ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Local Government-By-law-Validity-Street traffic-Regulation-Prohibition of
driving cattle through specified streets at any time, and through other streets during specified times-Reasonableness-Local Government Act 1928 (Vict.), sec. MELBOURNE,
197 (1) (i), (ii), (xix), (xxiv), (2)* Thirteenth Schedule, Part I., par. 44.* Sept. 27.
The Council of the City of Melbourne passed a by-law in the following terms SYDNEY,
No person shall drive or cause to be driven into or through any portion of the city any cattle intended for sale, slaughter or shipment or passing from one part of the country to another save and except as hereinafter is mentioned, that is to say :-(a) The streets set forth in the first schedule hereto may be used for such purposes at any time. (b) The streets set forth in the second schedule hereto may be used for such purposes only between the hours of twelve o'clock midnight and eight o'clock in the morning." The first schedule specified nine streets, and the second schedule forty-four streets. Most of the streets specified in the first schedule were in the vicinity of saleyards for sheep and cattle at Newmarket and the yards were owned and controlled by the city council. Evidence was adduced by the appellant to show that the by-law could in practice not be complied with.
sec. 197 (2), that sub-sec. 1 of that (Vict.) provides :- sec. 197 (1),
section shall apply to the City of Mel- that by-laws may be made for any
bourne. By the Thirteenth Schedule, municipality
Part I. par. 44: "It shall be lawful following The adoption of any of
for the council to make regulations the provisions of the Thirteenth
for appointing the hours during Schedule hereto (ii) Carrying out any of the purposes provided for in the
into or through the municipal district or any parts thereof by boundaries set (xix) Regulating traffic and proces-
forth in such regulation any cattle for (xxiv) Regulating the
sale slaughter or shipment or travelling driving of cattle in or along any specified
from one part of Victoria or of any street in any municipal district." By
Held, that the by-law was within the powers conferred upon the municipality 11. C. OF by sec. 197 (1) (xix) and (2) of the Local Government Act 1928.
The unreasonableness of a by-law made under statutory powers by a local- governing body is not a separate and distinct ground of invalidity: the Court is not entitled to form its own opinion as to the reasonableness of a by-law and if it thinks it unreasonable, though within the scope of the powers granted, to
Decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Full Court) Williams v. City of Melbourne, (1933) V.L.R. 228, affirmed.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Victoria.
The appellant, Michael Sydney Williams, obtained a rule nisi calling upon the respondent,…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Williams v Melbourne Corporation [1933] HCA 56
Case
[1933] HCA 56
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Williams v Melbourne Corporation* concerned a by-law enacted by the City of Melbourne that prohibited the driving of cattle through most of the city's streets, with limited exceptions for specific streets during certain hours. The appellant, Michael Sydney Williams, sought to have the by-law quashed, arguing it was ultra vires, unreasonable, and against public policy. The matter was heard on appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria.
The central legal issue before the High Court of Australia was whether the by-law, which significantly restricted the movement of cattle through the city, fell within the powers conferred upon the Melbourne Corporation by the *Local Government Act 1928* (Vic.). Specifically, the Court had to determine if the by-law constituted a valid exercise of the power to "regulate traffic" under section 197(1)(xix) of the Act, or if it amounted to an impermissible prohibition. The Court also considered whether the by-law was invalid on the ground of unreasonableness.
The High Court, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria, held that the by-law was within the powers granted to the municipality. The Court reasoned that the power to regulate traffic was broad enough to include the imposition of restrictions on the times and streets through which traffic, including the movement of cattle, could occur. While acknowledging that a power to regulate does not permit an absolute prohibition, the Court found that the by-law did not constitute such a prohibition, as it provided for specific routes and times for cattle movement. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principle that unreasonableness is not a distinct ground for invalidating a by-law if it is otherwise within the scope of the statutory power conferred, unless the by-law is so unreasonable as to be capricious or fantastic and therefore not a genuine exercise of that power. The Court concluded that the by-law was a reasonable exercise of the council's power to manage urban traffic and ensure public safety and order.