FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2015] FCA 1383
Citation: AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1383 Appeal from: AZAFB v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1349 Parties: AZAFB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: SAD 169 of 2015 Judge: NORTH ACJ Date of judgment: 4 December 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Appeal – Application for review of decision of Tribunal affirming decision of delegate of Minister not to grant protection visa – Exercise of power under s 426A of Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Whether Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by proceeding with hearing of review in absence of review applicant – Change of contact details – Review applicant did not receive invitation to appear at hearing – Review applicant did not appear at hearing – Whether exercise of power under s 426A of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was legally unreasonable – Whether Tribunal gave reasons for proceeding with review in absence of review applicant – Whether Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations – Whether exercise of power lacked evident and intelligible justification – Whether exercise of power was legally unreasonable – Whether Tribunal decision was affected by jurisdictional error – Failure to contact review applicant via telephone number on Tribunal record was legally unreasonable – Decision of Tribunal to proceed in review applicant’s absence was legally unreasonable
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2), 425, 426A, 430 Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 915
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Ponugoti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 67Date of hearing: 25 November 2015 Date of last submissions: 26 November 2015 Place: Adelaide Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 30 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Ower Solicitor for the Appellant: McDonald Steed McGrath Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr P d’Assumpcao of Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
SAD 169 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: AZAFB
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
NORTH ACJ
DATE OF ORDER:
4 DECEMBER 2015
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the second respondent is changed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
2.The appeal is allowed.
3.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 18 May 2015 are set aside.
4.In lieu of those orders, the following orders are made:
(a)a writ of certiorari issue, directed to the second respondent, removing into the Court its decision, made on 19 May 2014 affirming…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1383
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court had to decide included whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by proceeding with the hearing in the absence of the appellant, whether the exercise of power under s 426A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was legally unreasonable, and whether the Tribunal gave reasons for proceeding with the review in the appellant's absence. The court also had to consider whether the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations, and whether the exercise of power lacked evident and intelligible justification.
The court found that the failure to contact the appellant via the telephone number on the Tribunal's record was legally unreasonable. The court also found that the decision of the Tribunal to proceed in the appellant's absence was legally unreasonable. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error as it did not take into account the possibility that a consequence of its decision to proceed was that the persecution feared by the appellant could be suffered. The court further held that the exercise of power under s 426A lacked evident and intelligible justification and was therefore legally unreasonable.
The final orders made by the court were to allow the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court, quash the decision of the Tribunal, and direct the Tribunal to hear and determine the application of the appellant for review of the decision of the delegate refusing to grant him a protection visa. The Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the second respondent is changed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
2. The appeal is allowed.
3. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 18 May 2015 are set aside.
4. In lieu of those orders, the following orders are made:
(a) a writ of certiorari issue, directed to the second respondent, removing into the Court its decision, made on 19 May 2014 affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant a protection visa to the appellant, for the purpose of quashing that decision;
(b) the decision of the second respondent, made on 19 May 2014, affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant the appellant a protection visa, is quashed;
(c) a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the second respondent, requiring it to hear and determine the application of the appellant for review of the decision of the delegate of the first respondent refusing to grant him a protection visa.
5. The first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant sought to rely on an affidavit affirmed by his solicitor, and filed on 25 September 2015, which demonstrated through documents obtained from the Department through a Freedom of Information request that the appellant's address was updated in the Department's records to the Aberfoyle Park address on 13 May 2014. Counsel for the Minister did not object to the admission of this evidence. CONSIDERATION Section 426A is one of many provisions within Part 7 of the Act dealing with the review of protection visa decisions. The central obligation of the Tribunal under s 414 is to review decisions. How it is to conduct that review is specified in Div 4 of Part 7. The scope and purpose of Part 7 of the Act is to ensure that the Tribunal performs the function of review. Section 426A confers a discretionary power. It is presumed that the legislature intended the power to be exercised reasonably. What constitutes that standard relevant to the present appeal was explained by the plurality (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18 in the following passages:68... The legal standard of unreasonableness should not be considered as limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision – which is to say one that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it – nor should Lord Greene MR be taken to have limited unreasonableness in this way in his judgment in Wednesbury. ...72... Further, in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd, Mason J considered that the preferred ground for setting aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to an irrelevant factor of no importance, is that the decision is "manifestly unreasonable". Whether a decision-maker be regarded, by reference to the scope and purpose of the statute, as having committed a particular error in reasoning, given disproportionate weight to some factor or reasoned illogically or irrationally, the final conclusion will in each case be that the decision-maker has been unreasonable in a legal sense....76As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v The King that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion "if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust". The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. ... Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.[Footnotes omitted.] When faced with an allegation that a decision is legally unreasonable, the Court is not asked to substitute its view of the merits of the exercise of the discretion. It exercises a supervisory function determining whether the decision conforms with the standard of reasonableness.