HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJMatter No S395/2002
APPELLANT S395/2002 APPELLANT
AND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS RESPONDENTMatter No S396/2002
APPELLANT S396/2002 APPELLANT
AND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS RESPONDENTAppellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
Appellant S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2003] HCA 71
9 December 2003
S395/2002 and S396/2002ORDER
In each matter:
1.Appeal allowed with costs.
2.Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 February 2002 and, in place thereof, order that:
(a) the appeal be allowed with costs; and
(b)the orders of Lindgren J dated 26 July 2001 be set aside and, in place thereof, order that:
(i)the application be granted with costs;
(ii)the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 5 February 2001 be set aside; and
(iii)the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for re-determination.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation:
B Levet with P de Dassel for the appellants (instructed by Bharati Solicitors)
S J Gageler SC with S B Lloyd for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
Intervener:
J W K Burnside QC with S E Pritchard appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of Amnesty International Australia (instructed by Allens Arthur Robinson)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 476(1)(e).
GLEESON CJ. The system of judicial review of administrative action, as it operates in relation to visa applications by people seeking acceptance as refugees, often means that, by the time a case reaches this Court, it is at the fifth level of decision-making. It may be, as in this case, that there have been adverse decisions at the first and second levels (the Minister's delegate and the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal")) and that the Tribunal's decision has been upheld at the third (Federal Court of Australia) and fourth (Full Court of the Federal Court) levels. It may not be surprising that, at the fifth level, an appellant will look for a new way of putting a case that has already failed on four occasions. The case put to this Court may bear little relationship to what was previously advanced, considered, and rejected. There is a risk that criticism of the reasoning of a decision-maker at an earlier stage might overlook the forensic context in which such reasoning was expressed; a context that may have changed almost beyond recognition. Proceedings before the Tribunal are not adversarial; and issues are not defined by pleadings, or any analogous process. Even so, this Court has insisted that, on judicial review, a decision of the Tribunal must be considered in the light of the basis upon which the application was made, not upon an entirely different basis which may occur to an applicant, or an applicant's lawyers, at some later stage in the process[1].
[1]Re Minister for…
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- Case
- [2003] HCA 71
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Refugee Review Tribunal had erred in law by finding that the appellants did not face a real chance of persecution because they conducted themselves discreetly and would continue to do so. This raised the question of whether a requirement to act discreetly to avoid serious harm constituted persecution under the Refugee Convention. The Court also considered whether the appellants' chosen mode of conduct was voluntary and whether it would provoke persecution.
The High Court accepted the respondent's submissions, finding that the Tribunal had not imposed a requirement of discretion on the appellants. Instead, the appellants had chosen to live discreetly, a choice not dictated by external imposition or fear of persecution. The Court distinguished between persecution and disapproval, even strong disapproval, noting that the drafters of the Convention were addressing refugees in the context of post-World War II Europe and not seeking to guarantee all human rights. The appellants had not demonstrated that any expression or manifestation of their homosexuality was likely to provoke persecution, nor did they express a desire to engage in activities aimed at securing greater toleration of homosexuality.
In each matter, the High Court allowed the appeal with costs. The orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court were set aside, and in their place, the appeals to the Federal Court were allowed with costs. The orders of Lindgren J were also set aside, with the applications granted with costs, the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal set aside, and the matters remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination.
Orders
Orders of the court
In each matter:
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 February 2002 and, in place thereof, order that:
(a) the appeal be allowed with costs; and
(b) the orders of Lindgren J dated 26 July 2001 be set aside and, in place thereof, order that:
(i) the application be granted with costs;
(ii) the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 5 February 2001 be set aside; and
(iii) the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for re-determination.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, HUGH AND KIRBY JJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ