Ranabhat v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Ranabhat v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1147

File number: MLG 1156 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL
Date of judgment: 24 July 2025
(and delivered by Judge Humphreys by telephone pursuant to s 210 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Student visa cancellation – decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal failed to afford the applicant procedural fairness – whether the Tribunal considered irrelevant evidence or information – whether the Tribunal failed to consider evidence or information before it – whether the Tribunal failed to give appropriate weight to certain factors – whether the Tribunal erred in assessing the degree of hardship the applicant might have faced if her visa remained cancelled – whether the Tribunal failed to make findings in relation to the applicant’s exceptional circumstances – whether the Tribunal’s findings were illogical, irrational or legally unreasonable – whether the conduct of the applicant’s representative amounted to a fraud on the Tribunal – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth), Items 10 & 25 in Schedule 16

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116, 357A, 359AA 360, 360A, 476 & 499 and Division 5 of Part 5

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Condition 8202 in Schedule 8

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia [1999] HCA 14

AVH24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 98

Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 600

BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384

Chen v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 670

Coertzen & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 2410

Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

CVI17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 688

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3

Elara v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1565

Kaur v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 243

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 805

Lee v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2005] FCA 464

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZLIX [2008] FCAFC 17

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey [2014] FCA 640

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited [1986] HCA 40

Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

MZAIB v…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1147
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ranabhat v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involves the applicant, a citizen of Nepal, who had her student visa cancelled by a delegate of the Minister. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which upheld the delegate's decision. The applicant sought to challenge the AAT's decision, claiming procedural unfairness, improper consideration of irrelevant evidence, failure to consider relevant evidence, and inappropriate weighing of factors. The court examined whether the AAT erred in assessing the hardship the applicant might face if her visa remained cancelled and whether the AAT failed to consider her exceptional circumstances. Additionally, the applicant's representative was accused of conducting a fraud on the Tribunal.

The central legal issues in this case involved determining whether the AAT erred in its review of the visa cancellation decision. Specifically, the court had to consider if the AAT failed to provide procedural fairness, improperly considered irrelevant evidence, neglected to consider relevant evidence, or incorrectly weighed the factors involved in the decision. Furthermore, the court examined whether the AAT's findings regarding the degree of hardship and exceptional circumstances were illogical, irrational, or legally unreasonable.

In its reasoning, the court first confirmed that the AAT afforded the applicant procedural fairness and did not commit any jurisdictional error in this regard. The court then addressed the applicant's claims about irrelevant evidence. By referencing established case law, particularly Khan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the court outlined the criteria for determining relevant and irrelevant considerations. It concluded that the AAT's decision-making process did not fall into error as it adhered to the legislative framework and correctly applied the relevant legal principles. The court also found that the AAT appropriately weighed the factors and did not commit any error in assessing the hardship or exceptional circumstances. Finally, the court dismissed the allegation that the applicant's representative had committed fraud on the Tribunal.

The court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the AAT's decision. Consequently, the application for judicial review was unsuccessful.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Court is satisfied that the Tribunal afforded the applicant procedural fairness and no jurisdictional error arises in this regard.Whether the Tribunal considered irrelevant evidence or information The applicant also suggested that the Tribunal considered or had regard to irrelevant evidence or information. Before addressing the information the Tribunal considered that the applicant suggests was irrelevant, it is useful to first outline the case law in relation to what amounts to a “relevant consideration” or an “irrelevant consideration”. This Court recently did so in Khan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 805. The analysis provided in Khan applies equally in this case and is repeated (with some minor amendments and additions) below. In this regard, the Court notes the summary provided by the Federal Court in Nguyen v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1107 as follows:23.A number of grounds of review assert error on the part of the Tribunal by either failing to take into account relevant considerations or taking into account irrelevant considerations. Before considering those and other grounds in more detail, it is convenient to identify the metes and bounds of that kind of alleged error going to the exercise of jurisdiction. It has been commonplace to refer to these two grounds as mandatory relevant considerations and forbidden irrelevant considerations. The addition of the words “mandatory” and “forbidden”, is something of a public law tautology, because that concept is built into the meaning of “relevant” and “irrelevant” in a public law sense, as the lengthy quote from Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 in the following paragraph demonstrates. But the deployment of that tautology is a useful way of emphasising that the issue is not one of relevance in the sense used in ordinary parlance, but rather whether a decision-maker is required in the exercise of jurisdiction to have regard to a particular consideration, or required not to have regard to a particular consideration.24.One of the most commonly cited, and clearly expressed, explanations of relevant and irrelevant considerations is by Mason J in Peko-Wallsend at 39-41 (omitting only citations and quotes; emphasis in original):(a)The ground of failure to take into account a relevant consideration can only be made out if a decision-maker fails to take into account a consideration which he is bound to take into account in making that decision…(b)What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making the decision is determined by construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If the statute expressly states the considerations to be taken into account, it will often be necessary for the court to decide whether those enumerated factors are exhaustive or merely inclusive. If the relevant factors – and in this context I use this expression to refer to the factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider – are not expressly stated, they must be determined by implication from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act. In the context of judicial review on the ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, this Court has held that, where a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard … By analogy, where the ground of review is that a relevant consideration has not been taken into account and the discretion is unconfined by the terms of the statute, the court will not find that the decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless an implication that he is bound to do so is to be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act. …(c)Not every consideration that a decision-maker is bound to take into account but fails to take into account will justify the court setting aside the impugned decision and ordering that the discretion be re-exercised according to law. A factor might be so insignificant that the failure to take it into account could not have materially affected the decision … A similar principle has been enunciated in cases where regard has been had to irrelevant considerations in the making of an administrative decision …(d)The limited role of a court reviewing the exercise of an administrative discretion must constantly be borne in mind. It is not the function of the court to substitute its own decision for that of the administrator by exercising a discretion which the legislature has vested in the administrator. Its role is to set limits on the exercise of that discretion, and a decision made within those boundaries cannot be impugned …It follows that, in the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to various considerations, it is generally for the decision-maker and not the court to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the matters which are required to be taken into account in exercising the statutory power … I say “generally” because both principle and authority indicate that in some circumstances a court may set aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to a relevant factor of no great importance. The preferred ground on which this is done, however, is not the failure to take into account relevant considerations or the taking into account of irrelevant considerations, but that the decision is “manifestly unreasonable”.25.It follows that in order to succeed upon a ground of failure to take into account a relevant consideration, or a ground of taking into account an irrelevant consideration, more than an assertion of general relevance or general irrelevance in the evaluative sense is required. That lesser degree of consideration or non-consideration is a matter for the decision-maker, subject to the general requirement to consider claims that are in fact made and submissions that are in fact advanced. For relevant or irrelevant considerations, what must be shown by the express words of the legislative scheme, or some particular feature of it, or by necessary implication, is that the element of compulsion or proscription is present. 26.The considerations that are relevant or irrelevant to a decision made under the Migration Act, in the sense of being mandatory or forbidden, are primarily, perhaps even entirely, determined by reference to that Act (including aspects of Direction 90 because it is made under s 499 of that Act), rather than by the particular facts of the case under consideration: see Applicant M185 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 230 at [8]-[10], and the cases cited and quoted of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323 at [73]-[74] and NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; 214 ALR 264 at [123] per Allsop J (as the Chief Justice then was, with Moore and Tamberlin JJ agreeing).27. The now Chief Justice also observed in NADH:(a)at [10], that reviewable error “by reason of failing to take into account relevant considerations, or taking into account irrelevant considerations, is an error that arises as a matter of law, rather than an error that is centrally concerned with the process of making the particular findings of fact upon which the decision-maker acts” and;(b)at [11], that the weight to be given to matters regarded as material by a Tribunal is a matter for it to determine.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 17 April 2019, the applicant applied to the then Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the “FCCA”) for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision (CB 156-161). The applicant filed an affidavit in support of that judicial review application which included further concerns that the applicant had with the Tribunal’s decision. The affidavit also annexed copies of the Tribunal’s decision and associated notification letters (CB 162-177). THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The application for judicial review is brought pursuant to s 476 of the Act. In order to succeed before this Court, the applicant must demonstrate that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal’s decision in some detail. The Tribunal’s decision is seven pages long and spans 36 paragraphs (CB 146-152). The final page contains extracts of relevant legislative provisions (CB 152). The Tribunal began by explaining that the applicant had sought review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister, on 19 September 2018, cancelling her visa. The Tribunal detailed that the applicant’s visa was cancelled because the delegate found that the applicant had not complied with a condition of her visa. The Tribunal confirmed that the applicant had appeared at a hearing before it on 14 March 2019 to give evidence and present arguments and that she was assisted by her representative at that hearing. The Tribunal explained that it had put information to the applicant regarding her enrolment (contained in her PRISMS records) at that hearing pursuant to s 359AA of the Act. It also put information to her from the Department’s file that the “applicant had been reported for working illegally”. The Tribunal explained that the applicant had been advised that the information was relevant because it suggested that she was not a genuine student. She was also advised that she could seek an adjournment or consult with her representative at any time. The applicant did not seek an adjournment but did seek additional time (through her representative) at the end of the hearing to provide further evidence to the Tribunal. The applicant was granted additional time to do so and that further evidence was received by the Tribunal on 14 March 2019 (at [1]-[9]). The Tribunal identified that the issue before it was whether the applicant had breached Condition 8202 in Schedule 8 of the Regulations and, if so, whether the applicant’s visa should be cancelled pursuant to s 116(1) of the Act. The Tribunal set out the requirements under Condition 8202 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations and explained that the applicant’s visa in this case was cancelled on the basis that the applicant was not enrolled in a registered course of study. Further, the applicant confirmed at the hearing that her enrolment had been cancelled on 7 November 2017, that she had not been attending classes or paying her tuition fees and was working on a full-time basis at that time. The applicant did not dispute that she had breached a condition attached to her visa when her enrolment was cancelled and confirmed that she understood the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal noted that the applicant’s PRISMS records confirmed the cancellation of the applicant’s enrolment and found that she had not complied with Condition 8202(2) in Schedule 8 of the Regulations (at [11]-[15]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the circumstances, the Court made an order (at the hearing of this matter on 16 April 2025) substituting the ART as the second respondent in this proceeding. The applicant’s migration history The applicant is a citizen of Nepal (Court Book (“CB”) 38 & 61). She arrived in Australia in January 2016 as the holder of a Student (Class TU) Higher Education Sector (Subclass 573) visa (granted offshore in December 2015) and was enrolled to study Diploma of Business and Bachelor of Business courses (CB 8 & 147). The applicant’s enrolments in those courses were cancelled. The applicant’s enrolment in the Diploma of Business course was cancelled on 27 January 2017 because the applicant had “transferred to [a] course at another provider” and her enrolment in the Bachelor of Business course was cancelled on 30 January 2017 due to “[n]on-commencement of studies” (CB 6). The applicant subsequently enrolled in a Bachelor of Professional Accounting which was scheduled to commence on 27 March 2017 and was due to be completed on 31 December 2019. However, that enrolment was cancelled on 7 November 2017 for “[n]on-payment of fees” (CB 6). On 20 June 2018, the Department of Home Affairs (the “Department”) wrote to the applicant (by email) to request updated contact details (CB 3-4). On 23 June 2018, the applicant provided the Department with updated postal and email addresses and a mobile phone number (CB 5). On 16 July 2018, the Department sent the applicant a “Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation” letter (the “NOICC”) under s 116 of the Act (CB 8-19). The NOICC was sent to the applicant by email and by registered post (CB 7 & 20). The NOICC referenced a breach of Condition 8202(2)(a) in Schedule 8 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the “Regulations”), noting that the applicant had “not been enrolled in a registered course of study since 7 November 2017” (CB 9). The applicant was given five working days within which to provide a response to the NOICC (CB 11). On 20 July 2018, the applicant provided a response to the NOICC (by email) (CB 21-27). That response included an “explanation” in relation to the NOICC (CB 22-26) and a medical letter in relation to the applicant’s father (dated 25 October 2017) (CB 27). The response stated that:(a)the applicant’s father was a politician and had been beaten in the past resulting in multiple surgeries, a hospital stay of six months and risking his eyesight;(b)whilst studying, the applicant was informed by her family that her father’s eyesight was getting worse and he required surgery which would cost 30 to 40 lakhs;(c)the applicant chose to stop studying and worked to support her family and help to pay for her father’s surgery;(d)her father’s health caused her stress, trauma and hardship which meant she was unable to focus on her studies or keep up with fee payments;(e)her father’s health problems and his treatments took longer than anticipated and, ultimately, her father lost vision completely in one eye and only retained 50 percent vision in the other;(f)the applicant accepted that she had breached her visa condition by discontinuing her studies but insisted that she was compelled to do so by her family situation; and(g)the applicant asked the Department to consider not cancelling her visa due to circumstances which were out of her control.