FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 915
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] FCA 915
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal's exercise of discretion to finalise the review was legally unreasonable and whether the appellants were denied procedural fairness. Furthermore, the court had to determine if the Tribunal failed to fulfil its obligations under section 360 of the Migration Act, and if the Federal Circuit Court had erred in not finding that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The appellants argued that the Tribunal's failure to provide further action before deciding to complete the review amounted to a breach of section 362B of the Act.
The court considered the Tribunal's statutory task, which is to arrive at the correct or preferable decision in the case before it according to the material before it. The court emphasised that the Tribunal has the necessary degrees of flexibility to ensure it can fully perform its statutory task, and that there is no contrary intention to section 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), which provides that where an Act confers a power or function or imposes a duty, then the power may be exercised and the function or duty must be performed from time to time as occasion requires. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, as the Tribunal had failed to take further action before deciding to complete the review, and thus breached the appellants' procedural fairness rights.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Federal Circuit Court were set aside. In lieu of the orders, the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal dated 7 March 2013 was set aside, and the Tribunal was required to hear and determine the appellants' application for review according to law. The parties were given time to file agreed proposed orders as to costs, and if no agreement could be reached, written submissions on the question of costs were to be filed and served within the specified timeframe.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court dated 13 February 2014 are set aside.
3. In lieu of the orders, there be an order that the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal dated 7 March 2013 be set aside.
4. The Tribunal is required to hear and determine the appellant’s application for review according to law.
5. On or before 4.00pm on Thursday 4 September 2014, the parties file agreed proposed orders as to costs.
6. If no agreement can be reached pursuant to paragraph 5, on or before 4.00pm on Thursday 11 September 2014, the parties file and serve written submissions on the question of costs, limited to two pages.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The first appellant further submitted that, since the Tribunal gave no reasons for its decision to proceed, it is not possible to discern an intelligible justification and the Court should not speculate in the way the Minister’s submission invited it to do. Rather, given that on the evidence the Tribunal was “well on notice” that there must have been an issue with the first appellant’s non-appearance, because of her history of contact with the Tribunal, the Tribunal should have taken some further action before deciding to complete the review and its failure to do so amounted to a breach of s 362B. CONSIDERATIONThe Tribunal’s statutory task The Tribunal’s statutory task, as revealed by a consideration of the Act as a whole and Parts 5 and 6 in particular, is to arrive at the correct or preferable decision in the case before it according to the material before it: Li 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18 at [10] per French CJ, referring to Bushellv Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 at 425 per Brennan J. The fact that it is a tribunal dealing with particular subject matter does not alter the nature of its task, which remains the same as those tribunals on which fundamental aspects of its scheme was modelled, such as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The range of powers, discretions and obligations reposed in the Tribunal by Div 5 of Part 5 of the Act, and the way in which the statute conditions them, might on a first reading suggest that the Tribunal has a limited amount of decisional freedom as to how it conducts its review once it has embarked upon it. That would be an incorrect impression. Division 5 is an exhaustive statement of the rules of natural justice only insofar as the “matters” with which it deals: see Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252; [2010] HCA 23 at [37]-[39] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ; Li 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18 at [18] per French CJ. Outside those matters, common law procedural fairness principles apply. Those principles, read with facultative provisions such as ss 353 and 357A(3) and general powers in (for example) s 363, combine to confer on the Tribunal the necessary degrees of flexibility to ensure it can fully perform its statutory task. For example, its power of adjournment (s 363(1)(b)), the power to take evidence by telephone (s 366), the power to require the Secretary to make further investigations (s 363(1)(d)) and the power to seek information (s 359) are all illustrations of the flexibility given by the statutory scheme to the Tribunal to enable it to perform its task. Given that task, and the jurisdictional criterion in s 65 of the Act of satisfaction, it would be wrong to construe that part of the legislative scheme concerning review of decisions established by Div 5 of Part 5 of the Act as one which permits the exercises of power, or the performance of obligations, where conferred, on a “once only” basis. The nature of the subject matter of reviews, involving as they frequently do evidence or material from overseas, may mean the Tribunal needs to seek information pursuant to s 359 on more than one occasion. There may be occasions — this case is an example — where an applicant needs to give the Tribunal information in accordance with s 358 on more than one occasion. More than one adjournment of a review may be necessary — whether to enable an applicant to obtain further evidence or material, to enable the Tribunal to make inquiries, to accommodate Tribunal indisposition or an applicant’s medical condition. These are but examples. Put differently, there is no contrary intention to s 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) which provides that where an Act confers a power or function or imposes a duty, then the power may be exercised and the function or duty must be performed from time to time as occasion requires.