Footscray Corporation v Maize Products Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 25 min read
67 CLR 301

THE MAYOR, COUNCILLORS AND CITIZENS

OF THE CITY OF FOOTSCRAY

RESPONDENT,

MAIZE PRODUCTS PROPRIETARY LIMITED RESPONDENT.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF By-law-Validity.-" " Suppressing nuisances Prohibition of use of pulverized fuel

in furnaces unless so constructed as to make escape of dust, grit or ash impossible

-Local Government Act 1928 (Vict.) (No. 3720), S. 197 (1) (x).

A municipal by-law provided :- No person shall, in" a defined area within the municipality, "use or permit to be used any pulverized fuel in any furnace unless such furnace is SO designed and constructed or is fitted with such appliances or devices or has attached to it a chimney or flue of such design and construction as to make it impossible for any dust, grit or ash arising from the process of combustion in such furnace to escape or be discharged into the air either from such furnace or any appliance or device fitted thereto or from any chimney or flue attached thereto." From evidence adduced on the hearing of an application to have the by-law quashed it appeared that there was no known appliance which would entirely prevent the escape of dust, grit or ash from furnaces using pulverized fuel, though there were appliances which would SO reduce the escape as to render it innocuous.

Held, by Rich and Starke JJ. (Latham C.J. dissenting), that the by-law was a valid exercise of the power conferred by S. 197 (1) (x) of the Local Government Act 1928 (Vict.) to make by-laws for 'suppressing nuisances."

Decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Macfarlan J.): Maize Products Pty. Ltd. v. City of Footscray, (1942) V.L.R. 218, reversed. APPEAL.

The municipality of the City of Footscray made a by-law, expressed to be made under S. 197 of the Local Government Act 1928 (Vict.)

67 CLR 302

" for the purpose of suppressing nuisance hereinafter described "

which provided Whereas there exists throughout the area defined hereunder in the municipal district a nuisance of dust, grit, and ash arising from the escape and discharge of such materials into the air from furnaces and the chimneys and flues of furnaces in such area And whereas it is considered by the Council of the said city to be necessary for the purpose of suppressing such nuisance to make this By-law: Now in the pursuance of the powers conferred by the Local Government Act 1928 and of all other powers (if any) in that behalf existing, the Mayor, Councillors, and Citizens of the City of Footscray do order as follows :-1. No person shall, in " a defined area within the municipality, use or permit to be used any pulverized fuel in any furnace unless such furnace is SO designed and constructed or is fitted with such appliances or devices or has attached to it a chimney or flue of such design and construction as to make it impossible for any dust, grit or ash arising from the process of combustion in such furnace…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Footscray Corporation v Maize Products Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1943] HCA 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Footscray (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which had quashed a by-law made by the appellant. The by-law, enacted under section 197(1)(x) of the Local Government Act 1928 (Vic.), prohibited the use of pulverized fuel in any furnace within a defined area unless the furnace, its appliances, or flue were designed and constructed to make the escape of dust, grit, or ash impossible. Maize Products Pty. Ltd. (the respondent), a ratepayer within the municipality, had sought to have the by-law quashed on the grounds that it exceeded the appellant's statutory authority and was unreasonable.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the by-law, which purported to suppress nuisances arising from dust, grit, and ash, was a valid exercise of the power conferred by section 197(1)(x) of the Local Government Act 1928. Specifically, the court had to determine if the by-law's requirement for the complete impossibility of dust, grit, or ash escape was an unreasonable or ultra vires means of achieving the suppression of nuisances, particularly given evidence that complete prevention was not technologically feasible, though significant reduction was possible.

Rich and Starke JJ. held that the by-law was a valid exercise of the appellant's power to suppress nuisances. They reasoned that while the by-law imposed a strict standard, the Local Government Act empowered municipalities to determine what constituted a nuisance in their locality. The evidence indicated a significant nuisance existed, and the by-law was not considered unreasonable or gratuitously oppressive, as it provided a means for compliance through appropriate furnace design and appliances, even if complete elimination of all particles was not achievable. They distinguished the case from *Melbourne Corporation v. Barry*, where a by-law was found to prohibit actions that were not inherently nuisances. Latham C.J., dissenting, agreed with the Supreme Court's reasoning that the by-law was invalid because it prohibited the use of pulverized fuel entirely, irrespective of whether it caused a nuisance, due to the impossibility of achieving 100% prevention of dust, grit, or ash escape.

The High Court allowed the appeal, discharging the order of the Supreme Court and ordering that the respondent pay the appellant's costs in the Supreme Court. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to the High Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.