AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 19 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2015] FCA 1383

Citation: AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1383
Appeal from: AZAFB v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1349
Parties: AZAFB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: SAD 169 of 2015
Judge: NORTH ACJ
Date of judgment: 4 December 2015
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Appeal – Application for review of decision of Tribunal affirming decision of delegate of Minister not to grant protection visa – Exercise of power under s 426A of Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Whether Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by proceeding with hearing of review in absence of review applicant – Change of contact details – Review applicant did not receive invitation to appear at hearing – Review applicant did not appear at hearing – Whether exercise of power under s 426A of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was legally unreasonable – Whether Tribunal gave reasons for proceeding with review in absence of review applicant – Whether Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations – Whether exercise of power lacked evident and intelligible justification – Whether exercise of power was legally unreasonable – Whether Tribunal decision was affected by jurisdictional error – Failure to contact review applicant via telephone number on Tribunal record was legally unreasonable – Decision of Tribunal to proceed in review applicant’s absence was legally unreasonable

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2), 425, 426A, 430
Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 915
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Ponugoti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 67
Date of hearing: 25 November 2015
Date of last submissions: 26 November 2015
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 30
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Ower
Solicitor for the Appellant: McDonald Steed McGrath
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr P d’Assumpcao of Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 169 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

AZAFB
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

NORTH ACJ

DATE OF ORDER:

4 DECEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the second respondent is changed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

2.The appeal is allowed.

3.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 18 May 2015 are set aside.

4.In lieu of those orders, the following orders are made: 

(a)a writ of certiorari issue, directed to the second respondent, removing into the Court its decision, made on 19 May 2014 affirming…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1383
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, AZAFB, challenged the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) to affirm the decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) not to grant him a protection visa. The central issue was whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by proceeding with the hearing of the review in the absence of the appellant. The appellant argued that he had updated his contact details with the Department of Immigration prior to the hearing, but the Tribunal did not receive this information.

The legal issues the court had to decide included whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by proceeding with the hearing in the absence of the appellant, whether the exercise of power under s 426A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was legally unreasonable, and whether the Tribunal gave reasons for proceeding with the review in the appellant's absence. The court also had to consider whether the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations, and whether the exercise of power lacked evident and intelligible justification.

The court found that the failure to contact the appellant via the telephone number on the Tribunal's record was legally unreasonable. The court also found that the decision of the Tribunal to proceed in the appellant's absence was legally unreasonable. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error as it did not take into account the possibility that a consequence of its decision to proceed was that the persecution feared by the appellant could be suffered. The court further held that the exercise of power under s 426A lacked evident and intelligible justification and was therefore legally unreasonable.

The final orders made by the court were to allow the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court, quash the decision of the Tribunal, and direct the Tribunal to hear and determine the application of the appellant for review of the decision of the delegate refusing to grant him a protection visa. The Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the second respondent is changed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

2. The appeal is allowed.

3. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 18 May 2015 are set aside.

4. In lieu of those orders, the following orders are made:

(a) a writ of certiorari issue, directed to the second respondent, removing into the Court its decision, made on 19 May 2014 affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant a protection visa to the appellant, for the purpose of quashing that decision;

(b) the decision of the second respondent, made on 19 May 2014, affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant the appellant a protection visa, is quashed;

(c) a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the second respondent, requiring it to hear and determine the application of the appellant for review of the decision of the delegate of the first respondent refusing to grant him a protection visa.

5. The first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The central issue in this appeal is whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by proceeding with the hearing of the review in the absence of the appellant. THE FACTS In his original visa application, made in January 2013, the appellant provided to the then Department of Immigration and Citizenship an address for receiving documents in Kilburn, South Australia. He later updated that address to an address in Klemzig, South Australia. On 30 July 2013, the delegate of the first respondent sent a letter to the appellant at the Klemzig address inviting him to interview concerning the visa application. On 19 August 2013, the applicant attended that interview. On 17 September 2013, the delegate refused the application for a visa. On 2 October 2013, the appellant applied for a review of the delegate's decision. Question 13 on the printed application form relevantly asked for contact details for the purpose of sending correspondence to the review applicant. The appellant filled in the contact details by providing the Klemzig address and an email address. Question 3 on the printed application form asked for contact details of the appellant in Australia. The appellant completed that question by providing the Klemzig address, his email address and a mobile phone number. On 6 December 2013, the appellant filed a five page written submission with a four page attachment. The submission concluded with a statement signed by Mary Philippa Symonds that she had assisted the appellant in preparing the submission. Her signature was accompanied by a stamp indicating that she was a Commissioner for taking affidavits in the Supreme Court of South Australia. Her mobile phone number was recorded next to that stamp. On 9 April 2014, the Tribunal sent an invitation to the appellant to appear on 19 May 2014 at the hearing of the review. The letter was addressed to the Klemzig address. THE TRIBUNAL DECISION On 19 May 2014, the appellant did not appear at the hearing. On that day the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa. The Tribunal explained in its decision:4.That letter [of invitation to attend the hearing] was addressed to his last given address, provided by himself, which was the same address used by the by the [sic] department. A check was made to see if any change of address had been notified and, none has been.5.The Tribunal had considered the applicant's claims as presented on file, and, in the letter inviting the applicant to a hearing the Tribunal stated:6."The Tribunal has considered the material before it but is unable to make a favourable decision on this information alone."7.The applicant, although invited, did not appear before the Tribunal on 19 May 2014 to give evidence and present arguments and did not contact the Tribunal prior to close of business on that date. The Tribunal decision outlines a number of concerns regarding the application for review and details further information that the Tribunal would have sought from the appellant had the appellant appeared at the hearing. The decision relevantly states:52. Had the applicant attended a hearing, as offered, I would have attempted to satisfy myself in regard to this situation. However, as he had chosen not to attend the hearing or to provide any reason for not doing so I am unable to be satisfied in this regard. 53, Equally, I am unable to be satisfied that he made every attempt to seek protection through the authorities since had [sic] has not provided evidence or statement other than that he had no confidence in them. I would have sought further details in this regard but, have been unable to since he did not attend the hearing. 54. He has claimed that his friends in the party had used their influence to have his son come to Australia to study I am unable to be satisfied as to the exact nature of that assistance or if there was any as I have been unable to seek further details concerning that matter. 55. As the applicant was absent from Sri Lanka for such a long period I would have sought further details on his claimed assistance to displaced Tamils by allowing them, through the person with the power of attorney, to settle on his wife’s land. 56. As I have been unable to discuss these issues with the applicant I am unable to be satisfied that he faces any consequential harm. 57. He was on notice that this was the case when the letter of invitation to attend the hearing was sent. He has not attended the hearing, nor has be [sic] provided any further submission and I am therefore not satisfied that the applicant meets the criteria for s 36(2)(a) of the Act or that he is a refugee.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 9 June 2015, the appellant filed a notice of appeal in this Court which advanced the following grounds:1.The learned Judge erred in rejecting the evidence of the appellant that he had notified the Department of Immigration of his change of address from Klemzig to Aberfoyle Park prior to 9 April 2014, in the absence of cross-examination or any other basis to do so, and should have found as a fact that the appellant did so notify the Department.2.The learned Judge erred in finding that the Tribunal gave reasons for its determination under subs. 426A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to make a decision under the review without taking any further action or to allow or enable the appellant to appear before it, and should have found that the Tribunal, while stating in its s. 430 statement what it did, did not state the reasons why it did so.3. The learned Judge erred in not finding that the Tribunal in determining to proceed under s. 426A had not taken into account the possibility that a consequence of its decision to proceed was that the persecution feared by the appellant could be suffered.4.The learned Judge erred in that, in the circumstances of this matter:a.not finding that there had been a failure to take into account a relevant consideration in relation to the exercise of power under s. 426A; or b. further or alternatively, not finding the exercise of power under s. 426A lacked an evident and intelligible justification and therefore was legally unreasonable; andc.not holding that the Tribunal's decision was thereby affected by jurisdictional error. FURTHER EVIDENCE ON APPEAL The appellant sought to rely on an affidavit affirmed by his solicitor, and filed on 25 September 2015, which demonstrated through documents obtained from the Department through a Freedom of Information request that the appellant's address was updated in the Department's records to the Aberfoyle Park address on 13 May 2014. Counsel for the Minister did not object to the admission of this evidence. CONSIDERATION Section 426A is one of many provisions within Part 7 of the Act dealing with the review of protection visa decisions. The central obligation of the Tribunal under s 414 is to review decisions. How it is to conduct that review is specified in Div 4 of Part 7. The scope and purpose of Part 7 of the Act is to ensure that the Tribunal performs the function of review. Section 426A confers a discretionary power. It is presumed that the legislature intended the power to be exercised reasonably. What constitutes that standard relevant to the present appeal was explained by the plurality (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18 in the following passages:68... The legal standard of unreasonableness should not be considered as limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision – which is to say one that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it – nor should Lord Greene MR be taken to have limited unreasonableness in this way in his judgment in Wednesbury. ...72... Further, in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd, Mason J considered that the preferred ground for setting aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to an irrelevant factor of no importance, is that the decision is "manifestly unreasonable". Whether a decision-maker be regarded, by reference to the scope and purpose of the statute, as having committed a particular error in reasoning, given disproportionate weight to some factor or reasoned illogically or irrationally, the final conclusion will in each case be that the decision-maker has been unreasonable in a legal sense....76As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v The King that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion "if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust". The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. ... Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.[Footnotes omitted.]

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 9 April 2014, the Tribunal sent an invitation to the appellant to appear on 19 May 2014 at the hearing of the review. The letter was addressed to the Klemzig address. THE TRIBUNAL DECISION On 19 May 2014, the appellant did not appear at the hearing. On that day the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa. The Tribunal explained in its decision:4.That letter [of invitation to attend the hearing] was addressed to his last given address, provided by himself, which was the same address used by the by the [sic] department. A check was made to see if any change of address had been notified and, none has been.5.The Tribunal had considered the applicant's claims as presented on file, and, in the letter inviting the applicant to a hearing the Tribunal stated:6."The Tribunal has considered the material before it but is unable to make a favourable decision on this information alone."7.The applicant, although invited, did not appear before the Tribunal on 19 May 2014 to give evidence and present arguments and did not contact the Tribunal prior to close of business on that date. The Tribunal decision outlines a number of concerns regarding the application for review and details further information that the Tribunal would have sought from the appellant had the appellant appeared at the hearing. The decision relevantly states:52. Had the applicant attended a hearing, as offered, I would have attempted to satisfy myself in regard to this situation. However, as he had chosen not to attend the hearing or to provide any reason for not doing so I am unable to be satisfied in this regard. 53, Equally, I am unable to be satisfied that he made every attempt to seek protection through the authorities since had [sic] has not provided evidence or statement other than that he had no confidence in them. I would have sought further details in this regard but, have been unable to since he did not attend the hearing. 54. He has claimed that his friends in the party had used their influence to have his son come to Australia to study I am unable to be satisfied as to the exact nature of that assistance or if there was any as I have been unable to seek further details concerning that matter. 55. As the applicant was absent from Sri Lanka for such a long period I would have sought further details on his claimed assistance to displaced Tamils by allowing them, through the person with the power of attorney, to settle on his wife’s land. 56. As I have been unable to discuss these issues with the applicant I am unable to be satisfied that he faces any consequential harm. 57. He was on notice that this was the case when the letter of invitation to attend the hearing was sent. He has not attended the hearing, nor has be [sic] provided any further submission and I am therefore not satisfied that the applicant meets the criteria for s 36(2)(a) of the Act or that he is a refugee. The Tribunal gave similar reasons for being unable to be satisfied that the appellant engaged complementary protection obligations under s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). THE APPLICATION TO THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant sought to rely on an affidavit affirmed by his solicitor, and filed on 25 September 2015, which demonstrated through documents obtained from the Department through a Freedom of Information request that the appellant's address was updated in the Department's records to the Aberfoyle Park address on 13 May 2014. Counsel for the Minister did not object to the admission of this evidence. CONSIDERATION Section 426A is one of many provisions within Part 7 of the Act dealing with the review of protection visa decisions. The central obligation of the Tribunal under s 414 is to review decisions. How it is to conduct that review is specified in Div 4 of Part 7. The scope and purpose of Part 7 of the Act is to ensure that the Tribunal performs the function of review. Section 426A confers a discretionary power. It is presumed that the legislature intended the power to be exercised reasonably. What constitutes that standard relevant to the present appeal was explained by the plurality (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18 in the following passages:68... The legal standard of unreasonableness should not be considered as limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision – which is to say one that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it – nor should Lord Greene MR be taken to have limited unreasonableness in this way in his judgment in Wednesbury. ...72... Further, in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd, Mason J considered that the preferred ground for setting aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to an irrelevant factor of no importance, is that the decision is "manifestly unreasonable". Whether a decision-maker be regarded, by reference to the scope and purpose of the statute, as having committed a particular error in reasoning, given disproportionate weight to some factor or reasoned illogically or irrationally, the final conclusion will in each case be that the decision-maker has been unreasonable in a legal sense....76As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v The King that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion "if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust". The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. ... Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.[Footnotes omitted.] When faced with an allegation that a decision is legally unreasonable, the Court is not asked to substitute its view of the merits of the exercise of the discretion. It exercises a supervisory function determining whether the decision conforms with the standard of reasonableness.