NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38

Citation: NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38
Parties: NBMZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
File number: NSD 1972 of 2013
Judge(s): ALLSOP CJ, BUCHANAN AND KATZMANN JJ
Date of judgment: 9 April 2014
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Refugees – Unlawful non-citizens – Refusal to grant a protection (class XA) visa – person assessed as satisfying definition of refugee – Indefinite immigration detention – No realistic prospect of removal from Australia in reasonably foreseeable future – Scope of Minister’s discretion under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Whether the Minister’s exercise of power was affected by jurisdictional error – Whether the Minister was obliged to consider individual circumstances of the applicant – Whether the Minister was obliged to consider legal consequences for the applicant of visa refusal – Whether the Minister was obliged to consider the legal framework within which the discretion is exercised – Whether the Minister was obliged to consider risk to the Australian community if applicant was granted a visa – Whether the Minister was permitted to take into account general deterrence

MIGRATION – Refugees – relationship between the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) and the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Extent of protection obligations owed to persons satisfying the definition of a “refugee” under Article 1A(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Judicial review – Review of a decision made under a discretionary power – mandatory considerations arising with respect to discretionary powers


ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Judicial review – procedural fairness – requirement to inform applicant of the central place of deterrence as a consideration

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 25D
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 4, 4(2), 13(1), 14(1), 30(1), 30(2), 36, 36(2)(a), 36(3), 36(4), 36(4)(a), 36(5), 36(5)(b), 36(5A), 46A, 46A(1), 46A(2), 46A(3), 47, 65, 91U, 189, 189(1), 195A, 196, 197AA-197AG, 197AB(1), 197AC(1), 198, 198(6), 499, 501, 501(1), 501(6), 501(6)(aa), 501(7), 501F, 501G(1)
Ministerial Direction No. 55 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s501 (Cth)

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954), Articles 1, 1A(2), 1C, 1D-1F, 2, 4, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 33, 33(1), 34
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)

Cases cited:

Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562 considered
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 referred to
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 considered
Cunliffe v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 79; 129 ALD 233 considered
Djalic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 151

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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 38
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court was presented with an application for judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse the granting of a protection (class XA) visa to the applicant, a Sunni Kurd in a Shi'ite Islamic state, accused by a mullah of apostasy. The applicant's mental health issues, which included clinical depression, suicidal ideation, and self-harm, were exacerbated by his uncertain legal status in Australia, news of a car accident involving his wife and child, and his detention. The primary issue for the court was whether the Minister's exercise of power under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was affected by jurisdictional error. The court found that the Minister was not obliged to consider the individual circumstances of the applicant, the legal consequences for the applicant of visa refusal, the legal framework within which the discretion is exercised, or the risk to the Australian community if the applicant was granted a visa. However, the Minister was permitted to take into account general deterrence. The court found that there was no jurisdictional error or relevant inadequacy in how the applicant’s mental state was put forward to the Minister and that the decision was made in the knowledge that the applicant had repeatedly tried to harm himself. The court agreed with the orders proposed by Buchanan J and quashed the Minister's decision to refuse to grant the applicant a protection (class XA) visa. The court also prohibited the respondent and his delegates, servants and agents from acting upon or giving effect to the decision and ordered the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs, as taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. A writ of certiorari issue, quashing the 25 July 2013 decision of the Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship to refuse to grant the applicant a protection (class XA) visa under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“decision”).

2. A writ of prohibition issue, prohibiting the respondent and his delegates, servants and agents from acting upon or giving effect to the decision.

3. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs, as taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

We have had the advantage of reading the reasons of Buchanan J. We agree with the orders he proposes. His Honour’s explanation of the background, statutory framework and issues (which we gratefully adopt) allows us to express our views shortly. Background In addition to the matters referred to by Buchanan J, one particular aspect of the applicant’s position should be noted. The basis of acceptance of the applicant’s status as a refugee was that he was a Sunni Kurd in a Shi’ite Islamic state accused by a mullah of the capital crime of apostasy. In other words, the harm the applicant feared, and which was accepted to be well-founded, was of the gravest kind. In making this observation, we should not be taken to be advocating any gradation of worth of claims for asylum under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 and entered into force 22 April 1954, as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 (“Refugees Convention”). Nevertheless, the nature and quality of the feared persecution may vary widely from case to case. Of course, in every case it must be of a sufficiently serious nature as to warrant the giving of protection. Indefinite detention This Court is bound by the reasoning of the majority in Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562. The power of executive detention is, of course, limited by the scope and purpose of the underlying power – to decide upon immigration status and then, on a given hypothesis, to deport. But the practical realities of individual circumstances mean that some people may face detention for years, with no end in sight. It may be that the harshness of indefinite detention in a particular case is relieved by the making of a “residence determination” under s 197AB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). Such provision might be employed by the Minister to ameliorate what might otherwise be the physical and psychological burdens on a detainee (relevantly hypothesised here as someone recognised by Australia to require protection under the Refugees Convention) faced with indefinite detention. Indeed, after the incident giving rise to the applicant’s conviction, s 197AB was employed. Nevertheless, the applicant remains in indefinite detention. It is true, too, that the Minister may grant a detainee a visa in the circumstances described in s 195A of the Act. But, as Buchanan J points out in his reasons, there was no reference to the possibility or the willingness of the Minister to contemplate a visa under s 195A in either the briefing paper to him, or in his reasons. We agree with Buchanan J that the applicant is entitled to have this application determined on the hypothesis that he will be indefinitely detained and that any question of a visa under s 195A is, at best, a matter of speculation. There is no foundation for any assumption that the Minister will grant any relevant visa. Of course, the applicant’s detention may end by Australia finding a country willing to take him, in circumstances where there is no risk of refoulement. In the present case, however, there was no material before the Minister to suggest that there was such a country; nor was there any suggestion that there was a country which the applicant had a right to enter and in which to reside for the purposes of s 36(3) of the Act.The scope of the Minister’s discretion

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

ALLSOP CJ
We agree with the conclusion of Buchanan J, and his reasons therefor, that there was no jurisdictional error or relevant inadequacy in how the applicant’s mental state was put forward to the Minister. There was no relevant misstatement or omission that may have affected the Minister’s consideration of the matter. That, of course, means that the decision was made in the face of a submission, which was not questioned, that at the time of the loss of temper (the “childish tantrum” as described by the sentencing magistrate), the applicant was suffering from clinical depression exacerbated by his detention, uncertain legal status and the possible injury to, or death of, his wife and daughter as a result of a car accident in Iran, which had driven him to attempt suicide or serious self-harm shortly prior to the incident. What is more, the material in the possession of the Department (at least that which is in the Departmental file) is to be treated as being in the Minister’s possession (see Peko-Wallsend Ltd at 31). A copy of the applicant’s medical records during his time in detention was held by the Department. That means that the decision was made in the knowledge (whether actual or constructive) that the applicant had repeatedly tried to harm himself and that within hours of the incident he was assessed by a medical officer as being very distressed and needing to be removed from the detention centre.Other aspects of the decision In the light of our conclusions it is unnecessary to deal with the other issues raised in argument. The application also throws up other important issues not the subject of argument. It is inappropriate to deal with them in detail or to reach a conclusion about them. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to make some observations, and to say something more about the Refugees Convention. It is important to recognise not only the place of Art 33(1), but also of Art 33(2) in the contextual fabric for decision-making about those who have been recognised as refugees. It describes the serious conditions that justify the return of a refugee to a place where he or she may face persecution. Article 33(2) and the circumstances within it reflect the balance contained within the Refugees Convention between protection of those who need it, and the legitimate entitlement of Contracting States not to be required to give protection to those who pose a danger to the host State and its people. The nature of the assessment of status under Art 1A(2) is generally one that requires close attention to the personal circumstances and position of the claimant. The Refugees Convention is directed to the human condition of individuals, and their posited flight from persecution. Rarely (save for clear cases of systematic persecution against groups) can a judgment be made about whether an individual is entitled to the status of a refugee by reference to general considerations divorced from the individual’s personal circumstances. See, in this context, the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status published by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (as revised in 1992) at 47, in the section entitled “Establishing the Facts”. Likewise, a decision not to afford protection (by the refusal of a visa) to someone who is recognised to satisfy Art 1A(2) would require clear statutory foundation if it were to be lawfully made by reference to considerations unconnected with the personal circumstances of the person in respect of whom Australia, by its treaty-making power and laws, had undertaken to protect from persecution.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: ALLSOP CJ

A case note made on 31 October 2011, shortly after the incident said: … He is not coping well not knowing the status of the health of his wife and daughter. IHMS believe it is important that he is able to find out ASAP whether or not his wife and child are ok. It is better that he knows, even if it is sad news. There was some suggestion that DIAC work with the client and his cousin in appealing to him to get the information, however if he is unable to get it, then the Australian Red Cross might need to assist. IHMS have advised that the recent property damage was done out of frustration for his current situation not because he was “being behavioural”, protesting or being malicious. (Emphasis added.) Counsel for the applicant drew attention to the passage I have emphasised as an example of information which should have been put directly before the Minister. However, matters of this kind were expressly referred to by the applicant’s migration agent in representations to a delegate of the Minister on 28 March 2013, that the applicant should not be refused a visa. The migration agent said: 19.The Applicant’s crime was committed in the context of clinical depression exacerbated by his uncertain legal status in Australia, news of a car accident in which his wife and child was involved, and his detention in Australia. … The migration agent referred to a “Standard Health Event’ report from IHMS (obtained from the Department under Freedom of Information legislation) dated 31 October 2011 which recorded: Wife and daughter was involved in a MVA a month ago. His last contact was a month ago when he was told that his daughter is in ICU and his wife has a fracture. He has not had any news since and is very distressed. The representations by the migration agent had, included as attachments, reports from a consultant psychiatrist and a psychologist. The representations, the attachments, and other matters relevant to the applicant’s mental health were drawn to the Minister’s attention in the Minute to him seeking a decision about the application for a protection visa. The following “mitigating factors” were put before the Minister: Mitigating Factors35. Defence counsel submitted in court on 3 October 2012 that Mr [NBMZ] was suffering from a ‘great deal of mental health issues’, had attempted suicide on the day of the incident and was taken to the Darwin Hospital (Attachment F, pages 4). 36. Mr [NBMZ’s] psychologist advised defence counsel that Mr [NBMZ] had been formally diagnosed with ‘post traumatic stress disorder’ and was in the process of obtaining treatment through medication and an appointment with a psychiatrist (Attachment F, page 4). 37. Mr [NBMZ’s] migration agent considers that his mental health influenced his behaviour and states: ‘The Applicant’s crime was committed in the context of clinical depression exacerbated by his uncertain legal status in Australia, news of a car accident in which his wife and child was involved, and his detention in Australia’ (Attachment J, page 4). 38. Since committing the offence, Mr [NBMZ] has continued to seek assistance for his mental health issues (Attachment J, page 4). He has received treatment from consultant psychiatrist, Dr Dilprasan De Silva, who has prescribed medication and provided some supportive psychotherapy (Attachment L). 39. Mr [NBMZ] has also been receiving counselling from Ms Katayoon Haghseresht, principal psychologist at Takes Care Psychology Pty Ltd. In a report to Dr Keith Woodhead dated 27 February 2013 she states: ‘Throughout my sessions with Mr [NBMZ], he has presented with severe levels of anxiety, depression and stress. He has frequently presented with suicidal ideation and self harm; one of the main reasons for this has been his prolonged state of remaining in the Community Detention Program, feeling responsible to financially support his mother and sisters who remain in a small village in Iran. Furthermore, his mother has been severely burned in a domestic accident and needed urgent and long-term medical care in which he has been unable to fully support’ [Transcribed as written] (Attachment K). 40. In relation to potential risk to the Australian community, the migration agent submitted that Mr [NBMZ] has spent over 21 months in Australia and has attempted to establish an identity in this country by ‘seeking continued medical treatment’. He stated that Mr [NBMZ] has shown a steady improvement and is ‘seeking to work towards greater improvement in life’ (Attachment J, page 5). 41. Stipendiary Magistrate Cavanagh took into account Mr [NBMZ’s] plea of guilty when considering an appropriate disposition. It is open for you to find that Mr [NBMZ] is remorseful and has simplified the judicial process with his plea of guilty. 42. In conclusion to the submission, Mr [NBMZ’s] migration agent states: ‘In these circumstances, the Applicant is no longer a threat to the Australian community and has spent a significant time in Australia learning and appreciating Australia’s values. He is remorseful of his past actions and seeks to become a positive contributor in Australian society once he has finalised his immigration matter. Therefore the discretion to refuse to grant the Applicant a PV under s501(1) of the Act should not be exercised’ (Attachment J, page 5). 43. It is open for you to find that Mr [NBMZ] is taking measures to learn to cope more adequately with the stressors that precipitated his offending and is endeavouring to improve his life and adapt to Australian society and values. 44. Mr [NBMZ’s] migration agent further submitted that Mr [NBMZ] ‘did not harm (nor threaten to harm, apart from himself) any individuals, but damaged property in an enclosed environment in a detention centre. The Applicant has not shown any intent to engage in criminal or serious conduct in a public setting’ (Attachment J, page 4). 45. Mr [NBMZ] arrived in Australia on 24 June 2011 and has remained onshore for more than two years. Mr [NBMZ] had been in Australia for over three months at the time of the above offending.