BDY18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BDY18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 24

Appeal from: BDY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 195
File number: WAD 107 of 2019
Judge: MCKERRACHER, COLVIN AND JACKSON JJ
Date of judgment: 27 February 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION - appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority affirming the delegate's decision to refuse appellants' applications for protection visas - where appellants sought leave to raise new ground of appeal - whether decision of Authority not to consider new information reached by process of reasoning that was illogical and unreasonable - consideration of s 473DD of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) - leave granted to raise amended ground of appeal - appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 473DD, Part 7AA
Cases cited:

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111

AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 388

BNV18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2019] FCA 378

CHZ19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 914

CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474

CVV16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1890

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 264 CLR 123

LKQD v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1591

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; (2017) 257 FCR 111

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110; (2018) 264 FCR 249

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 264 CLR 217

PQSM v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1540

Vo v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 108

Date of hearing: 14 February 2020
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 92
Counsel for the Appellants: Ms J Moore
Solicitor for the Appellants: Hotchkin Hanly Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr PM Knowles
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitors
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

WAD 107 of 2019
BETWEEN:

BDY18

First Appellant

BEA18

Second Appellant

BDZ18

Third Appellant

BEB18

Fourth Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

MCKERRACHER, COLVIN AND JACKSON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

27 FEBRUARY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Appeal allowed.

2.The decision of the second respondent be set aside and the matter be remitted to the second respondent for determination according to law.

3.The first respondent do pay the costs of the appeal to be assessed if not agreed.

4.There be liberty to apply…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellants in BDY18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection sought judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority affirming the delegate's refusal of their applications for protection visas. The appellants argued that the Authority had erred in not considering new information provided by the father, who claimed that documents related to charges and convictions in Iran were sent to the wrong email address and were only discovered after the decision was made. The Minister opposed the grant of leave to amend the grounds of appeal to raise this ground, but the Court granted leave and allowed the appeal.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Authority's decision not to consider the new information was reached by a process of reasoning that was illogical and unreasonable. The statutory provisions in Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) impose conditions that must be met before new information can be considered by the Authority. The Court needed to determine if the Authority's conclusion that it was not satisfied with the father's attempt to send the Court Documents was illogical or unreasonable, and if the concerns about the credibility of the documents were justified.

The Court found that the Authority's decision was not supported by a logical and reasonable process. The Authority did not adequately address the father's explanation that the email address error was due to misreading the handwritten address and the father's lack of familiarity with technology. Furthermore, the Court found that the concerns about the credibility of the Court Documents were not sufficiently substantiated. The Court concluded that the Authority's failure to consider the new information was an error of law, and thus the appeal was allowed.

The orders of the Court were to allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the second respondent, remit the matter to the Authority for redetermination, and order the Minister to pay the costs of the appeal. The Court reserved liberty to apply to vary the cost orders within seven days.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. The decision of the second respondent be set aside and the matter be remitted to the second respondent for determination according to law.

3. The first respondent do pay the costs of the appeal to be assessed if not agreed.

4. There be liberty to apply to vary the cost orders within 7 days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister opposed the grant of leave to amend the grounds of appeal to raise the above ground. The Court heard argument both on the leave question and the merits of the ground.Summary of decision For the following reasons, we grant leave to raise the amended ground of appeal and allow the appeal with costs. We will reserve liberty to apply to vary the cost orders in case any party contends that different cost orders are appropriate. Having regard to the nature of the appeal ground and the findings made by the Authority concerning the credibility of the account by the father as to whether he attempted to send the Court Documents to the delegate, we expect that consideration would be given to whether the matter should be remitted for redetermination by a different reviewer.The statutory provisions concerning receipt of new information by the Authority Part 7AA of the Act provides for the review by the Authority of the refusal of certain types of protection visa applications. Broadly speaking, Part 7AA applies where there has been a refusal of a protection visa application made by a person who arrived in Australia by boat in an unauthorised way after 13 August 2012 but before 1 January 2014 (and any child of that person born in Australia). Such persons are referred to in the Act as 'fast track applicants'. The review process applies automatically and there is no other merits review process available to fast track applicants. The argument proceeded on the basis that the appellants were fast track applicants. Within Part 7AA is an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the Authority: Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 264 CLR 217 at [20]. Therefore, it is the statutory provisions in Part 7AA that describe the procedural protections afforded to a visa applicant when the application is referred to the Authority. As to the procedure, there is a duty on the Secretary of the Department to give to the Authority certain review material, including material provided by the visa applicant to the original decision maker (usually a case officer who acts as a delegate of the Minister in deciding whether to grant the application). The Authority may get 'new information' being documents or information that was not before the Minister when the original decision was made and that the Authority considers may be relevant. However, the Authority must not consider new information unless certain conditions are met. They are stated in s 473DD which provides as follows:For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b)the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:(i)was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii)is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant's claims.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellants say that the father did take steps to provide evidence to the delegate about the charges and the conviction, but they were sent to the wrong email address. The error was not discovered until after the decision was made by the delegate.Review by the Immigration Assessment Authority The relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provided for an automatic review by the Authority of the decision by the delegate. As part of the review process, the father provided a statutory declaration explaining the circumstances that had led to the documents being sent to the wrong email address. In the statutory declaration he said:(1)during his interview he was asked to provide evidence of his court case in Iran and he said he would provide the evidence after the interview;(2)he was given seven days to provide the information and the case officer wrote her email on a piece of paper;(3)on 5 May 2017 he sent an email to the case officer requesting additional time as he was waiting to receive evidence from Iran;(4)on 7 May 2017 he sent a church document relating to his wife's claim based upon her conversion to the Christian faith since arriving in Australia;(5)on 10 May 2017 he emailed three court documents and a power of attorney to the case officer (the documents were not translated into English);(6)after that he received the notification that the visa applications were refused and the decision was explained;(7)he was surprised to see reference in the decision to the fact that he had not sent in any evidence;(8)on 25 July 2017 he sent a further email checking that the email address was correct and he did not receive a reply;(9)he engaged the services of a migration agent and forwarded the emails to her;(10)it emerged that he had misread the email address (reading the handwritten address as containing the letter 'v' when it was an 'r');(11)with the assistance of a friend he retrieved delivery failure notifications from his spam folder;(12)he had since been told that the documents on which he relies must be translated into English and he subsequently provided translations to the Authority;(13)the documents had been sent to him electronically by his lawyer in Iran and the lawyer holds the originals; and(14)he does not have regular access to the internet and is not good with technology. The appellants sought to rely on the delivery failure notifications and the documents before the Authority. The documents included what were said to be court documents relating to the charges brought against the father in Iran and the sentences imposed as well as a power of attorney given to a lawyer (Court Documents). The Act provides that the Authority must not consider new information unless certain conditions are met. Those conditions are stated in s 473DD. The conditions are expressed in terms that require the Authority to be satisfied as to certain things before new information can be considered. The Authority formed the view that it was not satisfied and therefore the Court Documents could not be received as new information. Broadly speaking there were two reasons given by the Authority for that view. First, the Authority was not satisfied that the father did attempt to send the Court Documents to the delegate as he claimed. Second, the Authority had a number of concerns about the credibility of the Court Documents.