Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS   APPELLANT

AND

FATHIA MOHAMMED YUSUF  RESPONDENT

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf

[2001] HCA 30

31 May 2001
M10/2000

ORDER

1.   Appeal allowed.

2.   Appellant to pay respondent's costs of the appeal.

3.   Set aside order 1 made by the Full Court of the Federal Court on 2 December 1999, and in place thereof, order that:

a)     the appeal to that Court be allowed;

b)orders 1 and 3 of the orders made by Finn J on 30 August 1999 be set aside and in place thereof, order that the application for review be dismissed.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

R R S Tracey QC with A L Cavanough QC and P R D Gray for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

J Basten QC with J A Gibson for the respondent (instructed by Victoria Legal Aid)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

RE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

EX PARTE FATHIA MOHAMMED YUSUF          PROSECUTOR/APPLICANT

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Yusuf
31 May 2001
M126/2000

ORDER

Application dismissed with no order as to costs.

Representation:

J Basten QC with J A Gibson for the prosecutor/applicant (instructed by Victoria Legal Aid)

R R S Tracey QC with A L Cavanough QC and P R D Gray for the first respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

No appearance for the second respondent

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS   APPELLANT

AND

OGANES ISRAELIAN  RESPONDENT

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Israelian
31 May 2001
M13/2000

ORDER

1.   Appeal allowed.

2.   Appellant to pay respondent's costs of the appeal.

3.   Set aside so much of the order made by the Full Court of the Federal Court on 20 May 1999 as dismissed the appeal to that Court, and in place thereof, order that:

a)     the appeal to that Court be allowed;

b)orders 1, 2 and 3 of the orders made by R D Nicholson J on 1 May 1998 be set aside and in place thereof, order that the application for review be dismissed.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

R R S Tracey QC with A L Cavanough QC and P R D Gray for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

B A Keon-Cohen QC with J A Gibson for the respondent (instructed by Armstrong Ross)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

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Details
Case
[2001] HCA 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs against decisions of the Federal Court that had set aside decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The primary dispute concerned whether the RRT had failed to comply with its obligations under section 430(1)(c) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) by not making and setting out findings on all objectively material questions of fact. This failure was argued to constitute a jurisdictional error, rendering the RRT's decisions reviewable under section 476 of the Act.

The legal issues before the High Court included the scope of the grounds for judicial review under Part 8 of the *Migration Act*, specifically whether an improper exercise of power or want of evidence, as defined in section 476, encompassed failures to consider relevant considerations or make findings on material facts. The Court also had to determine the nature and extent of the duty imposed by section 430(1)(c) on the RRT to record its decisions and set out findings on all objectively material questions of fact, and whether a failure to do so constituted a procedural error in connection with the making of the decision, as contemplated by section 476(1)(a).

The High Court reasoned that section 476(1)(a) of the *Migration Act*, which allows for review of decisions where a procedure required by the Act in connection with the making of the decision has not been observed, extends to the procedural requirements of section 430. However, the Court clarified that section 430(1)(c) does not impose a duty on the RRT to make findings on every conceivable question of fact, but rather on those questions that are objectively material to the decision. The Court found that the Federal Court had erred in its interpretation of section 430(1)(c) and section 476(1)(a) by treating the failure to make express findings on certain facts as a jurisdictional error. The Court allowed the Minister's appeals, setting aside the orders of the Federal Court and dismissing the applications for review.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Appellant to pay respondent's costs of the appeal.

3. Set aside order 1 made by the Full Court of the Federal Court on 2 December 1999, and in place thereof, order that:

a) the appeal to that Court be allowed;

b) orders 1 and 3 of the orders made by Finn J on 30 August 1999 be set aside and in place thereof, order that the application for review be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The grounds specified in ss 476(1)(d) and (g) of the Act – improper exercise of power and want of evidence – are circumscribed, respectively, by sub-ss (3) and (4) of that section. It is necessary to refer only to sub-s (3) which provides:" The reference in paragraph (1)(d) to an improper exercise of a power is to be construed as being a reference to:(a)an exercise of a power for a purpose other than a purpose for which the power is conferred; and(b)an exercise of a personal discretionary power at the direction or behest of another person; and(c)an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case;but not as including a reference to:(d)taking an irrelevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power; or(e)failing to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power; or(f)an exercise of a discretionary power in bad faith; or(g)any other exercise of the power in such a way that represents an abuse of the power that is not covered by paragraphs (a) to (c)."Background facts and the Tribunal's decisionsMs Yusuf Ms Yusuf sought a protection visa on the basis that she was a refugee as defined in the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 (together referred to as "the Convention")[11]. More particularly, she claimed she had a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of race if returned to Somalia.[11]Article 1A(2) defines a refugee as any person who:"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." In support of her claim that she was a refugee as defined in the Convention, Ms Yusuf gave an account of her home in Mogadishu being invaded and of her husband being attacked by members of another clan, the Hawiye. As a result, she claimed, her husband had to run away and she and her children were left behind. She also claimed that, on two later occasions, she was attacked by members of the Hawiye clan when she left her home to go shopping. On both occasions, she said, she was rescued by neighbours who were also members of the Hawiye clan. In a supplementary statement, Ms Yusuf claimed that her sister and three of her sister's children had been killed by members of the Hawiye. According to that statement, her sister's husband and one child survived and, in accordance with tradition, she was required to marry and, in fact, married her sister's husband. The Tribunal rejected Ms Yusuf's claims with respect to her sister and her sister's children but accepted that she had twice been attacked by members of the Hawiye clan. However, the Tribunal found that her clan membership was not the motive for those attacks. In so finding, the Tribunal noted that there was advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade that the Abaskul clan, of which Ms Yusuf was a member, was not targetted by the Hawiye. The Tribunal also noted that, on the occasions when she was attacked, Ms Yusuf had been rescued by members of the latter clan.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ GAUDRON J HUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ KIRBY J (dissent)
By reason of the findings set out above, the Tribunal concluded that Mr Israelian was not a refugee as defined in the Convention and, thus, not entitled to a protection visa.The Federal Court decisions At first instance, it was held by the Federal Court (Finn J) that Ms Yusuf's claim that her home had been invaded and her husband forced to flee was a material question of fact upon which the Tribunal was required by s 430(1)(c) of the Act to make findings in the written statement setting out its decision. Because it had not, it was held pursuant to s 476(1)(a) that a procedure required by the Act in connection with the making of a decision had not been observed. Accordingly, the Tribunal's decision was set aside. As already mentioned, that decision was upheld by the Full Federal Court. In the case of Mr Israelian, it was held by the Federal Court (R D Nicholson J), at first instance, that his application for review should be allowed and the Tribunal's decision set aside because the Tribunal failed to consider whether "the International Community through the [High Commissioner] had condemned the military action in [Nagorno-Karabakh] as contrary to basic rules of human conduct and whether [in] all the circumstances of the matter, deserters and/or draft evaders in Armenia were a particular social group; that is defined, united or linked otherwise than by the fear of the allegedly persecutory law." Because of the Tribunal's failure to consider the matters set out above, it was held that "[its] decision [with respect to Mr Israelian] involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law." Further, it was held that that failure was a failure to set out findings on material questions of fact as required by s 430(1)(c) of the Act and, therefore, a failure to observe procedures required by the Act. That latter holding was affirmed by the Full Court. The Full Court had no reason to consider and, in fact, did not consider whether the decision also involved an error of law.Section 430 of the Act and procedures required by the Act At the relevant time, s 430 of the Act was headed "Refugee Review Tribunal to record its decisions etc and to notify parties". Logically, the making of a decision and the recording of it are distinct steps. Were the ground of review allowed by s 476(1)(a) expressed in terms of procedures to be observed in the making of a decision, there might, perhaps, be some scope for an argument that it does not extend to procedures to be observed in recording a decision. However, the phrase used in s 476(1)(a) is "in connection with the making of the decision" – a phrase signifying a less precise connection than "in the making of the decision". Moreover, s 430 is not concerned solely with the recording of a decision. In terms, it is also concerned with the "prepar[ation of] a written statement that ... sets out the decision of the Tribunal". Notwithstanding that the making of a decision and the recording of a decision are logically distinct steps, the making of a decision and the preparation of a written statement setting out that decision often constitute a single process. Given that that is so and given, also, that the expression used in s 476(1)(a) is "in connection with the making of [a] decision", there is no basis for reading s 476(1)(a) as not extending to the procedures required by s 430 of the Act. However, that is not, of itself, determinative of the question raised by the Minister's appeals: there remains a question as to the nature and extent of the procedure required by s 430(1)(c).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GAUDRON J, HUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ,

The court's reasoning in the case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf centred on several pivotal issues regarding the interpretation and application of s 430(1)(c) and s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court first addressed whether s 430(1)(c) imposes a duty or obligation on the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) to make and set out findings on all objectively material questions of fact. The court examined the language of s 430(1)(c), which mandates that the RRT prepare a written statement setting out its decision. Given the integral connection between making a decision and recording it, the court concluded that the procedures required by s 430 encompass both the decision-making process and its documentation. Therefore, the failure to make findings on material questions of fact in the written statement equates to a procedural error.

Turning to the second issue, the court considered whether the RRT's failure to refer to an alternative basis of an applicant's claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution constitutes a ground for judicial review under s 476. The court found that such an omission could indeed constitute an error of law, as it involves an incorrect interpretation of applicable law. This error was deemed significant enough to warrant judicial review under s 476, as it undermined the RRT's ability to properly assess the applicant's claim.

The third issue involved whether the RRT's omission to address one of three alleged past acts, which were significant to an applicant's claim of a well-founded fear of persecution, constitutes a ground for judicial review. The court held that the failure to make an express finding on a material aspect of a claim reflects an error in the decision-making process and is therefore reviewable under s 476. The court emphasized the importance of considering all relevant evidence to ensure a fair and comprehensive evaluation of the claim.

Further, the court addressed whether the RRT's failure to consider certain legal issues relevant to an applicant's claim constitutes an error of law and thus a ground for judicial review. The court affirmed that such omissions could indeed be grounds for review, as they involve misinterpretation or misapplication of the law. This finding was grounded in the principle that the RRT must correctly identify and apply the relevant legal standards to the facts of the case.

The court then examined whether the failure to set out findings on material questions of fact as required by s 430(1)(c) constitutes a failure to observe procedures required by the Act. The court concluded that such a failure does indeed represent a procedural error, as the preparation of a written statement setting out the decision is a procedural requirement under s 430. The omission of material findings in this statement breaches the statutory obligation to document the decision-making process comprehensively.

Lastly, the court interpreted the phrase "in connection with the making of a decision" in s 476(1)(a) to extend to the procedures required by s 430. The court found that the phrase signifies a less precise but inclusive connection, thereby encompassing both the decision-making and documentation processes. This interpretation was supported by the logical interdependence of these steps and the broad scope intended by the legislature in s 476(1)(a).

In summary, the court's decisions established that the RRT's failure to make and document findings on all material questions of fact, as well as its failure to properly consider relevant legal issues, constitute procedural errors that warrant judicial review under s 476 of the Act. These decisions reinforce the importance of thorough and legally sound decision-making processes in refugee claims.