Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1526
•19 September 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1526
File number(s): ADG 75 of 2022 Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD Date of judgment: 19 September 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – student visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – consideration of PIC 4020 – whether Tribunal erred in referring to its finding on PIC 4020(1) or the circumstances underpinning its conclusion in that regard in making a finding on PIC 4020(4) – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 375A, 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cl 500.217 in Schedule 2 and PIC 4020 in Schedule 4
Cases cited: BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21
DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 931
Le v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1694
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 774
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Trivedi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 169
Vyas v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCCA 1226
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 62 Date of last submission/s: 30 June 2025 Date of hearing: 16 June 2025 Place: Adelaide Applicants: First applicant appeared self-represented and on behalf of the second applicant Counsel for the First Respondent: Alex Chan Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore ORDERS
ADG 75 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: JASLEEN KAUR
First Applicant
VARINDER VIRK
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GERRARD
DATE OF ORDER:
19 SEPTEMBER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE GERRARD:
INTRODUCTION
The applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (as it then was) (the Tribunal) affirming an earlier decision of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant them Student (subclass 500) visas (the visas). As will be explained, for the applicants to succeed in this Court, they must establish that the Tribunal decision contains a jurisdictional error. This Court cannot undertake a review of the merits of the decision under review.
For the reasons set out below, the Court has not found jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. On that basis, the application cannot succeed.
BACKGROUND
The applicants are citizen of India (Court Book (CB) 4-6). They first arrived in Australia on 5 March 2019 as holders of student visas (CB 207-208).
On 7 March 2021, the applicants applied for the visas (CB 1-22). In that application, Ms Kaur (the applicant) indicated that she intended to study the final four subjects of her master’s degree in software engineering that was the subject of her previous student visa (CB 15, 27). Mr Virk (the second applicant), the applicant’s husband, was named as a member of the applicant’s family unit (CB 4-5).
The applicants provided written submissions and other documentation in support of their application (CB 27-52) and appointed a migration agent as their authorised representative (CB 24-26).
On 18 June 2021 and 19 July 2021, a delegate of the Minister invited the applicants to comment on adverse information received, namely, that the applicant had previously unsuccessfully applied for a student visa under a different name and date of birth, and had failed to disclose this in her 2021 visa application (CB 53-58). The applicants did not respond to this invitation.
On 13 July 2021, the applicants’ migration agent withdrew representation (CB 59-61).
On 24 August 2021, the delegate refused to grant the applicants the visas (CB 74-80). The delegate found that the applicant did not satisfy cl 500.217 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) because the applicant did not satisfy Public Interest Criterion (PIC) 4020(1).
Clause 500.217 provides as follows:
(1)The applicant satisfies public interest criteria 4001, 4002, 4003, 4004, 4010, 4013, 4014, 4020 and 4021.
(2)If the applicant has not turned 18, public interest criteria 4012A, 4017 and 4018 are satisfied in relation to the applicant.
(3)If the applicant had turned 18 at the time of application, the applicant satisfies public interest criterion 4019.
(4)The applicant (other than a Foreign Affairs student or a Defence Student) satisfies public interest criterion 4005.
(5)The applicant, being a Foreign Affairs student or a Defence Student, satisfies public interest criterion 4007.
The relevant part of PIC 4020 in Schedule 4 of the Regulations provides:
(1)There is no evidence before the Minister that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Tribunal during the review of a Part 5- reviewable decision, a relevant assessing authority or a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth, a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to:
(a) the application for the visa; or
(b)a visa that the applicant held in the period of 12 months before the application was made.
The delegate found that the applicant had provided a bogus document in support of her application and therefore could not meet PIC 4020(1) in order to satisfy cl 500.217 for the grant of the visa.
On 27 August 2021, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision (CB 81-88). In that review application, the applicants nominated a lawyer as their authorised representative (CB 86).
On 9 September 2021, a delegate of the Minister issued a non-disclosure certificate under s 375A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) (CB 93).
On 13 December 2021, the applicants were invited to attend a hearing scheduled for 12 January 2022 (CB 96-98), which was later postponed to 2 March 2022 (CB 124-126).
On 4 January 2022, the applicants’ representative requested a copy of the applicants’ departmental and Tribunal file (CB 99, 102).
On 6 January 2022, the Tribunal provided access to the requested files, save for information subject to the s 375A certificate, as well as departmental information partially excluded under the Privacy Act 1988 (CB 105-106).
On 28 February 2022, the applicants’ representative provided a statement from the applicant as well as written submissions (CB 134-195).
On 17 December 2021, the applicant attended the Tribunal hearing with her representative (CB 199).
On 3 March 2022, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants the visas.
On 29 March 2022, the applicants lodged an application for judicial review in this Court (CB 205-213 ). That application seeks review of the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to s 476 of the Act.
THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicants must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal’s decision in some detail.
The Tribunal’s reasons began by identifying the visa under review, noting that the applicants had applied for the Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visas on 7 March 2021 (at [1]-[2]). The Tribunal explained that a delegate of the Minister had refused to grant the applicant the visa because the delegate found that the applicant had provided a bogus document, or information that is false or misleading, in relation to the visa application (at [2]).
The Tribunal confirmed that the applicant appeared before it with her representative to give evidence and present arguments on 2 March 2022 (at [5]-[6]).
The Tribunal outlined that the issue before it was whether the applicant met PIC 4020 as required by cl 500.217 of the Regulations (at [8]).
The Tribunal set out the relevant legislation in that regard and noted that the requirements of PIC 4020(1) and (2) can be waived if there are certain compelling or compassionate reasons to justify granting the visa (at [9]).
The Tribunal set out the ultimate question before it, which is set out as follows (at [10]):
Is there evidence that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Tribunal during the review of a Part 5-reviewable decision, a relevant assessing authority or a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth, information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to the application for the visa?
The Tribunal also outlined the relevant definitions under PIC 4020, namely, that (at [13]-[14]):
·‘information that is false or misleading in a material particular’ is defined in PIC 4020(5);
·the requirements of PIC 4020(1) apply whether or not the bogus document was provided by the applicant, and whether it was done knowingly or unwittingly; and
·the Tribunal is not required to find that the applicant was aware the information was purposely untrue, however an element of fraud or deception by some person is necessary to attract that provision (Trivedi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 169) (Trivedi)).
Against this background, the Tribunal set out the applicant’s statement with a history of her personal background and visa applications (at [11]). It highlighted that the applicant had a passport issued on 24 March 2015, expiring on 23 March 2025, in the name of Harpreet Kaur born in 1994, as well as a second passport issued on 4 August 2018, expiring on 3 August 2028, in the name of Jasleen Kaur born in 1997. The Tribunal confirmed the first passport was not declared at pages 3 and 17 of the visa application subject to the review (at [12]).
The Tribunal then set out the applicant’s oral evidence given at the hearing, that her brother-in-law and an agent he was dealing with told her and her husband that because they had had Australian and Canadian student visa applications refused, they should get new identities. The agent offered to, and did, arrange their new identities, names and dates of birth as they appear on the passports lodged in support of the visa application subject of the review. The applicant said at the hearing that it “was arranged by an agent and my brother-in-law. I don’t know anything” (at [15]).
The Tribunal, after carefully considering the evidence, was satisfied that the applicant knew she was giving false or misleading information in relation to her visa application, and there was, at the very least, an element of deception to the giving of such information. The applicant claimed she did not fill out or sign her application, which the Tribunal did not accept as a reasonable proposition or excuse for providing false or misleading information (at [16]).
The Tribunal also acknowledged the applicant said at the hearing that “it was not the right way to get a visa” and asked to be forgiven. The Tribunal set out that there was no doubt in its mind that the applicant was fully aware of what obtaining a new identity meant, she did not disagree or object to the proposition and did in fact get a new identity, to apply for an Australian student visa, and travel to Australia using this false identity once the visa was granted. The Tribunal considered it fanciful at best to lay the responsibility for what was in her visa application on another person (at [17]).
The Tribunal confirmed at the hearing that the applicant accepted via her representative that she understood she did not meet PIC 4020(1). The Tribunal made the following findings:
(a)that there was evidence before the Tribunal that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Tribunal, a relevant assessing authority or a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth:
(i)information that is false or misleading in a material particular as defined in PIC 4020(5) that was false or misleading at the time it was given and relevant to any of the criteria the Minister may consider when making a decision on an application, whether or not it was made because of that information; and
(ii)in relation to the visa application or a visa held in the 12 months before the visa application was made.
(b)The material particular is the assessment of the applicant against the genuine temporary entrant criteria where it relates to her immigration history.
The Tribunal therefore found, on the evidence and admissions detailed above, that the applicant did not meet PIC 4020(1) for the grant of the visa (at [20]).
The Tribunal then considered whether there were any compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australia, or whether there were any compassionate or compelling circumstances that affect the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen, such that PIC 4020(1) and (2) should be waived (at [21]-[22]). In response, the applicant stated that she had made open and frank admissions about the false passports, and feared returning to India because of her father-in-law’s involvement and affiliation with Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar and that he was imprisoned. The Tribunal did not consider it necessary for the applicant to provide a verifiable document confirming the incarceration of her father-in-law, however it accepted that he is or was incarcerated for a number of years (at [23]).
The Tribunal also set out the applicant’s submission that her qualification as a software engineer, at a Masters degree level from an Australian university with exceptionally good grades, would enable her to fulfil a critical skill shortage so as to satisfy the compelling circumstance that would justify granting the visa (at [24]). The Tribunal accepted the evidence provided that Software Engineer is on the current Priority Migration Skilled Occupation list and also highlighted her desire to eventually pursue a PhD, where it appears her academic standard may be of a level that it is likely she could do so (at [25]).
Whilst the applicant expressed remorse for providing false or misleading information, the Tribunal found the weight of the fraud significantly outweighed any benefit Australia may receive in terms of the applicant’s intention to pursue a career as a Software Engineer. The Tribunal accepted that, in light of only finishing her Masters degree in mid-2021, and having limited employment opportunities since holding a bridging visa, it is speculative at best for her to claim that the potential of her contribution in the Australian workforce is a compelling circumstance to justify the granting of the visa (at [26]). She has also been unable to obtain a positive skills assessment as a software engineer (at [27]).
The Tribunal distinguished a 2019 Tribunal decision provided in submissions by the applicant where a Member found that there were compelling circumstances to justify granting the visa for an applicant who did not meet PIC 4020(1) who was a registered nurse working in aged care, who was refused a subclass 189 (skilled independent) permanent visa (at [28]).
Whilst the word ‘compelling’ is not defined, the Tribunal has considered the evidence and information relevant to the applicant’s claim that her qualifications, post-graduate and career aspirations are compelling circumstances, however, the Tribunal was not satisfied the requirements should be waived (at [29]).
The Tribunal confirmed the applicant was provided with a copy of the non-disclosure certificate pursuant to s 375A and invited her to comment on the validity of the certificate. The applicant’s representative responded that it is a valid certificate, to which the Tribunal set out disclosing such information would disclose, or enable a person to ascertain, the existence or identity of a confidential source of information (at [30]-[31]).
The Tribunal was therefore not satisfied that there were compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australia that justify the granting of the visa and does not satisfy PIC 4020 for the purpose of cl 500.217 (at [32]-[33]).
Accordingly, the Tribunal found that there was no evidence before it, nor any claim made, that the second applicant is a member of the family unit of a person who holds a student visa, having satisfied the primary criteria for that visa (at [34]).
The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants the visas (at [7], [35]).
APPLICATION TO THIS COURT
The application for judicial review filed by the applicants on 29 March 2022 contains one particularised ground of review as follows:
1.The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) erred in its assessment of whether Public Interest Criterion 4020(1) of Schedule 4 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) should be waived pursuant to PIC 4020(4), by treating the circumstances of the failure to meet PIC 4020(1) as being relevant to the exercise of the discretion in PIC 4020(4).
Particulars
a) The Tribunal declined to waive the requirements of PIC 4020(1) pursuant to PIC 4020(4) for reasons including that the weight of the fraud outweighed any benefit Australia may receive.
b) Such reasoning of the Tribunal tends to suggest that rather than finding that the compassionate and compelling circumstances found to exist justify granting the visa, the Tribunal has determined to decline to exercise the discretion because it did not find the relevant circumstances to justify the granting of the visa. Such an approach fails to recognise the threshold nature of the satisfaction required by PIC 4020(4).
c) In making the finding referred to above at (a) the Tribunal erred by treating the discretionary matters set out in PIC 4020(4) legally relevant to the content of PIC 4020(1) and the reasons for the breach of PIC 4020(1). The discretionary matters set out in PIC 4020(4) are unrelated to the content of PIC 4020(1) and (2) and reasons for any breaches thereof.
d) The Tribunal’s error was material to the outcome of its decision. Consequently, the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error.
The applicants also filed an affidavit with that judicial review application on 29 March 2022, annexing copies of the Tribunal’s decision.
The applicant appeared before the Court on 16 June 2025 without legal representation but with the assistance of a Punjabi interpreter. The Court confirmed with the applicant that she had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister’s written submissions.
At the outset of the hearing, the Court raised an issue with counsel for the Minister that arguably the Tribunal may have not engaged with the applicants’ submission that they left India due to safety and employment concerns, save for accepting that the applicant’s father-in-law was incarcerated. In doing so, the Tribunal appeared to have failed to address, to reach any kind of finding, or engage in any discussion as to whether or not those fears were a compassionate or a compelling circumstance. The parties were therefore granted leave to file supplementary written submissions to that effect. The Minister filed supplementary submissions addressing this issue on 30 June 2025.
The materials before the Court include:
·the application for judicial review filed by the applicants on 29 March 2022;
·the supporting affidavit filed by the applicants on 29 March 2022 (the affidavit being taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 16 June 2025);
·a Court Book numbering 213 pages (tendered and referenced as Exhibit 1);
·written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 3 June 2025; and
·supplementary written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 30 June 2025.
The applicant was not represented at the hearing and the Court was thus mindful of the comments of Colvin J in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] and Feutrill J in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 at [55] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review). That sensible and appropriate course is now the standard procedure in this Court: see, by way of recent example, Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 931 at [10]. Accordingly, at the hearing of this matter, the applicant was invited to tell the Court what she believed to be wrong with the Tribunal’s decision and/or procedure.
The Court also took some time to explain that it could not undertake a merits review of the Tribunal’s decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272) and could only consider whether or not the Tribunal decision revealed jurisdictional error. The Court explained that in migration decisions such as the decision being challenged, common categories of alleged jurisdictional error include:
(a)where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 178 (Craig));
(b)where the decision-maker ignores relevant material (Craig at 178);
(c)where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material (Craig at 178);
(d)where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354-355);
(e)where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias (SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]); and
(f)where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 27-28; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]-[28] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445).
However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list and she should attempt to tell the Court why she said the Tribunal had fallen into error.
Against that background, the applicant raised that the Tribunal erred in failing to consider that as her situation in India was not safe at the time, her and her husband made a decision to leave India. When asked, the applicant acknowledged she had assistance in preparing her judicial review application but that she understands the grounds that had been advanced. However, when invited to make any submissions at the hearing the applicant indicated that there was nothing further she wished to raise with the Court. The applicant also did not wish to make any submissions in reply to the Minister.
CONSIDERATION
As outlined above, the application for judicial review contains a single particularised ground. Noting that the applicants were unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to interpret the applicants’ grounds as broadly as possible (as per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392). The Court also explored with counsel for the Minister the issue adverted to above at [46].
The Minister observed that the central question raised by the application is whether the Tribunal could refer back to its finding on PIC 4020(1) or the circumstances underpinning its conclusion on PIC 4020(1), in making a finding on PIC 4020(4). In respect of PIC 4020(1), the Tribunal had found that the applicant had provided false or misleading answers in her visa application and specifically rejected as “fanciful” her claim that responsibility for this lay with another person. In respect of PIC 4020(4) the Tribunal found, inter alia, that the weight of that fraud significantly outweighed any benefit Australia might receive from the applicant’s stated intention of pursuing a career in Australia as a software engineer.
The Minister drew the Court’s attention to the following observation by Judge Emmett in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 774 (Singh)at [60].
the discretionary matters set out in PIC 4020(4) are unrelated to the content of PIC 4020(1) and (2) and reasons for any breaches thereof. Accordingly, any error in the Tribunal’s consideration of one of the three breaches of PIC 4020(1) (which I have found) would not have affected the Tribunals consideration of PIC 4020(4). In the circumstances, I do not accept the submissions of the applicant to the contrary.
The Minister observed that the above statement from Judge Emmett appeared to underpin the argument in this application. However, the Minister further drew the Court’s attention to the subsequent decision of Judge Jarrett in Le v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1694 where his Honour found that Singh should not be read as a “statement of principle” and further that the statutory language does not suggest that the discretion in PIC 4020(4) is fettered in any way.
The Court agrees with the Minister’s submission in this respect. In any event, the Tribunal’s consideration in respect of “the weight of the fraud” is responsive, in part, to the applicant’s expression of remorse which the applicant had wanted the Tribunal to have regard to in respect of considering compassionate or compelling circumstances.
Ultimately, though, the Court accepts the Minister’s contention that PIC 4020(4) should not be construed as ruling impermissible any consideration of an applicant’s circumstances which may emanate from findings made in respect of PIC 4020(1).
The Minister further contended that the Tribunal actively and intellectually engaged with the applicant’s evidence and submissions. The Court agrees that the Tribunal properly summarised the applicant’s evidence and submissions about her father-in-law’s incarceration and her own fears of returning to India. The Tribunal did not make any additional findings about the applicant’s fears of returning to India or her father-in-law’s circumstances as the power in PIC 4020(4) required it to consider whether there were any compelling circumstances that “affect the interests of Australia”, or compassionate or compelling circumstances that “affect an Australian citizen or permanent resident, or an eligible New Zealand citizen”. The applicant’s fears about returning to India and the circumstances of her family members were directed at neither of those issues. In this respect, the Minister relied upon Vyas v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCCA 1226 where Judge Raphael observed:
In the court’s view, the Explanatory Memorandum is of assistance in considering the plain words of the regulation, such that it cannot be said that it would be sufficient for the applicants to demonstrate that their circumstances are compelling or compassionate alone. There has to be a connection with Australia or an Australian citizen, Australian permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen; because otherwise there would be no utility in having those words in the clause, which would be contrary to the views expressed by the High Court in Project Blue Sky that an attempt must be made to give meaning to all the words of a statutory provision.
It is clear that the applicant’s limited submissions in this respect were matters which were personal to her. As the applicant was not an Australia citizen, permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen, the discretionary waiver could not apply to her and that was the basis for the Tribunal declining to consider those matters in respect of PIC 4020(4).
The Court is satisfied that, even adopting the broad approach referred to in [52] of these reasons, no jurisdictional error is apparent.
CONCLUSION
The application for review and additional submissions made by the applicant has failed to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The Court is otherwise unable to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard. Associate:
Dated: 19 September 2025
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