HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJAMIRA SAEED APPELLANT
AND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP RESPONDENT
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23
23 June 2010
S305/2009ORDER
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2.Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 1 April 2009 and in its place order that:
(a)Appeal allowed with costs.
(b) Set aside Orders 2 and 3 of the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia made on 2 December 2008 and in their place order that:
(i)a writ of certiorari issue directed to the delegate of the respondent, quashing the decision dated 16 July 2008;
(ii)a writ of prohibition issue directed to the respondent, prohibiting the respondent from giving effect to the delegate's decision dated 16 July 2008;
(iii)a writ of mandamus issue to the respondent requiring the respondent to consider and determine the applicant's application for a Skilled – Independent Visa (Subclass 175) according to law; and
(iv)the respondent pay the applicant's costs.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
S B Lloyd SC with L J Karp for the appellant (instructed by Christopher Levingston & Associates)
S J Gageler SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with L A Clegg for the respondent and intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
R J Meadows QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia with C L Conley intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia (instructed by State Solicitor for Western Australia)
M G Hinton QC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia with C Jacobi intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of South Australia (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of South Australia)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJ. Division 3 of Pt 2 the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") contains provisions with respect to the grant or refusal of visas for non-citizens. Subdivision AB of that Division is directed to the Minister's dealing with an application for a visa and information relating to it. At issue in this appeal is whether an amendment to subdiv AB, effected by the insertion of s 51A[1], has the effect of excluding the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule and whether it may validly do so. In the circumstances of this case the rule would have required the Minister's delegate to afford the appellant an opportunity to comment upon information which had been provided to the delegate and which supported an inference that an essential aspect of the appellant's case for a visa was false.
[1]Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 (Cth).
The terms of s 51A are not directed to all requirements of natural justice. They are expressed to apply to the requirements…
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- Case
- [2010] HCA 23
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were twofold: first, the extent to which section 51A of the *Migration Act* could exclude the rules of procedural fairness; and second, the extent to which adverse personal information could be used against an applicant without affording them an opportunity to respond under the laws of natural justice. The Court was required to interpret the interaction between section 51A and section 57 of the Act, and consider whether the common law principles of natural justice applied when section 51A was read in conjunction with section 57.
The Court reasoned that while section 51A was enacted in response to previous case law and intended to limit the application of procedural fairness, its language was not sufficiently clear and unambiguous to displace fundamental common law principles. Applying the principle that any intention to interfere with fundamental rights must be clearly manifested, the Court found that section 51A, as it applied to offshore visa applicants, did not exclude the obligation to provide an opportunity to comment on adverse material. The Court concluded that the Minister was obliged to provide the appellant with an opportunity to answer the adverse material.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal with costs, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court. The decision of the delegate of the Minister was quashed, and a writ of mandamus was issued requiring the Minister to consider and determine the appellant's visa application according to law.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 1 April 2009 and in its place order that:
(a) Appeal allowed with costs.
(b) Set aside Orders 2 and 3 of the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia made on 2 December 2008 and in their place order that:
(i) a writ of certiorari issue directed to the delegate of the respondent, quashing the decision dated 16 July 2008;
(ii) a writ of prohibition issue directed to the respondent, prohibiting the respondent from giving effect to the delegate's decision dated 16 July 2008;
(iii) a writ of mandamus issue to the respondent requiring the respondent to consider and determine the applicant's application for a Skilled – Independent Visa (Subclass 175) according to law; and
(iv) the respondent pay the applicant's costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The appellant's visa application was assessed by a delegate of the Minister, who refused the application on the basis of adverse information received from a third party. The appellant challenged the decision, contending that the Minister had not afforded procedural fairness by not giving the appellant an opportunity to respond to the adverse information. The Minister argued that Section 51A of the Act excludes the application of procedural fairness in certain circumstances, particularly when dealing with visa applications. The case raised questions about the extent to which adverse personal information could be used without providing an opportunity to comment, and whether the common law natural justice applies when Section 51A of the Act is read with Section 57 of the Act.
The High Court considered the construction and operation of Section 51A of the Migration Act. The Court found that Section 51A was a response to the decision in Ex parte Miah and was intended to overcome the effect of that decision. The Court held that Section 51A excluded the natural justice hearing rule only in relation to onshore visa applicants, and not offshore visa applicants. The Court found that the provision of particulars of information to offshore visa applicants for comment was not a "matter" dealt with by Section 57 or the relevant subdivision. The Court held that the implication of the natural justice hearing rule with respect to offshore visa applicants was maintained, and the Minister was obliged to provide the appellant with an opportunity to answer the adverse material.
The case of Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship arose from the refusal of the appellant's application for a Skilled Independent visa under the Migration Act 1958. The initial application was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship on the basis of adverse information provided by a third party. Dissatisfied with this decision, the appellant sought judicial review in the Federal Magistrates Court, which was subsequently appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court. Both courts had upheld the Minister's decision, prompting the appellant to seek further review by the High Court of Australia. The central issue in this appeal was the extent to which procedural fairness, specifically the rules of natural justice, apply to visa applications under the Migration Act, particularly in light of the provisions of section 51A of the Act, which was inserted in response to the High Court's decision in Ex parte Miah. This appeal thus primarily involved the interpretation of sections 51A and 57 of the Migration Act and the extent to which these provisions exclude the application of the common law rules of natural justice.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJ, HEYDON J
Section 57(2) did not apply in Ex parte Miah as the information in question was not "relevant information" within the meaning of sub-s (1). The issue was whether natural justice nonetheless operated to require the provision of the information. It was argued for the Minister that subdiv AB was a code, as its heading ("Code of procedure for dealing fairly, efficiently and quickly with visa applications") suggested. It therefore excluded natural justice principles. The argument was not accepted by a majority of the Court[31]. McHugh J observed that the use of the word "fairly" in the heading made it difficult to extrapolate a manifestly clear intention to exclude natural justice principles[32]. Gaudron J considered that the heading imparted notions of procedural fairness[33]. Moreover, as her Honour pointed out, the correct question is not whether subdiv AB constitutes a code; it is whether, on its proper construction, it relevantly (and validly) limits or extinguishes the obligation to accord procedural fairness[34]. For it to do so requires a clear expression of intention. No member of the majority[35] found such an expression present in the subdivision.[31]Gaudron, McHugh and Kirby JJ.[32]Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 at 95 [131].[33]Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 at 85 [95]-[96].[34]Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 at 83-84 [90], referring to Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at 101 [41] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ; [2000] HCA 57.[35]Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 at 85 [95] per Gaudron J, 94 [128] per McHugh J and 113 [181] per Kirby J.Section 51A and its operation Section 51A appeared as item 1 to the Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 (Cth). That Act also introduced virtually identical sections to s 51A in other parts of the Act, including s 357A in Pt 5 and s 422B in Pt 7, which concern the conduct of reviews by the Migration Review Tribunal and the Refugee Review Tribunal respectively. The insertion of s 51A was plainly a response to the decision in Ex parte Miah. The language of the section and its analogues, and in particular the phrase "in relation to the matters it deals with" in sub-s (1), has been considered in judgments of single judges and Full Courts of the Federal Court. The phrase has been described as difficult to construe[36] and apply[37]. In VXDC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[38] and in Lay Lat[39] it was described as ambiguous or obscure.[36]Moradian v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 142 FCR 170 at 178 [28].[37]WAID v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 220 at [57].[38](2005) 146 FCR 562 at 568 [22].[39](2006) 151 FCR 214 at 225 [64]. The difficulty in the meaning of the phrase "in relation to the matters it deals with" was resolved in VXDC and then subsequently in Lay Lat, by resort to extrinsic materials. In Lay Lat the Full Court considered that the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2002 amending legislation and the second reading speech of the Minister made it plain that the terms of sections such as s 51A(1) were intended to overcome the effect of the decision in Ex parte Miah[40]. The Full Court said[41]:"We agree with the observation … in VXDC that the drafters of the Explanatory Statement and the Minister could hardly have made the intention of the 2002 amendments any clearer."[40]Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214 at 225 [64], [66].[41]Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214 at 225 [65].