NAFF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ

APPLICANT NAFF OF 2002  APPELLANT

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS
AFFAIRS & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] HCA 62

8 December 2004
S112/2004

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 31 March 2003 set aside, and in their place order that:

(a)the appeal to the Full Federal Court be allowed; and

(b)the order of Tamberlin J in the Federal Court of Australia made on 22 July 2002 be set aside.

3.Order absolute for a writ of certiorari directed to the second respondent, quashing the decision of the second respondent in matter N00/32904 dated 19 March 2002.

4.Order absolute for a writ of mandamus directed to the second respondent, requiring the second respondent to determine according to law the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the first respondent dated 15 March 2000.

5.The first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia before Tamberlin J, in the Full Federal Court and in this Court.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

M N Allars for the appellant (instructed by the appellant)

N J Williams SC with J D Smith for the first respondent (instructed by Sparke Helmore)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

Immigration – Refugees – Refugee Review Tribunal – Decision – Judicial review – Procedural fairness – Non-compliance with statutory duties – Tribunal concerned by inconsistencies in applicant's evidence at oral hearing – Tribunal said it would give the applicant a chance to respond in writing to its concerns – Whether Tribunal's failure to do so involved a failure to complete the review process – Whether failure involved a breach of the duty to conduct a review under s 414(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Whether failure involved a breach of the duty to hear from the applicant under s 425(1) – Whether reviewable error where absence of evidence from the applicant about effect of failure.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 56, 414(1), 415(1), 425(1), 427(1)(b), 420, Pt 7 Divs 2-7A.

McHUGH, GUMMOW, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ.

Background

  1. On 1 September 1999, the appellant, a citizen of India but not of Australia, entered Australia.

  2. The appellant's application for a protection visa.  On 30 September 1999, the appellant applied to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs ("the Department") for the grant of a protection visa. He claimed to be a Muslim Tamil who had a well-founded fear of political persecution in India, and hence was a non-citizen to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol…

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Details
Case
[2004] HCA 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, NAFF, appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute concerned the Refugee Review Tribunal's handling of NAFF's application for review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. The Tribunal had expressed concerns about inconsistencies in NAFF's evidence and indicated it would provide an opportunity for a written response, but failed to do so before making its decision.

The High Court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's failure to allow NAFF to respond in writing to its stated concerns constituted a breach of its statutory duties. Specifically, the Court considered whether this failure amounted to a breach of the duty to complete the review process under s 414(1) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), and whether it breached the duty to hear from the applicant under s 425(1) of the Act. The Court also considered whether a reviewable error occurred in the absence of evidence from NAFF regarding the effect of this failure.

The Court reasoned that the Tribunal's statement that it would give NAFF a chance to respond in writing constituted an undertaking that was relevant to the outcome of the hearing. The Tribunal's failure to observe this undertaking was considered a departure from the requirements of procedural fairness. The Court found that the duty to review under s 414(1) entailed a statutory duty to consider arguments presented and afford procedural fairness, which included allowing the applicant to respond to concerns raised by the Tribunal. The Court noted that the relevant provisions of the Act, which imposed duties of procedural fairness, were not excluded by later amendments.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Federal Court and the original order of Tamberlin J. The Court issued a writ of certiorari to quash the Tribunal's decision and a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to determine NAFF's application according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay NAFF's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 31 March 2003 set aside, and in their place order that:

(a) the appeal to the Full Federal Court be allowed; and

(b) the order of Tamberlin J in the Federal Court of Australia made on 22 July 2002 be set aside.

3. Order absolute for a writ of certiorari directed to the second respondent, quashing the decision of the second respondent in matter N00/32904 dated 19 March 2002.

4. Order absolute for a writ of mandamus directed to the second respondent, requiring the second respondent to determine according to law the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the first respondent dated 15 March 2000.

5. The first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia before Tamberlin J, in the Full Federal Court and in this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

Substantially, the appellant supported the dissenting reasons of Downes J in the Full Court. His Honour considered that the Tribunal's closing words were not to be given a narrow interpretation[14]. He said that they effectively constituted an undertaking, relevant to the outcome of the hearing, that should have been observed. The failure to do so was a departure from the requirements of procedural fairness. It required a fresh hearing of the appellant's claim before the Tribunal. The approach of the dissenting judge was correct. The appellant is entitled to the amended relief that he claimed[15]. The appeal should be allowed.[14]NAFF (2003) 127 FCR 259 at 272-273 [60]. See also reasons of McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [45].[15]The relief claimed in this Court was amended to take into account the fact that the proceedings were brought under the Judiciary Act, s 39B and invoked the constitutional writ of mandamus and the supplementary writ of certiorari. The Tribunal was, by order of the Court, added as a party to the proceedings and submitted to this Court's orders.The facts and applicable legislation The reasons of McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ ("the joint reasons") set out the history and nature of the proceedings; the relevant provisions of the Act governing the hearing before the Tribunal; and the decisional background of the attempts to secure judicial review from the Federal Court. I will not repeat any of these matters. No question arises concerning the privative provisions of the Act, having regard to the character of the appellant's complaint against the Tribunal, which was one of jurisdictional error, as that expression has been explained[16]. [16]Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 508 [83]. Since the appellant's application to the Tribunal was lodged, in April 2000, the Act has been amended in terms apparently intended to exclude the residual operation of the common law requirements of "natural justice" (procedural fairness). The amendments state that the specified provisions of the Act are an "exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule"[17]. However, that provision commenced operation on 4 July 2002, and so does not apply to this application. [17]The Act, s 422B, inserted by Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 (Cth), Sched 1, item 6. The appeal must be decided in terms of the requirements of the general law of procedural fairness, either as that law was implicitly incorporated in the Act before s 422B took effect or as it applies as a rule of the common law that had not, to that time, been abolished or diminished by statute[18].[18]See Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584-586, 615; Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 169 CLR 648 at 652; Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 553-554 [112]-[113]; Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at 99-101 [38]-[42], 142-143 [168]-[169]; Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 at 108-109 [171]-[172].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

No party challenged the Tribunal member's power to make her closing statement. What was its source? Section 427(1)(b) granted a power to adjourn the review from time to time. The scope of that power must be considered against the background of s 420 which obliged the Tribunal to pursue an objective of acting fairly and according to substantial justice without being bound by technicalities. In that statutory context, the power to grant adjournments must have included a power to grant adjournments on conditions. In substance what happened here was that an adjournment was granted on condition that further material in writing was supplied on matters to be indicated by the Tribunal's questions. Another source of power may be found in a combination of ss 415(1)[5] and 56[6]. Section 56(2) conferred on the Minister a power, in considering an application for a visa, to invite, in writing, an applicant to give additional information in a specified way (for example, by answering questions), and s 415(1) conferred on the Tribunal the same power. [5]Section 415(1) provided:"The Tribunal may, for the purposes of the review of an RRT-reviewable decision, exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by this Act on the person who made the decision.[6]Section 56 provided:"(1) In considering an application for a visa, the Minister may, if he or she wants to, get any information that he or she considers relevant but, if the Minister gets such information, the Minister must have regard to that information in making the decision whether to grant or refuse the visa.(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the Minister may invite, orally or in writing, the applicant for a visa to give additional information in a specified way." The Tribunal's duty to allow the appellant to give evidence and present argument Although the Tribunal was obliged to provide an informal mechanism of review (s 420(1)), and although the Tribunal was not bound by "technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence" (s 420(2)(a)), the Act established important requirements of a substantive kind, several of which were designed to ensure that applicants for review received procedural fairness. The duty of the Tribunal under s 414(1) to review the delegate's decision (which arose once the appellant had applied for review) continued until one of the outcomes described in s 415(2) was arrived at, for example, the affirming, the varying or the setting aside of the decision. One aspect of the overall duty to review was the duty to invite the appellant to give evidence and present arguments: s 425(1). The duty to review therefore entailed a statutory duty to consider the arguments presented and in that way to afford the appellant procedural fairness. That implied that if the Tribunal thought that the arguments had been presented so inadequately that the review could not be completed until further steps had been directed and performed, it could not be peremptorily concluded by the making of a decision before that direction was complied with or withdrawn. What happened on 5 February 2002?

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIRBY J (dissent)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: