BOCTOR -v- MAHAR [2016] WADC 112
| DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [2016] WADC 112 | |
| Case No: | APP:8/2016 | 17 JUNE 2016 | |
| Coram: | BRADDOCK DCJ | 5/08/16 | |
| PERTH | |||
| 9 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Appeal dismissed | ||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | SHAWGI TOBIA BOCTOR SAMIRA BOCTOR HAYDEN BRYCE MAHAR JULIA MAHAR |
Catchwords: | Minor case Appeal to District Court Want of Jurisdiction Natural justice Section 32(3)(b) Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 Costs |
Legislation: | District Court Act 1969 s 6, s 65 Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 s 25, s 26, s 32, s 43 |
Case References: | Attorney General v Sillem (1864) 11 ER 1200 Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487 |
JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
- IN CIVIL
- SAMIRA BOCTOR
Appellants
AND
HAYDEN BRYCE MAHAR
JULIA MAHAR
Respondents
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram : MAGISTRATE TEMBY SM
File No : PE MINOR 4606 of 2015
Catchwords:
Minor case - Appeal to District Court - Want of Jurisdiction - Natural justice - Section 32(3)(b) Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 - Costs
Legislation:
District Court Act 1969 s 6, s 65
Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 s 25, s 26, s 32, s 43
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellants : In Person
Respondents : In Person
Solicitors:
Appellants : Not applicable
Respondents : Not applicable
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Attorney General v Sillem (1864) 11 ER 1200
Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487
- BRADDOCK DCJ:
Introduction
1 The appellants are the former owners of land at 19 Dewey Street in Shelley, Western Australia. In 2005, the appellants decided to prepare for the subdivision of the property, which was an investment property. They took steps to meet the requirements of the City of Canning and the West Australian Planning Commission for that purpose. One of the requirements was to decommission the previous septic tank system. They engaged a contractor called Sepco to remove the septic tank.
2 Subsequently, the appellants swore a statutory declaration dated 15 September 2005, confirming that they had decommissioned the septic system, by emptying and removing two concrete septic tanks and backfilling the ground with sand. They also deposed to the fact that they had removed the drains and back filled with clean sand.
3 The subdivision it was subsequently registered and the appellants then sold property to a Mr Lee. Mr Lee proceeded to obtain planning permission and developed the property with two new dwellings. The purchasers of one of the dwellings, 19A Dewey Street, are the respondents.
4 On 20 November 2014, the respondents noticed that the pavers on their driveway were sinking. The following day a light tap to the pavers…
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- Case
- [2016] WADC 112
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the District Court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Magistrates Court under Section 32(3)(b) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the appellant had been denied natural justice during the proceedings before the Magistrates Court. The appellant argued that the consent order was not properly executed and that they had not been given an opportunity to be heard on the enforcement of the order.
The court held that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Magistrates Court as the appeal did not fall within the grounds specified in Section 32(3)(b) of the Act. The court further found that the appellant had not been denied natural justice because they had been given an opportunity to be heard on the enforcement of the consent order, and any perceived unfairness did not constitute a breach of natural justice. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi