FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ashraf v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 50
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 50
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's failure to summon Ms S constituted a jurisdictional error and if the primary judge was correct in finding that there was no jurisdictional error. The court examined whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by the failure to summon Ms S, considering the principles of jurisdictional error and the duty to inquire into critical facts. The court assessed the reasoning of the primary judge and the Tribunal against relevant statutory provisions and case law, including the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li.
The court concluded that the primary judge was correct in finding that there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The court found that the appellant had not demonstrated that the Tribunal's failure to summon Ms S was legally unreasonable or that it reflected a failure to consider all material before it. The court held that the Tribunal's decision not to summon Ms S was not a jurisdictional error, as there was no evidence that the Tribunal had failed to consider the available information indicating that the Department held Ms S's contact details. The court dismissed the appeal and the Minister's application for leave to rely on a proposed notice of contention.
The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed, that the Minister's application for leave to file a notice of contention be dismissed, and that the appellant pay the Minister's costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum. The court also set out detailed directions for the parties to agree on the costs or for the Registrar to determine the appropriate lump sum figure if no agreement was reached.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The first respondent’s application for leave to file a notice of contention be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal (other than the costs of the application for leave to file a notice of contention), to be fixed by way of a lump sum.
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
4. Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.
5. In the absence of any agreement pursuant to paragraph 4 of these orders, within 21 days the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).
6. Within a further 14 days, the appellant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).
7. In the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister accepted that the contentions set out above had not been raised in the Federal Circuit Court proceeding. The Court indicated at the appeal hearing that it would determine the application for leave to rely on the proposed notice of contention as part of its consideration of the appeal. The Court heard argument both on whether leave should be granted and on the substance of the grounds in the proposed notice of contention.Consideration We will consider each of the grounds of appeal in turn (while noting that there is some overlap between the grounds). Before doing so, we set out the key relevant legislative provisions (as in force at the time of the Tribunal decision). Section 352(4) of the Migration Act provided:The Secretary [of the Department] must, as soon as is practicable after being notified of the application, give to the Registrar [of the Tribunal] each other document, or part of a document, that is in the Secretary’s possession or control and is considered by the Secretary to be relevant to the review of the decision. Section 363 relevantly provided:(1)For the purpose of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may: (a)take evidence on oath or affirmation; …(3)Subject to subsection (4), the presiding member in relation to a review may:(a)summon a person to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence; (b)summon a person to produce to the Tribunal such documents as are referred to in the summons; PIC 4020 (which formed part of the criteria for a skilled visa) has been set out at [19] above. The expression “bogus document” in s 5(1) of the Migration Act was in materially the same terms as set out in [20] above.Ground 1 The appellant’s submissions in relation to this ground can be summarised as follows:(a)The primary judge erred in finding that there was “nothing put as to how the Tribunal could have done more” than it did in order to seek to identify contact details for Ms S in order to summon her to give evidence under s 363(3)(a) of the Migration Act. The appellant had, in his affidavit, identified information before the Tribunal in the (redacted) transcripts of interview with Ms S that indicated that the Department had documents recording Ms S’s home address and personal email address.(b)In effect, the appellant contended below that it was inexplicable that the Tribunal had not exercised its powers to obtain Ms S’s contact details from the Department in circumstances where the Tribunal: (a) thought fit to summon the Secretary to produce other documents under s 363(3)(b); (b) was amenable to summoning Ms S if it could identify her contact details; and (c) had made some attempt to identify her contact details (by “search[ing] available internet directories”).(c)Indeed, the failure of the Tribunal to obtain Ms S’s contact details from the Department would be inexplicable, were it to be assumed that the Tribunal had complied with its duty to consider all of the information before it in determining the review. The only available inference is that the Tribunal did not read, let alone consider, the whole of the transcripts of interview with Ms S.(d)Thus, contrary to the findings of both the primary judge and the Tribunal, the Tribunal could obviously and easily have done more to find Ms S: for example, it could have summoned the Secretary to produce documents recording her contact details.(e)Furthermore, the adverse information which Ms S gave at her interviews with the Department was critical to the outcome of the appellant’s case. The appellant denied the accuracy of what Ms S had told the Department, and indicated that there may be issues as to her credibility. He therefore, reasonably, wished to have the Tribunal test Ms S’s information by summoning her to give evidence to the Tribunal.(f)The appellant had no power to obtain Ms S’s contact details. He had already done everything reasonably within his power, including by requesting the Tribunal to give access to unredacted transcripts of interview and writing directly to the Department to seek information (including noting that no attempt had been made to contact Ms S). Accordingly, the appellant was entirely reliant on the Tribunal performing its function lawfully, including by exercising its powers (including under s 363) reasonably.(g)This was a case where there was an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, easily obtained by the Tribunal: see the observations of Wilcox J in Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 (Prasad) at 169-170. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429 (SZIAI), the High Court criticised the expression “duty to inquire” as “apt to direct consideration away from the question whether the decision which is under review is vitiated by jurisdictional error” ([25]). The Court recognised that “[i]t may be that a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, could, in some circumstances, supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review” and that “[i]f so, such a failure could give rise to jurisdictional error by constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction”. The Court also recognised that “[i]t may be that failure to make such an inquiry results in a decision being affected in some other way that manifests itself as jurisdictional error”.(h)Subsequently, in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, the High Court confirmed that a legally unreasonable failure or refusal to exercise a discretionary power could result in jurisdictional error: see [56], [59], [63], [83], [90], [99], [100].(i)More recently, in BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530 at [136]-142], Bromberg J engaged in a thorough survey of cases and principles regarding the consequences of a failure by the Tribunal to exercise a power to inquire. See also Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 257 CLR 22 at [49]-[52]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151 (Le) at [64]-[79]; MZABA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 234 FCR 425 at [69]-[78]. See also, in relation to legal unreasonableness, AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 244 FCR 144 at [21]-[28].(j)Here, jurisdictional error (whether characterised as a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction or as a legally unreasonable failure to exercise a discretionary power by the Tribunal) is manifest. Viewed through the lens of legal unreasonableness, the Tribunal’s failure to summon Ms S should be assessed by reference to the reason that it gave for not doing so: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [45], [47]. The reason the Tribunal gave was that there was nothing further that it could do to identify Ms S’s contact details. That was manifestly wrong, and reflected a failure by the Tribunal to consider the whole of the transcripts of interview: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426 at [68], [69], [71], [79]; Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 743 (Perera) at [49]; Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [151]; SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at [59], [129], [191]-[199].(k)The sole authority relied on both by the Tribunal and the primary judge, Patel, is distinguishable. In that case, Flick J (with whom Edmonds J agreed) referred to SZIAI but said that “[o]n the facts of the present case, there was no readily available information to which any duty of inquiry could ... attach”; “there was no real prospect that any inquiry would have resulted in any relevant information being made available” ([40], see also [44]). Here, there was such a prospect. There was a real (indeed virtually inevitable) prospect that the Department had contact details for Ms S. The Tribunal’s unreasonable failure to exercise its powers to get Ms S’s contact information reflected its failure to consider the material before it, which showed that the Department had such information. The primary judge erred by failing to recognise this.