BWS22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BWS22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 387   

Appeal from: BWS22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 635
File number(s): VID 617 of 2023
Judgment of: BUTTON J
Date of judgment: 18 April 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – visas – appeal from orders of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dismissing application for judicial review – where the Appellant was granted a Global Special Humanitarian visa in October 2010 – where delegate subsequently cancelled the Appellant’s visa pursuant to s 116(1AA) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) – where the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision – whether the primary judge erred in construing the meaning of the term “identity” in s 116(1AA) of the Act – whether the primary judge erred in finding that procedural fairness was not required to be afforded to the Appellant’s half-brother in circumstances where the half-brother held a visa as a dependent member of the Appellant’s family unit – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had failed to consider the mandatory legal consequences of its decision – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 116, 118A, 119, 140, 189, 198

Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Bill 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596; [1990] HCA 57

Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1; [1932] HCA 9

Applicants M16 of 2004 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2005) 148 FCR 46; [2005] FCA 1641

Baini v R (2012) 246 CLR 469; [2012] HCA 59

BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 165 ALD 39; [2019] FCA 574

BQG21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 865

BWS22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 635

Chou v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2021) 286 FCR 459; [2021] FCAFC 130

Commissioner of Police v Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383

Farah v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 185

Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; [1985] HCA 81

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566; [2006] HCA 50

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 38

NZYQv Minister for Immigration Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 1005; [2023] HCA 3

Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319; [2010] HCA 41

Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 251 CLR 25; [2010] HCA 23

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 92
Date of hearing: 5 March 2024
Counsel for the Appellant: M Guo
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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 387
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal, BWS22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant, BWS22, sought judicial review of a decision to cancel his Global Special Humanitarian visa. The appellant was granted the visa in 2010, but it was subsequently cancelled by a delegate under section 116(1AA) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision. The appellant's primary contentions on appeal were that the primary judge erred in interpreting the term "identity" in section 116(1AA) of the Act, that procedural fairness was not afforded to his half-brother, and that the Tribunal failed to consider the mandatory legal consequences of its decision.

The court considered the appellant's argument that the Tribunal misconstrued the meaning of the term "identity" by not acknowledging that DNA evidence could be probative of identity. The court held that the Tribunal correctly identified the limitations of the DNA evidence, finding that it was probative of familial connections and only partially relevant to the appellant's identity. The court rejected the argument that the Tribunal erred in not considering procedural fairness for the appellant's half-brother, as the primary judge correctly found that section 140 of the Act did not require procedural fairness to be afforded in these circumstances. The court also dismissed the argument that the Tribunal failed to consider the mandatory legal consequences of its decision, as the Tribunal did not err in its approach to the DNA evidence or in its consideration of the appellant's identity.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I will deal with the DNA evidence first. DNA evidence The primary judge considered the Tribunal’s analysis of the DNA evidence, observing (at PJ [70]–[71]) that: [70]At paragraph [73] of its decision record, the Tribunal went on to say that:73. Although during the hearing, the applicant accepted the provision of inconsistent information, he contended that the DNA test proves his identity. The Tribunal discussed with the applicant the DNA test results and indicated that the results demonstrate that he has two half-brothers and that the half-brothers are full siblings. The Tribunal indicated that it did not consider the DNA test results to be conclusive evidence of the applicant’s identity – the results show familial association. … (emphasis in original)[71]The Tribunal did not err in its consideration of the DNA evidence. In its reasons for its decision, the Tribunal did not say that the DNA evidence was not relevant to determining the applicant’s identity. Rather, it simply identified, correctly in my view, the limitation of that evidence. The appellant contended that the Tribunal wrongly restricted the relevance of the DNA evidence to establishing “familial association”, when it was also probative of “identity”. This was said to involve reviewable error as, even accepting that DNA evidence may not be conclusive on the question of identity, it was capable of contributing to the establishing of a person’s identity. The appellant contended that the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal erred, as alleged. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s view that the evidence was not conclusive of the appellant’s identity must be read in the context of the appellant’s argument that the DNA evidence proved his identity. The Minister contended that the Tribunal did not find that the DNA evidence was not probative of the appellant’s identity, but rather identified the limitations of the evidence, finding that it was probative of the appellant’s familial connections and was therefore only partially relevant to the appellant’s identity. The Minister submitted that the primary judge was correct to conclude (at PJ [79]) that the Tribunal’s approach to the DNA evidence did not reflect any error of law. Consideration The appellant’s argument misconstrues the Tribunal’s reasons. As is clear from the first sentence of T [73], the Tribunal was addressing the appellant’s contention that the DNA evidence “proves his identity” (emphasis in original). The Tribunal rejected that contention on the basis that the DNA evidence revealed he had two half-brothers, but was not “conclusive evidence of the [appellant’s] identity” (T [73]). The Tribunal’s reference to the evidence not being conclusive on the question of identity was responsive to the submission put by the appellant to the Tribunal that it was conclusive. There was never any question that the appellant had two half-brothers (being the point that the DNA evidence did establish). The appellant never explained how the DNA evidence could have been taken into account by the Tribunal in a way that went beyond the accepted fact that the appellant had two half-brothers.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister may not be satisfied of a visa holder’s identity for a wide range of reasons. Any contention that a decision-maker is required to consider whether he or she is satisfied of a visa holder’s identity but, in so doing, must exclude from consideration the provision of incorrect information of the kind provided by the appellant — which included a wide array of instances in which, and documents by which, the appellant claimed to have different names and dates and places of birth — cannot be accepted. The adoption of a number of names and dates of birth, or other identifying details, can mean that the Minister is not satisfied as to identity, even though the circumstances may also mean that incorrect information was provided, potentially attracting ss 109 or 106(1)(aa). It is also not apparent how the appellant’s Anthony Hordern point logically connects with the significance of the discretion that is enlivened where the decision-maker is not satisfied of the visa holder’s identity.Conclusion on Ground 1 Ground 1 is framed in terms that not only impugn the primary judge’s reasoning, but in terms that contend the primary judge ought to have reached the specified conclusion with the consequences specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). While I would not have, as the primary judge did (PJ [57]), concluded that, properly construed, “identity” means “true identity”, ground 1 must nonetheless be rejected. That is for two reasons. First, the parties’ substantively argued their cases on the basis of the correctness of the Tribunal’s approach. I have, for the reasons set out above, concluded that the Tribunal did not misconstrue the term “identity”. As such, I have concluded that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error in that respect, albeit on a somewhat different basis from that of the primary judge. Secondly, the ground advances positive propositions as to what the primary judge ought to have held and the consequences of so holding. It follows from my reasoning above that I do not accept the positive contentions as framed. Ground 1 must be rejected.Ground 2: procedural fairness By ground 2 of his notice of appeal, the appellant contended that the primary judge erred in finding that Subdiv E, of Div 3 of Pt 2 of the Act did not require that procedural fairness be afforded to the appellant’s half-brother. It was contended that the primary judge ought to have found that, where another person’s visa may be cancelled pursuant to s 140(1), that person was required to be afforded procedural fairness. Section 140 of the Act applies where cancellation of a visa (including, relevantly, pursuant to s 116 of the Act) results in cancellation of another visa. Sections 140(1)–(2) provide that: (1)If a person’s visa is cancelled under section 109 (incorrect information), 116 (general power to cancel), 128 (when holder outside Australia), 133A (Minister’s personal powers to cancel visas on section 109 grounds), 133C (Minister’s personal powers to cancel visas on section 116 grounds) or 137J (student visas), a visa held by another person because of being a member of the family unit of the person is also cancelled.(2)If:(a)a person’s visa is cancelled under section 109 (incorrect information) 116 (general power to cancel), 128 (when holder outside Australia), 133A (Minister’s personal powers to cancel visas on section 109 grounds), 133C (Minister’s personal powers to cancel visas on section 116 grounds) or 137J (student visas); and(b)another person to whom subsection (1) does not apply holds a visa only because the person whose visa is cancelled held a visa; the Minister may, without notice to the other person, cancel the visa.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s view that the evidence was not conclusive of the appellant’s identity must be read in the context of the appellant’s argument that the DNA evidence proved his identity. The Minister contended that the Tribunal did not find that the DNA evidence was not probative of the appellant’s identity, but rather identified the limitations of the evidence, finding that it was probative of the appellant’s familial connections and was therefore only partially relevant to the appellant’s identity. The Minister submitted that the primary judge was correct to conclude (at PJ [79]) that the Tribunal’s approach to the DNA evidence did not reflect any error of law. Consideration The appellant’s argument misconstrues the Tribunal’s reasons. As is clear from the first sentence of T [73], the Tribunal was addressing the appellant’s contention that the DNA evidence “proves his identity” (emphasis in original). The Tribunal rejected that contention on the basis that the DNA evidence revealed he had two half-brothers, but was not “conclusive evidence of the [appellant’s] identity” (T [73]). The Tribunal’s reference to the evidence not being conclusive on the question of identity was responsive to the submission put by the appellant to the Tribunal that it was conclusive. There was never any question that the appellant had two half-brothers (being the point that the DNA evidence did establish). The appellant never explained how the DNA evidence could have been taken into account by the Tribunal in a way that went beyond the accepted fact that the appellant had two half-brothers. There is no error in the Tribunal’s approach to the DNA evidence. The “true identity” issue The Tribunal’s summary of the different names, dates and places of birth used by the appellant from time to time was set out in its reasons (T [50]ff). In the published version of its reasons, the Tribunal replaced any references to specific information capable of being used to identify the appellant, or other persons referred to, with square brackets and generic information (eg, [DOB] and [Ms D]). Adopting the anonymised version of the Tribunal’s reasons, it said as follows:50.The applicant entered Australia [in] March 2009 claiming to be [AB] ([DOB 1]) born in Nigeria; in the 48R visa application, he indicated that his full name is [AB], that he has also been known by [C], and that his date of birth is [Date 1]. He declared that his wife as [Ms D] ([DOB]) and his three children are [Mr E] ([DOB]), [Mr F] ([DOB]) and [Mr G] ([DOB]).51.The applicant arrived at Melbourne Airport [in] March 2009 on the Nigerian passport issued in the name [AB] ([DOB 1]). He was interviewed and he now claimed to be [BC] ([DOB 2]) and that he used his brother’s passport to travel to Australia. He was accompanied by [Mr G] ([DOB]) and [Mr F] ([DOB]). In the 48R application, the applicant claimed they were his children but during the interview, he said that they were his half-brothers and not his children as he had originally claimed.52.In the Protection visa application lodged on 18 March 2009, the applicant claimed to be [BC] ([DOB 2]), and that [Mr J] ([DOB]) and [Mr G] ([DOB]) are his half-brothers. He claimed that his brother [AB] ([DOB 1]) had organised the passports for him and his half-brothers to facilitate the grant of the Tourist (Subclass 676) visa. During the RRT hearing on 22 June 2009, the applicant claimed that in about 1960, his mother [Ms L] had adopted [AB] after the death of [A]’s mother.53.On 30 April 2010, during the IVT interview, the applicant indicated that he had provided incorrect information to the Department in relation to his identity since his initial arrival at Melbourne Airport [in] March 2009. He indicated that the three passports he and his half-brothers used to enter Australia were bogus. This included the Nigerian passport, document [number 1], in the name [AB] ([DOB 1]). In the interview, the applicant initially claimed that the passport, document [number 1], belonged to him and had his photo but the name and date of birth were that of his brother, [AB] ([DOB 1]), which he used for travel to [Country 2] prior to his travel to Australia. However, the applicant later claimed that he and [AB] ([DOB 1]) are the same person. The applicant provided to an officer from the IVT another Nigerian passport, document [number 2], for [BC] ([DOB 2]).54.The outcome of fingerprint checks resulted in a positive match between the applicant’s fingerprints taken by the Department, [Country 2] and [Country 4]. The applicant’s fingerprints in [Country 2] matched the recorded identity of [LM] ([DOB 4]), alias [BAC], who was recorded as [a Country 3] national. [LM] was convicted in [Country 2] for driving a vehicle while uninsured and driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence. [LM] was also convicted of obtaining pecuniary advantage by deception and sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment. [LM] told the [Country 2] authorities that he had obtained employment with a [Workplace] in [Suburb] using a photograph substituted Nigerian passport in the name of [ABC] ([DOB 1]), document [number 3]. [LM]’s application for asylum was refused and he was removed from [Country 2] [in] July 2007.55.In [Country 4], fingerprint checks matched the recorded identity of [AB] ([DOB 1]). The checks revealed that there is an outstanding warrant for the applicant relating to larceny, and although the applicant does not have a criminal conviction, he is wanted by the [Country 4] authorities to stand trial for the outstanding larceny charges.56.The applicant lodged an application for an Australian Citizenship by conferral and in support, he provided a [Country 2] Criminality Certificate issued on 10 February 2015. The certificate stated [ABC] ([DOB 1]) was the holder of a Nigerian passport, document [number 1]. The applicant was interviewed in relation to his Australian Citizenship application by an officer of the Department’s Identity Unit and an officer from the Citizenship section. During this interview, the applicant was presented with scanned copies of two Nigerian driver’s licences, namely, Nigerian driver’s licence [number 1], in the name of [CB] ([DOB 3]), which he provided when he arrived at Melbourne Airport, and the Nigerian driver’s licence [number 2], in the name of [CB – different spelling of B] ([DOB 2]), which he provided in support of his Protection visa application. During that interview, the applicant stated that he had lost his licence but was unable to explain how he was able to provide the scanned copy of the lost licence. Furthermore, the applicant denied knowing [Ms D] or ever being married to anyone by that name. He was questioned about the Nigerian passport and birth certificate issued in the name of [Ms D] ([DOB]) and the fraudulent birth certificates indicating his half-brothers were his children with [Ms D] ([DOB]). He said that he never married [Ms D], that she did not exist and that the documents had been acquired by an agent in Nigeria for the applicant.57.The applicant was presented with a copy of the Nigerian Birth Certificate he provided in support of the Tourist visa in [Country 1] on 05 February 2009, in the name [AB] ([DOB 1]). The applicant acknowledged that the birth certificate contained fraudulent information and did not reflect his true identity. He claimed that his true date of birth is [Date 2]. When asked why the Department should accept that his date of birth is [Date 2], the applicant indicated that he used the other date of birth “because of the situation back home in Nigeria and to protect myself and so that I would not be easily identifiable.” The applicant indicated that [AB] ([DOB 1]) did not exist and that he has no other siblings aside from his half-brothers.58.In the citizenship application, the applicant named two female parents, [Ms O] ([DOB]) and [Ms L] ([DOB]), but no male parent, indicating that he has named three mothers, [Ms I], [Ms O] and [Ms L], and two fathers, both named [Mr H], in documents and applications provided to the Department.59.At the identity interview, the applicant was presented with information that was received by the Department from a reliable third party indicating that his mother, [Ms L], was alive in 2017 and his half-brothers have been in contact with this person, which indicates that the death certificate and the consequent Protection visa claims were fraudulent. In response, he claimed he did not know anything about his half-brothers contacting a person named [Ms L].60.The Tribunal is satisfied on the evidence that the applicant has been known in Australia, [Country 2] and [Country 4] under different names and identities. He has provided documents, some of which, by his own account, were not genuine or contained incorrect information.61.The applicant’s visa was not cancelled on the basis of the provision of incorrect information or bogus documents but on identity issues. In his response to the NOICC, the applicant conceded that the information he provided is confusing, internally inconsistent, and creates a degree of uncertainty about his true identity. He recognised that the Department’s lack of clarity about his identity was “initially generated by myself, as my two younger half-brothers…and I fled to Australia from Nigeria using identity documents that were not our own”. He claimed that due to their haste to leave Nigeria and as a result of his desire “to conceal our real identities” from those in Nigeria who might cause them harm, he travelled on a passport issued in the name of [AB], [DOB 1]. He conceded that the passport was not his and that his true identity is [BAC].62.The applicant claimed that during the Citizenship interview held on 21 June 2017, he was very nervous and did not represent himself well. He claimed that despite making foolish errors and misleading the Department in 2009, he has been consistent since first arriving in Australia about his true identity.(Emphasis in original.)