CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641

Appeal from: CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 244
File number: NSD 207 of 2018
Judge: THAWLEY J
Date of judgment: 31 October 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether Authority failed to consider exercising its discretion under s 473DC – whether legally unreasonable for Authority not to consider exercising its discretion under s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to invite the appellant to comment on “new information” – where “new information” was country information not specific to the appellant which was not before the Minister – where statutory scheme contemplates use of country information without affording the referred applicant an opportunity to be heard – where country information was not shown to give rise to any new issue and was not used in a way that was materially different to earlier country information before the Minister
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, Div 3, ss 473DA(1), 473DB(1), 473DC, 473DE, 473EA(1), 473FA(1), 473GA, 473GB
Cases cited:

BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365

BMV16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 90

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 114

CMY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1333

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 12

EKW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1366

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DZU16 (2018) 253 FCR 526

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594

VAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 31 October 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr O Jones
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr MP Cleary
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 207 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CCQ17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

THAWLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 OCTOBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THAWLEY J:

  1. This is an appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 5 February 2018, dismissing the appellant’s application to that Court under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1641
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, who arrived in Australia on 13 October 2012, seeking judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm the delegate’s refusal to grant a protection visa. The dispute hinged on whether the IAA had failed to consider exercising its discretion under section 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to invite the appellant to comment on "new information". This "new information" was country information not specific to the appellant and which was not before the Minister. The statutory scheme allows for the use of country information without providing the referred applicant an opportunity to be heard, provided that such information does not give rise to new issues and is not used in a way that materially differs from earlier country information before the Minister.

The court had to determine if the IAA's failure to invite the appellant to comment on the new country information was legally unreasonable. This involved examining whether the statutory framework allowed the IAA to rely on new country information without consulting the appellant and whether the new information introduced any new issues or was used differently from previous information. The court needed to balance the statutory discretion with the principles of natural justice and fairness, particularly in the context of refugee status determinations.

The court found that the statutory scheme did permit the IAA to use new country information without giving the appellant an opportunity to comment, provided that such information did not introduce new issues and was not used in a materially different way. The court concluded that the new country information did not give rise to any new issues and was consistent with the previous information used by the Minister. Therefore, the IAA’s decision not to invite the appellant to comment on the new information was not legally unreasonable.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed. The decision underscored the importance of ensuring that new information does not introduce new issues or alter the substantive context in which previous decisions were made.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant arrived at Christmas Island on 13 October 2012.THE DELEGATE’S DECISION The delegate was not satisfied that the appellant met the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. The delegate concluded that the appellant did not meet the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. It is not necessary to set out the delegate’s conclusions and reasoning other than to note that the delegate relied on various items of country information including a “DFAT Country Information Report Sri Lanka”, 18 December 2015 (2015 DFAT Report).THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION The Authority affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The Authority accepted that:(1)between 2004 and 2007, the appellant was suspected of having LTTE links and interrogated and beaten on a number of occasions (although fewer than claimed in the appellant’s written application): A[8]; (2)in 2006, the appellant’s neighbour, Mr P, was shot and killed, and that after the death, plain clothed men interrogated the appellant, and beat his parents: A[9];(3)in 2007, the appellant was sent by his parents to India due to poor living conditions and the continuing adverse attention he received from the SLA due to being a young Tamil male in an area where the LTTE was active: A[10]. The Authority did not accept parts of the appellant’s account of events given at his SHEV interview regarding the death of his friend, Mr S, after his return to Sri Lanka. The Authority stated at A[16] to A[18] and A[20]:16.In particular, the applicant’s evidence at the SHEV interview regarding Mr S was vague and disjointed, which contrasted with his evidence about other events such as the physical assaults he was subjected to prior to 2007, which were less recent experiences. I am prepared to accept the applicant had a friend called Mr S, who may have been murdered for the reasons the applicant has claimed, but I do not accept the applicant was in any way linked to this matter, or subject to the adverse attention of the SLA as a result.17.The applicant stated he returned from India on 30 December 2010 and that evening spoke to his friend Mr S, who told him that the sand moving project was causing water to flow into their village, and the project should be stopped. Mr S told the applicant “he was writing about it on his computer” and the next morning Mr S was found murdered. In the applicant’s written claims he has stated he had told people he was also opposed to the project and was concerned other people believed he, the applicant, would publish a critical article. Given the applicant had only been home for a few hours, after an absence of three years, during which he has not claimed he had any contact with Mr S, I find this implausible. On the evidence before me I do not accept the applicant had any sort of conversation with Mr S the night before his murder, that the applicant told people he was opposed to the project, or that the local community believed the applicant was going to continue on with the work of Mr S. 18.I also note the applicant has been inconsistent as to whether it was the SLA or the EPDP who came to question him, his parents and other neighbours the day after the murder, and which group continued to question the applicant’s parents about his whereabouts while he was in hiding. The delegate asked the applicant who he believed had murdered Mr S and he responded it was the EPDP. The delegate asked the applicant if the SLA had come to ask him about Mr S’s murder and he replied they had not, but the EPDP had. However in the applicant’s written claims he has stated it was the SLA who were searching for him when he was hiding in [redacted] and Colombo. …20.On the evidence before me I do not accept the applicant was questioned about Mr S’s murder the day after it occurred or that the SLA and/or EPDP had any interest in him regarding this matter. As I am satisfied the SLA and/or the EPDP did not have an interest in the applicant for any other reason, I do not accept the SLA and/or EPDP questioned the applicant’s parents four to five times when he was hiding in [redacted], or three times after he had left [redacted] for Colombo, where he claims he resided for fourteen months before departing Sri Lanka for Singapore by plane. On the evidence before me I am not satisfied the applicant has a profile with the Sri Lankan authorities because of the murder of his friend Mr S, that he was ever wanted for questioning or that he was ever in hiding for this reason. I am not satisfied the applicant faced a real chance of harm from the SLA or EPDP in relation to his friendship with a claimed activist, Mr S, or any imputed anti-Sri Lankan government political opinion arising from this.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established