FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP APPELLANT
AND
SZJSS AND ORS RESPONDENTS
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48 15 December 2010 S147/2010
ORDER
1. Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside paragraphs 1 and 2(a) and (b) of the order of the Federal Court of Australia made on 24 November 2009 and, in lieu thereof, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed.
3.Appellant to pay the costs of the first and second respondents in this Court.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
S J Gageler SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with G T Johnson for the appellant (instructed by DLA Phillips Fox Lawyers)
B W Walker SC with J R Young for the first and second respondents (instructed by Simon Diab & Associates Solicitors)
Submitting appearance for the third respondent
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ. The first and second respondents, husband and wife and citizens of Nepal, arrived in Australia on 22 February 2006. Shortly afterwards, on 5 April 2006, each applied for a protection visa.
A criterion for a protection visa under the Migration Act1958 (Cth)[1] is that the applicant is a non‑citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol[2], or that the spouse or dependant of such an applicant is a non‑citizen in Australia and the applicant holds a protection visa[3]. The Refugees Convention includes in its definition of a refugee any person who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of … membership of a particular social group or political opinion" cannot or will not return to their home country[4].
[1]Reprint No 11 contains the applicable text of the Act.
[2]Migration Act, s 36(2)(a).
[3]Migration Act, sub-ss 36(2)(b)(i) and (ii).
[4]Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by Article 1(2) of the Refugees Protocol.
Under Pt 7 of the Migration Act, the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") is under a duty to review "an RRT‑reviewable decision" of the delegate of the Minister[5] and in doing so the Tribunal is obliged to determine whether or not it is satisfied that the respondents meet the respective criteria referred to above.
[5]Migration Act, s 414(1).
A delegate of the appellant refused the first respondent's application on 3 July 2006 in accordance with s 65 of the MigrationAct. On 10 October 2006, the Tribunal affirmed that decision. The first and second respondents sought judicial review of that decision in the Federal Magistrates Court. On 15 August 2007, the Federal Magistrates Court set aside the decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal to be determined according to law[6].
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The Minister for Immigration and Citizenship appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Federal Court of Australia. The Federal Court had found that the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) had committed jurisdictional error in its review of the protection claims of the first and second respondents, who were citizens of Nepal. The Federal Court had determined that the RRT failed to give proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to certain letters tendered as evidence and that its description of some oral evidence as a "baseless tactic" gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Consequently, the Federal Court had remitted the matter for redetermination.
The High Court was required to determine whether the RRT had fallen into jurisdictional error. This involved considering two main aspects: first, whether the RRT's approach to the letters in evidence, by assigning them "no weight," constituted a failure to give them proper, genuine, and realistic consideration; and second, whether the RRT's characterisation of the first respondent's oral evidence as a "baseless tactic" demonstrated an apprehension of bias, thereby vitiating the decision-making process.
The High Court allowed the Minister's appeal. The Court reasoned that the Federal Court had erred in its assessment of the RRT's decision. The High Court found that the RRT's reasons, when read as a whole, did not demonstrate a failure to consider the evidence genuinely or realistically. The expression "baseless tactic," while strong, was considered by the High Court in the context of the RRT's overall assessment of the evidence and the applicant's credibility, and it did not, in the Court's view, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court concluded that the RRT had engaged in a process of evaluation, even if its conclusions were adverse to the applicant.
Accordingly, the High Court set aside the orders of the Federal Court and ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed. The Minister was ordered to pay the costs of the first and second respondents in the High Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside paragraphs 1 and 2(a) and (b) of the order of the Federal Court of Australia made on 24 November 2009 and, in lieu thereof, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed.
3. Appellant to pay the costs of the first and second respondents in this Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Federal Court found that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error in finding that the first and second respondents are not refugees because it failed to give "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" to letters in evidence and because it described the giving of certain evidence by the first respondent as a "baseless tactic"[9]. The reasons of the Tribunal were also said by the Federal Court to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias[10], and the matter was remitted for hearing and determination according to law[11]. It is against that decision that the Minister now appeals. The third respondent, the Tribunal, submits to any order this Court may make, save as to costs. Special leave to appeal to this Court was granted on the conditions that the Minister does not seek to disturb the costs orders below and that the Minister will pay the respondents' costs to the appeal, in any event.[9]SZJSS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 113 ALD 270 at 281 [46] and 282 [49].[10]SZJSS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 113 ALD 270 at 284 [59]-[61].[11]SZJSS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 113 ALD 270 at 285. The facts and procedural history From 1996 until 2006, there was a civil war in Nepal. In November 2006, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between the Nepalese government and the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (the "Maoists"). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement gave the Maoists a role in government. However, in February 2006, when the first and second respondents left Nepal, the Nepalese civil war had not yet ended. Subsequently, in 2008 there were parliamentary elections in Nepal for the Constituent Assembly. In his initial application and before both the first and second Tribunals, the first respondent claimed to fear harm from the Maoists, the Royal Nepalese Army and the police. Before arriving in Australia, he had been a school teacher and, as the owner of a shop, a businessman in the remote Turang village of Gulmi District, Nepal. The first respondent claimed consistently throughout each of the proceedings that the Maoists forced him, and other teachers, to pay compulsory donations out of their wages into Maoist coffers. Originally, the first respondent was forced to pay the equivalent of one day's wages per month, but this gradually increased until he was paying the equivalent of one week's wages each month. The first respondent claimed that he was forced to attend Maoist training camps with other teachers. Also, the first respondent claimed that the Maoists forced him to pay additional taxes in respect of a retail shop which he and his wife were running. The donations were referred to compendiously in the Tribunal's decision as "revolutionary taxes". The first respondent claimed that each of the then government of Nepal and the Maoists suspected he sympathised with the opposite side in the conflict. The donations to the Maoists were, he feared, interpreted by the local government authorities as support for the rebels, whereas the Maoists suspected that he was supplying the government with information and other assistance. He claimed that it would be unsafe and unreasonable for him to relocate to Kathmandu because the Maoists from whom he feared persecution had networks there. The first respondent's claim for protection was based both on his political opinions and his membership of particular social groups, as both a teacher and a businessman.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ
It is also convenient to set out the relevant parts of the Tribunal's decision concerning the Tribunal's description of the giving of certain oral evidence by the first respondent as a "baseless tactic":"The [first respondent] claimed to the Department and to the [Tribunal] that as teachers and business people he and his wife were harassed and punished by the Maoists in the form of obligatory, increasing revolutionary taxes, the donations referred to throughout this decision. …The Tribunal is not satisfied on the evidence before it that school teachers are currently being charged revolutionary taxes under threat of violence in Kathmandu, where the [first respondent] was last residing. The Tribunal is not satisfied that if the [first respondent] became a school teacher in Kathmandu or other large cities, he would be obliged to donate to the Maoists or face persecutory threats for refusing …For that matter, the Tribunal is not satisfied on the evidence before it that, irrespective of where he might reside in Nepal, the [first respondent] would face a real chance of the resumption in forced donations to the Maoists upon his becoming a businessman or shopkeeper again. When the Tribunal asked him why he could not come out of hiding in Kathmandu now and live there like his brother, he did not suggest that this was because he is a businessman and because his brother is not, or suggest that businessmen in Kathmandu face a real chance of Convention‑related harm. He cited, as the only distinguishing factor, the fact that he is by vocation a school teacher. The Tribunal is of the view that to a very large part, the [first respondent]'s reference to being a school teacher at this point was a baseless tactic to help him address the potentially adverse impression the Tribunal disclosed to him after he said that people who used to be in hiding from the Maoists are now living out in the open." Federal Court decision The appeal to the Federal Court followed the Federal Magistrate's determination that the Tribunal decision contained no jurisdictional error. In their Notice of Appeal to the Federal Court, the first and second respondents advanced a claim that the Tribunal had failed to give "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" to the evidence before it. The Federal Court's reasoning included the following[12]: "The … [T]ribunal did not find that the two headmasters were prepared to write falsehoods in the letters. I cannot conceive how any rational, reasonable approach to the evaluation of that evidence could give it 'no weight'. I am satisfied rather that the … [T]ribunal was not genuinely considering the [respondents'] claims as corroborated by the letters on the material before it. It used the formula of giving material 'no weight' as a basis on which it might ignore probative, relevant and highly supportive material corroborating the factual basis of the fears which the [first respondent] claimed. It did this simply as a basis for putting the evidence to one side, having said that it had looked at it. … I am of opinion that when the … member said that he gave no weight to the three letters, he simply recited that he had considered them only to discard them. This was not a proper, genuine or realistic evaluation of this material. …Here, the … [T]ribunal disabled itself from assessing the [first respondent's] case in relation to his fear of persecution in [Kathmandu], by putting to one side as having no weight, letters that corroborated his claim that he continued to be pursued in [Kathmandu] and by characterising as 'a baseless tactic' the continued maintenance of his original claim that as a teacher in [Kathmandu] he feared suffering persecution because the Maoists were still pursuing him. …Not only was the attribution of a 'baseless tactic' made without evidence, it was contrary to the evidence. … A fair-minded lay observer or properly informed lay person would find the use of the language 'baseless tactic' disturbing in the context of this tribunal's reasoning. Coupled with the … member using the 'no weight' formulation to shut out powerfully corroborative independent evidence, verified at the [T]ribunal's earlier request by the Australian Embassy in Nepal, I am satisfied that a fair‑minded lay observer or properly informed lay person would regard this [T]ribunal member as having an apparent bias against the [first respondent's] account".[12]SZJSS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 113 ALD 270 at 280‑284 [43]-[61].Was there jurisdictional error?
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ