FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
ANN19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1073
File number: MLG 395 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE FORBES Date of judgment: 14 July 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the applicant fears harm on the basis of his involvement with an opposition party – where the Minister concedes Tribunal misconstrued evidence – whether error was material – anatomy of decision-making considered – realistic possibility of different outcome – jurisdictional error established – writs issued Legislation: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)
Cases cited: BDY18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 273 FCR 170
BKQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 40
CKC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1260
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 562
VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 81 Date of hearing: 1 July 2025 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Sharify Solicitor for the Applicant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Sypott Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor The Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 395 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: ANN19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE FORBES
DATE OF ORDER:
14 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the First Respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2.The name of the Second Respondent be amended to “Administrative Review Tribunal”.
3.A writ of certiorari issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 18 January 2019 (Case Number: 1507254).
4.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
5.The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1073
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT's alleged misinterpretation of evidence constituted a material error affecting the outcome of the decision. The court had to determine if the error was significant enough to warrant a different result, considering the AAT's approach to assessing credibility and the evidence presented. The Minister conceded that the AAT misconstrued the evidence but argued that the error was not material, as the AAT's overall approach to credibility remained unchanged.
The court examined the AAT's reasons to understand the relationship between the error and the decision. It found that the AAT's concerns about the applicant's credibility were central to its decision. The Minister's concession that the AAT misconstrued evidence regarding the applicant's activities and whereabouts during his alleged period of hiding was material, as it affected the AAT's overall assessment of credibility. The court concluded that the AAT's decision was affected by jurisdictional error because the misconstrued evidence was central to its findings.
The court found that the AAT's error was material, leading to a different outcome being realistically possible. The applicant was entitled to the relief he sought, and the orders were made accordingly. The court quashed the AAT's decision and remitted the matter to the AAT for reconsideration in light of the correct evidence.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At [92], Mortimer J observed:…When the Court is assessing the effects, or consequences, of a misunderstanding of the evidence or information by a decision-maker such as the Tribunal, it must, in my opinion, be careful not to conduct that assessment by reference to what the Court knows only with the benefit of hindsight about the remainder of the decision-maker’s approach. The Court must act on the basis that the decision-maker, if properly instructed on the evidence and information, had a mind open to persuasion. The Court does not, and cannot, know the weight the appellant’s perceived recent invention had with the Tribunal in terms of its overall approach to the appellant’s credibility. As Lee J observes, these kinds of findings cannot be nicely compartmentalised from one another: that is not how credibility reasoning works.CONSIDERATION In LPDT at [10], the High Court explained that the enquiry into the materiality of error is wholly backward-looking. The question is to be answered by reference to the decision that was made and, depending on the nature of the error, how that decision was made. At [32] the court reinforced this point:…[t]he question [is] whether the decision that was in fact made by the Tribunal could, not would, “realistically” have been different had there been no error. The answer to that question, in this appeal, is to be determined from the face of the Tribunal’s reasons. Investigating the anatomy of the decision-making process through the published reasons is the means by which the error can be seen in context and its materiality or otherwise to the ultimate decision assessed. Even though decision-making involves a complex mental process, it is necessary to explore the relationship between the error and the impugned decision in an effort to understand the effect of the former on the latter. In the current case, the Tribunal introduced paragraph [17] of its reasons under the bolded heading “Credibility”. The Tribunal then sets out its intended approach to the assessment of credibility in the context of a protection visa application:[17] In assessing the applicant’s credibility, the Tribunal notes that the mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish the genuineness of the asserted fear, that the fear is “well-founded” or that it is for the reason claimed. A fear of persecution is not “well-founded” if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation. Although the concept of onus of proof is not appropriate to administrative inquiries and decision-making, the relevant facts of the individual case will have to be supplied by the applicant herself [sic], in as much detail as is necessary to enable the examiner to establish the relevant facts. A decision-maker is not required to make the applicant's case for her or him. Nor is the Tribunal required to accept uncritically any and all the allegations made by an applicant.(MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596, Nagalingam v MILGE (1992) 38 FCR 191, Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169 70.)[18]In determining whether an applicant is entitled to protection in Australia the Tribunal must first make findings of fact on the claims he or she has made. This may involve an assessment of the applicant's credibility and, in doing so, the Tribunal is aware of the need and importance of being sensitive to the difficulties asylum seekers often face. Accordingly, the Tribunal notes that the benefit of the doubt should be given to asylum seekers who are generally credible, but unable to substantiate all of their claims.[19] On the other hand, as stated previously, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any or all allegations made by an applicant. In addition, the Tribunal is not required to have rebutting evidence available to it before it can find that a particular factual assertion by an applicant has not been established. Nor is the Tribunal obliged to accept claims that are inconsistent with the independent evidence regarding the situation in the applicant’s country of nationality (See Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451, per Beaumont J; Selvadurai v MIEA & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J and Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547).