SZKUO v Minister for Immigration (No.2)

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZKUO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION (No.2) [2009] FMCA 498
MIGRATION – Application for declaratory relief that applicant is not liable to removal and injunctive relief to restrain the respondent from removing the applicant from Australia and continuing to detain the applicant – whether an application for a protection visa has been finally determined in circumstances where the Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision is found to have been affected by jurisdictional error but constitutional writ relief was refused and the application for judicial review dismissed – whether the applicant’s bridging visa continues in circumstances where he has had notification only of a purported privative clause.
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s.15AA
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5(9); 5(9)(a); 189; 196; 198; 198(6); 425; 426A; 430; 430(1); 430B(6); 474; 476; 476(1); pt.5; pt.7
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), sch.2
SZKUO v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 2073
SZKUO v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FCA 93
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZHSQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1295
SZIMG v Minister for immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 368
Keen v Telstra Corporation Limited (2006) 230 ALR 313
Tervonen v Minister for Justice and Customs (No.2) [2007] FCA 1684
Ma v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 69
Lansen v Minister for Environment and Heritage [2008] FCAFC 189
Jadwan Pty Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Aged Care (2003) 145 FCR 1
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189
Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 24 ALR 307
Leung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 79 FCR 400
Applicant: SZKUO
Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
File number: SYG 631 of 2009
Judgment of: Emmett FM
Hearing date: 13 May 2009
Date of last submission: 13 May 2009
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 27 May 2009

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Patrick Reynolds
Solicitors for the Applicant: Ms May Guo, Fragomen Lawyers
Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr Andras Markus, Australian Government Solicitor
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 631 of 2009

SZKUO

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application made to the Court pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on the basis that it seeks relief in respect of the following migration decisions:

    i)A decision under s.198 of the Act to make arrangements for the removal of the Applicant from Australia and in respect of which the Applicant was notified on or about 20 February 2009; and

    ii)The decision under s.189 and/or s.196 of the Act to continue to detain the Applicant and/or refuse to release the Applicant from detention in respect of which the Applicant received notification on 11 March 2009.

  2. It…

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Details
Case
[2009] FMCA 498
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Applicant in SZKUO v Minister for Immigration (No.2) sought to challenge the validity of a decision made by the Tribunal in relation to their application for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Applicant argued that the Tribunal's decision, which was allegedly infected by jurisdictional error, did not constitute a valid decision under s.5(9)(a) of the Act. They contended that, as a result, their application for a protection visa had not been "finally determined". The Applicant relied on various High Court cases, including Bhardwaj and Plaintiff S157/2002, to support their argument that a decision affected by jurisdictional error is no decision at all and does not have legal consequences.

The legal issues before the Court were whether a decision affected by jurisdictional error can be considered a valid decision under s.5(9)(a) of the Act and whether such a decision constitutes a "finally determined" application for a protection visa. The Court had to consider the authorities that addressed these issues, including Bhardwaj and other cases cited by the Applicant. The Court also had to consider the purpose of the relevant legislation and how it should be construed in light of the authorities.

In reaching its decision, the Court noted that while an invalid administrative decision can have operational effect under some statutes, the key issue was whether s.5(9) of the Act should be construed to give effect to the purpose of the legislation, which is to identify the point of time when an application for a protection visa is no longer subject to any form of review. The Court held that, in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal had purported to make a decision, and that decision had not been set aside. The Applicant could not challenge the validity of the decision any further, as it had been finally determined by the Federal Magistrates Court. The Court found that the Applicant's argument that the decision was no decision at all did not apply in this case, as the Court had refused to issue Constitutional writs in the exercise of its discretion. Therefore, the decision had operational effect and the Applicant's application for a protection visa had been "finally determined".

The Court's final orders were not explicitly stated in the text provided, but it can be inferred that the Court dismissed the Applicant's argument and upheld the validity of the Tribunal's decision. The Applicant's application for a protection visa was considered "finally determined", and no further legal challenge could be mounted against the decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

At the heart of the submission by counsel for the Applicant is a submission that “a decision” as referred to in s.5(9)(a) of the Act does not include a purported privative clause decision and that the decision of the Tribunal is a purported privative clause decision. Therefore, no valid review has been completed in respect of the Delegate’s decision; and, therefore, the Applicant’s application for a protection visa has not been “finally determined”. In support of that submission, counsel for the Applicant relied on various statements of members of the High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 (“Bhardwaj”). In particular at [51] where Gaudron and Gummow JJ stated:“A decision that involves jurisdictional error is a decision that lacks legal foundation and is properly regarded, in law, as no decision at all.” And at [53]:“… it follows that, if the duty of the decision-maker is to make a decision with respect to a person’s rights but, because of jurisdictional error, he or she proceeds to make what is, in law, no decision at all, then, in law, the duty to make a decision remains unperformed.”And at [153] where Callinan J stated that:“Once it is recognised that a court could set it aside for jurisdictional error, the decision can be seen to have no relevant legal consequences.” The Applicant also referred the Court to Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 (“Plaintiff S157/2002”) at 506; 509) where the High Court of Australia held that an administrative decision which involved a jurisdictional error was no decision at all and is therefore not a privative clause decision as defined in s.474 of the Act. The High Court found that a privative clause decision does not extend to include a decision apparently or purportedly made under the Act. In Bhardwaj, the High Court of Australia found that the tribunal was entitled to complete its review by correcting in a second decision a jurisdictional error in the first decision. The High Court found that in the first decision, the tribunal had not conducted a review as required by the Act and as such had failed to exercise jurisdiction. Counsel for the Applicant then took the Court to various authorities that had applied the principles in Bhardwaj (SZHSQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1295 per Rares J at [59]; SZIMG v Minister for immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 368 per Rares J at [24]; Keen v Telstra Corporation Limited (2006) 230 ALR 313 per Rares J at [29]; Tervonen v Minister for Justice and Customs (No.2) [2007] FCA 1684 per Rares J at [115]). However, none of these cases raised the issue before this Court of the legal effect of a decision affected by error where, upon judicial review of the decision of the administrative body, Constitutional writ relief was refused. Bhardwaj cannot be understood to stand for the proposition that jurisdictional error on the part of an administrative decision-maker always means that the decision is no decision or a decision without legal consequences (Ma v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 69 at [27]). Bhardwaj did not consider the circumstances where, having found that a decision-maker has made a decision infected by jurisdictional error, the Court refuses to issue Constitutional writs in the exercise of its discretion. The refusal to issue Constitutional writs means that the Court will not compel the decision-maker to treat the decision as no decision at all (Lansen v Minister for Environment and Heritage [2008] FCAFC 189 at [166]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The authorities have made clear that an invalid administrative decision can have operational effect under some statutes, such as where it may be necessary to treat an invalid decision as valid because no person seeks to have it set aside or ignored. The consequence may be the same if a court has refused to declare an administrative decision to be invalid for discretionary reasons (Leung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 79 FCR 400 at 413 (“Leung”); Bhardwaj per Gleeson CJ). In Leung, Finkelstein J, with whom Beaumont and Heerey JJ agreed, stated at 413 as follows:“There is no doubt that an invalid administrative decision can have operational effect. For example it may be necessary to treat an invalid administrative decision as valid because no person seeks to have it set aside or ignored. The consequence may be the same if a court has refused to declare an administrative decision to be invalid for a discretionary reason. In some circumstances the particular statute in pursuance of which the purported decision was taken may indicate that it is to have effect even though it is invalid or that it will have effect until it is set aside.” (emphasis added) Section 5(9) must be construed in light of the purpose of the scheme of the relevant legislation. It is clear that the purpose of s.198 and s.5(9) is to bring to finality the dispute between the parties. To that end, the legislation ought to be construed so as to give effect to that purposive intention (s.15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901). The provisions of s.198 concerning removal are mandatory in that an officer must remove as soon as practicable an unlawful non-citizen in the circumstances variously specified in s.198. The relevant provisions should be construed so as to enable identification with precision the point of time when an application has been finally determined. Neither s.198 nor s.5(9) refer to a “valid decision”. A “decision” in s.5(9) ought be construed so as to give effect to the purpose of the legislation, which is to identify the point of time when an application for a protection visa made under the Act is no longer subject to any form of review and the litigation between the parties is at an end. It is no longer open to the Applicant to impugn or challenge the validity of the Tribunal’s decision dated 26 July 2001. The Applicant could not commence a fresh proceeding for Constitutional writ relief in respect of that decision without being met by a defence of res judicata or issue estoppel, since the question of his entitlement to Constitutional writ relief in respect of that decision was finally determined by Cameron FM when His Honour dismissed the Applicant’s application for such relief. In short, the Tribunal has purported to make a decision. That decision has not been set aside. No other person has standing to challenge the validity of the decision. It may be that, where the Tribunal has purported to make a decision which is affected by jurisdictional error, the Tribunal could of its own motion reconsider that decision because of that error. In those circumstances, the Tribunal’s review may not yet be complete. However, that is not the question raised by the language of s.5(9).