ANN19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

ANN19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1073

File number: MLG 395 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE FORBES
Date of judgment: 14 July 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the applicant fears harm on the basis of his involvement with an opposition party – where the Minister concedes Tribunal misconstrued evidence – whether error was material – anatomy of decision-making considered – realistic possibility of different outcome – jurisdictional error established – writs issued
Legislation:

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)

Cases cited:

Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1

BDY18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 273 FCR 170

BKQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 40

CKC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1260

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82

SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 562

VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 81
Date of hearing: 1 July 2025
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Sharify
Solicitor for the Applicant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Sypott
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
The Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

MLG 395 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

ANN19

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE FORBES

DATE OF ORDER:

14 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the First Respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.The name of the Second Respondent be amended to “Administrative Review Tribunal”.

3.A writ of certiorari issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 18 January 2019 (Case Number: 1507254).

4.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.

5.The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,371.30.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1073
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicant, a citizen of Guinea, sought a protection visa based on his involvement with an opposition party and his fear of persecution by the Guinean government. The dispute arose after the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirmed the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship's decision to deny the applicant's visa application. The applicant challenged the AAT's decision, arguing that the Tribunal misconstrued key evidence, leading to an incorrect assessment of his credibility and claims.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT's alleged misinterpretation of evidence constituted a material error affecting the outcome of the decision. The court had to determine if the error was significant enough to warrant a different result, considering the AAT's approach to assessing credibility and the evidence presented. The Minister conceded that the AAT misconstrued the evidence but argued that the error was not material, as the AAT's overall approach to credibility remained unchanged.

The court examined the AAT's reasons to understand the relationship between the error and the decision. It found that the AAT's concerns about the applicant's credibility were central to its decision. The Minister's concession that the AAT misconstrued evidence regarding the applicant's activities and whereabouts during his alleged period of hiding was material, as it affected the AAT's overall assessment of credibility. The court concluded that the AAT's decision was affected by jurisdictional error because the misconstrued evidence was central to its findings.

The court found that the AAT's error was material, leading to a different outcome being realistically possible. The applicant was entitled to the relief he sought, and the orders were made accordingly. The court quashed the AAT's decision and remitted the matter to the AAT for reconsideration in light of the correct evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, I am persuaded that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. Accordingly, the applicant is entitled to the relief he seeks.BACKGROUND The background to these proceedings was summarised in the outline of submissions filed by the Minister and is not contested. The following chronology draws substantially from that outline. The applicant was born in 1980 and is a citizen of Guinea. On 7 November 2013, the applicant first arrived in Australia as the holder of a Visitor (Class FA) (Subclass 600) visa. On 28 November 2023, the applicant applied for the protection visa and in an accompanying statutory declaration alleged that:(a)he is with the “movement for the improvement of the current state of human protection in Guinea”;(b)he will be abused and mistreated by the Guinean government who want to ensure he does not “express what the government is doing”;(c)he has previously been beaten, tortured and knocked unconscious by the police who are protecting the government;(d)the Guinean authorities are killing people from his village; and(e)he will be killed upon his return. On 6 March 2015, the applicant participated in an interview with a delegate of the Minister and provided more details, claiming that:(a)in or around 2009 the applicant and his friends witnessed the aftermath of a stadium massacre carried out by Guinean soldiers;(b)at the time he was a medical student and attempted to assist injured persons at the site of the massacre, but was apprehended by soldiers who frisked him and found a membership card for ‘Union des Forces pour le Changement’ (UFC);(c)the soldiers and police then tied him up, beat him and tortured him; and (d)all the people he assisted with are either dead or missing. On 13 May 2015, a delegate of the Minister refused the visa application. The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was a refugee or a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations.Administrative Appeals Tribunal On 27 May 2015, the applicant applied to the then Refugee Review Tribunal for merits review of the delegate’s decision. On 25 June 2018, the applicant’s legal representative wrote to the Tribunal providing a completed appointment of representative form signed by the applicant and a request for access to documents under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). On 10 July 2018, the Tribunal released in full the documents relevant to the applicant’s FOI request. On 23 July 2018, the applicant was invited to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 10 August 2018. On 6 August 2018, the applicant’s representative provided written submissions and other supporting documentation to the Tribunal. On 9 August 2018, the applicant’s representative provided the Tribunal with a statutory declaration of the applicant dated 3 August 2018 to be read with the written submissions provided. On 10 August 2018, the Tribunal heard the application. The applicant attended the Tribunal hearing with his representative and the assistance of a French interpreter. The Tribunal’s Migration Hearing Record records that the hearing commenced at 9:34am and concluded at 1:45pm but suggests that there was an adjournment of over an hour during that time. At the conclusion of the hearing the Tribunal afforded the applicant an opportunity to provide further information or a response within 14 days.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 18 January 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant was informed of the decision and the Tribunal’s reasons on 21 January 2019. Tribunal decision The Tribunal identified the applicant’s claims as follows[2]:(a)the applicant was a medical student at the university in Conakry at the time of a stadium massacre on 28 September 2009;(b)while at university the applicant became a member an opposition political party, the UFC, because he believed in their values and the leader’s vision about helping people and maintaining human rights;(c)the applicant and two of his friends helped victims of the massacre;(d)when helping victims of the massacre the applicant was searched by soldiers and police who found his UFC party card and then tied him up and beat him unconscious. He bears the scars of having been wounded on the arm and the head;(e)the applicant’s two friends were subsequently killed or went missing;(f)the applicant went into hiding from the authorities fearing that he would be located and subjected to further harm. He moved around the country and then fled to Australia; and(g)the applicant fears being killed for his membership of the UFC, an opposition political party, his witnessing the aftermath of the stadium massacre and his status as a doctor.[2] Tribunal reasons at [1], [12]-[16] In dealing with those claims, the Tribunal noted that it had concerns with significant parts of the applicant’s evidence at [21]. At paragraphs [11]-[14] of their Outline of Submissions filed in the judicial review application, the Minister summarised the critical elements of the Tribunal’s decision and its findings in relation to the issue of credibility of the applicant’s claims for protection. I am satisfied that the Minister’s summary, set out below, fairly and accurately reflects the Tribunal’s findings:[11] The applicant had claimed that two of his friends – ‘A’ and ‘M’ – who had witnessed the aftermath of the massacre with him, had disappeared. In his written claims, he said that M was later found dead in a water pipe: [23]. However, at hearing, the applicant gave evidence that it was A who was murdered, and not M, and that he had been told this by A’s mother, with whom he lived at the time: [24]. The Tribunal found that this inconsistent evidence had not been adequately explained, and that it cut across his earlier written claims. The Tribunal noted that this caused it to have doubts about whether any of the applicant’s claims were A, M or A’s mother were true, and whether other evidence that had been given was true: [25]-[27].[12] The Tribunal noted that the applicant made undetailed claims with his protection visa application, and that those claims did not align with the new claims that he advanced at, and since, his Departmental interview: [28]-[29]. It did not accept the suggestion made on behalf of the applicant that he did not receive adequate assistance from his registered migration agent, finding that the initial claims were prepared with a level of care and thought and that they were not a summary of the later claims that were advanced at the Departmental interview: [30]-[33]. It found that the discrepancies in the claims were not minor or inconsequential; the new claims – that he witnessed the aftermath of the massacre, that he was a UFC member, and that he was a trained medical professional – were “absolutely central” and were not initially raised with the visa application: [34]. It found that the discrepancies in the claims were strongly indicative of the claims raised at the Departmental interview having been “manufactured”, and that this also cast doubt on all claims made by the applicant: [35].[13] The applicant claimed that, after being beaten unconscious on 28 September 2009, he did not depart Guinea until 5 November 2013. He said that was in hiding during this time period. The Tribunal observed that the applicant’s evidence on this time period was “confused and contradictory”, citing the following matters: 13.1. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had claimed at hearing that he did not engage in paid work during this period, whereas the applicant’s written claims stated that he was working nights loading and unloading food into trucks to save money to escape Guinea: [36]. 13.2. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had claimed to have done some work for the UFC during an election in this period and that the applicant had “avoided the question” when asked how this was possible if he was in hiding: [36]. 13.3. The Tribunal asked the applicant at hearing where he had lived while he was in hiding. He initially “answered vaguely” that he did not have a fixed place. However, when pressed by the Tribunal, he listed a number of locations but could not provide detail as to when, and for how long, he was living in each location: [37], [40]-[41]. [T]he Tribunal also asked the applicant how his girlfriend, who became pregnant with his child in 2011, had stayed with him while he moved between a number of locations. He responded by saying that if someone loves you, they follow you in whatever you do: [37].13.4. The Tribunal was concerned that the applicant had remained in Guinea for four years while authorities searched for him, but had not been located in that time, given its concerns about whether the applicant was hiding. The applicant’s response to this concern was to state that the country was ‘closed’ at various times between 28 September 2009 and 5 November 2013, and that when he attempted to leave in 2012, he was unable to do so and subsequently became scared to leave due to the murder of his friend’s mother: [38]-[39]13.5. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s evidence about whether or not he was working, the time periods which he spent in various places, and how he managed to move around as claimed whilst his pregnant girlfriend was with him. The Tribunal found that, in light of these concerns, the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was in hiding as claimed and that he was able to hide from the authorities for a period of four years in a context where the authorities had information about him (having seized his UFC and ID cards in 2009). These concerns led the Tribunal to doubt that the applicant was of interest to the authorities at this time or any other time: [41]. (Court Book 392)[14] The Tribunal found that its concerns were significant, going to the very heart of the applicant’s claims. It found that he was not a witness of truth, and that his claims were not credible. Accordingly, it rejected the entirety of the applicant’s claims about witnessing the aftermath of a massacre and going into hiding for a period of four years: [42]-[43]. (Court Book 392)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At [92], Mortimer J observed:…When the Court is assessing the effects, or consequences, of a misunderstanding of the evidence or information by a decision-maker such as the Tribunal, it must, in my opinion, be careful not to conduct that assessment by reference to what the Court knows only with the benefit of hindsight about the remainder of the decision-maker’s approach. The Court must act on the basis that the decision-maker, if properly instructed on the evidence and information, had a mind open to persuasion. The Court does not, and cannot, know the weight the appellant’s perceived recent invention had with the Tribunal in terms of its overall approach to the appellant’s credibility. As Lee J observes, these kinds of findings cannot be nicely compartmentalised from one another: that is not how credibility reasoning works.CONSIDERATION In LPDT at [10], the High Court explained that the enquiry into the materiality of error is wholly backward-looking. The question is to be answered by reference to the decision that was made and, depending on the nature of the error, how that decision was made. At [32] the court reinforced this point:…[t]he question [is] whether the decision that was in fact made by the Tribunal could, not would, “realistically” have been different had there been no error. The answer to that question, in this appeal, is to be determined from the face of the Tribunal’s reasons. Investigating the anatomy of the decision-making process through the published reasons is the means by which the error can be seen in context and its materiality or otherwise to the ultimate decision assessed. Even though decision-making involves a complex mental process, it is necessary to explore the relationship between the error and the impugned decision in an effort to understand the effect of the former on the latter. In the current case, the Tribunal introduced paragraph [17] of its reasons under the bolded heading “Credibility”. The Tribunal then sets out its intended approach to the assessment of credibility in the context of a protection visa application:[17] In assessing the applicant’s credibility, the Tribunal notes that the mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish the genuineness of the asserted fear, that the fear is “well-founded” or that it is for the reason claimed. A fear of persecution is not “well-founded” if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation. Although the concept of onus of proof is not appropriate to administrative inquiries and decision-making, the relevant facts of the individual case will have to be supplied by the applicant herself [sic], in as much detail as is necessary to enable the examiner to establish the relevant facts. A decision-maker is not required to make the applicant's case for her or him. Nor is the Tribunal required to accept uncritically any and all the allegations made by an applicant.(MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596, Nagalingam v MILGE (1992) 38 FCR 191, Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169 70.)[18]In determining whether an applicant is entitled to protection in Australia the Tribunal must first make findings of fact on the claims he or she has made. This may involve an assessment of the applicant's credibility and, in doing so, the Tribunal is aware of the need and importance of being sensitive to the difficulties asylum seekers often face. Accordingly, the Tribunal notes that the benefit of the doubt should be given to asylum seekers who are generally credible, but unable to substantiate all of their claims.[19] On the other hand, as stated previously, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any or all allegations made by an applicant. In addition, the Tribunal is not required to have rebutting evidence available to it before it can find that a particular factual assertion by an applicant has not been established. Nor is the Tribunal obliged to accept claims that are inconsistent with the independent evidence regarding the situation in the applicant’s country of nationality (See Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451, per Beaumont J; Selvadurai v MIEA & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J and Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547).