Ashraf v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ashraf v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 50

Appeal from: Ashraf v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 373
File number: VID 282 of 2017
Judges: TRACEY, MORTIMER AND MOSHINSKY JJ
Date of judgment: 3 April 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – skilled visa – where the Migration Review Tribunal affirmed decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse visa – where grounds of Tribunal’s decision included failure to satisfy Public Interest Criterion 4020 – where applicant requested the Tribunal to summon a witness, namely the person who had purportedly signed a work experience reference, but the Tribunal did not do so – whether Tribunal decision affected by jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 56, 97, 352, 359, 363, 424

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch 4, cl 4020

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510

AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 244 FCR 144

BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530

DZADQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 143 ALD 659

Endeavour Energy v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (2016) 244 FCR 178

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Khadgi (2010) 190 FCR 248

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKTI (2009) 238 CLR 489

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426

MZABA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 234 FCR 425

Patel v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 145 ALD 566

Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 743

Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155

SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294

SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214

SZLPO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 1) (2009) 177 FCR 1

SZOIN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 123

SZRLO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 825

Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan (1999) 95 FCR 553

Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 257 CLR 22

Date of hearing: 8 November 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 71
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr N Wood with Mr A Yuile
Solicitor for the Appellant: Da Gama Pereira and Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Knowles
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save…
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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ashraf v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerns an appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision by the Migration Review Tribunal to affirm the decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse a skilled visa application. The appellant, Ashraf, had applied for a skilled visa, nominating the occupation of cook, and submitted a work experience reference as part of his application. However, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision to refuse the visa, citing, among other reasons, a failure to satisfy the Public Interest Criterion 4020, which relates to the provision of a bogus document. The appellant argued that the Tribunal should have summoned the signatory of the work experience reference, Ms S, to testify, but it did not do so.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's failure to summon Ms S constituted a jurisdictional error and if the primary judge was correct in finding that there was no jurisdictional error. The court examined whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by the failure to summon Ms S, considering the principles of jurisdictional error and the duty to inquire into critical facts. The court assessed the reasoning of the primary judge and the Tribunal against relevant statutory provisions and case law, including the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li.

The court concluded that the primary judge was correct in finding that there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The court found that the appellant had not demonstrated that the Tribunal's failure to summon Ms S was legally unreasonable or that it reflected a failure to consider all material before it. The court held that the Tribunal's decision not to summon Ms S was not a jurisdictional error, as there was no evidence that the Tribunal had failed to consider the available information indicating that the Department held Ms S's contact details. The court dismissed the appeal and the Minister's application for leave to rely on a proposed notice of contention.

The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed, that the Minister's application for leave to file a notice of contention be dismissed, and that the appellant pay the Minister's costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum. The court also set out detailed directions for the parties to agree on the costs or for the Registrar to determine the appropriate lump sum figure if no agreement was reached.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The first respondent’s application for leave to file a notice of contention be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal (other than the costs of the application for leave to file a notice of contention), to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

4. Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.

5. In the absence of any agreement pursuant to paragraph 4 of these orders, within 21 days the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

6. Within a further 14 days, the appellant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

7. In the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the appeal is to be dismissed. The appellant has not demonstrated that the Federal Circuit Court erred in dismissing the application for judicial review. In particular, it is not demonstrated that the primary judge erred in not concluding that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error.Background facts The following statement of the background facts is based on the reasons of the primary judge, the reasons of the Tribunal and the documents in the Appeal Book. It is also based on certain additional facts agreed between the parties in the course of the appeal hearing (as indicated below). In July 2006, the appellant arrived in Australia on a student visa. On 4 May 2009, the appellant applied for a skilled visa. He nominated the occupation of cook on his application. On 5 August 2009, the appellant provided a TRA skills assessment in support of his application. To obtain the skills assessment, the appellant had provided TRA with the Work Experience Reference (AB 42-44). The reference is on the letterhead of L’Aspromonte restaurant. It is a three-page typed letter, detailing work undertaken by the appellant. The first two paragraphs state:This is to certify that [the appellant] has been working for L’Aspromonte from 03/09/08 till 20/06/09 as a cook.[The appellant] has undertaken unpaid work experience as a cook and contributes more than 940hrs to our restaurant. He worked for more than 20 hours/week during his breaks & Christmas holidays. During his tenure of employment with us he was working under the supervision of a head chef ([Ms S]). The letter is not dated at the top of the first page, but the date 2 July 2009 is stamped at the foot of each page, adjacent to a certification by the appellant’s migration agent. In December 2009, Ms S was interviewed by investigators on behalf of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (the Department), as it then was. There were two interviews: the first on 14 December; the second on 21 December. The transcripts of these interviews (with certain material redacted) are included in the Appeal Book (commencing at AB 74 and AB 177 respectively). During the first interview, Ms S was asked about work experience references provided by L’Aspromonte in respect of visa applicants. The transcript includes the following (at AB 98):Q213. Were you involved in signing the letters?A No.Q214. So you’ve never signed any of the work references?A Never.Q214. Have you written any of the work references?A Never. Ms S was asked questions about specific people who were the subject of work experience references. One of these was the appellant. In relation to the appellant, the transcript includes (at AB 157):Q782.… OK, I now produce Exhibit 1/127T in the name of [the appellant]?AYeah.Q783.So do you know this person?AYeah.Q784.It says that they worked for you on this work reference for 940 hours?ANo they didn’t.Q785.No? OK. How many hours would they have done?ACouple of hundred maybe.Q786.OK. And . . .ANo.Q (cont’d)… not your signature?ANo.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In light of our conclusions in relation to the grounds of appeal, it is unnecessary to consider the Minister’s application for leave to rely (out of time) on the proposed notice of contention. The Minister accepts that the matters set out in the proposed notice of contention were not raised before the primary judge. No explanation has been provided as to why the matters were not raised below or for the delay in raising the proposed notice of contention. In all of the circumstances, including that it is unnecessary to consider the matter because of our conclusion in relation to the appeal, we consider the appropriate course to be to dismiss the application for leave to rely on the proposed notice of contention.Conclusion For the reasons set out above, the appeal is to be dismissed. There is no apparent reason why costs should not follow the event. Accordingly, we will also order that the appellant pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal (other than the costs of the application for leave to file a notice of contention), to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister accepted that the contentions set out above had not been raised in the Federal Circuit Court proceeding. The Court indicated at the appeal hearing that it would determine the application for leave to rely on the proposed notice of contention as part of its consideration of the appeal. The Court heard argument both on whether leave should be granted and on the substance of the grounds in the proposed notice of contention.Consideration We will consider each of the grounds of appeal in turn (while noting that there is some overlap between the grounds). Before doing so, we set out the key relevant legislative provisions (as in force at the time of the Tribunal decision). Section 352(4) of the Migration Act provided:The Secretary [of the Department] must, as soon as is practicable after being notified of the application, give to the Registrar [of the Tribunal] each other document, or part of a document, that is in the Secretary’s possession or control and is considered by the Secretary to be relevant to the review of the decision. Section 363 relevantly provided:(1)For the purpose of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may: (a)take evidence on oath or affirmation; …(3)Subject to subsection (4), the presiding member in relation to a review may:(a)summon a person to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence; (b)summon a person to produce to the Tribunal such documents as are referred to in the summons; PIC 4020 (which formed part of the criteria for a skilled visa) has been set out at [19] above. The expression “bogus document” in s 5(1) of the Migration Act was in materially the same terms as set out in [20] above.Ground 1 The appellant’s submissions in relation to this ground can be summarised as follows:(a)The primary judge erred in finding that there was “nothing put as to how the Tribunal could have done more” than it did in order to seek to identify contact details for Ms S in order to summon her to give evidence under s 363(3)(a) of the Migration Act. The appellant had, in his affidavit, identified information before the Tribunal in the (redacted) transcripts of interview with Ms S that indicated that the Department had documents recording Ms S’s home address and personal email address.(b)In effect, the appellant contended below that it was inexplicable that the Tribunal had not exercised its powers to obtain Ms S’s contact details from the Department in circumstances where the Tribunal: (a) thought fit to summon the Secretary to produce other documents under s 363(3)(b); (b) was amenable to summoning Ms S if it could identify her contact details; and (c) had made some attempt to identify her contact details (by “search[ing] available internet directories”).(c)Indeed, the failure of the Tribunal to obtain Ms S’s contact details from the Department would be inexplicable, were it to be assumed that the Tribunal had complied with its duty to consider all of the information before it in determining the review. The only available inference is that the Tribunal did not read, let alone consider, the whole of the transcripts of interview with Ms S.(d)Thus, contrary to the findings of both the primary judge and the Tribunal, the Tribunal could obviously and easily have done more to find Ms S: for example, it could have summoned the Secretary to produce documents recording her contact details.(e)Furthermore, the adverse information which Ms S gave at her interviews with the Department was critical to the outcome of the appellant’s case. The appellant denied the accuracy of what Ms S had told the Department, and indicated that there may be issues as to her credibility. He therefore, reasonably, wished to have the Tribunal test Ms S’s information by summoning her to give evidence to the Tribunal.(f)The appellant had no power to obtain Ms S’s contact details. He had already done everything reasonably within his power, including by requesting the Tribunal to give access to unredacted transcripts of interview and writing directly to the Department to seek information (including noting that no attempt had been made to contact Ms S). Accordingly, the appellant was entirely reliant on the Tribunal performing its function lawfully, including by exercising its powers (including under s 363) reasonably.(g)This was a case where there was an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, easily obtained by the Tribunal: see the observations of Wilcox J in Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 (Prasad) at 169-170. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429 (SZIAI), the High Court criticised the expression “duty to inquire” as “apt to direct consideration away from the question whether the decision which is under review is vitiated by jurisdictional error” ([25]). The Court recognised that “[i]t may be that a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, could, in some circumstances, supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review” and that “[i]f so, such a failure could give rise to jurisdictional error by constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction”. The Court also recognised that “[i]t may be that failure to make such an inquiry results in a decision being affected in some other way that manifests itself as jurisdictional error”.(h)Subsequently, in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, the High Court confirmed that a legally unreasonable failure or refusal to exercise a discretionary power could result in jurisdictional error: see [56], [59], [63], [83], [90], [99], [100].(i)More recently, in BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530 at [136]-142], Bromberg J engaged in a thorough survey of cases and principles regarding the consequences of a failure by the Tribunal to exercise a power to inquire. See also Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 257 CLR 22 at [49]-[52]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151 (Le) at [64]-[79]; MZABA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 234 FCR 425 at [69]-[78]. See also, in relation to legal unreasonableness, AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 244 FCR 144 at [21]-[28].(j)Here, jurisdictional error (whether characterised as a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction or as a legally unreasonable failure to exercise a discretionary power by the Tribunal) is manifest. Viewed through the lens of legal unreasonableness, the Tribunal’s failure to summon Ms S should be assessed by reference to the reason that it gave for not doing so: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [45], [47]. The reason the Tribunal gave was that there was nothing further that it could do to identify Ms S’s contact details. That was manifestly wrong, and reflected a failure by the Tribunal to consider the whole of the transcripts of interview: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426 at [68], [69], [71], [79]; Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 743 (Perera) at [49]; Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [151]; SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at [59], [129], [191]-[199].(k)The sole authority relied on both by the Tribunal and the primary judge, Patel, is distinguishable. In that case, Flick J (with whom Edmonds J agreed) referred to SZIAI but said that “[o]n the facts of the present case, there was no readily available information to which any duty of inquiry could ... attach”; “there was no real prospect that any inquiry would have resulted in any relevant information being made available” ([40], see also [44]). Here, there was such a prospect. There was a real (indeed virtually inevitable) prospect that the Department had contact details for Ms S. The Tribunal’s unreasonable failure to exercise its powers to get Ms S’s contact information reflected its failure to consider the material before it, which showed that the Department had such information. The primary judge erred by failing to recognise this.