Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ

Matter No S395/2002

APPELLANT S395/2002  APPELLANT

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS   RESPONDENT

Matter No S396/2002

APPELLANT S396/2002  APPELLANT

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS   RESPONDENT

Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Appellant S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

[2003] HCA 71
9 December 2003
S395/2002 and S396/2002

ORDER

In each matter:

1.Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 February 2002 and, in place thereof, order that:

(a)     the appeal be allowed with costs; and

(b)the orders of Lindgren J dated 26 July 2001 be set aside and, in place thereof, order that:

(i)the application be granted with costs;

(ii)the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 5 February 2001 be set aside; and

(iii)the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for re-determination.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

B Levet with P de Dassel for the appellants (instructed by Bharati Solicitors)

S J Gageler SC with S B Lloyd for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Intervener:

J W K Burnside QC with S E Pritchard appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of Amnesty International Australia (instructed by Allens Arthur Robinson)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 476(1)(e).

  1. GLEESON CJ.   The system of judicial review of administrative action, as it operates in relation to visa applications by people seeking acceptance as refugees, often means that, by the time a case reaches this Court, it is at the fifth level of decision-making.  It may be, as in this case, that there have been adverse decisions at the first and second levels (the Minister's delegate and the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal")) and that the Tribunal's decision has been upheld at the third (Federal Court of Australia) and fourth (Full Court of the Federal Court) levels.  It may not be surprising that, at the fifth level, an appellant will look for a new way of putting a case that has already failed on four occasions.  The case put to this Court may bear little relationship to what was previously advanced, considered, and rejected.  There is a risk that criticism of the reasoning of a decision-maker at an earlier stage might overlook the forensic context in which such reasoning was expressed; a context that may have changed almost beyond recognition.  Proceedings before the Tribunal are not adversarial; and issues are not defined by pleadings, or any analogous process.  Even so, this Court has insisted that, on judicial review, a decision of the Tribunal must be considered in the light of the basis upon which the application was made, not upon an entirely different basis which may occur to an applicant, or an applicant's lawyers, at some later stage in the process[1].

    [1]Re Minister for…

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Details
Case
[2003] HCA 71
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs*, the High Court of Australia considered appeals by two Bangladeshi nationals who sought Protection Visas. The appellants, who identified as homosexual men, claimed a well-founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh. Their applications were refused by the respondent, and this decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The matter proceeded to the Federal Court and ultimately to the High Court.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Refugee Review Tribunal had erred in law by finding that the appellants did not face a real chance of persecution because they conducted themselves discreetly and would continue to do so. This raised the question of whether a requirement to act discreetly to avoid serious harm constituted persecution under the Refugee Convention. The Court also considered whether the appellants' chosen mode of conduct was voluntary and whether it would provoke persecution.

The High Court accepted the respondent's submissions, finding that the Tribunal had not imposed a requirement of discretion on the appellants. Instead, the appellants had chosen to live discreetly, a choice not dictated by external imposition or fear of persecution. The Court distinguished between persecution and disapproval, even strong disapproval, noting that the drafters of the Convention were addressing refugees in the context of post-World War II Europe and not seeking to guarantee all human rights. The appellants had not demonstrated that any expression or manifestation of their homosexuality was likely to provoke persecution, nor did they express a desire to engage in activities aimed at securing greater toleration of homosexuality.

In each matter, the High Court allowed the appeal with costs. The orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court were set aside, and in their place, the appeals to the Federal Court were allowed with costs. The orders of Lindgren J were also set aside, with the applications granted with costs, the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal set aside, and the matters remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination.

Orders

Orders of the court

In each matter:

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 February 2002 and, in place thereof, order that:

(a) the appeal be allowed with costs; and

(b) the orders of Lindgren J dated 26 July 2001 be set aside and, in place thereof, order that:

(i) the application be granted with costs;

(ii) the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 5 February 2001 be set aside; and

(iii) the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for re-determination.

Background

Background to the litigation

The question in this case was not, as the appellants contended, whether, absent imposed or enforced discretion as to their homosexuality, they would be likely to be persecuted in their country of nationality and residence, but whether their mode of conduct was voluntarily chosen, and had and would not provoke persecution of them.The facts The appellants, who are homosexuals, are Bangladeshi nationals. They have lived together since 1994. According to one of them, in Bangladesh, "homosexuality is not open and not acceptable like many other countries in the world." His family is of the Muslim faith. The other appellant's history included an account of his loss of a position that he had held in Bangladesh and in respect of which the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"), in affirming the decision of the delegate of the respondent to refuse them Protection Visas, said this[42]:"When his 1981 dismissal was discussed, [that appellant] said that he had lost his job because he had raped young men from the office who came to visit him in his room. These people had complained and he lost his job. I asked him to clarify that he had forced these men to have sex with him when they did not want to. He said that this was correct and confirmed that this was the reason that he had lost his job. He said that no other action had been taken against him."There was evidence before the Tribunal that s 377 of the Penal Code of Bangladesh provides as follows:"Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." The appellants did not suggest that they were likely to be prosecuted under this provision and placed no reliance on it. This was probably because there was evidence before the Tribunal from a knowledgable lawyer that he could not recall a prosecution under the section during the last 20 years. [42]RRT Reference N99/28381; N99/28382, 5 February 2001 at 12. The appellants entered Australia in February 1999. They applied to the respondent for Protection Visas on 4 March 1999. Their applications were refused. They applied to the Tribunal for a review of that refusal on 17 May 1999. In order to obtain a Protection Visa the appellants had to satisfy the Tribunal that they were refugees who[43]:"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."[43]Article 1A(2) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ HUGH AND KIRBY JJ GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ
The respondent submits, contrary to the assertion of the appellants, that the Tribunal did not impose a requirement of discretion: that neither in form nor in substance did the Tribunal find that the appellants were bound to, or must, for their own protection, live discreetly in Bangladesh. The appellants had in fact, and would in all likelihood continue to live, as a matter of choice, quietly without flaunting their homosexuality. These were not men who wished to proclaim their homosexuality. Living as they did, they were not oppressed. Discretion, it was put, was purely a matter of choice and not of external imposition. No one required them, as Lindgren J pointed out, ever to modify their behaviour.The decision The submissions of the respondent should be accepted. It is clear that the appellants did not seek to make a case that they wished to express their homosexuality in other than a discreet, indeed personal, way. There may be good reason, divorced entirely from fear, for this. They may have wished to avoid disapproval of the, or a significant section of the, society in which they lived, perhaps even marked disapproval. There is a great difference however between persecution and disapproval, even strongly expressed disapproval. As Kennedy J in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Zia Mehmet Binbasi[61] points out, persecution is a strong word. In 1951 those who drafted the Convention were not seeking to guarantee all human rights. Rather they were seeking to deal with refugees in the context of the immediate aftermath in Europe of the Second World War[62]. More likely, as is the case with many, the appellants here regarded their sexual preference and activities as personal and not public matters, and ones therefore that required no public or overt expression.[61][1989] Imm AR 595 at 599. On the other hand, it has been accepted in the United States that the harm inflicted on homosexuals in some other countries has been so damaging that it clearly amounts to persecution. See the summary in Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States, 3rd ed (1999) at 394-395.[62]See the original definition of "refugee" in Art 1 of the Convention. The appellants were unable to satisfy the Tribunal that there were any expressions or manifestations of their homosexuality which had, or were likely to provoke persecution of them. It was not suggested that they had or wished to engage in "sexual politics" or other politics, to secure greater toleration of homosexuality in the society in which they lived, or indeed that they had any interest in living in other than a relatively private, domestic way. This is by no means unusual. In many societies, both heterosexual and homosexual couples regard their domestic and sexual arrangements and activities as entirely private. So too, in all societies, there are greatly varying views, and indeed laws, about what is or is not acceptable, conventional, or proper sexual conduct or practice, both heterosexual and homosexual. And the same may readily be said about other expressions of identity, not merely sexual. These may well be matters of cultural and national interest in respect of which there may be great divergence of opinion and, in consequence, laws, from nation to nation. For example, in Ireland the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 58, makes abortion a felony punishable by imprisonment for life and other legislation has restricted access to contraceptive devices[63] and also access to information about abortion[64]. It is not necessarily beyond argument that sexual inclination or practice necessarily defines a social class[65], a matter which was not raised here but seems to have been assumed.[63]See the Health (Family Planing) Act 1979 (Ireland).[64]See the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995 (Ireland).[65]In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Zia Mehmet Binbasi [1989] Imm AR 595 at 599, Kennedy J neither rejected nor accepted an argument to that effect.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, HUGH AND KIRBY JJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ