VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCAFC 158

MIGRATION – application for protection visa – Tribunal had regard to information from Lonely Planet Guide in rejecting aspect of appellant’s claim – whether failure to provide appellant with opportunity to comment upon information constituted breach of s 424A of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether information “the reason, or a part of the reason” for affirming decision under review – point raised on appeal having previously been abandoned at first instance – whether leave to rely upon proposed ground should be granted

WORDS & PHRASES – “the reason, or a part of the reason” – s 424A(1) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424A, 441A, 476(1), 481(1)

VEAJ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 678 at [33]-[34] referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Al Shamry (2001) 110 FCR 27 at 40-41 referred to
Baig v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 380 referred to
VHAJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 609 at [51]-[52] and [72] referred to
NARV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 203 ALR 494 at [17], [24] referred to
SZADS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1251 at [47] referred to
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at 122 referred to
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 at 145 referred to
Dagli v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 298 at [91] referred to
Tuncok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1069 referred to
NATL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 112 at [17] referred to
Paul v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 [94] referred to

VAAC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 74 at [27] referred to
H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 63 ALD 43 referred to
O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310 referred to
Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [20]-[24] and [38] referred to
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7 referred to
VAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 123 at [30], [33], [41] followed
NAMB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 718 at [80] referred to
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 195 ALR 502 at [37] referred to

C Beaton-Wells, “Disclosure of adverse information to applicants under the Migration Act 1958” (2004) 11 AJ Admin L 61 at 64-67

VUAX v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

V1027 of 2003

KIEFEL, WEINBERG & STONE JJ
15 JUNE 2004
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

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Details
Case
[2004] FCAFC 158
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a Jordanian citizen of Palestinian ethnicity, appealed against the dismissal of an application for review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal, affirming the Minister’s refusal to grant him, his wife, and children a Protection (Class XA) visa. The Tribunal's decision was based on its conclusion that the appellant did not satisfy the requirements of the Refugees Convention, which was upheld by the judge of the Court on 27 October 2003. The appeal centred on the interpretation and application of the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth).

The primary legal issue the Court needed to decide was whether the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of the appellant's claims of persecution by the Jordanian government and Hamas, and whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the applicable legal standards in reaching its decision. The Court was also required to determine if there was any justification for allowing the appellant to raise a new ground of appeal that was not presented before the primary judge.

The Court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was well-reasoned and supported by the evidence. It found that the Tribunal had properly evaluated the appellant's claims and had given detailed reasons for rejecting his assertions of persecution. The Court further held that leave to argue a new ground of appeal should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice, and in this case, the proposed ground of appeal had no merit and was of doubtful value. The Court emphasised the importance of settling substantial issues at the trial stage to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.

The Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the procedural rules in judicial review matters and the need for appellants to present all relevant grounds of appeal at the earliest opportunity.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Court who, on 27 October 2003, ordered that an application for review under s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) be dismissed. The application was for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 23 March 2001 that affirmed a decision of the respondent Minister, by his delegate, to refuse the appellant, his wife and children a Protection (Class XA) visa. It is common ground that the law to be applied is that which existed prior to the commencement of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth). THE BACKGROUND FACTS The appellant is a Jordanian citizen of Palestinian ethnicity. He is 44 years old, and arrived in Australia on 6 August 2000. His wife and children arrived several weeks later, on 30 August 2000. Upon his arrival in Australia, the appellant initially claimed to be stateless, maintaining that he had never held Jordanian citizenship. However, he later conceded that he was a Jordanian citizen. Indeed, he conceded that he had been granted a Jordanian passport on four separate occasions. He arrived in Australia on a Jordanian passport issued on 4 April 2000, valid to 4 April 2005. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL The Tribunal, in its reasons for decision, referred to the appellant’s educational, family and business background. It then set out his account of having joined, in 1991, the Islamic Resistance Movement (“Hamas”), the militant Palestinian body, now proscribed in this country as a terrorist organisation. It also summarised his account of having participated in demonstrations and other anti-government activities in support of the Palestinian resistance against Israel. The appellant claimed that the Jordanian Government had been tolerant of Hamas until 1994, when its attitude towards the organisation changed. Demonstrations, marches and political speeches by Hamas members were banned, as the Government at that time supported peace initiatives between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The appellant claimed that since 1994 he had been repeatedly arrested and mistreated by Government officials. He stated that this had occurred about ten times in 1996, and again in 1997, and more frequently throughout 1998 and 1999. He said that in 1999, he was summoned to attend the Security Office in Amman where a high-ranking official told him that his life would be “destroyed” if he did not collaborate with the security forces against Hamas. He said that he was summoned again about ten days later, and that the security officer arranged for two Hamas members to see them together. This led to his being suspected by Hamas of being a traitor to the movement, and to his being threatened with death. According to the appellant, he was arrested a week later, taken to the same security building, and assaulted after he refused to assist the authorities. He claimed that some days later, two men and a woman broke into his house and attacked his wife, seriously injuring her.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, counsel for the respondent submitted that the Court should refuse leave to argue this ground given that it had not been agitated before the primary judge, and indeed, had been expressly abandoned. He referred to the observations of the Full Court in H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 63 ALD 43, which were in turn endorsed in the Full Court in VAAC. CONCLUSION In our view, the application for leave to rely upon the sole ground of appeal now raised should be refused. Leave to argue a ground of appeal not raised before the primary judge should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so: O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310; H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; and Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [20]-[24] and [38]. In Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1, Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ observed, in their joint judgment, at 7:“It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish.” The practice of raising arguments for the first time before the Full Court has been particularly prevalent in appeals relating to migration matters. The Court may grant leave if some point that was not taken below, but which clearly has merit, is advanced, and there is no real prejudice to the respondent in permitting it to be agitated. Where, however, there is no adequate explanation for the failure to take the point, and it seems to be of doubtful merit, leave should generally be refused. In our view, the proposed ground of appeal has no merit. There is no justification, therefore, for permitting it to be raised for the first time before this Court. It is clear from a reading of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision as a whole that it affirmed the delegate’s decision because it concluded that the appellant did not satisfy the requirements of the Refugees Convention. The Tribunal provided a number of reasons for coming to this conclusion. It found that the appellant’s Palestinian ethnicity was not the source of any discrimination. It rejected the appellant’s claim that the authorities had persecuted members of Hamas from about 1994. It rejected the appellant’s claim to have been detained on a regular basis since 1995, and gave detailed reasons for doing so. It rejected his claim to have been served with “subpoenas”, and regarded these documents as either forgeries or as having been fraudulently obtained. It rejected his account of having been offered the role of informant against Hamas. It did not accept that any threats to which he may have been subjected, or any attack that may have been made upon his wife, were motivated by any perception that he was an informant, or for any other political reason. It found that whatever led him to sell his business and bring his family to Australia, it was not because he faced a real chance of persecution by government authorities or by Hamas, as he claimed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established