BGR19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1496
•23 September 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BGR19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1496
File number(s): MLG 880 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE FARY Date of judgment: 23 September 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa – Administrative Appeals Tribunal not satisfied that applicant is a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations as outlined in s 36(a) or (aa) –delegate’s decision to refuse the grant of the visa affirmed – whether Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed. Legislation: Australian Constitution s 75(v)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36(2), 47(1), 65(1), 424, 425, 476, 477
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) Sch 2 Pt 2 Div 1
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cll 866.1 – 866.6
Cases cited: Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
Applicant NAFF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] HCA 62
AMF15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 30
ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109
CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21
Gehlert v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 305 FCR 172
Gehlert v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 129
LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 418 ALR 152
Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNCR [2011] FCA 369
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 158
MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 80
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72
Perera v Minister for Immigration &Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 115 FCR 1
SZHTI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 702
SZOVP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2011] FMCA 442
SZQRU v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 1234
SZQVN v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FMCA 325
SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 219 FCR 212
SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253
SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] 233 FCR 451
Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 128 Date of last submission/s: 9 September 2025 Date of hearing: 29 July 2025 and 9 September 2025 Applicant: In person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms Petrovski, Sparke Helmore Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 880 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BGR19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATVIE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE FARY
DATE OF ORDER:
23 SEPTEMBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding, including any reserved costs, fixed in the sum of $9,097.93.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE FARY:
INTRODUCTION
By way of Application filed on 26 March 2019, the applicant (Applicant) seeks judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Tribunal) (formerly the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) dated 21 February 2019 (Tribunal’s Decision), pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act).
In the Tribunal’s Decision the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the First Respondent (Minister) not to grant the Applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (Visa) on the basis that the Applicant had not satisfied the Delegate that she is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2) of the Migration Act.
The hearing of the Application took place at the Melbourne Registry of the Court on 29 July 2025 and was adjourned until 9 September 2025 (Hearing).[1] The Minister was represented by a solicitor. The Applicant was self-represented with the assistance of an interpreter. At the conclusion of the Hearing, judgment was reserved.[2] These are the reasons for judgment in relation to the Hearing.
[1] Orders made by Judge Fary on 29 July 2025, Order 2.
[2] Orders made by Judge Fary on 8 September 2025, Order 1.
ISSUE IN DISPUTE
The issue in dispute is whether the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in determining that it was not satisfied that the Applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act.
BACKGROUND
The Applicant is a citizen of Malaysia.
On 3 February 2017, the Applicant arrived in Australia as the holder of an Electronic Travel Authority (Subclass 601) visa.[3]
[3] Court Book (CB) 42.
On 15 March 2017, the Applicant applied for the Visa, the subject of these proceeding.[4] The Applicant applied for the Visa on the basis that she was a Shia Muslim and could not practice her religion, as Malaysia’s laws prohibit this sect of Islam.[5]
[4] CB 1-37.
[5] CB 32-37.
On 5 July 2017, a Delegate of the Minister refused to grant the Applicant the Visa (Delegate’s Decision).[6] The Delegate found on the basis of country information and a lack of adequate explanation, that the Applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution or face a real risk of significant harm.[7]
[6] CB 39-63.
[7] CB 58.
On 21 July 2017, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for review (Review Application).[8]
[8] CB 64-65.
On date same, the Tribunal acknowledged receipt of the Review Application.[9]
[9] CB 66-68.
On 13 April 2018, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend a hearing on 14 June 2018.[10]
[10] CB 69-71.
On 14 April 2018, the Applicant requested that the First hearing be rescheduled as she had moved locations.[11]
[11] CB 73-75.
On 19 April 2018, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend the scheduled hearing on 14 June 2018 at a new location.[12]
[12] CB 76-78.
On 10 May 2018, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend a rescheduled hearing on 25 July 2018 due to Member unavailability.[13]
[13] CB 85-87.
On 12 June 2018, the Applicant responded that she would join the hearing on 25 July 2018.[14]
[14] CB 90-93.
On 25 July 2018, the Applicant attended the hearing with the assistance of an interpreter (First hearing).[15]
[15] CB 94-98.
On 16 August 2018, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend another hearing on 20 November 2018.[16]
[16] CB 109-110.
On 21 September 2018, the Applicant wrote to the Tribunal and requested that the hearing be postponed on the basis that she was pregnant.[17]
[17] CB 118-122.
On 26 September 2018, the Tribunal denied the Applicant’s request in the absence of an adequate reason for postponement.[18]
[18] CB 122.
On 4 October 2018, the Applicant wrote to the Tribunal and provided a copy of a medical certificate dated 1 October 2018.[19]
[19] CB 123-124.
On date same, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend a rescheduled hearing on 22 November 2018 due to Member unavailability.[20]
[20] CB125-128.
On 19 November 2018, the Tribunal advised that the hearing had been postponed due to Member unavailability and that a new hearing date would be provided.[21]
[21] CB 134-135.
On 11 January 2019, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend the rescheduled hearing on 21 February 2019.[22]
[22] CB 136-138.
On 21 February 2019, the Applicant attended the hearing with the assistance of an interpreter (Second hearing).[23] On date same, the Tribunal made an oral decision to affirm the Delegate’s Decision.[24]
[23] CB 147-154.
[24] CB 155-156.
On 4 March 2019, the Applicant requested a written copy of the Tribunal’s Decision.[25]
[25] CB 160.
On 18 March 2019, the Tribunal provided written reasons of its decision dated 15 March 2019 to the Applicant.[26]
[26] CB 161-168.
TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
The Tribunal’s Decision is at 163 to 168 of the Court Book.
The Tribunal first outlined the relevant law to the matter and the purpose of the Tribunal in relation to the Review Application: Tribunal’s Decision [1] to [3].
The Tribunal noted that the Applicant’s claims for protection were considered at the First hearing. The Applicant confirmed that her claims were accurately and fairly summarised by the Tribunal at both the First and Second hearings.[27]
[27] CB 166 [10]-[11].
The Tribunal noted that when the Applicant was asked if she wanted to amend her claims, she responded “no” at both hearings. However, during the Second hearing, the Applicant advised the Tribunal that she had gotten married in May 2017.[28] The Applicant advised the Tribunal that her husband was not aware of the nature of her protection claims.[29] The Applicant also advised the Tribunal that her husband did not know that she was a Shia Muslim.[30]
[28] CB 166 [14].
[29] CB 167 [16].
[30] CB 166-167 [12], [14]-[16].
When questioned about her written claims, the Applicant suggested that she was assisted by a friend who had misled her and that the form was not “completely correct” because of her poor grasp of the English language.[31] The Tribunal found that the Applicant had been given the opportunity to make appropriate corrections over the course of the two hearings.[32]
[31] CB 167 [18]-[19].
[32] CB 168 [23].
At the Second hearing, the Tribunal raised concerns with the Applicant in relation to her protection claims.[33] The Tribunal noted that the Applicant’s oral evidence relating to her faith were inconsistent with nature of her written claims. The Tribunal considered that the Applicant had returned to Malaysia on four occasions since the time she claimed to have practised Shia Islam.[34]
[33] CB 167 [20].
[34] CB 167 [20]-[22].
The Tribunal found the Applicant’s evidence to be unsatisfactory and inconsistent with prior statements made to the Department of Home Affairs (formerly the Department of Immigration and Border Protection) (Department) and the Tribunal.[35]
[35] CB 168 [25].
The Tribunal found the Applicant’s evidence to be illogical, vague and lacking in appropriate corroboration.[36] The Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant was or had ever been a practising Shia Muslim.[37]
[36] CB 168 [25].
[37] CB 168 [28].
Based on information before it, the Tribunal concluded that the Applicant failed to satisfy s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act.[38]
[38] CB 168 [28]-[31].
PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT
On 26 March 2019, the Application was filed in this Court, within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal’s Decision pursuant to s 477 of the Migration Act.
On 9 June 2021, Orders were made by Registrar Carney if this Court for the First Respondent’s name be amended to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.” That the Applicant file and serve any amended application, written submissions and any Supplementary Court Book. That the First Respondent file and serve written submissions and a copy of the Court Book.
On 21 November 2024, Orders were made by Registrar Foster of this Court for the First Respondent’s name be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.” For the Second Respondent’s name be amended to “Administrative Review Tribunal.” That the Applicant file and serve: any amended application, written submissions and any Supplementary Court Book. That the First Respondent file and serve written submissions and any affidavit evidence on which they seek to rely on. The Court noted that the Applicant confirmed she had retained a copy of the Court Book and was uncertain whether the physical address she had provided was current. The Applicant made an undertaking to the Court to check whether the address was correct and file an amended Notice of Address for Service form if necessary.
The Application was listed for final hearing before me on 29 July 2025.
At that Hearing, the Applicant sought leave to amend her Application and requested an adjournment for the purposes of obtaining evidence as to misinterpretation. The Minister noted that there was likely to be an audio recording of the hearing, but noted that it was a matter for the Applicant to obtain the transcript. I said to both parties that what was required, was both the preparation of an “accurate transcript” and the “identification of errors”. I told the Applicant: “all factual matters will need to be in the form of an “affidavit” and that “I strongly recommend that you get legal advice” in terms of what evidence to procure.
There are numerous references in the transcript of the Hearing to the need for the Applicant to obtain evidence from an interpreter, including in the context of discussion about how long the matter should be adjourned so as to obtain that evidence. For example:
HIS HONOUR: I – it’s a matter for you as to how you prove to me that the interpretation was incorrect. One type of evidence that is sometimes considered is evidence of an interpreter who – I – listens to the transcript, transcribes it and identifies the errors that were made in interpretation.
At the conclusion of the Hearing on 29 July 2025, I indicated that “I am minded to grant the Applicant leave to amend and adjourn the matter” so that the Applicant “can procure and adduce evidence”.
On 29 July 2025, Orders were made by me for the First Respondent’s name be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”. That the matter be adjourned until 9 September 2025 before me. For the Applicant to have leave to file and serve by 1 August 2025: an amended Application. That the Applicant file and serve by 29 August 2025: any further evidence, including written submissions. That the First Respondent file and serve by 5 September 2025: any submissions in reply.
On 6 August 2025, an Amended Application was filed in this Court.
This matter was heard on 9 September 2025 for a resumed Hearing before me.
The Applicant relied upon the following documents:
(a)the Application filed 26 March 2019;
(b)affidavit of the Applicant affirmed 26 March 2019;
(c)affidavit of the Applicant affirmed 28 July 2025;
(d)affidavit of the Applicant affirmed 31 July 2025;
(e)an amended Application filed 6 August 2025;
(f)affidavit of Applicant affirmed 20 August 2025 (Affidavit of Applicant affirmed 20 August 2025);
(g)outline of submissions filed 26 August 2025; and
(h)list of authorities filed 4 September 2025.
The Minister relied upon:
(a)the response, filed 4 April 2019;
(b)outline of submissions filed 15 July 2025;
(c)affidavit of service of Kristina Petrovski filed 16 July 2025;
(d)list of authorities filed 25 July 2025;
(e)outline of submissions in reply filed 5 September 2025; and
(f)list of authorities filed 5 September 2025.
Both parties relied on the Court Book.
The Application contained the following grounds of review (Original Grounds of Review):
1. The decision of the Tribunal: (Original Ground 1).
a. is affected by an error of law; and
b. denied the applicant procedural fairness.
2. I am getting legal advice and will provide further particulars in due course. (Original Ground 2).
(Words in bold added, otherwise as written)
The Amended Application contains the following grounds of review (Grounds of Review):
1. Procedural Fairness and Interpretation Issues (Ground 1).
•The Applicant respectfully contends that she was denied procedural fairness during her hearings before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("AAT"). Although the AA T engaged an accredited interpreter, several critical issues arose:
•Misinterpretation of Key Questions: During the hearing, several questions were translated as statements. As a result, the Applicant believed the questions were settled facts and did not realise she was being asked to respond or elaborate. This limited her ability to fully explain her claims.
•Impact on Evidence Presentation: The Applicant did not feel safe or clear to elaborate further on her circumstances, particularly regarding her religious belief, marital status, and family situation, due to these interpretation flaws.
•Fear and Emotional Distress: At the time of both hearings, the Applicant was pregnant, anxious, and lacked legal representation. These circumstances impacted her ability to respond with full clarity. This failure in effective communication significantly impacted the Applicant's ability to present her case and respond to the Tribunal's concerns.
2. Errors in Application Form and Misunderstandings (Ground 2).
The Minister highlights inconsistencies and errors in the Applicant's Form 866. However, these were primarily due to the following:
•Language Barrier: The Applicant has limited English skills and relied on an unqualified friend (not a migration agent) to assist with the application. She was unaware of the legal consequences of incorrect or incomplete information.
•Cultural and Legal Uncertainty: The Applicant did not include her marriage details in the form as the marriage occurred in Thailand and was not officially registered in Malaysia. She believed it could not be declared.
•Fear of Disclosure: The Applicant did not initially disclose that her husband knew she was a Shia Muslim, because she feared the Tribunal would misinterpret that information as a sign that she faced no danger. In reality, they were forced to marry outside Malaysia (in Thailand) precisely because her religious identity could cause serious legal and social consequences in her home country. She was scared this context would not be understood or would be used against her.
3. Timing of Additional Disclosures (Ground 3).
The Applicant provided additional information during the second hearing, including details about her marriage and children. These disclosures were not withheld deliberately but were made as the Applicant grew more comfortable and aware of what could be safely shared.
4. Credibility Findings Were Unreasonable (Ground 4).
The Tribunal made adverse credibility findings based on perceived inconsistencies. However, many of these inconsistencies are attributable to:
•Miscommunication via the interpreter;
•Emotional distress and pregnancy during hearings
•Lack of legal advice and support
These contextual factors should have been given more weight before concluding that the Applicant lacked credibility.
5. Request for Remittal (Ground 5).
The Applicant respectfully requests that the Federal Court find jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's approach, particularly in failing to:
•Ensure effective interpretation;
•Properly weigh the Applicant's vulnerable condition (pregnancy, lack of counsel);
•Consider the impact of cultural and linguistic barriers on the accuracy of her responses.
Accordingly, the Applicant submits that the matter should be remitted back to the AAT for reconsideration with proper procedural safeguards.
(Words in bold added, otherwise as written)
APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
The Applicant submits that the Tribunal’s Decision is affected by jurisdictional error on the basis that she was denied procedural fairness.
Denial of procedural fairness
The Applicant alleges that the Tribunal relied on interpreted questions and answers that were materially incorrect in reaching the decision. The Applicant contends that this deprived her of a fair opportunity to respond.
Failure to consider relevant matters
The Applicant submits that her pregnancy and illness at the time of the hearing materially affected her ability to give consistent oral evidence. The Applicant submits that the Tribunal failed to properly take into account her vulnerable state during the hearing.
Legal unreasonableness
The Applicant submits that the Tribunal Decision was legally unreasonable and reached adverse credibility findings based on misinterpreted exchanges during submissions. The Applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to properly engage with the Applicant’s explanations or circumstances.
Legal principles
The Applicant points to the following legal principles:
(a)that a denial of procedural fairness constitutes jurisdictional error;[39]
(b)where interpretation errors prevent a fair hearing, a decision cannot stand;[40] and
(c)a decision is legally unreasonable if it is based on illogical or irrational reasoning.[41]
[39] NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263.
[40] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
[41] Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332.
The Applicant submits that the interpreter at the hearing repeatedly conveyed questions as statements.[42] The Applicant contends that this created prolonged silences and confusion in her submissions. The Applicant contends that the Tribunal wrongly attributed this “silence” and “confusion” to evasiveness or a lack of credibility.
[42] Affidavit of Applicant affirmed 20 August 2025, Annexure A.
The Applicant submits that she relied on an unqualified friend for assistance when completing Form 866 of her Visa application.[43] The Applicant submits that errors were the result of language barriers and a lack of legal knowledge, as opposed to dishonesty.
[43] Affidavit of Applicant affirmed 20 August 2025, Annexure B.
The Applicant submits that her disclosures were made at different stages due to fear, trauma and cultural barriers.[44] The Applicant contends that this undermines the Tribunal’s finding that inconsistencies were “deliberate.”
[44] Affidavit of Applicant affirmed 20 August 2025, Annexure C.
The Applicant notes that she was pregnant and unwell during the hearing in 2019.[45] The Applicant submits that her vulnerable condition materially impacted her ability to give evidence. The Applicant submits that the Tribunal failed to consider this evidence.
[45] Affidavit of Applicant affirmed 20 August 2025, Annexure D.
9 September 2025 hearing
At the Hearing before me on 9 September 2025, the Applicant sought to tender into evidence a shorter and longer version of a transcript that she had created of the Tribunal hearing from a recording provided by the Minister’s solicitors, in order to make good her claim of misinterpretation. I rejected that tender for reasons given, including that it had not been prepared by an accredited interpreter and was not submitted in accordance with Orders that I made on 29 August 2025 in relation to further evidence.
A curiosity of the document sought to be tendered was that it was prepared by the Applicant who made submissions before me with the assistance of an interpreter. The Applicant said that she did this herself as she was the one who attended the hearing and heard everything. The Applicant said that she understands English, and can speak English, but in situations like this (i.e. the hearing), she needs an interpreter. She said that since the Tribunal hearing, she had learnt a lot about English and had also taken lessons, “so I understand English better”. She said that in 2019, “I knew that there was a mistake but I was afraid to voice it” and “did not know of my rights”.
The Applicant relied on a document entitled “Annexure A – Interpreter Misinterpretation (Cover Note & Table)” that had been created by her. The table purports to “highlight
spoints where the interpreter misinterpreted the Tribunal Member’s questions by changing them into statements.” A number of the questions/statements were in the form “that’s not correct, is it?” The Applicant submits this is because the interpretation was incorrect. She submits that the hearing was unfair and that she was not provided with the opportunity to answer.The Applicant referred in her oral submissions to her pregnancy and anxiety. She acknowledged that she had received an adjournment, but that it was only for a short period.[46] As a result, she said that she was reluctant to seek a further adjournment on the second occasion and was concerned that the Tribunal would not regard her as serious.
[46] However, the correspondence from the Tribunal suggests that the request for an adjournment was rejected (CB 130), although the Tribunal did move the hearing from 20 November 2018 to 22 November 2018, of its own accord (CB 126).
The Applicant said that she was asking the Court to accord her fairness and to give her another hearing because of the interpreter’s mistake, her vulnerable condition and because she did not understand her rights. She said that she had lost a meaningful opportunity to present her case. She asked that I refer the matter back to the Tribunal because of jurisdictional error.
RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
The Minister submits that the Application fails to establish any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s Decision and should be dismissed.
The Minister’s submissions filed 15 July 2025 address the Applicant’s Original Grounds of Review.
Original Ground 1(a)
The Minister contends that this ground cannot be made out in the absence of further particulars and should be dismissed.
Original Ground 1(b)
The Minister submits that the Tribunal complied with its procedural fairness obligations outlined in ss 425 and 425A of the Migration Act. The Minister notes that the Applicant was relevantly invited to attend two hearings before the Tribunal, which were conducted with the assistance of an interpreter. The Minister notes the Applicant was on notice by way of the Delegate’s Decision records and from the Tribunal’s questioning at both hearings on the credibility of her claims. The Minister contends that there was no information the Tribunal was required to put to the Applicant pursuant to s 424A of the Migration Act. The Tribunal appropriately had regard to DFAT country information, written submissions provided by the Applicant and the Applicant’s oral evidence at the hearings.
Original Ground 2
The Minister submits that this ground is not a proper ground of review.
Submissions in reply to the Amended Application
The Minister continues to rely on his submissions filed 15 July 2025, in addition to those outlined below.
Ground 1
The Applicant alleges that the Tribunal failed to afford her procedural fairness due to interpretation issues during the hearings. The Minister notes that the Applicant does not specify whether the alleged errors occurred during the First hearing (on 25 July 2018) or the Second hearing (on 21 February 2019). However, based on the timestamps provided in Annexure A,[47] it appears that the errors occurred during the Second hearing.[48]
[47] Affidavit of Applicant affirmed 20 August 2025, Annexure A.
[48] CB 94-98.
The Applicant alleges that six questions asked by the Member were translated as statements rather than as questions.[49] The Applicant further alleges that she was unable to answer the Member’s questions with full clarity as she was pregnant, anxious and lacked legal representation.
[49] See Affidavit of Applicant affirmed 20 August 2025, Annexure A.
To establish a denial of a fair hearing due to interpretation issues, the Applicant must show one of the following:
(a)that the standard of interpretation was so inadequate such that the Applicant was prevented from giving evidence; or
(b)that the interpretation errors were material to a conclusion made by the Tribunal and adverse to the Applicant.[50]
[50] SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142; 219 FCR 212 at [65]. See generally at [64]-[69].
The Minister notes that this ground cannot be made out in the absence of a transcript prepared by an accredited interpreter of the Malay language.[51] The Minister notes that the Applicant failed to provide a transcript in the correct format. The Minister contends that the Tribunal’s Decision record does not indicate that there were any interpretation issues at the hearings.
[51] SZQVN v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FMCA 325 at [16].
The Minister submits that the translations as provided by the Applicant[52] fail to establish jurisdictional error. The Minister contends that it was open to the Applicant to advise the Tribunal of the inaccuracies of the statements made at the hearings. Further, the Minister notes that the Tribunal provided the Applicant with an opportunity to address “any concerns” at the Second hearing.[53] The Applicant did not address any concerns in relation to interpretation issues at this hearing.
[52] Affidavit of Applicant affirmed 20 August 2025, Annexure A.
[53] CB 168 [24].
The Minister submits that the Applicant’s state of anxiety and pregnancy, as well as lack of legal representation, does not necessarily mean that she was denied a fair hearing. There is no evidence that the Applicant had a medical condition which rendered her “entirely unfit” to attend the hearings and answer questions.[54] The Minister notes that the Applicant did not raise any concerns in relation to her fitness to attend, following the Tribunal’s invitation to the rescheduled hearing on 11 January 2019. Instead, the Applicant responded to the invitation on the same date confirming her attendance.[55] The Tribunal’s Decision record indicates that the Member was aware of the Applicant’s pregnancy, and that she was nonetheless able to participate in the hearing.[56]
[54] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNCR [2011] FCA 369 per Tracey J at [30]-[34]; SZOVP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2011] FMCA 442 per Driver FM at [48].
[55] CB 141-144.
[56] CB 166 [13] and 166-167 [14]-[19].
The Minister submits that there is no evidence that the Tribunal contravened the apprehended bias rule based on its questions or questioning style.[57] The Minister submits that this ground should be dismissed.
[57] Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [31].
Grounds 2 and 3
Grounds 2 and 3 provide reasons for discrepancies in the Applicant’s Visa application form and the disclosure of her marriage at the Second hearing.
The Minister submits that these grounds do not identify jurisdictional error made by the Tribunal. At their highest, these grounds invite the Court to engage in impermissible merits review and should be dismissed.[58]
[58] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 (Wu Shan Liang) at 272.
Ground 4
The Applicant asserts that the Tribunal should have given more weight to the alleged interpretation issues, her emotional distress and lack of legal representation.
The Minister submits that it was for the Tribunal to determine what weight to give to the Applicant’s evidence.[59] The Minister notes that the Applicant did not raise any of her concerns at the hearing, despite being given the opportunity to do so. As such, it cannot be said that the Tribunal was unreasonable in not affording her concerns a higher level of weight. The Minister submits that the Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings were otherwise open to it.
[59] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2008) 243 CLR 164.
Ground 5
The Minister submits that this ground is merely a request to the Court to remit the matter to the Tribunal and is not a proper ground of review.
The solicitor for the Minister made oral submissions at the Hearing.
PRINCIPLES
General
Section 476 of the Migration Act provides that the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under s 75(v) of the Constitution.
Section 75(v) of the Constitution provides that the High Court has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Thus, subject to the statutory exceptions provided for in s 476 of the Migration Act, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Further, s 474 of the Migration Act does not preclude judicial review of decisions under the Migration Act where jurisdictional error is alleged.[60]
[60] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 (Plaintiff S157/2002).
“The task of the Court [in an application for judicial review] is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it.” The court neither consider the merits of the decision nor remakes it.[61] The critical question is whether the decision maker has exceeded the authority or power conferred by the statute.[62]
[61] Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 per Allson CJ, Besanko and O’Callaghan JJ at [17].
[62] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323 (Yusuf) at [82] (per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
The Court may grant relief if it is satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error.[63] Jurisdictional error by a statutory decision maker may manifest itself in a variety of ways. Recognised categories of jurisdictional error include “misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness”.[64] Different kinds of error may overlap.[65] The categories are not closed.[66]
[63] Plaintiff S157/2002.
[64] LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 418 ALR 152 (LPDT) at [3].
[65] Yusuf at [82].
[66] LPDT at [3].
In most but not all cases, for an error to be jurisdictional, the error must be material to the decision being challenged. The test is whether there is a “realistic possibility” that the decision that was made “could” have been different, but for the error.[67] This is to be determined as “a matter of reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts that have been determined”.[68] It has been described as an “undemanding” standard.[69]
[67] LPDT at [7].
[68] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506 per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [38].
[69] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 80 per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ (at [33]).
Protection Visas (Subclass 866)
Section 47(1) of the Migration Act requires the Minister to consider a valid application for a visa. Section 65(1) of the Migration Act provides that the Minister is to grant a visa if satisfied that the grant of the visa (as prescribed by the Migration Act or the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations)) have been satisfied, and to refuse to grant the visa, if not so satisfied.
Section 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act provides that a criterion for the visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee. The term “refugee” is defined by s 5H of the Migration Act in terms that require the applicant for the visa to have a “well-founded fear of persecution”[70] as defined by s 5J.
[70] See s 5H(1)(a) of the Migration Act.
Section 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act provides that a criterion for the visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non‑citizen in Australia (other than a non‑citizen mentioned in s 36(2)(a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non‑citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm.
Sections 36(2)(b) and (c) of the Migration Act provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that that applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen mentioned in s 36(2)(a) or (aa) who holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
The criteria that the Applicant was required to satisfy for the grant of a Protection visa (Subclass 866) are set out in cll 866.1 to 866.6 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations.
CONSIDERATION
Ground 1 (Procedural Fairness)
Ground 1 is that:
Procedural Fairness and Interpretation Issues
•The Applicant respectfully contends that she was denied procedural fairness during her hearings before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("AAT"). Although the AAT engaged an accredited interpreter, several critical issues arose:
•Misinterpretation of Key Questions: During the hearing, several questions were translated as statements. As a result, the Applicant believed the questions were settled facts and did not realise she was being asked to respond or elaborate. This limited her ability to fully explain her claims.
•Impact on Evidence Presentation: The Applicant did not feel safe or clear to elaborate further on her circumstances, particularly regarding her religious belief, marital status, and family situation, due to these interpretation flaws.
•Fear and Emotional Distress: At the time of both hearings, the Applicant was pregnant, anxious, and lacked legal representation. These circumstances impacted her ability to respond with full clarity.
•This failure in effective communication significantly impacted the Applicant's ability to present her case and respond to the Tribunal's concerns.
The Applicant contends that this failure “significantly impacted [her] ability to present her case and respond to the Tribunal’s concerns.
I will deal with the first three bullet points first, under the heading “Misinterpretation”.
Misinterpretation
The first three bullet points (above) concern alleged errors in interpretation.
The function of an interpreter is to “place the non-English speaker as nearly as possible in the same position as an English speaker”, and that the interpreter “provides the means for communication between the applicant, the tribunal and other participants in the tribunal hearing, in cases where the applicant’s own linguistic capacities are not, on their own, sufficient to that end”.[71]
[71] Perera v Minister for Immigration &Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6 at [24].
Whether a departure from proper “standards of interpretation” renders a hearing unfair depends upon the circumstances of the case.[72] An interpreter must “convey the substance of what is said” to an applicant so that he or she, in turn, can “communicate the substance of his or her case and to respond to the issues raised”.[73] It is critical that the essential elements of what was said by the appellant are communicated to the Tribunal.[74]
[72] SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 219 FCR 212 (SZRMQ) at [5].
[73] Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 115 FCR 1 at [28].
[74] SZRMQ at [90].
In SZRMQ, Allsop CJ stated (at [9]):
It will be a matter of evaluation in all the circumstances, by reference to the issues, the nature of the evidence, the character and frequency of any proven errors in interpretation, and any other factor apparently relevant to the quality of the communication, as to whether the hearing was fair. Relevant to the task will be how the decision-maker approached the resolution of the task before her or him.
The difficulty with the Applicant’s evidence is that the document relied upon by her to establish misinterpretation (“Annexue A – Interpreter Misinterpretation (Cover Note & Table)”) was not prepared by an accredited interpreter, and in any event, only purports to interpret six discrete questions without any context. Putting to one side the question of whether the Applicant is qualified to give expert evidence as to misinterpretation, noting her reliance on an interpreter at both the Tribunal hearing and the Hearing before me,[75] the difficulty with the evidence is that it lacks the context necessary in order to perform an evaluation of the type referred to by Allsop CJ in SZRMQ. In the absence of admissible or probative evidence of misinterpretation, the Court is “entitled to accept that [Tribunal’s] decision records as accurately reflecting the matters to which it refers as taking place at the hearing”.[76]
[75] And the Tribunal’s comment that the Applicant sought to explain deficiencies and inconsistencies, in part, “because of a poor grasp of English” (at least in 2019): CB 127 [18].
[76] Applicant NAFF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] HCA 62.
There is some force to the Minister’s submission that following the statements that are challenged, it was open to the Applicant to dispute or correct the Tribunal’s summary. The Minister pointed to the Tribunal’s comment that “after an adjournment, I gave you a further opportunity to address the Tribunal about concerns that I had raised with you.”[77] However, as with my comments in the previous paragraph, I could not reach those conclusions without reference to the whole of the transcript. Like the Applicant, the Minister has had the opportunity to obtain a transcript by an accredited interpreter, which identifies and contextualises any alleged misinterpretation, and the Minister did not take up that opportunity.
[77] CB 168 [24].
I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that there was misinterpretation, including misinterpretation of a nature and extent that amounted to jurisdictional error.
Fear, emotional distress and lack of legal representation
The second aspect of Ground 1 is the Applicant’s claim that at the time of both hearings, the Applicant was pregnant, anxious, and lacked legal representation, which impacted her ability to respond with full clarity, present her case and respond to the Tribunal.
The Tribunal was aware of the Applicant’s pregnancy because of its response to the Applicant’s application for an adjournment that attached a copy of a medical certificate.[78]
[78] CB 123, CB 124 and CB 130.
There was no evidence before the Tribunal or me that the Applicant’s pregnancy or anxiety prevented her from “participating effectively in” the Tribunal hearing.[79]
[79] BXD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 765.
There is no evidence to suggest that the Tribunal was on notice at the hearing before it of the Applicant’s anxiety, and even if it were, it would not have necessitated an open-ended enquiry into the Applicant’s condition. “Fairness does not ordinarily require the court or tribunal to undertake a psychiatric or psychological assessment to investigate the extent to which the person in question may be at a disadvantage; and ordinarily it would be impossible to tell”.[80]
[80] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 per Gleeson CJ at [19].
As to the point concerning legal representation, there is no right to legal representation in migration proceedings,[81] and it is not a requirement of procedural fairness that legal representation be provided.[82]
[81] AMF15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 30 per Flick, Griffiths and Perry JJ at [51] and SZHTI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 702 per Gyles J at [4].
[82] SZQRU v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 1234 at [24]; Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533.
Procedural Fairness - generally
The requirements of natural justice in relation to the Applicants’ hearing before the Tribunal were codified by Division 4 of Part 7 of the Migration Act in relation to the matters dealt with in that Division.
Section 442B of the Migration Act provided (at the date of the Tribunal’s Decision):
1.This Division is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with.
2.Sections 416, 437 and 438 and Division 7A, in so far as they relate to this Division, are taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters they deal with.
3.In apply this Division, the Tribunal must act in a way that is fair and just.
I am satisfied that the Tribunal complied with its procedural fairness obligations:
(a)on 10 May 2018, the Applicant was invited to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 25 July 2018 in compliance with ss 425 and 425A of the Migration Act;
(b)the Applicant attended the hearing which was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the English and Malay languages;
(c)on 11 January 2019, the Applicant was invited to attend a Second hearing before the Tribunal on 21 February 2019 in compliance with ss 425 and 425A of the Migration Act;
(d)the Applicant attended the hearing which was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the English and Malay languages;
(e)the Delegate’s Decision record and the Tribunal’s questioning at the hearings put her on notice that the credibility of her claims and evidence would be the determinative issue on review; and
(f)the Tribunal did not breach its obligation to give particulars of “information” under s 424A of the Migration Act as there was no “information” that was subject to this requirement, noting the exceptions in ss 424A(3)(a), 424(3)(ba) and 424A(3)(b) of the Migration Act.
I am not satisfied that jurisdictional error is made out by reference to Ground 1.
Grounds 2 and 3
Ground 2 is that:
Errors in Application Form and Misunderstandings
•The Minister highlights inconsistencies and errors in the Applicant's Form 866.
•Language Barrier: The Applicant has limited English skills and relied on an unqualified friend (not a migration agent) to assist with the application. She was unaware of the legal consequences of incorrect or incomplete information.
•Cultural and Legal Uncertainty: The Applicant did not include her marriage details in the form as the marriage occurred in Thailand and was not officially registered in Malaysia. She believed it could not be declared.
•Fear of Disclosure: The Applicant did not initially disclose that her husband knew she was a Shia Muslim, because she feared the Tribunal would misinterpret that information as a sign that she faced no danger. In reality, they were forced to marry outside Malaysia (in Thailand) precisely because her religious identity could cause serious legal and social consequences in her home country. She was scared this context would not be understood or would be used against her.
Ground 3 is that:
Timing of Additional Disclosures
The Applicant provided additional information during the second hearing, including details about her marriage and children. These disclosures were not withheld deliberately but were made as the Applicant grew more comfortable and aware of what could be safely shared.
Grounds 2 and 3 concern the discrepancies in the Applicant’s Visa application form, and provide an explanation for those discrepancies. The explanation given for the discrepancies is: “Language barrier”, “Cultural and Legal Uncertainty” and “Fear of Disclosure”. The alternative explanations do not impugn the Tribunal’s Decision and findings, or demonstrate that it committed jurisdictional error by reaching a different conclusion as to the reason for the discrepancies. The proper role of the court on a judicial review is not to review the merits of the administrative decision-maker’s decision.[83]
[83] Wu Shan Liang per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ at p 272; Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [53]–[54].
I am not satisfied that jurisdictional error is made out by reference to Grounds 2 or 3.
Ground 4
Ground 4 is that:
Credibility Findings Were Unreasonable
The Tribunal made adverse credibility findings based on perceived inconsistencies.
However, many of these inconsistencies are attributable to:
•Miscommunication via the interpreter
•Emotional distress and pregnancy during hearings
•Lack of legal advice and support
These contextual factors should have been given more weight before concluding that the Applicant lacked credibility.
In ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[84] Griffiths, Perry and Bromwich JJ summarised the relevant principles:[85]
[84] (2016) 250 FCR 109.
[85] At [83]. Discussed in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496.
a. McHugh J’s oft quoted comments in Ex parte Dumairajasingham (which were cited by the primary Judge in the proceedings here) to the effect that a finding on credibility is the function of the primary decision-maker (or Tribunal) par excellence, does not mean that such findings are not susceptible to review for jurisdictional error on several potential grounds;
b. the issue whether or not a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is “a case specific inquiry” and it is not one which should be analysed by reference to fixed categories or formulas (SZRKT at [77] per Robertson J);
c. in each case, what the decision-maker has decided must be analysed in detail in order to determine whether or not a jurisdictional error has occurred (SZRKT at [77] per Robertson J); and
d. without derogating from what is said above regarding the danger of relying too heavily on “fixed categories or formulas” (which includes the danger of blindly repeating McHugh J’s comments in Ex parte Dumairajasingham), adverse credibility findings might involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as:
•failure to afford procedural fairness;
•reaching a finding without a logical or probative basis;
•unreasonableness; and/or
•other grounds as discussed by Flick J in SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] 233 FCR 451; [2015] FCA 1089 at [20]–[21] and in SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253 at [31], as referred to approvingly by the Full Court in CQG15 at [40]–[42].
Paragraph [24] to [26] of the Tribunal’s Decision recorded that:[86]
Accordingly, in addition to submitting these incomplete and incorrect documents and statements to the Department you have repeatedly relied on them before this Tribunal for its consideration on the same basis. I pointed out to you that all of this conduct on your behalf reflects poorly on your credibility given that you have submitted these documents have persisted in relying on them without correcting them. After an adjournment, I gave you a further opportunity to address the Tribunal about the concerns that I had raised with you. I note that following this adjournment, you made no comments.
Having carefully considered your claims contained within your original application together with the evidence I have received at the hearing, my concerns remain. As summarised above, I find your evidence to be unsatisfactory, inconsistent with prior statements made to both the Department and the Tribunal. I note that in all occasions these statements were sworn statements.
I find your evidence to me to be illogical, vague, and lacking in appropriate corroboration in material respects. I also find your subsequent explanations to be unsatisfactory and note that, having been given the opportunity to make statements in response, you have declined that opportunity.
[86] CB 168 [24]-[26].
The Applicant contends that many of the inconsistencies were attributable to misinterpretation, emotional distress and pregnancy and lack of legal advice and support. The Applicant contends that these “contextual factors” should have been given more weight before concluding that the Applicant lacked credibility.
The Applicant appears to acknowledge by the terms of Ground 4 that there are inconsistencies in the evidence that she relied upon in her application and before the Tribunal. This is consistent with her response to the Tribunal that is recorded at [18],[87] for example, in relation to the inconsistencies concerning the Applicant’s “family of origin”, her “relationship status” and the extent of her contact with her family of origin in Malaysia.
[87] CB 167 [18].
I find no evidence that the Tribunal reached its conclusions concerning the Applicant’s credibility by failing to afford procedural fairness, reaching a finding without a logical or probative basis or unreasonableness. Weighting of evidence that resulted in the adverse credibility finding is generally a matter for the Tribunal, and in this case, there is no reason to consider that it committed jurisdictional error in reaching its conclusions concerning credibility.
I am not satisfied that jurisdictional error is made out by reference to Ground 4.
Ground 5
Ground 5 is that:
Request for Remittal
The Applicant respectfully requests that the Federal Court find jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's approach, particularly in failing to:
•Ensure effective interpretation;
•Properly weigh the Applicant's vulnerable condition (pregnancy, lack of counsel);
•Consider the impact of cultural and linguistic barriers on the accuracy of her responses.
Accordingly, the Applicant submits that the matter should be remitted back to the AAT for reconsideration with proper procedural safeguards.
This ground would appear to be a summary of Grounds 1 to 4.
I am not satisfied that jurisdictional error is made out by reference to Ground 5.
CONCLUSION
As the Applicant has not established that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error, and where I have not otherwise been able to discern jurisdictional error,[88] the Application for review must be dismissed.
[88] Noting the comments of Mortimer J (as her Honour was then) in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 158 at [113].
Costs
At the end of each party’s submissions, I invited them to make submissions as to costs in the event that the Application succeeded or was dismissed. In the event that the Application was dismissed, the Minister sought costs in the sum of $9,097.93, being the scale amount.[89] I am satisfied that costs ought to follow the event,[90] and that it is appropriate to make an Order in that amount having regard to the scale and the extent of work undertaken as evidenced by the Court file.[91]
[89] See Division 1 of Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth). Compare Gehlert v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 129.
[90] Compare Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72.
[91] Compare Gehlert v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 305 FCR 172.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty-eight (128) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Fary. Associate: MC
Dated: 23 September 2025
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