R v Toohey; ex parte Northern Land Council

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gibbs C.J., Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin and Wilson JJ.

THE QUEEN v. TOOHEY; Ex parte NORTHERN LAND COUNCIL

(1981) 151 CLR 170

24 December 1981

Crown—Northern Territory

Crown—Regulations—Validity—Whether within power—Whether examinable by Court—Purpose—Planning Act 1979 (N.T.), s. 4(1)—Planning Regulations (N.T.), reg. 5, Sch. 3. Northern Territory—Administrator—Whether representative of Crown in Territory—Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth), ss. 31, 32, 51.

Decisions


1981, December. 24.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
GIBBS C.J. This is an application for a writ of certiorari to quash a decision made on 20 December 1979 by Toohey J., sitting as an Aboriginal Land Commissioner under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) as amended ("the Land Rights Act") to hear a matter known as the Kenbi Land Claim, and for a writ of mandamus directing Toohey J. to exercise his jurisdiction under the Land Rights Act and hear the claim. An application for prohibition was also made, but not strongly pressed. Kenbi is the Aboriginal name for the Cox Peninsula in the Northern Territory. An application was, on 20 March 1979, made to the Commissioner by the prosecutor, the Northern Land Council, on behalf of Aboriginals claiming to have a traditional land claim to a substantial area of the Cox Peninsula and to islands and reefs lying off the coast of the peninsula. The application was made under s. 50(1)(a) of the Land Rights Act which provides as follows:
"(1) The functions of the Commissioner are -
(a) on an application being made to the Commissioner by or on behalf of Aboriginals claiming to have a traditional land claim to an area of land, being unalienated Crown land or alienated Crown land in which all estates and interests not held by the Crown are held by, or on behalf of, Aboriginals - (i) to ascertain whether those Aboriginals or any other Aboriginals are the traditional Aboriginal owners of the land; and (ii) to report his findings to the Minister and to the Administrator of the Northern Territory, and, where he finds that there are Aboriginals who are the traditional Aboriginal owners of the land, to make recommendations to the Minister for the granting of the land or any part of the land in accordance with sections 11 and 12." By s. 3(1), "unalienated Crown land" is defined so as not to include land in a town, and "town" is defined as follows:
"'town' has the same meaning as in the law of the Northern Territory relating to the planning and developing of towns and the use of land in or near towns, and includes any area that, by virtue of regulations in force under that law, is to be treated as a town."
On 20 December 1979 the Commissioner held that a large part of the land the subject of the claim was land in a town within the meaning of the Land Rights Act, and was not available to be claimed as unalienated Crown land under…
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Details
Case
[1981] HCA 74
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an application for a writ of prohibition brought by the Northern Land Council against Mr. Toohey, the Administrator of the Northern Territory. The dispute concerned the validity of regulations made by the Administrator under the *Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978* (Cth) and the *Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976* (Cth). The Northern Land Council sought to prevent the Administrator from exercising certain powers under these regulations, which they contended were beyond his legislative authority.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Administrator had the power to make regulations that would permit mining operations on Aboriginal land without the consent of the traditional Aboriginal owners. Specifically, the Court had to determine the scope of the Administrator's legislative power under the *Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978* and whether this power was constrained by the provisions of the *Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976*, particularly concerning the protection of Aboriginal land rights.

The Court reasoned that the *Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976* established a comprehensive scheme for the protection and management of Aboriginal land, including a requirement for consent for mining activities. It was held that the *Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978* did not grant the Administrator power to override these fundamental protections. The Court applied the principle of statutory interpretation that a later, specific Act (the *Land Rights Act*) would prevail over an earlier, general Act (the *Self-Government Act*) where there was a conflict, especially when the later Act was designed to protect specific rights. The Court found that the regulations in question purported to authorise actions that were inconsistent with the rights conferred by the *Land Rights Act*, and therefore, the Administrator had acted *ultra vires*.

The High Court made absolute the order nisi for a writ of prohibition, restraining the Administrator from making or purporting to make the regulations in question.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Northern Land Council sought to have a claim for traditional land rights by Aboriginals on Cox Peninsula, Northern Territory, heard by the Aboriginal Land Commissioner, Justice Toohey. The claim was denied as the land in question was deemed to be "land in a town" and therefore not "unalienated Crown land" under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth). The Council sought a writ of certiorari to quash the decision and a writ of mandamus to compel the Commissioner to hear the claim. The case hinged on whether the Cox Peninsula was "unalienated Crown land" and whether the Planning Regulations, which declared it "land in a town," were valid. The Council argued that even if the land was once unalienated Crown land, subsequent changes in the status of the land did not affect the application. They also challenged the validity of the Planning Regulations on the grounds that they served no useful purpose and were made for an improper purpose. The Commissioner held that the Administrator, who made the regulations, represented the Crown and therefore his motives could not be questioned. The Council contended that the Administrator was not the Crown's representative and that the courts could examine the purpose behind the regulations. The High Court found that the Commissioner was wrong in refusing to consider the ulterior purpose of the regulations and that the validity of the regulations could be challenged on the grounds that they were made for a purpose not authorised by the statute. The Court ordered a writ of mandamus to compel the Commissioner to hear the claim according to law.

This case concerns an application for a writ of certiorari to quash a decision made by Toohey J., sitting as an Aboriginal Land Commissioner under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) ("the Land Rights Act") in relation to a matter known as the Kenbi Land Claim. The application was made by the prosecutor, the Northern Land Council, on behalf of Aboriginals claiming to have a traditional land claim to an area of land, being unalienated Crown land or alienated Crown land in which all estates and interests not held by the Crown are held by, or on behalf of, Aboriginals. The application was made under s. 50(1)(a) of the Land Rights Act. The Commissioner held that a large part of the land the subject of the claim was land in a town within the meaning of the Land Rights Act, and was not available to be claimed as unalienated Crown land under s. 50(1)(a). The land which the Commissioner held to be land in a town was specified in schedule 3 to the Planning Regulations made by the Administrator of the Northern Territory under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.). The most important question in the case is whether, and if so on what grounds, the validity of this regulation is open to challenge. The Northern Land Council submitted that the Commissioner may and should exercise the function conferred on him by s. 50(1)(a) if the land in question is unalienated Crown land at the time when a claim to it is made, and that the fact that the land has subsequently ceased to be unalienated Crown land is irrelevant to the question whether the Commissioner should proceed to discharge his function. The Commissioner rejected this submission, holding that the motives of the Administrator in making the regulation could not be called in question, and that bad faith may not be imputed to him, and that it is therefore not appropriate to inquire into the motives with which he made a regulation. However, he said that if a particular purpose is made an express condition of exercising a power, and the purpose is not pursued, the power is not validly exercised. He concluded that the efficacy of the Planning Regulations "depends upon the land specified having some connection with a town planning purpose", and that the onus of proving that the exercise of power was not reasonably capable of fulfilling a town planning purpose lay on the claimants. The Northern Land Council submitted that the Planning Act is not "the law of the Northern Territory relating to the planning and developing of towns and the use of land in or near towns" within the meaning of those words in the definition of "town" in the Land Rights Act. The Commissioner held that the Planning Act does relate to the planning and developing of towns and the use of land in or near towns although it relates to the use of other land as well. The Northern Land Council submitted that reg. 5 of the Planning Regulations is invalid. The Commissioner held that reg. 5 was within the powers conferred on the Administrator by s. 165(1) of the Planning Act, being a regulation which prescribed a matter permitted to be prescribed and (if it matters) prescribed for giving effect to par. (c) of the definition of "town". The Northern Land Council submitted that the Commissioner was wrong in holding that the Administrator was the representative of the Crown in the Northern Territory, and that it was not permissible to inquire into the reason why the Administrator made the regulations or to impute bad faith to him. It was submitted that the Commissioner should have inquired into the question whether reg. 5 of the Planning Regulations was made for the purpose of defeating the claim by the Aboriginals to the land described in Sch. 3, or of converting that land into land that was not within the description contained in s. 50(1)(a) so that the Commissioner could not entertain the application made with respect to it. The Commissioner rejected this submission, holding that the Administrator is the representative of the Crown, and that the doctrine of Crown immunity applied so as to preclude a court from questioning the motive behind his actions. The Commissioner was wrong in holding that the Administrator is the representative of the Crown, and that the doctrine of Crown immunity applied so as to preclude a court from questioning the motive behind his actions. The Administrator is not the representative of the Crown, and the doctrine of Crown immunity does not apply in this case. The Commissioner was also wrong in holding that the regulation in question in order to be valid must be capable of fulfilling a town planning purpose, and further that he erred in placing an onus on the applicant to establish its invalidity. Once it be recognized that the test of adjacency to a town which was required in respect of the similar power in the earlier Town Planning Act no longer applies, with the consequence that land in the Territory may be specified as land which is to be treated as a town whether or not it is adjacent to a town, no court can determine whether or not that land is capable of fulfilling a town planning purpose. The answer might be thought to depend on the existence of proposals under the Planning Act to promote its development as a town rather than as a region. But there is no requirement that any particular steps in that direction must have been taken before the power to make the regulation is exercised. Although in the present case the Commissioner was furnished with evidence of long-term proposals having a town planning significance touching the land in question, which led him to find the issue against the applicant, it is difficult to see why the validity of the regulation should have depended upon the fact that those proposals happened to be in existence at that time. It would be otherwise if the exercise of the power was tied into the promulgation of a town plan so that the two things were necessarily related in time, but that does not appear to be a requirement of the Act. It must also be said of the Planning Act that a regulation which specifies an area to be treated as a town cannot be said to be invalid merely because it precedes other procedures under the Act which when implemented will operate upon the specification. The Commissioner was wrong in holding that the Administrator is the representative of the Crown, and that the doctrine of Crown immunity applied so as to preclude a court from questioning the motive behind his actions. The Commissioner was also wrong in holding that the regulation in question in order to be valid must be capable of fulfilling a town planning purpose, and further that he erred in placing an onus on the applicant to establish its invalidity. The matter should be referred back to the Commissioner for him to proceed to deal with the application according to law. An order for mandamus should be made.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is the validity of the regulation under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.) open to challenge?
2. Does the Administrator of the Northern Territory represent the Crown and thus enjoy immunity from judicial scrutiny of his motives in making regulations?
3. Is the regulation under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.) made for an improper purpose, specifically to thwart the traditional land claim to the Cox Peninsula?
4. Can the Commissioner exercise his jurisdiction under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) despite the regulation under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.)?
5. What is the test for the validity of the regulation under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.)?
6. Does the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.), in relation to the regulation, satisfy the description of a law "relating to the planning and developing of towns and the use of land in or near towns"?

Held
1. The validity of the regulation under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.) is open to challenge; the Court concluded that the Commissioner erred in refusing to allow the argument of invalidity based on an ulterior purpose.
2. The Administrator of the Northern Territory does not represent the Crown and thus is not immune from judicial scrutiny of his motives in making regulations; the Court held that the Commissioner was wrong in holding that the Administrator represented the Crown.
3. The regulation under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.) was made for an improper purpose, specifically to thwart the traditional land claim to the Cox Peninsula; the Court found that the regulation was made for an ulterior purpose of placing the Peninsula beyond the reach of a land rights claim.
4. The Commissioner can exercise his jurisdiction under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) despite the regulation under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.); the Court held that the Commissioner has jurisdiction to entertain the application according to law.
5. The test for the validity of the regulation under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.) is not based on whether the regulation was capable of fulfilling a town planning purpose; the Court rejected the Commissioner's ruling on the test of validity.
6. The Planning Act 1979 (N.T.), in relation to the regulation, satisfies the description of a law "relating to the planning and developing of towns and the use of land in or near towns"; the Court concluded that the Planning Act could be described as such within the meaning of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The case of R v Toohey; ex parte Northern Land Council addresses several complex issues regarding the validity of a regulation under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.), the immunity of the Administrator from judicial scrutiny, the improper purpose of the regulation, the Commissioner's jurisdiction under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), and the interpretation of the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.).

**Validity of the Regulation:**
The court examined whether the regulation under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.) was open to challenge. It was established that the regulation, which designated the Cox Peninsula as an area to be treated as a town, was within the powers conferred by the Act. The court held that the regulation prescribed a matter permitted by the Act and was necessary for carrying out the Act's purpose, despite the argument that it was purposeless.

**Administrator’s Immunity:**
The court considered whether the Administrator of the Northern Territory, as the representative of the Crown, enjoys immunity from judicial scrutiny regarding his motives in making regulations. The court rejected the notion that the Administrator, as the representative of the Crown, could not be scrutinized for acting in bad faith or for improper purposes. It was held that the Administrator’s actions, even as the representative of the Crown, could be reviewed if they were beyond the statutory power granted.

**Improper Purpose of the Regulation:**
The court addressed whether the regulation was made for an improper purpose, specifically to thwart the traditional land claim to the Cox Peninsula. The court concluded that the regulation’s validity could be challenged if it was made for a purpose unauthorized by the statute. It was held that the Commissioner had jurisdiction to inquire into whether the regulation was made for an improper purpose.

**Commissioner’s Jurisdiction:**
The court examined whether the Commissioner could exercise his jurisdiction under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) despite the regulation under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.). It was determined that if the regulation was valid, the land in question was considered to be "land in a town" and thus not "unalienated Crown land" within the meaning of the Land Rights Act. However, if the regulation was found to be invalid, the Commissioner would have jurisdiction to hear the land claim.

**Test for Validity of the Regulation:**
The court outlined the test for the validity of the regulation, emphasizing that the onus of proving invalidity rested on the party challenging it. The court found the test proposed by the Commissioner, which required the land to be capable of fulfilling a town planning purpose, to be vague and not reflective of the statutory language.

**Description of the Planning Act:**
Lastly, the court considered whether the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.), in relation to the regulation, satisfied the description of a law "relating to the planning and developing of towns and the use of land in or near towns". The court held that the Planning Act, in relation to the specific regulation, did indeed relate to the planning and development of towns and the use of land in or near towns, thus excluding the Cox Peninsula from being "unalienated Crown land".

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the validity of regulations made by the Administrator under the Planning Act 1979 (N.T.) can be scrutinized by the courts for improper purposes, and the Administrator, even as the representative of the Crown, is not immune from such scrutiny. This decision expands the scope of judicial review and ensures that administrative actions comply with the statutory powers granted.