Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., Stephen, Mason, Murphy and Aickin JJ.

HEATLEY v. TASMANIAN RACING AND GAMING COMMISSION

(1977) 137 CLR 487

7 July 1977

Administrative Bodies

Administrative Bodies—Natural justice—Racing commission constituted by statute—Power to require a person to refrain from entering a racecourse—Whether commission required to comply with rules of natural justice—Requirements of natural justice—Racing and Gaming Act, 1952 (Tas.), s.39(3).

Decisions


July 7.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. The applicant for special leave was served with a notice given under the powers conferred on the Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission ("the Commission") by s.39 of the Racing and Gaming Act, 1952 (Tas.) ("the Act") requiring him to refrain from entering any racecourse in the State of Tasmania during the currency of the notice which was stated to be until its rescission by the Commission. No notice of an intention to issue and serve the abovementioned notice was given to the applicant. The grounds upon which it was given were not stated, nor was any opportunity afforded to the applicant to make any representation prior to its issue. The question is whether, upon its proper construction, the power granted by s.39 of the Act is qualified by the necessity to observe the requirements of natural justice before the notice is served. (at p490)

2. I have recently attempted to state the effect of the case law on the basis on which the courts require that a statutory authority, having power to affect a citizen in his rights or property, is bound to hear him before exercising the granted power. In Twist v. Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106 , I described the action of the court when deciding that the repository of the power was so bound to observe natural justice as a process of supplementing the legislation where the court was of opinion that such a course was not inconsistent with the terms of the statute. More recently, in Salemi v. MacKellar (No. 2) (Salemi's Case) (1977) 137 CLR 487 at p 396 , I have emphasized that the court's function in this connexion is to construe a statute by which the power is granted and to educe the qualification of the power by construction of the statute. The court thus, if it is of opinion that the statute properly construed does require, though not expressly but implicitly, the observance of natural justice, does supplement the express language of the statute by effecting the qualification of the grant of power. (at p491)

3. It has become quite clear that this qualification may be found in a statute although the granted power is not a power judicial in its nature but purely administrative. Because the legislature is not presumed to authorize injustice, it is easier to imply the qualification where the statute is silent. But this does not mean, in my opinion, that because the statute is silent, the provision of natural justice is presumed. It remains always a question of construction, bearing…
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Details
Case
[1977] HCA 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Heatley, the applicant, sought judicial review of a decision by the Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission, the respondent, to refuse to grant him a bookmaker's licence. The applicant had been convicted of a criminal offence in Victoria and the Commission, in exercising its discretion under the relevant legislation, considered this conviction to be a disqualifying factor. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Commission had acted unlawfully in refusing the licence. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the Commission had taken into account an irrelevant consideration, namely the applicant's prior conviction, or failed to take into account a relevant consideration, or if its decision was otherwise so unreasonable that it could not be justified. The Court also considered the scope of the Commission's discretion under the relevant legislation and the principles of administrative law governing the exercise of such discretion.

The High Court, by majority, held that the Commission had acted unlawfully. The majority reasoned that while the Commission had a broad discretion, it was not unfettered. The legislation required the Commission to consider the applicant's suitability to hold a licence, and while past convictions could be relevant, the Commission had failed to properly assess the nature of the applicant's conviction and its relevance to his suitability as a bookmaker. The Court emphasised that a decision-maker must apply their mind to the specific circumstances of the case and not rely on a blanket policy or a rigid interpretation of past events. The principles of administrative law, particularly the requirement for a decision to be based on relevant considerations and to be reasonable, were central to the Court's reasoning.

The High Court ordered that the decision of the Commission be quashed and remitted the matter back to the Commission for reconsideration according to law.

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