FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BJW19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1534
File number(s): ADG 118 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD Date of judgment: 19 September 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – temporary protection visa – decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether IAA made irrational finding – whether IAA understood and engaged with applicant’s claim – whether IAA should have invited applicant to interview – unreasonable exercise of s 473DC – jurisdictional error established – writs issued Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473CB, 473DC, 473DD, 476 Cases cited: ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 439
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21
Leka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 123
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Applicant S20/2002[2003] HCA 30; 198 ALR 59
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 56 Date of last submission/s: 22 May 2025 Date of hearing: 27 May 2025 Place: Adelaide Counsel for the Applicant: Mitchell Simmons Solicitor for the Applicant: Estrin Saul Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Alex Chan Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
ADG 118 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BJW19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GERRARD
DATE OF ORDER:
19 SEPTEMBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the then Immigration Assessment Authority made on 11 March 2019.
2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the applicant’s review application according to law.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE GERRARD:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA) affirming an earlier decision of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant him a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV). For the applicant to succeed in this Court, he must establish that the IAA decision contains a jurisdictional error (Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476). This Court cannot undertake a review…
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- AGLC
- BJW19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1534
- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1534
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the IAA made an irrational finding or failed to properly understand and engage with the applicant's claims. The court found that the IAA's decision not to invite the applicant for an interview was a jurisdictional error. The IAA had not properly considered whether to invite the applicant for an interview and had failed to take into account the exceptional circumstances presented by the applicant's former migration agent's conduct. The court found that the IAA's failure to invite the applicant for an interview was a jurisdictional error that rendered the IAA's decision invalid. The court also found that the IAA's findings in respect of the applicant's protest activity and religious beliefs were not irrational or unreasonable. The IAA had properly considered the evidence before it and had provided reasons for its findings.
The court found that the IAA had made a jurisdictional error in declining to invite the applicant for an interview. The court issued writs in favour of the applicant and against the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.
The court ordered that the decision of the IAA be set aside and that the matter be remitted to the IAA for reconsideration in accordance with the court's reasons. The court also ordered that the applicant's costs of the application be paid by the Minister.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The materials before the Court include:·The amended application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 9 May 2025;·The affidavit of the applicant sworn and filed on 3 April 2019 (taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 27 May 2025);·A Court Book numbering 391 pages (marked as Exhibit 1);·Written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant on 9 May 2025; and·Written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 22 May 2025.CONSIDERATIONGround 1 – Did the IAA make a finding that was irrational, unreasonable or lacking in intelligible justification? This Court has previously considered the principles relating to illogicality and legal unreasonableness in Leka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 123 as follows (at [80]-[83]):[80] It is well established that the characterisation of a decision as legally unreasonable because of illogicality or irrationality is not easily made (see Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at [33] (Djokovic) and the cases cited therein). [81] In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131] (SZMDS), Crennan and Bell JJ set out the test for irrationality or illogicality as follows:...[T]he test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.[82] The correct approach, according to the High Court in SZMDS, is to enquire “whether it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did engage and to make the findings it did make on the material before it” (at [133]). At [135], the High Court stated:On the probative evidence before the Tribunal, a logical or rational decision maker could have come to the same conclusion as the Tribunal. Whilst there may be varieties of illogicality and irrationality , a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker. A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn...[83] In Djokovic at [35], it was observed:Ultimately, the question is whether the satisfaction of the relevant state of affairs or matter was irrational, illogical or not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12 at 20–21 [38]; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Applicant S20/2002[2003] HCA 30; 198 ALR 59 at 71 [52] and 98 [173], such that it cannot be said to be possible for the conclusion to be made or the satisfaction reached logically or rationally on the available material. It will then satisfy the characterisation of unjust, arbitrary or capricious.