HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GUMMOW ACJ,
HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP APPELLANT
AND
SZMDS & ANOR RESPONDENTS
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16
26 May 2010
S193/2009ORDER
1. The appeal be allowed.
2.Orders 3, 4 and 5 made by the Federal Court of Australia on 10 March 2009 be set aside.
3.In place of those orders:
(a)the appeal to the Federal Court of Australia be dismissed; and
(b)Order 2 made by the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on 8 July 2008 be set aside.
4.The appellant pay the reasonable costs of the first respondent of the appeal to this Court.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
S J Gageler SC Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia with G T Johnson for the appellant (instructed by DLA Phillips Fox Lawyers)
T A Game SC with T Baw for the first respondent (instructed by Sarom Solicitors)
Submitting appearance for the second respondent
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GUMMOW ACJ AND KIEFEL J. A criterion for the issue of a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") is that the applicant be a non‑citizen of Australia to whom the Minister "is satisfied" that Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Section 36(2)(a) of the Act so provides[1]. If the Minister "is satisfied" that this and other criteria "have been satisfied" then the Minister "is to grant the visa"; if "not satisfied", then the visa must be refused (s 65(1)).
[1]The appropriate text of the Act appears in Reprint No 11.
The term "satisfy" has various shades of meaning. Two of them are involved in the collocation presented by ss 36 and 65 of the Act. One is that the applicant for a protection visa answers or meets the requirement or condition that Australia has protection obligations to the applicant. The second is that the decision maker accepts or is content that the applicant answers or meets that requirement or condition.
Upon review by the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the RRT") of a refusal by the Minister (or the delegate of the Minister), the RRT exercises all the powers and discretions conferred by the Act upon the Minister (s 415(1)).
The reiteration in ss 36 and 65 of the Act of the term "satisfied" is significant for the issues on this appeal by the Minister from the decision of the Federal Court (Moore J)[2]. The Federal Court allowed an appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court (Scarlett FM)[3] and quashed the decision of the RRT (the second respondent). Moore J held that the RRT had fallen into jurisdictional error because its determination that the first respondent was not a refugee was based on illogical or irrational findings or inferences of fact[4] and remitted the matter to the RRT to be heard and determined according to…
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- Case
- [2010] HCA 16
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were whether faulty or illogical findings of fact by the RRT amounted to an error of law, and whether any such error constituted jurisdictional error, thereby invalidating the RRT's decision. The Court was required to determine if the RRT had failed to reach a required standard of "articulation" in its decision-making process, which could lead to jurisdictional error.
The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the RRT's reasoning contained jurisdictional error. The RRT had based its adverse inferences on assumptions that a person fearing persecution for their homosexuality would not travel to their home country, even briefly, and would seek asylum at the first available opportunity. The Court held that these assumptions were not necessarily applicable to fears based on sexual identity, unlike fears based on immutable characteristics like race. The Court reasoned that such assumptions failed to adequately appreciate that sexual identity encompasses broader aspects of human relationships and activity, and that the RRT's reasoning was so illogical that no reasonable decision-maker could have arrived at it. Consequently, the High Court set aside the orders of the Federal Court and dismissed the appeal to that court, reinstating the original decision of the Federal Magistrates Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. Orders 3, 4 and 5 made by the Federal Court of Australia on 10 March 2009 be set aside.
3. In place of those orders:
(a) the appeal to the Federal Court of Australia be dismissed; and
(b) Order 2 made by the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on 8 July 2008 be set aside.
4. The appellant pay the reasonable costs of the first respondent of the appeal to this Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GUMMOW ACJ, KIEFEL J, HEYDON J, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ
An erroneously determined jurisdictional fact may give rise to jurisdictional error. The decision maker might, for example, have asked the wrong question[83] or may have mistaken or exceeded the statutory specification or prescription in relation to the relevant jurisdictional fact. Equally, entertaining a matter in the absence of a jurisdictional fact will constitute jurisdictional error[84].[83]Minister for Immigration v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30. [84]Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 at 574 [72]; [2010] HCA 1.Development and scope of "illogicality" and "irrationality" In House v The King[85] Starke J stated that even wide discretions "must be exercised judicially, according to rules of reason and justice, and not arbitrarily or capriciously …" The plurality recognised that a sentence of imprisonment which was notably severe was not thereby "unreasonable or clearly unjust"[86]. Setting a test or formula for isolating the implied category of discretionary decisions which are "unreasonable or clearly unjust" has not proved simple. [85](1936) 55 CLR 499 at 503; [1936] HCA 40.[86]House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 507 per Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ. Just as the unreasonableness of a result was referred to in Avon Downs, correspondingly, the "reasonableness" of a decision has often been considered in circumstances where a public officer must be "satisfied" of some fact or circumstance. In R v Connell; Ex parte The Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd, it was not suggested that such an officer must prove his or her satisfaction. However it was found that a requirement that a public officer be "satisfied" of certain facts or have "reasonable cause" to believe facts imports a requirement that the opinion is one that could be formed by a reasonable person[87]. The Chief Justice went on to state:"If the opinion which was in fact formed was reached by taking into account irrelevant considerations or by otherwise misconstruing the terms of the relevant legislation, then it must be held that the opinion required has not been formed. In that event the basis for the exercise of power is absent, just as if it were shown that the opinion was arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or not bona fide."[88]Further, satisfaction of the existence of facts must amount in point of law to what an empowering provision prescribes or specifies[89]. As explicated subsequently by Gibbs J in Buck v Bavone[90], this means a decision-making authority which must be satisfied of certain facts "must act in good faith; it cannot act merely arbitrarily or capriciously." His Honour went on to say that even if certain specified errors could not be established "the courts will interfere if the decision reached by the authority appears so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could properly have arrived at it"[91]. Such formulations convey the idea that a court should not lightly interfere with administrative decision-making.[87]R v Connell; Ex parte The Hetton BellbirdCollieriesLtd (1944) 69 CLR 407 at 432 per Latham CJ; [1944] HCA 42; see also Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 at 224-225 per Viscount Maugham, 228 per Lord Atkin.[88]R v Connell; Ex parte The Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd (1944) 69 CLR 407 at 432.[89]R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 117 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ; [1953] HCA 22.[90](1976) 135 CLR 110 at 118; [1976] HCA 24.[91]Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110 at 118.