Day v Harness Racing New South Wales

Link copied
Case Copied 72 min read

Supreme Court


New South Wales

  • Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Day v Harness Racing New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 1402
Hearing dates:29 and 30 September 2014, 1, 2 and 3 October 2014
Decision date: 14 October 2014
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Adamson J
Decision:

1. Dismiss the summons.

2. Unless an application for a different order is made in writing to my Associate within seven (7) days hereof, order the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' costs of the proceedings.

Catchwords: GAMING AND RACING - multiple challenges to new anti-doping rule making cobalt a prohibited substance for harness racing horses
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - rule neither disproportionate nor irrational - requisite connection between Harness Racing NSW's functions and rule - procedural fairness does not require hearing before interim suspension pending imminent inquiry having regard to whole process which includes right of appeal on the merits to Racing Appeals Tribunal
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - Anthony Hordern principle - s 21 of the Act not restricted by the terms of s 18 of the Act -collective decision-making of stewards not necessary - single steward empowered to suspend
Legislation Cited: Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA), s 16
Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA), ss 24, 36.
Harness Racing Act 2009 (NSW), ss 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42, 47, 48
Racing Appeals Tribunal Act 1983 (NSW), s 15B
Racing Appeals Tribunal Regulation 2010 (NSW), s 9
Cases Cited: AG (SA) v Adelaide City Corporation [2013] HCA 3; 249 CLR 1
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; 175 CLR 564
Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1
Assistant Commissioner Michael James Condon v Pompano Pty Limited [2013] HCA 7; 295 ALR 638
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223
Australian Education Union v Department of Education and Children's Services [2012] HCA 3; 248 CLR 1
Bienke v Minister for Primary Industries and Energy (1994) 125 ALR 151
Dawson v The Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 157
Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) [2003] HCA 28; 214 CLR 318
Farah Constructions Pty Limited v Say-Dee Pty Limited [2007] HCA 22; 230 CLR 89
Foster v Jododex Australia Pty Limited (1972) 127 CLR 421
Harper v Racing Penalties Appeal Tribunal of Western Australia (1995) 12 WAR 337
Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487
House v Forestry Tasmania (1995) 5 Tas R 169
Jarratt v Commissioner of Police for New South Wales [2005] HCA 50; 224 CLR 44
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; 159 CLR 550
Macquarie Bank Limited v Fociri (1992) 27 NSWLR 203
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom [2006] HCA 50; 228 CLR 566
Minister for Primary Industries and Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 381
NBNB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Day v Harness Racing New South Wales and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2014] NSWSC 1402
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Day v Harness Racing New South Wales involved multiple challenges to a new anti-doping rule introduced by Harness Racing New South Wales (HRNSW) that designated cobalt as a prohibited substance for harness racing horses. The challenges were brought by several parties including individual drivers, owners, and racing associations. They argued that the rule was irrational, disproportionate, and that they had not been given procedural fairness before the rule was enforced. The matter was heard in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales.

The court had to determine whether the new rule was a lawful exercise of HRNSW's statutory powers. It also needed to assess if procedural fairness was observed before the rule was applied, particularly in relation to the interim suspension of participants. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the rule-making process complied with statutory construction principles, and if the collective decision-making of stewards was a necessary requirement under the relevant legislation.

The court found that the new rule was neither irrational nor disproportionate as it was within HRNSW's functions to regulate doping in harness racing and there was a requisite connection between the rule and those functions. The court also held that procedural fairness was not compromised by the interim suspension as the whole process, including the right to appeal to the Racing Appeals Tribunal, was fair. The court further ruled that the statutory construction did not restrict the authority to make such rules and that a single steward had the power to suspend participants. Consequently, the challenges were dismissed.

The final orders of the court upheld the new anti-doping rule and rejected all claims brought by the applicants. The interim suspension of participants remained in effect pending the outcome of the inquiries and appeals.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around challenges to new anti-doping rules introduced by Harness Racing New South Wales (HRNSW), which designated cobalt as a prohibited substance for harness racing horses. Cobalt is a naturally occurring mineral, and its use in racing was previously permitted under certain conditions. The new rules, contained in Rule 157, made cobalt a prohibited substance effective from 1 October 2017. The rules provided a transition period until 30 November 2017 for trainers to remove cobalt from their horses' diets. Following this, the use of cobalt was strictly prohibited. Cobalt is believed to have an erythropoietic effect, potentially enhancing the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood, which could provide an unfair advantage in racing. The case involves several trainers who challenged the new rules on various grounds, including the making of the rules, their proportionality, and the procedural fairness in their enforcement.

The trainers, represented by Day, sought various reliefs including declarations that the rules were invalid, unlawful, and contrary to law. They also sought orders for certiorari to quash the rules, injunctions to restrain HRNSW from enforcing the rules, and declarations that the rules were irrational and disproportionate. The challenges were grounded on several grounds including the rules being outside HRNSW's statutory powers, lacking rational basis, and being oppressive or disproportionate. The case also involved an interim application to suspend the enforcement of the rules pending the outcome of the substantive proceedings.

The case was heard initially in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales. The primary matter was a challenge to the validity of the anti-doping rules made by HRNSW. The case was brought before the court on an expedited basis, given the impending commencement date of the rules. The interim application for suspension was heard first, and the substantive proceedings followed. The interim application was dismissed, and the substantive proceedings were subsequently heard. Throughout the proceedings, HRNSW defended the rules as within their statutory powers, necessary for the integrity of racing, and proportionate in their impact. The court considered the arguments presented and the relevant statutory framework, including the Harness Racing Act 1995 (NSW) and related rules.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Are the new anti-doping rules, which prohibit the use of cobalt in harness racing horses, within the statutory powers of HRNSW?
2. Are the new anti-doping rules rational and proportionate to the objectives of ensuring fair racing?
3. Was there a procedural fairness requirement that necessitated a hearing before the interim suspension of the rules?
4. Does the statutory construction of the Harness Racing Act 1995 (NSW) require collective decision-making by stewards for suspension actions, or can a single steward act?

Held
1. The court concluded that the new anti-doping rules, which prohibit the use of cobalt in harness racing horses, are within the statutory powers of HRNSW.
2. The court found that the new anti-doping rules are rational and proportionate to the objectives of ensuring fair racing.
3. The court determined that there was no procedural fairness requirement that necessitated a hearing before the interim suspension of the rules.
4. The court held that the statutory construction of the Harness Racing Act 1995 (NSW) does not require collective decision-making by stewards for suspension actions; a single steward can act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined whether the new anti-doping rules, prohibiting the use of cobalt in harness racing horses, were within the statutory powers of HRNSW. The court found that the rules were necessary to protect the integrity of the sport and to ensure fair racing. The rules had a requisite connection to the functions of HRNSW, which include regulating harness racing to ensure fair play. The court relied on the statutory interpretation principle that an administrative body has the power to make rules that are reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives of the statute.

Regarding the rationality and proportionality of the new anti-doping rules, the court held that the rules were rational and proportionate to the objective of ensuring fair racing. The court considered the evidence presented and concluded that the use of cobalt in harness racing horses posed a significant risk to the safety of the horses and the fairness of the racing. The court found that the rules were not arbitrary or irrational and that they were proportionate to the identified risks.

The court also addressed the issue of procedural fairness and the need for a hearing before the interim suspension of the rules. The court held that there was no procedural fairness requirement that necessitated a hearing before the interim suspension. The court considered the whole process, which included the right of appeal on the merits to the Racing Appeals Tribunal, and found that the interim suspension was justified to prevent imminent harm while the inquiry was conducted.

Lastly, the court interpreted the statutory provisions regarding the decision-making powers of stewards. The court applied the Anthony Hordern principle and concluded that section 21 of the Act did not restrict the terms of section 18. The court found that collective decision-making by stewards was not necessary and that a single steward was empowered to suspend the rules. The court's decision on this issue is the binding legal principle established by the case.