FFQ18 v Minster for Immigration
[2020] FCCA 1730
•26 June 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| FFQ18 v MINSTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 1730 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of Immigration Assessment Authority decision – refusal of a protection visa – applicant claiming a fear of harm in Afghanistan – applicant’s fears found not to be well founded – whether the Authority erred in dealing with the applicant’s claims considered – no jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 5AA,36, 46A, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, 473EA, 473GA, 474GB |
| Cases cited: AQU17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCAFC 111 CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 1641 Minister for Immigration v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 |
| Applicant: | FFQ18 |
| First Respondent: | MINSTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | PEG 515 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Driver |
| Hearing date: | 26 June 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 26 June 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared in person |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr P Macliver |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The title of the Minister is amended in accordance with order 1 made by Judge Kendall on 20 January 2020.
The application filed 5 October 2018 is dismissed.
The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application, in the sum of $7,467 in accordance with rule 44.15(1) and item 3 of Division 1 of Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
PEG 515 of 2018
| FFQ18 |
Applicant
And
| MINSTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
Introduction and background
The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority). The decision was made on 17 September 2018. The authority affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister (delegate) not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Background facts relating to the applicant’s claims for protection and the Authority’s decision on them are set out in the Minister’s outline of submissions.
The applicant is a national of Afghanistan, who is of Hazara ethnicity and the Shi’a Islamic faith.[1]
[1] Court Book (CB) 139
The applicant entered Australia by sea at the Territory of Christmas Island on 21 February 2013, when he did not hold a visa that was in effect.[2] Accordingly, he is an unauthorised maritime arrival.[3]
[2] CB 151
[3] See Migration Act, ss.5 and 5AA(1)
On 23 May 2016, the Minister’s Department sent a letter to the applicant advising that the Minister had exercised the power in s.46A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 Cth (Migration Act) to allow him to make a valid application for a temporary protection visa or a safe haven enterprise (temporary) visa (“protection visa”).[4]
[4] CB 22-23
The applicant lodged an application for a protection visa on 27 February 2017,[5] with the assistance of a registered migration agent.[6]
[5] CB 27, 81, 92, 131, 135
[6] CB 69-79
The applicant claimed protection on the basis that he feared “harm at the hands of Taliban on account of my Shi’a religion Hazara ethnicity and employment with a company working for the government”,[7] and as a returnee from the west.[8]
[7] CB 2 [3], 75
[8] CB 74, [32], 75
The applicant attended an interview before the Minister’s Department on 26 October 2017, to give further evidence in relation to his protection claims.[9] He was accompanied by his registered migration agent and assisted by an interpreter. The applicant provided to the Minister’s Department a translated marriage certificate dated 11 July 2008,[10] a letter from his general practitioner dated 1 July 2017,[11] and post-interview submissions.[12]
[9] CB 92-93, 114. The interview has been audio recorded but not transcribed
[10] CB 115-116
[11] CB 126-128
[12] CB 117-125
On 9 January 2018, the delegate made a decision to refuse the application for a protection visa, on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant satisfied s.36(2) of the Migration Act.[13]
[13] CB 131-150
On 12 January 2018, the Minister referred the matter to the Authority, in accordance with s.473CA of the Migration Act.[14] On the same date, the Authority sent the applicant an acknowledgment of the referral, an information sheet and a copy of the Authority’s Practice Direction.[15]
[14] CB 152
[15] CB 152-164
On 31 January 2018, the applicant’s new registered migration agent notified the Authority of his appointment, and provided a written submission to the Authority.[16] The Authority noted that the written submission contained argument responding to the delegate’s decision and reasserts claims and information already before the delegate, which it considered in conducting the review.[17] However, it also noted that the written submission contained new information (within the meaning of s.473DC(1) of the Migration Act), relating to:
a)minor additions and clarifications about the applicant’s existing claims;[18] and
b)details and claims that were not previously advanced.[19]
[16] CB 165-171
[17] CB 179, [3]
[18] CB 179, [4]
[19] CB 179, [5]
The Authority was not satisfied that there was exceptional circumstances to justify it considering the new information under s.473DD(a) of the Migration Act.[20]
[20] CB 180-181, [11]-[13]
However, the Authority also obtained new information, namely updated country information in respect of Afghanistan, that it proceeded to rely upon in accordance with s.473DD(a) of the Migration Act.[21]
[21] CB 181, [14]. This new information was not required to be given to the applicant pursuant to s.473DE(3)(a) of the Migration Act
As noted above, on 17 September 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision.[22]
[22] CB 178-198
Authority decision
The Authority’s findings about the applicant’s claims are summarised as follows:
a)Identity and family: The Authority accepted that the applicant is a Shi’a Hazara from a named district in Afghanistan,[23] that his father was killed by the Taliban and that his brother has been missing since 2011.[24] However, it found that the applicant had no profile and/or did not face any chance of harm in connection with his father’s death or his brother’s disappearance;[25]
b)Health: The Authority accepted that the applicant had some kidney issues, depression, stress and anxiety.[26] It also found that there would be challenges in obtaining health care, but noted that the applicant would not be prevented from or denied access to health care or medication on return to Afghanistan.[27] The Authority was not satisfied on the medical information that the applicant faced a chance of harm for any reason related to his current health circumstance;[28]
c)Abduction by the Taliban: The Authority accepted the applicant’s account of his first abduction by the Taliban in mid-2012 to be plausible, including the nature of his detention and escape.[29] The Authority accepted that the first incident occurred.[30] The Authority also accepted that the second abduction occurred in or about November 2012.[31] However, the Authority was not satisfied that the second abduction was a targeted attack or that it was related to the first abduction, or connected with the applicant’s profile.[32] The Authority was prepared to accept that ethnicity may have been a factor in the abduction.[33] The applicant did not have a pre-existing profile with the Taliban who abducted him in late 2012, nor did they impute him with a profile of a person associated with or supportive of the Afghan government.[34] The Authority found that forced labour and ransom were the motives here, but it did not discount the applicant may have been at risk if he had stayed in captivity.[35] Having regard to all the circumstances and relevant country information, the Authority found that the applicant would not face a real chance of harm in connection with his abduction, detention and escape, or on the basis of any related or residual profile.[36] The Authority concluded that the applicant’s fear of harm related to the abductions, and that any profile arising from those abductions was not well-founded;[37]
d)Employment: The Authority accepted that the applicant had previously worked for a private construction company, which contracted for projects connected with the Afghan government or the international community.[38] The Authority found that the applicant’s work for his previous company was motivated by a desire for employment and income rather than to work for or support the government specifically.[39] It further found that should the applicant return to that employment, he would have an indirect profile of someone associated with the Afghan government and/or the international community.[40] The Authority noted that the applicant had been targeted once as a result of his employment, but it gave weight to the fact that he worked for four years otherwise without incident and that he returned to work after changes were made to his work patterns/areas and security.[41] The Authority accepted that previous targeting occurred in an area where there was considerable insurgent activity and insecurity.[42] However, the Authority was satisfied that the applicant’s former employer and the applicant would not have returned to work in that area.[43] The Authority found that if the applicant returned home and worked as he did after the first abduction, the chance of him being targeted for abduction or other harm would be remote.[44] In the event that the chance of harm was more than remote, the Authority was satisfied that the applicant could take reasonable steps to modify his behaviour to avoid a real chance of harm on the basis of this profile.[45] The Authority was of the view that those steps would not conflict with the matters set out in s 5J(3) of the Migration Act;[46]
e)Ethnicity/religion: The Authority found the chance of the applicant facing harm from the Taliban on the basis of his religious and ethnic profile was remote.[47] Country information suggested that the Taliban did not currently have a sectarian or ethnic agenda, rather the main targets of the Taliban remained the government, the international community and Afghan national security forces.[48] The Authority noted that there was information to suggest the risk of harm from Islamic State Khorasan Province in some areas was elevated.[49] However, it found that in the applicant’s home area this risk was very remote;[50]
f)Road security: Taking into account the applicant’s individual circumstances and country information, the Authority found that the applicant could safely access his home area, whilst noting that there had been incidents involving Hazaras on the roads. That is, it was of the view that there was not at real chance of serious harm arising from the applicant’s religious and ethnic profile;[51]
g)Societal discrimination: The Authority found that the applicant may experience societal discrimination, however it noted that this was not at a level that would threaten the applicant’s capacity to subsist, or would otherwise constitute or amount to serious harm.[52] In the context of the applicant returning to his home area, the Authority held that the chance or risk of discrimination or other harm for reasons of his ethnicity, religion or related profile would be highly remote, and that there was no real chance of the applicant facing discrimination or harm in that context;[53]
h)Claims related to time in the west: The Authority was of the view that the applicant’s status as a returnee from the west or an asylum seeker would be unremarkable.[54] It noted that the applicant would be returning to a region of Afghanistan with limited insurgent activity, where he was already known and where his family continued to live.[55] It also noted that the applicant was unlikely to be viewed with suspicion or imputed with any adverse profile or harmed.[56] Further, the Authority noted that the applicant had spent the overwhelming majority of his life in his home area, and would be highly fluent in local culture.[57] Moreover, the Authority noted that his familial and tribal links would not only benefit him in terms of reintegration, work and accommodation, but also in avoiding any suspicion or adverse profile.[58] The Authority held that it was very unlikely that the applicant would be viewed with suspicion, considered an infidel, a spy for the west or otherwise targeted on the basis that he was a returnee or former asylum seeker.[59] The Authority was not satisfied that there was a real chance of the applicant facing harm, whether considered separately or cumulatively, if he returned to live in Afghanistan;[60]
i)General insecurity and violence: The Authority noted that the security situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated in recent years, and that there were dangers to low profile civilians living in the applicant’s home province.[61] However, it noted that insurgent or generalised violence was not at such a level, scope or frequency that the applicant would face a real chance of harm as a civilian if he returned to live in his home province or district.[62] The Authority held that the chance of the applicant being harmed in generalised or insurgent violence was present but remote.[63] It accepted that there were elevated risks for Shi’a Hazaras in Kabul, however was of the view that the applicant’s stay in the capital would be temporary.[64] Given the occasional, albeit serious nature of the attacks in Kabul and against its airport, the Authority was of the view that there was not a real risk or chance of the applicant facing harm for any reason during any temporary stay in Kabul prior to travelling to his home region.[65] Ultimately, the Authority was of the view that the applicant could safely access his home area, and it would be reasonable for him to remain in that region, and/or to travel infrequently into less secure areas;[66] and
j)Complementary protection: For similar reasons to its refugee findings, the Authority found that the applicant did not face a real risk of significant harm.[67]
[23] CB, 182, [18]
[24] CB 182, [19]
[25] CB 182, [19]
[26] CB 183, [19]
[27] CB 182, [22]
[28] CB 183, [23]
[29] CB 183, [24]
[30] CB 183, [24]
[31] CB 184. [31]
[32] CB 184. [32]
[33] CB 185. [34]
[34] CB 185, [35]
[35] CB 185, [36]
[36] CB 185, [38]
[37] CB 185, [38]
[38] CB 186, [39]-[40]
[39] CB 186, [43]
[40] CB 186, [40]
[41] CB 186, [42]
[42] CB 186, [42]
[43] CB 186, [42]
[44] CB 186, [42]
[45] CB 186, [43]
[46] CB 186, [43]
[47] CB 187, [46]
[48] CB 187, [46]
[49] CB 187, [47]-[48]
[50] CB 188, [49]
[51] CB 188-189, [50]-[52]
[52] CB 189, [53]
[53] CB 189, [53]
[54] CB 190, [61]
[55] CB 190, [61]
[56] CB 190, [61]
[57] CB 190, [62]
[58] CB 190, [62]
[59] CB 190, [62]
[60] CB 191, [63]
[61] CB 191, [64]-[65]
[62] CB 192, [67]
[63] CB 192, [67]
[64] CB 192, [68]
[65] CB 192, [68]
[66] CB 192, [68]
[67] CB 193-194, [72]-[75]
The current proceedings
These proceedings began with a show cause application filed on 5 October 2018. There are two unparticularised grounds in that application:
1. the Assessor failed to properly consider all of my claims
2. the Assessor didn’t give me a chance [to] comment on one aspect of my claims
The application is supported by a short affidavit filed with it, which I received. I also have before me as evidence the court book filed on 29 November 2018, and the affidavit of Jonathon Papalia, made on 12 June 2020.
Annexed to that affidavit is a confidential annexure, JP1. The confidential annexure was provided to me in a sealed envelope. It was not provided to the applicant. It comprises a bundle of Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) financial records. It is a record of overseas financial transactions involving the applicant while he has been in Australia.
Only the Minister provided pre-hearing written submissions in accordance with procedural orders made in this case. I invited oral submissions from the applicant. Those were limited to the merits of the Authority decision. As I explained to him, those merits are beyond the scope of this proceeding.
I explained to the applicant, upon hearing oral submissions from the Minister’s counsel, that it seemed to me there were only two legal issues in this case. The first concerns the Authority’s treatment of new information. This is detailed in the Authority’s reasons from [2]–[14]. I am satisfied that the Authority correctly applied s.473DD of the Migration Act in relation to new information. The conclusions reached by the Authority in relation to that new information were within the range of available conclusions open to the Authority.
The second issue concerns a purported non-disclosure certificate. This is reproduced at CB 129. The Minister concedes correctly that the certificate is invalid. The Authority’s reasons are silent in relation to the certificate. It is thus not known whether the Authority even adverted to the certificate.
I am willing to accept that the Authority erred by not disclosing the certificate or the existence of the certificate to the applicant and inviting his comments on it. However, the error does not, in my view, go to jurisdiction. The AUSTRAC records do not bear on any issue in the review.
The only passing contextual relevance of the AUSTAC records arises from [19] of the Authority decision. The Authority there accepted that the applicant supports his family in Afghanistan financially. That was not a factor operating adversely on his claims for protection.
In other respects, I agree with the Minister’s submissions concerning the grounds of review, and the certificate.
Ground 1
The applicant’s assertion that the Authority failed to properly consider all of his claims suggests that he is inviting the Court to engage in impermissible merits review.[68]
[68] See Minister for Immigration v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at [31] (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ)
The Authority is required to consider the applicant’s claims for protection and their component integers where those claims or integers:
a)are the subject of a clearly articulated argument relying on established facts, or
b)clearly emerge from the materials before the Authority.[69]
[69] See AYY17 v Minister for Immigration (2018) 261 FCR 503 at [18] (Collier, McKerracher and Banks-Smith JJ)
In the present matter, the applicant has not identified any claim or integer of a claim that the Authority has not considered. The applicant’s claims for protection were set out in his statement to the Minister’s Department,[70] at his interview and in his post-interview submission.[71] The Authority accurately summarised the applicant’s claims at [15] of its reasons, and has proceeded to consider all of these claims in its decision.
[70] CB, 72-76
[71] CB, 117-125
To the extent that the ground may relate to the Authority’s failure to consider new information, which included further claims for protection, the Authority’s choice not to consider those claims was based on its lack of satisfaction that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering that new information, with the result that the precondition in s.473DD(a) of the Migration Act was not met.
That lack of satisfaction involved an evaluative judgment,[72] which was explained by the Authority at [4]-[13] of its reasons for decision.
[72] See Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration (2018) 264 CLR 217 at [75] (Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ)
What will amount to exceptional circumstances is inherently incapable of exhaustive statement.[73] Each case will be different to every other case and must be treated on its merits and the matters for the Authority to take into consideration must necessarily vary from case to case.
[73] AQU17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCAFC 111 at [14] (McKerracher, Murphy and Davies JJ)
In the present case, the Authority reasoned that the (relevant) new information (raising new claims) was information which the applicant could have articulated earlier.[74] In respect of new information that clarified the applicant’s claims, the Authority reasoned that it could have been provided earlier, and that it did not add to the applicant’s existing claims, which were accepted by the Authority on the material already before it.[75]
[74] CB 180, [12]
[75] CB 181, [13]
It was open to the Authority, on the material before it, to make those findings.
Ground 1 is not established.
Ground 2
By this ground, the applicant alleges that the Authority did not give him an opportunity to comment on one aspect of his claims. The applicant has not identified which particular aspect of his claims he was not invited to comment on, nor why he says the failure to invite him to comment on that aspect amounts to jurisdictional error.
This ground needs to be assessed in the context of the provisions in Part 7AA of the Migration Act, which set out the statutory task of the Authority and the procedures it is required to follow. The Authority has limited procedural fairness obligations, which are set out in Division 3 of Part 7AA.[76] In particular:
a)section 473DB(1) of the Migration Act provides, subject to Part 7AA, that the Authority is to review the decision on the papers, without accepting or requestion new information, and without interviewing the applicant;
b)although the Authority has a discretion to obtain new information that it considers would be relevant to the review, it does not have any duty to get, request or accept new information in any circumstances;[77]
c)pursuant to s.473DD of the Migration Act, the Authority can only consider new information that was not before the delegate if:
i)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and
ii)in relation to the new information provided by the applicant, the applicant satisfies the Authority that the information was not and could not have been provided to the delegate prior to the decision under review, or that the information is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected consideration of the applicant’s claims; and
d)section 473DE of the Migration Act applies where the Authority considers new information under s.473DD of the Migration Act, and requires the Authority, in certain circumstances, to give particulars of the new information to the applicant, explain to the applicant why the information is relevant to the review and invite the applicant to comment on the information.
[76] The provisions in Division 3 of Part 7AA (along with ss.473GA and 473GB) comprise an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the Authority: see BVD17 v Minister for Immigration [2019] HCA 34 at [29]
[77] Migration Act, s.473DC(2)
In the present case, the applicant was sent a copy of the Authority’s practice direction, which explains an applicant’s option to provide the Authority a submission.
Commenting on the delegate’s decision, and that the Authority can only consider new information in very limited circumstances as set out in s.473DD of the Migration Act.[78]
[78] CB 160-164
For the reasons given in respect of Ground 1, the Authority was required to be satisfied that the cumulative criteria is s.473DD of the Migration Act were met in order to consider any new information given or proposed to be given to it by the applicant. It was not so satisfied. That judgment was required to be reasonable[79] and was one that was open to it to make.
[79] See Plaintiff M174/2016 at [21]
In respect of the new country information, that material falls within s.473DE(3)(a) of the Migration Act and therefore did not need to be put to the applicant by the Authority.[80]
[80] See CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 1641 at [34] (Thawley J) and the cases cited therein
Non-disclosable material
On 12 January 2018, the Secretary provided the Authority with material relevant to the review in accordance with s.473CB(1)(c) of the Migration Act. That material included a document that had been purportedly certified by a delegate of the Minister on 29 November 2017 under s.473GB(5) of the Migration Act as being covered by s.473GB(1), that is, that disclosure of any matter contained in the document would be contrary to the public interest for the reason set out in the certificate, other than a reason set out in s.473GA(1)(a) or (b) of the Migration Act.[81]
[81] CB 29
The purported s.473GB(5) certificate provides a reason that is set out in s.473GA(1)(a) of the Migration Act as the reason why the disclosure of the material would be contrary to the public interest that could form the basis for a claim for public interest immunity. That reason would appear to be contrary to the prohibition in s.473GB(1)(a) of the Migration Act that the Minister’s reason why disclosure would be contrary to the public interest be something “other than a reason set out in s.473GA(1)(a) or (b)” of the Migration Act. Prima facie, that certificate would appear to be invalid.
The s.473GB certificate relates to material annexed to Minister’s Department correspondence at CB 112-113 concerning moneys transferred by the applicant to recipients in Afghanistan, including his brother. That correspondence is dated 23 and 24 October 2017, and the delegate’s reasons for decision demonstrate that the accompanying material to the purported certificate was before the delegate.[82] Accordingly, it is not “new information” within the meaning of s.473DC(1) of the Migration Act.[83]
[82] Protection Visa Decision Record at [4] on page 9, CB 143, referring to the applicant’s “demonstrated ability to send money transfers to his family in Afghanistan”
[83] Plaintiff M174/2016 at [27]; CED16 v Minister for Immigration (2018) 265 FCR 115 at [54]-[56] (Derrington J)
An incorrect notification by the Secretary that s.473GB(1) of the Migration Act applies in relation to a document or information amounts, without more, to an unauthorised act in breach of a limitation within the statutory procedures which condition the performance of the overarching duty of the Authority to conduct a review.[84] A breach of that limitation does not deny legal force to a decision made on a subsequent review unless that breach is material.[85]
[84] See Minister for Immigration v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 241 at [44] (Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ)
[85] Ibid
A breach is material to a decision only if compliance could realistically have resulted in a different decision.[86]
[86] SZMTA at [45]
Accepting that a breach may have denied the applicant an opportunity to make submissions on the validity of the notification and to present his evidence and make submissions in the knowledge that the material which was the subject of the notification might not be taken into account by the Authority,[87] the material was of such marginal significance to the Authority’s consideration of the applicant’s claims that the denial could not realistically have made any difference to its decision.
[87] Noting that s.474GB(3)(a) Migration Act implicitly confers a discretion
Unreasonableness
There may be circumstances in which it would be legally unreasonable to fail to consider exercising the discretions under either s.473DC(3) and 473DE(1) of the Migration Act to invite an applicant to comment on new information,[88] or to disclose confidential information under s.473GB(3)(b) of the Migration Act (if it relied upon such confidential information, which is not accepted).[89]
[88] See CCQ17 at [38] and the cases cited therein
[89] SZMTA at [24]
The applicant bears the onus of establishing:
a)the factual foundation for the conclusion that the Authority did fail to consider exercising the discretion; and
b)that there was jurisdictional error in failing to consider exercising the discretion.
The Authority is not required to include a statement as to the exercise of a procedural decision in the course of review.[90] The absence of a reference to the consideration or exercise of a discretion does not of itself give rise to an inference that its exercise was not considered.[91]
[90] Migration Act, s.473EA(1); see also CCQ17 at [39]
[91] CCQ17 at [39]
In the present case, even if the Authority failed to consider exercising any of the statutory discretions above, the circumstances were not such that any failure was legally unreasonable with the consequence that the decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error.
Conclusion
I conclude that the applicant is unable to demonstrate that the position of the Authority is affected by any jurisdictional error.
The decision is therefore a privative clause decision, and the application must be dismissed. I will so order.
In consequence of the dismissal of the application, the Minister seeks an order for costs in accordance with the Court scale. The applicant claims impecuniosity, but as has been previously stated that is not a reason for the Court to refrain from making a costs order.
I will order that the applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application, in the sum of $7,467 in accordance with rule 44.15(1) and item 3 of Division 1 of Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
I certify that the preceding fifty three (53) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Driver
Associate:
Date: 2 July 2020
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