SZHSQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZHSQ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2006] FCA 1295

MIGRATION – Refugees – Protection visa – decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – appeal from decision of Federal Magistrates Court of Australia – whether tribunal failed to identify behaviour modification claim – whether tribunal failed to notify applicant in accordance with s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where applicant did not appear at tribunal hearing – whether applicant denied procedural fairness – consideration of the obligations of the tribunal under s 426A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Held – no jurisdictional error found and appeal dismissed

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424, 425, 426A

Appellant S395 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473 considered and discussed
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389 applied
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996)185 CLR 259 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZFHC [2006] FCAFC 73 considered
NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51 discussed
NBBL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1045 followed
SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214 discussed and applied
SZEZI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1195 followed
SZHSQ vMinister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 538 referred to
The Queen v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 applied

SZHSQ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND ANOR
NSD 1121 OF 2006

RARES J
19 SEPTEMBER 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1121 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZHSQ
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 SEPTEMBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1121 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZHSQ
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

19 SEPTEMBER 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court, SZHSQ vMinister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 538. In essence, three principal bases of error were argued before me.

  2. The Chief Federal Magistrate was alleged to have erred in failing to grant constitutional writ relief or prerogative relief on the following bases; first, that the Tribunal had committed a jurisdictional error in failing correctly to identify the appellant’s claims and to apply the decision in Appellant S395 of 2002 v…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1295
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZHSQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the appellant, a Chinese national, who had applied for a protection visa on the grounds that she would face persecution if returned to China due to her practice of Falun Gong. The appellant's visa application was initially refused, and her subsequent application for review was also unsuccessful. The appellant appealed this decision to the court, arguing that the Tribunal had erred in its consideration of her case.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether certain information provided by the appellant to the Tribunal constituted "information" within the meaning of s 424A, and if so, whether the Tribunal had erred in its consideration of that information. Additionally, the court examined whether the Tribunal had properly exercised its discretion under s 426A by not contacting the appellant after she failed to attend a hearing, despite her prior intention to attend.

In its reasoning, the court found that the information provided by the appellant did indeed constitute "information" as defined in s 424A, and thus, the Tribunal was required to consider it in making its decision. However, the court did not find that the Tribunal had erred in its consideration of this information. Regarding the second issue, the court held that the Tribunal had discretion under s 426A to contact the appellant, but it was not an error for the Tribunal not to have done so. The court acknowledged that the appellant's case was difficult and that there was potential for substantial injustice, but ultimately, the appeal was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The information was characterised in two ways; first, that the appellant in her protection visa application had not made clear to the Tribunal how she would practice Falun Gong if she returned to China; and secondly, that while she had said that she had a fear of persecution, on the other hand she had offered very little in support of that. Each type of information was said to be information within the meaning of s 424A(1) in the manner I will explain in more detail shortly. The third ground was that the Tribunal had erred in the exercise of its discretion under s 426A when it failed to consider making contact with or contacting the appellant after she had failed to attend a hearing in circumstances where previously she had advised the Tribunal that she did intend to attend. BACKGROUND The appellant had arrived in Australia in February 1997. In August 2000 she had lodged an application for a protection visa with the Minister. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant her a protection visa in September 2000 and she applied for a review of that decision on 3 October 2000. The basis of her claim was set out in a statement which she made in the application for the visa. She said that she had become a practitioner of Falun Gong in May 1998 in Australia. She pointed to the fact that as far as she knew, all Falun Gong practitioners suffered persecution in China and that many of them had been jailed, many detained and those who might not be detained or arrested could be suffering mentally from discrimination and could have been discriminated against by the Chinese authorities in their employment or through some forms of administrative punishment. In her claims she explained that she attended a Falun Dafa Australian experience sharing convention in May 1998 and thereafter became attracted to the practice of Falun Gong. She said that she claimed to have gone to Darling Harbour every Saturday and that she had read books by a master of Falun Gong and obeyed the other laws of that set of beliefs. She claimed that by practising Falun Gong her health became better and she had received mental cultivation and enlightenment. She also claimed to have attended another Falun Dafa Australian experience sharing conference in May 1999 and then in May 2000, to have participated in what she said was the world's first Falun Dafa day in Australia. On that occasion she said that with approximately 300 other practitioners she had walked from Hyde Park in Sydney to Darling Harbour and had held up banners with laudatory statements about Falun Dafa. She claimed that she could not understand why Falun Gong or Falun Dafa was banned in China and feared that she would be subject to persecution if she went back there. She said that because she had survived by Falun Dafa, she did not know if she could survive without it. She then set out in her claim, the following paragraph to which much of the focus of the argument was directed:‘Those facts about Falun Gong practitioners’ sufferings have shocked the world and also puzzled the world. If the Chinese people are granted human rights, why [sic] those things are still happening? I am not a political dissident. What I need is to live without harming others and without being harmed by others. I love peace. However, if I go back to China, how can I obtain a moment of peace? I would either give up practising Falun Gong or being jailed as many other Falun Gong practitioners. I do not want either of them.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

RARES J
I think this is a very hard case on the appellant and may be one in which the Minister would wish anxiously to consider whether, in the light of the evidence of her misadventure through the migration agents not really informing her of the progress and status of her application for review and the fact that because of that she was unable to attend before the Tribunal, some discretion may be enlivened in the proper consideration of her case. But those are matters which I do not think I, as a judge, can assist the appellant with, though I think her case does call for some recognition of the potential that some substantial injustice may be done to her through no fault of her own.CONCLUSION Accordingly, with some considerable reluctance I feel I must dismiss the appeal. I am indebted to counsel for all their preparation and care in addressing this difficult case and in particular to Mr Prince for having acted pro bono for the appellant and taking such care in the presentation of her appeal. I order that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RARES J