” to claim constitutes ground for review under Pt 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Tribunal failed to “review” decision or “consider” applicant’s claim

WORDS AND PHRASES – “proper, genuine and realistic consideration”

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 427(1)(d), 476

Majeed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 470 applied
Rahman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1277 applied
Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 94 FCR 28 at 64 discussed
Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163 at 184-185 discussed
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka (1999) 84 FCR 411 at pars 20-26 applied
Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287 discussed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v A (1999) 91 FCR 435 at 448 mentioned
Dambagolla Arachchige v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 121 mentioned
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 579 mentioned
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1994) 47 FCR 300 at 304 mentioned
Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan (1999) 95 FCR 553 at 560-561 mentioned
Telstra Corporation Limited v Treloar [2000] FCA 1170 at pars 23-28 mentioned
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at par 40 applied
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 at 549 cited
R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal;Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 at 242 cited

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS V
ANTHONYPILLAI
NO. V 812 OF 2000

HEEREY, GOLDBERG AND WEINBERG JJ
21 MARCH 2001
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 812 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPLICANT

AND:

RAVINDRAKUMAR ANTHONYPILLAI
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HEEREY, GOLDBERG AND WEINBERG JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MARCH 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal is allowed.

2.The orders of the primary judge are set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered that the application for review is dismissed.

3.        The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and at first instance.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 812 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPLICANT

AND:

RAVINDRAKUMAR ANTHONYPILLAI
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HEEREY, GOLDBERG AND WEINBERG JJ

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 274
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai involves the Minister appealing a decision of the Federal Court to set aside a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) that had refused the applicant's application for a protection visa. The applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, sought a protection visa on the grounds of persecution due to his alleged membership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The RRT had found that the applicant's claims of detention and mistreatment by the Sri Lankan security forces were not credible. The primary judge of the Federal Court found that the RRT had failed to properly, genuinely, and realistically consider the applicant's claims, and thus set aside the RRT's decision. The Minister appealed this decision to the High Court.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the Federal Court was correct in finding that the RRT had failed to properly consider the applicant's claims of detention and mistreatment. The Minister argued that the phrase "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" had been incorrectly applied by the Federal Court, as it was more appropriate in the context of discretionary powers under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The Minister contended that the RRT's decision to grant or refuse a protection visa was not an exercise of a discretionary power, and thus the phrase should not have been applied.

The High Court held that the Federal Court had erred in applying the phrase "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" to the RRT's decision. The Court noted that the phrase was more appropriately used in the context of discretionary powers under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), and that the RRT's decision to grant or refuse a protection visa was not an exercise of such a power. The Court held that the Federal Court should have applied a different standard of review, such as the relevant/irrelevant considerations ground at common law. The Court found that the Federal Court had failed to properly apply the relevant standard of review, and thus the appeal was allowed. The orders of the primary judge were set aside, and in lieu thereof, it was ordered that the application for review was dismissed. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and at first instance.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders of the primary judge are set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered that the application for review is dismissed.

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and at first instance.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an applicant, Mr Anthonypillai, who applied for a protection visa in Australia. He claimed to be a refugee from Sri Lanka, alleging persecution due to his alleged support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Tribunal reviewed his claims and evidence, including his alleged detention and mistreatment in 1992 and 1996, as well as his employment history. The Tribunal also considered the letter from his lawyer, Miss Thilga Subramaniam, which did not mention his detention in 1992. The Tribunal found issues with the applicant's evidence about detentions and concluded that he did not have an actual or imputed LTTE profile.

The matter initially came before the Tribunal, which made a decision on the applicant's protection visa application. The Tribunal's decision was then subject to review by the court. The applicant appealed the Tribunal's decision, and the matter was heard by the court. The court reviewed the Tribunal's decision, considering whether it had given proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the applicant's claims of detention and mistreatment.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY, GOLDBERG AND WEINBERG JJ
On 28 April 1999 the respondent’s solicitors wrote to the Tribunal dealing with a number of matters which had arisen at the hearing, including the lawyer’s letter. Amongst other things it was noted that the letter did not confirm the applicant’s arrest in 1992. The solicitors suggested that the Tribunal could assume that the lawyer had a great number of clients and could not remember details and that it was possible that she had destroyed some of her older files. Also, she may have been asked only to confirm the detentions in 1996. Again the suggestion was made that the Tribunal should contact Miss Subramaniam directly.Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal’s decision was given on 16 July 1999. After referring to the legislation and a number of authorities on the Refugees Convention, the Tribunal under the sub-heading “Claims and Evidence” proceeded to summarise the claims already referred to. In the course of dealing with the 1992 arrest the Tribunal noted that the respondent“… stated in the hearing that the lawyer’s name was Miss Thilga Subramaniam. When it was put to him that there was no mention of this detention in her letter, he stated that his wife had arranged this letter and he had no control over what was in it.” At a later stage the Tribunal again referred to the lawyer’s letter. The Tribunal said: “The applicant stated that his wife had obtained this letter. It was pointed out to the applicant that the letter appeared vague in that the letter did not provide any precise dates as to when she acted for the applicant. It also did not mention his alleged detention in 1992 when this lawyer allegedly also assisted. The applicant stated that there was a telephone number and the lawyer could be telephoned to confirm the information.” Under the sub-heading “Findings and Reasons” the Tribunal accepted that the respondent lived in Jaffna from 1984 until 1992 and was prepared to accept his explanation that the employer’s letter stating that he worked in Dubai for nine years was concocted to assist him in obtaining a visa. However this did not mean that the Tribunal accepted that during his period in Jaffna the respondent had developed an LTTE profile. This claim was based on him working in a restaurant frequented by the LTTE and having brothers-in-law who were active members. However the authorities would have to know about these matters before imputing to him an opinion of support of the LTTE. The Tribunal said:“In the Tribunal’s view, his willingness to return to Sri Lanka from Dubai in 1996 indicates that he did not have and did not consider he had an actual or imputed LTTE profile. Further in the Tribunal’s view he had taken no action during his time in Jaffna that would lead the security forces to consider him an LTTE operative.” The Tribunal then noted it had “considerable difficulty” with the applicant’s evidence about detentions. As to the 1992 detention, when the respondent claimed his tongue was pierced with a pencil, the Tribunal did not accept his explanation that he did not seek medical treatment as he would have to tell what happened to him. Had he been seriously tortured in the way claimed by the authorities the Tribunal believed he would have sought treatment. Moreover, given the severity of the claimed tortures and the threats he received, the Tribunal did not believe he would have returned to Sri Lanka on two occasions after moving to Dubai. In addition the applicant did not appear to have made any arrangements for his wife to leave but appears to have been content for her to remain in Sri Lanka. As she was actually born in Jaffna and had brothers in the LTTE she would have been in at least as vulnerable a position as the applicant. The Tribunal concluded this topic by noting: “Further in the letter from his lawyer detailing his detentions, no mention is made of this first and apparently most horrific detention.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY, GOLDBERG AND WEINBERG JJ

His Honour concluded (at par 28) that “in failing to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the applicant’s claims of detention and mistreatment on three occasions in 1996, the RRT failed to properly discharge its functions under the Act in accordance with law. The failure constituted a failure to comply with the procedures required to be observed under the Act, an error of law or a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction by not giving proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the questions it is required to address: see s 476(1)(a),(b),(c) or (e).”“Proper, genuine and realistic consideration” Senior counsel for the Minister pointed out that the authorities cited by his Honour at par 17 of the judgment, other than Paramanthan, were concerned with the ground of review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5(1)(d) and 5(2)(f) where a discretionary power is exercised in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case. A similar ground is available under Pt 8: s 476(1)(d) and (3)(c). But there was no suggestion in the present case that the Tribunal’s decision was the application of some rule or policy. Moreover, making a decision to grant or refuse a protection visa is not, in any relevant sense, the exercise of a discretionary power. Support for the Minister’s submission comes from Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163. The plaintiff, a judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, sought common law judicial review of a finding of the Conduct Division of the Judicial Commission of New South Wales. Spigelman CJ, with whom Mason P, Priestley, Sheller and Powell JJA agreed, said (at 185):“Mr Conti also invoked the well-known ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, and failing to take into account relevant considerations. In this regard, he invoked a formulation which finds its origin in the judgment of Gummow J, then of the Federal Court of Australia: Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291, in which his Honour said that a decision must give ‘proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case’. This particular formulation of words has been applied in a number of subsequent judgments of the Federal Court, including Hindi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 1 at 13, per Sheppard J; Surinokova v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 33 FCR 87 at 96, per Hill J; Pattanasri v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 34 ALD 169 at 178-179, per Burchett J. The special characteristics of the applicable statutory framework in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), require particular care before applying the administrative law jurisprudence of the Federal Court to the common law. There is specific provision in s 5(2)(f) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) that a finding of improper exercise of power may be based on:‘(2)(f)An exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case.’The Federal Court cases involved the alleged application of a policy in this sense, as is made clear by the words ‘to the merits of the case’, in the formulation of Gummow J in Khan.Nevertheless, a similar proposition may be appropriate in the context of the relevant/irrelevant considerations ground at common law: see, for example, ‘any real sense’, Turner v Minister for Immigration (1981) 55 FLR 180 at 184, per Toohey J; ‘genuinely and realistically’, Howells v Nagrad Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 169 at 195, per Fox J and Franki J; ‘proper consideration’, Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 604, per Wilson J; and in this Court, the formulation ‘no real opportunity … to give consideration to’, in Parramatta City Council v Hale (1982) 47 LGRA 319 at 331, per Street CJ; see also at 335-336.These particular formulations must be treated with care, so that the relevant/irrelevant considerations ground is not expanded to permit review of the merits. That ground is restricted in accordance with the now classic judgment of Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-42, to matters which the decision maker was obliged to take into account.”