FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
PLCP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 398
Review of: PLCP and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2024] AATA 198 File number(s): VID 194 of 2024 Judgment of: HORAN J Date of judgment: 24 April 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke cancellation of visa – whether legally unreasonable to defer assessment of non-refoulement obligations to subsequent protection visa application – whether failure to consider applicant’s representations regarding impediments to her removal to South Sudan – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36A, 197C, 501(3A), 501(6)(a), 501BA, 501CA(4) Cases cited: BJI20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1632
BNGP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 298 FCR 609
ECE21 v Minister for Home Affairs (2023) 297 FCR 422
Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 267 FCR 628
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1
NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37; 97 ALJR 1005
Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582
PLCP and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2024] AATA 198
Shi v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCAFC 136
Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 246 FCR 146
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 68 Date of hearing: 23 July 2024 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Guo with Dr J Murphy Solicitor for the Applicant: Asylum Seeker Resource Centre Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Barrington Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 194 of 2024 BETWEEN: PLCP
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
HORAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 APRIL 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HORAN J:
The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 1 February 2024, by which the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke the cancellation of the Global Special Humanitarian visa (Class XB subclass 202) formerly held by the…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 398
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable in deferring consideration of the applicant's non-refoulement obligations and whether the Tribunal failed to adequately consider the applicant's representations regarding the impediments to her removal to South Sudan. The court had to determine if the Tribunal's approach was legally sound and whether the decision-maker provided an evident and intelligible justification for deferring consideration of the non-refoulement obligations.
The court found that the Tribunal's decision was not legally unreasonable. It noted that while the Tribunal had deferred consideration of the applicant's non-refoulement obligations, it did so on the basis that the applicant could apply for a protection visa where her claims could be comprehensively assessed. The court held that the Tribunal was entitled to defer consideration of the non-refoulement obligations in the circumstances of this case, as there was no legal requirement for the Tribunal to consider those claims at the visa cancellation stage. The court further found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the applicant's submissions and the evidence regarding the risk of harm she would face in South Sudan, and the decision to defer consideration was justified.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the application with costs. The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the costs of the Minister as agreed or taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ground 3 was not ultimately pressed by the applicant.CONSIDERATIONGround 1: Was the Tribunal’s decision legally unreasonable? In her written submissions, the applicant submits that “[w]hile in many respects the Tribunal’s approach was careful and thorough, it erred jurisdictionally in its response to the Applicant’s representations concerning non-refoulement obligations and the risk of harm said to engage those obligations”. The applicant contends that the process of reasoning engaged in by the Tribunal to defer consideration of non-refoulement obligations in the particular circumstances of this case was legally unreasonable, leading to jurisdictional error. The applicant had made extensive submissions before the delegate as to the harm that she would face if she were returned to South Sudan. The delegate accepted for the purposes of their decision that the applicant could face a real risk of harm in South Sudan, including “forced marriage, rape, persecution, harm and possibly even death due to her ethnicity, status as a woman and the absence of any familial support there”, and as a consequence accepted that there was a real likelihood that non-refoulement obligations were enlivened in relation to the applicant’s return to South Sudan. Before the Tribunal, the applicant relied on the findings made by the delegate, along with country information consistent with those findings. Rather than seeking to address those submissions or that evidence, the Minister contended that the Tribunal should defer assessment of the applicant’s claims to fear harm in South Sudan, on the basis that it was open to the applicant to apply for a protection visa so that those claims could be comprehensively assessed. In her reply submissions to the Tribunal, the applicant reiterated that she was likely to be owed non-refoulement obligations and resisted the Minister’s submission that the Tribunal need not engage with her submissions that she would face a real chance of harm on return to South Sudan, arguing that such an approach was “legally wrong and poses the risk of leading the Tribunal into error”. After submitting that the Tribunal was required to engage with her clearly articulated representations, the applicant’s reply submissions continued:23. In light of the ease with which enacted nonrefoulement obligations can be considered, the Tribunal in the present [case] ought not defer its consideration of enacted nonrefoulement obligations. Indeed, the Applicant submits that it would be unreasonable to do so. Rather, the Tribunal should find that removing the Applicant would place Australia in breach of its enacted nonrefoulement obligations. It should further find that this is a significant matter weighing in favour of revocation, both because of the prospect of that eventuality occurring and because of the alternative prospect of the Applicant being indefinitely detained.(Emphasis added.) In this Court, the applicant submits that the High Court’s decision in Plaintiff M1 does not require a decision-maker to defer consideration of non-refoulement obligations, but simply confirms that such an approach is permissible, as “one available outcome”: see Plaintiff M1 at [9](3), [30], [36] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon and Steward JJ). Accordingly, where a non-refoulement claim is included in the representations made by a former visa holder or is otherwise suggested by the circumstances, it remains open to a decision-maker under s 501CA(4) to consider that claim: Plaintiff M1 at [30]. The applicant submitted that the approach adopted by the decision-maker in the circumstances of any particular case is governed by the principles of legal reasonableness and that, where the decision-maker decides to defer consideration of non-refoulement obligations, there must be an evident and intelligible justification for adopting that approach.