Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 915

Citation: Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 915
Appeal from: Kaur & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 161
Parties: RANJIT KAUR and SACHIN KUMAR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: VID 130 of 2014
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 28 August 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court affirming decision of Migration Review Tribunal to refuse a Student visa – first appellant did not receive invitation to second Tribunal hearing and did not attend hearing – whether the Tribunal’s exercise of discretion to finalise the review was legally unreasonable – whether appellants denied procedural fairness – whether Tribunal failed to fulfil its obligations under s 360 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Federal Circuit Court erred in not finding that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error – appeal allowed.
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 33(1)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 353, 357A, 358, 359, 359B, 359C, 360, 360A, 362B, 363, 366, 379A, 379C, 425, 426A, 430, 441A

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 5A cl 5A405

Cases cited:

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Bushellv Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408
Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135; [2000] HCA 5
Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190
Jacob v Utah Construction and Engineering Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 200
Kaur v Minister or Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 161
Kim v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 64
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 139 ALD 50; [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO (2009) 238 CLR 627; [2009] HCA 37
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKTI (2009) 238 CLR 489; [2009] HCA 30
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZFHC (2006) 150 FCR 439; [2006] FCAFC 73
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304; [2005] FCAFC 118
Minister for Immigration and Multiculural Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553; [2003] FCAFC 12
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v Khosa [2009] 1 SCR 339
MZXRE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 176 FCR 552; [2009] FCAFC 82
NADK of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 184
NBBL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 152 FCR 592; [2006] FCA 1045
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252; [2010] HCA 23
SBSC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 77
SZDPB v Minister or…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 915
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kaur and others sought to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had affirmed the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal to refuse their applications for a student visa. The appellants argued that the Tribunal had breached procedural fairness and its statutory obligations under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by failing to provide adequate notice of a second hearing and by proceeding to make a decision without the appellants' presence. The Federal Circuit Court had found that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error, but the appellants contended that this was incorrect and sought a review of the Tribunal's decision.

The central legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal's exercise of discretion to finalise the review was legally unreasonable and whether the appellants were denied procedural fairness. Furthermore, the court had to determine if the Tribunal failed to fulfil its obligations under section 360 of the Migration Act, and if the Federal Circuit Court had erred in not finding that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The appellants argued that the Tribunal's failure to provide further action before deciding to complete the review amounted to a breach of section 362B of the Act.

The court considered the Tribunal's statutory task, which is to arrive at the correct or preferable decision in the case before it according to the material before it. The court emphasised that the Tribunal has the necessary degrees of flexibility to ensure it can fully perform its statutory task, and that there is no contrary intention to section 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), which provides that where an Act confers a power or function or imposes a duty, then the power may be exercised and the function or duty must be performed from time to time as occasion requires. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, as the Tribunal had failed to take further action before deciding to complete the review, and thus breached the appellants' procedural fairness rights.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Federal Circuit Court were set aside. In lieu of the orders, the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal dated 7 March 2013 was set aside, and the Tribunal was required to hear and determine the appellants' application for review according to law. The parties were given time to file agreed proposed orders as to costs, and if no agreement could be reached, written submissions on the question of costs were to be filed and served within the specified timeframe.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court dated 13 February 2014 are set aside.

3. In lieu of the orders, there be an order that the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal dated 7 March 2013 be set aside.

4. The Tribunal is required to hear and determine the appellant’s application for review according to law.

5. On or before 4.00pm on Thursday 4 September 2014, the parties file agreed proposed orders as to costs.

6. If no agreement can be reached pursuant to paragraph 5, on or before 4.00pm on Thursday 11 September 2014, the parties file and serve written submissions on the question of costs, limited to two pages.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In relation to the giving of the second hearing invitation, and the first appellant’s non-appearance, the Tribunal’s reasons contained the following paragraph (at [37]):On 29 January 2013 the Tribunal wrote to the review applicants by letter addressed to the first named applicant, advising that it had considered all the material before it relating to their application but it was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone. The Tribunal invited the applicants to give oral evidence and present arguments at a hearing on 20 February 2013. They were advised that if they did not attend the hearing and a postponement was not granted, the Tribunal may make a decision on their case without further notice. No response was received and the applicants did not appear before the Tribunal on the day and at the time and place at which they were scheduled to appear. In these circumstances the Tribunal has decided to make its decision on the review without taking any further action to enable the applications to appear before it.THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT DECISION The application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision, made on 8 April 2013, contained the following grounds:1. The Tribunal did not give me an opportunity to attend the hearing.2. I did not receive the tribunal letter dated 29 January 2013.3. The Tribunal knew that I did not receive it as the letter was returned.4. The Post Code provided by the Tribunal was for Glenhuntly not Melbourne. It was clearly an error. The Minister’s written submissions before the Federal Circuit Court characterised the appellants’ arguments in three possible ways. First, as a breach of its obligations under s 360 of the Act, second as a complaint that the non-receipt in fact of the second hearing invitation by the first appellant gave rise to some error in the Tribunal’s decision, or third, as a challenge to the reasonableness of the Tribunal’s exercise of discretion pursuant to s 362B of the Act to proceed to make a decision on the review following the non-appearance at the second convened hearing. However the argument was characterised, the Minister submitted it should not succeed. The Federal Circuit Court agreed with the Minister’s submissions that the course of conduct embarked upon by the Tribunal did not reveal any jurisdictional error. After dealing with an adjournment application which forms no part of the appeal to this Court, the Federal Circuit Court relied on the terms of ss 379A(4) and 379C(4) of the Act to find first that the first appellant was deemed to have received the second hearing invitation seven working days after it was sent and, second, that, even if the Tribunal had known of her actual failure to receive the invitation, it was not obliged to have “followed up” the second hearing invitation. The Federal Circuit Court relied on a passage from SZHSQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 155 FCR 159; [2006] FCA 1295 at [60] per Rares J which, with respect to the Federal Circuit Court, does not support that proposition. Rather, it supports the (clearly correct) proposition that the Tribunal had a discretion whether to proceed to determine the review and the more limited proposition that s 430 of the Act does not in its terms extend to imposing a statutory obligation to provide reasons for the manner in which that discretion is exercised.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first appellant further submitted that, since the Tribunal gave no reasons for its decision to proceed, it is not possible to discern an intelligible justification and the Court should not speculate in the way the Minister’s submission invited it to do. Rather, given that on the evidence the Tribunal was “well on notice” that there must have been an issue with the first appellant’s non-appearance, because of her history of contact with the Tribunal, the Tribunal should have taken some further action before deciding to complete the review and its failure to do so amounted to a breach of s 362B. CONSIDERATIONThe Tribunal’s statutory task The Tribunal’s statutory task, as revealed by a consideration of the Act as a whole and Parts 5 and 6 in particular, is to arrive at the correct or preferable decision in the case before it according to the material before it: Li 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18 at [10] per French CJ, referring to Bushellv Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 at 425 per Brennan J. The fact that it is a tribunal dealing with particular subject matter does not alter the nature of its task, which remains the same as those tribunals on which fundamental aspects of its scheme was modelled, such as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The range of powers, discretions and obligations reposed in the Tribunal by Div 5 of Part 5 of the Act, and the way in which the statute conditions them, might on a first reading suggest that the Tribunal has a limited amount of decisional freedom as to how it conducts its review once it has embarked upon it. That would be an incorrect impression. Division 5 is an exhaustive statement of the rules of natural justice only insofar as the “matters” with which it deals: see Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252; [2010] HCA 23 at [37]-[39] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ; Li 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18 at [18] per French CJ. Outside those matters, common law procedural fairness principles apply. Those principles, read with facultative provisions such as ss 353 and 357A(3) and general powers in (for example) s 363, combine to confer on the Tribunal the necessary degrees of flexibility to ensure it can fully perform its statutory task. For example, its power of adjournment (s 363(1)(b)), the power to take evidence by telephone (s 366), the power to require the Secretary to make further investigations (s 363(1)(d)) and the power to seek information (s 359) are all illustrations of the flexibility given by the statutory scheme to the Tribunal to enable it to perform its task. Given that task, and the jurisdictional criterion in s 65 of the Act of satisfaction, it would be wrong to construe that part of the legislative scheme concerning review of decisions established by Div 5 of Part 5 of the Act as one which permits the exercises of power, or the performance of obligations, where conferred, on a “once only” basis. The nature of the subject matter of reviews, involving as they frequently do evidence or material from overseas, may mean the Tribunal needs to seek information pursuant to s 359 on more than one occasion. There may be occasions — this case is an example — where an applicant needs to give the Tribunal information in accordance with s 358 on more than one occasion. More than one adjournment of a review may be necessary — whether to enable an applicant to obtain further evidence or material, to enable the Tribunal to make inquiries, to accommodate Tribunal indisposition or an applicant’s medical condition. These are but examples. Put differently, there is no contrary intention to s 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) which provides that where an Act confers a power or function or imposes a duty, then the power may be exercised and the function or duty must be performed from time to time as occasion requires.