FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111
Appeal from: AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 122 File number: VID 86 of 2018 Judges: MCKERRACHER, MURPHY AND DAVIES JJ Date of judgment: 13 July 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court appealing a decision of the Minister not to grant a protection visa to a “fast track applicant” – application of the s 473DD exception to the s 473DB prohibition on the Authority considering new information where there were “exceptional circumstances” – whether it was open to the Authority to conclude that “exceptional circumstances” were not made out – meaning of “exceptional circumstances” – whether the Authority took too narrow an interpretation of “exceptional circumstances” – whether the Authority had considered the s 473DD(b)(ii) requirement – whether the primary judge properly considered the matters required to be considered under s 473DD(a) – construction of s 473DD Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited:
BVZ16v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221; [2017] FCA 958
CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16
Date of hearing: 7 May 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 18 Counsel for the Appellant: Dr A McBeth Solicitor for the Appellant: Wimal & Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C Tran Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
VID 86 of 2018 BETWEEN: AQU17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
MCKERRACHER, MURPHY AND DAVIES JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 JULY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This appeal concerns s 437DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). The section is contained in Part 7AA of the Act, which governs the review process for a decision made by the first respondent (“the Minister”) not to grant a protection visa to a “fast track applicant”. For present purposes it is sufficient to note the following salient features of the review process:
(a)s 473CA imposes a duty on the Minister to refer a fast track reviewable decision to the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”) as soon as reasonably practicable after the decision is made;
(b)s 473CB imposes a duty on the Secretary to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (“the Secretary”)…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 111
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the arguments made by the appellant and the submissions by the respondents. It was noted that s 473DD(a) and s 473DD(b) are cumulative requirements, meaning that the Tribunal must not only consider the new information under s 473DD(b) but also be satisfied that there are "exceptional circumstances" under s 473DD(a) to justify considering the new information. The term "exceptional circumstances" was held to mean circumstances that are out of the ordinary, unusual, special, or uncommon. The court emphasised that the determination of whether "exceptional circumstances" exist depends on the particular circumstances of the visa applicant's case. The court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the matters required under s 473DD(a) and that the primary judge had correctly considered the issues under s 473DD.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. The costs were to be taxed in default of agreement, in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There are two grounds of appeal. Ground 1 challenges the correctness of the primary judge’s finding that the Authority had considered the s 473DD(b)(ii) requirement. Ground 2 challenges the correctness of the primary judge’s finding that the Authority “properly considered the matters required to be considered under s 473DD(a) of the Act”. Consideration In support of the appeal grounds, counsel for the appellant submitted that it was “essential … at a minimum” for the Authority to evaluate the credibility of the new information and the significance of the new information to the appellant’s claims. It was submitted that there was not only no actual finding on the s 473DD(b)(ii) matters, but also that merely noting an inconsistency in the accounts did not constitute proper consideration as to whether the new information was credible personal information that may have affected the consideration of the appellant’s claims. It was also submitted that the primary judge misunderstood the appellant’s argument below. It was submitted that s 473DD(a) and s 473DD(b) are cumulative, not co‑extensive, requirements so that the question of whether “exceptional circumstances” exist cannot be answered just by looking at the s 473DD(b) matters, but also requires consideration of whether there is anything out of the ordinary that justifies consideration of the new information. It was submitted that the Authority’s reasons did not reveal any consideration beyond the fact of the inconsistent accounts, which was an inadequate basis upon which to decide that “exceptional circumstances” did not exist to justify consideration of the new information. It was put that there was no consideration of the importance of the new information to the appellant’s claims, or of the appellant’s personal circumstances, or of the credibility of the new information, or of the reason for the later inconsistent account. As a matter of construction, it is undoubtedly correct that s 473DD(a) and s 473DD(b) are cumulative requirements. Section 473DD(a) imposes the requirement that the Authority must not consider new information unless it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information. Section 473DD(b) imposes the further requirement that the new information was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision to refuse to grant the protection visa (s 473DD(b)(i)) or is new information that is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims (s 473DD(b)(ii)). “Exceptional circumstances” is not a defined term for the purposes of s 473DD(a) and the words are to be given their ordinary meaning. In ordinary meaning, circumstances are “exceptional” if the circumstances may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon: BVZ16; Plaintiff M174. In Plaintiff M174 the plurality (Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ with whom Gordon and Edelman JJ each agreed in separate reasons) observed at [30] in relation to the requirement in s 473DD(a):Quite what will amount to exceptional circumstances is inherently incapable of exhaustive statement. The word “exceptional”, in such a context, is not a term of art but “an ordinary, familiar English adjective”: “[t]o be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered”.The quotation is from R v Kelly at [51], which was also cited in BVZ16 for the meaning “exceptional circumstances” in the context of s 473DD(a). There may be a combination of factors which, when viewed together, constitute “exceptional circumstances”, or one factor of its own which may be sufficient for “exceptional circumstances” to exist. In each case, whether there are exceptional circumstances must depend on the particular circumstances of the visa applicant’s case.