Cheryala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cheryala v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 43

Appeal from: Cheryala v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2261
File number: NSD 1635 of 2017
Judges: BESANKO, FLICK AND MCKERRACHER JJ
Date of judgment: 23 March 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – bridging visas – where Appellant charged with offences under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) – where Appellant’s bridging visa cancelled under reg 2.43(1)(p)(ii) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) on the basis of the charges – where all charges later withdrawn – where Appellant made a further application for a bridging visa – where application rejected as invalid in accordance with Item 1305(3)(g) of Sch 1 of the Migration Regulations because the applicant had previously held a visa that was cancelled on a ground specified in reg 2.43(1)(p)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – invalidity of regulation – whether regulation disproportionate to statutory power – whether reg 2.43(1)(p)(ii) or Item 1305(3)(g) of Sch 1 of the Migration Regulations invalid – whether reg  2.43(1)(p)(ii) or Item 1305(3)(g) “disproportionate” to the power conferred by s 504 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether reg 2.43(1)(p)(ii) or Item 1305(3)(g) infringe the presumption of innocence or the common law right to liberty of the person

Legislation:

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) s 4A

Industrial Relations Act1988 (Cth) s 299

Migration Act1958 (Cth) ss 4, 29, 31, 37, 42, 46, 65, 116, 118A, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 189, 338, 348, 476, 501, 504

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.01, 2.07, 2.25, 2.43, Sch 1 Item 1305

Crimes Act1900 (NSW) ss 86(1)(b), 61I, 61L

Local Government Act 1934 (SA) s 667

Cases cited:

Attorney-General (SA) v Adelaide City Corporation [2013] HCA 3, (2013) 249 CLR 1

Australian Maritime Officers’ Union v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 45, (2015) 230 FCR 523

BGM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 72, (2017) 155 ALD 450

Cheryala v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2261, (2017) 324 FLR 322

City ofFootscray v Maize Products Pty Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 301

Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1

CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 1, (2015) 255 CLR 514

Dai v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 199, (2007) 165 FCR 458

Dalla v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 998, (2016) 70 AAR 141

Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79

Evans v New South Wales [2008] FCAFC 130, (2008) 168 FCR 576

Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen [2015] HCA 14, (2015) 256 CLR 1

Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Huynh [2004] FCAFC 256, (2004) 139 FCR 505

Momcilovic v The Queen [2011] HCA 34, (2011) 245 CLR 1

Morton v Union Steamship Company of New…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Cheryala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection, the appellant, Mr Cheryala, sought to challenge the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss his application for a bridging visa. Mr Cheryala's previous visa had been cancelled, and he was subsequently charged with offences under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Following the withdrawal of these charges, Mr Cheryala applied for a new bridging visa, but his application was rejected under Item 1305(3)(g) of Sch 1 of the Migration Regulations because his previous visa had been cancelled on grounds specified in reg 2.43(1)(p). The primary legal issues for the court to determine were whether reg 2.43(1)(p)(ii) and Item 1305(3)(g) of the Migration Regulations were valid exercises of legislative power and whether they infringed upon the presumption of innocence or the common law right to liberty of the person.

The court found that the provisions in question did not exceed the legislative power conferred by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). It was held that Mr Cheryala's inability to make a valid application for a bridging visa was due to his status as someone who had previously held a visa that was cancelled on a specified ground, rather than being charged with an offence. The court also found that the provisions did not infringe upon the presumption of innocence or the common law right to liberty of the person, as there were mechanisms in place to review the decision to cancel the visa and to seek further review before the Federal Circuit Court. The court concluded that the relief sought by Mr Cheryala on appeal should be refused, and the Federal Circuit Court's decision was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The court held that neither reg 2.43(1)(p)(ii) nor Item 1305(3)(g) of Sch 1 of the Migration Regulations were beyond power or a disproportionate exercise of the power conferred by s 504 of the Migration Act to make Regulations consistent with the object of that Act. The decision highlighted the importance of following the proper legal procedures for challenging visa cancellation decisions and the availability of review mechanisms to address any potential unfairness.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant is to pay the costs of the Respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

That which precluded Mr Cheryala from being able to make a “valid application”, accordingly, was not his status as a person who had been “charged with an offence” (reg 2.43(1)(p)(ii)) but his status as a person who had “previously held a visa that [had] been cancelled on a ground specified in paragraph 2.43(1)(p)” (Item 1305(3)(g)). Even the alternative declaratory relief sought on behalf of Mr Cheryala as to the invalidity of Item 1305(3)(g) because it is a disproportionate exercise of legislative power failed to address the protections afforded by: ·the need for there to be a lawful exercise of the discretion conferred upon the Minister pursuant to s 116(1)(g) as to whether conduct could lawfully found a decision to cancel the visa; and ·the ability to seek review of the Minister’s decision, both before the Tribunal and the Federal Circuit Court.Although the facts and circumstances of any particular case would necessarily dictate any decision reached, it could well be the case that the more innocuous and trivial the conduct which has led to a visa applicant being charged with an offence the more unlikely it would be the case that the Minister could lawfully make a decision to cancel a visa. In the case of an adverse decision made by a delegate of the Minister (rather than the Minister personally), there would remain the prospect of seeking review on the merits before the Tribunal of such a decision. Either way, an applicant for a bridging visa is not precluded from making a valid application for such a visa by reason of his having been charged with an offence but rather by reason of a reviewable decision being made to cancel the visa. CONCLUSIONS It is concluded that the relief sought by Mr Cheryala on appeal should be refused. The Federal Circuit Court Judge was correct to reject the Application that was before that Court. Neither reg 2.43(1)(p)(ii) nor Item 1305(3)(g) of Sch 1 of the Migration Regulations are beyond power. Neither is a disproportionate exercise of the power conferred by s 504 of the Migration Act to make Regulations consistent with the object of that Act. On one view of the facts, it may perhaps be perceived that the facts have fallen in an unhappy sequence such as to occasion unfairness to Mr Cheryala. On that view of the facts, had Mr Cheryala exercised his right to seek review of the cancellation decision made on 22 June 2017, that application for review would in all probability not have been heard and resolved prior to the criminal charges being withdrawn on 9 August 2017. Indeed, the complainant (for whatever reason) had provided a witness statement dated 18 June 2017 indicating that she did “not wish to supply a formal statement or written version of events in relation to the incident” allegedly involving Mr Cheryala. It was unknown when Mr Cheryala became aware of the making of this statement. But the fate of any such application for review, had it been made, remains of course a matter of speculation.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appeal is to be dismissed. THE MIGRATION ACT & REGULATIONS The legislative provisions of present relevance are to be found interspersed throughout both the Migration Act and the Migration Regulations. The trail of discerning those provisions, however, is somewhat difficult to follow – at least without the benefit of Senior Counsel for the Respondent Minister spreading breadcrumbs along the path of judicial reasoning. Those provisions nevertheless start with s 4 of the Migration Act which sets forth as follows the object of the Act:Object of Act (1)The object of this Act is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens. (2)To advance its object, this Act provides for visas permitting non-citizens to enter or remain in Australia and the Parliament intends that this Act be the only source of the right of non-citizens to so enter or remain. (3)To advance its object, this Act provides for non-citizens and citizens to be required to provide personal identifiers for the purposes of this Act or the regulations. (4)To advance its object, this Act provides for the removal or deportation from Australia of non-citizens whose presence in Australia is not permitted by this Act. (5)To advance its object, this Act provides for the taking of unauthorised maritime arrivals from Australia to a regional processing country.Full effect should be given to the “object” set forth in s 4, including a matter as “broad” as the “national interest”: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Huynh [2004] FCAFC 256 at [74], (2004) 139 FCR 505 at 523 per Kiefel and Bennett JJ. Consistent with the object of the Act as set forth in s 4, s 29 provides a discretionary power upon the Minister to grant a visa. Section 31 provides for “prescribed classes of visas”. Section 31(2)(g) provides for “bridging visas” as provided for in s 37. Section 37, in turn, provides as follows: There are classes of temporary visas, to be known as bridging visas, to be granted under Subdivision AF.Further to s 31 of the Act, reg 2.01(2) (Items 4 to 12) provides for various classes of bridging visa. Section 42 of the Act relevantly provides that “a non-citizen must not travel to Australia without a visa that is in effect”. Section 46(3) provides that the “regulations may prescribe criteria that must be satisfied for an application for a visa of a specified class to be a valid application”. Section 46(4) then provides as follows:Prescribed criteria for validity …(4) Without limiting subsection (3), the regulations may also prescribe: (a)the circumstances that must exist for an application for a visa of a specified class to be a valid application; and (b) how an application for a visa of a specified class must be made; and (c) where an application for a visa of a specified class must be made; and (d)where an applicant must be when an application for a visa of a specified class is made.Further to s 46 of the Act, reg 2.07(1)(c) provides for “other matters relating to [an] application” for particular classes of visas, those “other matters” being found in Sch 1 of the Migration Regulations.