Rizk v Basseal

Case [2024] FCA 647


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rizk v Basseal [2024] FCA 647

Appeal from: Rizk v BB Dundas Pty Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 583
File number: NSD 917 of 2023
Judgment of: SHARIFF J
Date of judgment: 19 June 2024
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – appeal from finding that worker was not an employee – consideration of applicable standard of review in such an appeal – consideration of applicable principles where no written contract between parties – consideration of status of multifactorial test – no error found on part of primary judge – appeal dismissed – application for summary dismissal heard concurrently and dismissed with no order as to costs
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 13, 14, 15A(1), 15A(2), 550, 570

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1)(d), 25(1AA)(a), 31A(2)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 26.01(1)(a), (b) and (c)

Cases cited:

Ace Insurance Limited v Trifunovski [2013] FCAFC 3; (2013) 209 FCR 146

ASY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1888

Chiodo v Silk Contract Logistics [2023] FCA 1047

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Ickelheimer, 132 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1943)

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2014] HCA 32; (2014) 253 CLR 169

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 122; (2020) 279 FCR 631

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1; (2022) 275 CLR 165

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

EFEX Group Pty Ltd v Bennett [2024] FCAFC 35

Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118

Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 44; (2001) 207 CLR 21

Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378; (1983) 53 LGRA 325

Jin v Premium Travel Pty Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 22

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v FAK19 [2021] FCAFC 153; (2021) 287 FCR 181

On Call Interpreters and Translators Agency Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 3) [2011] FCA 366; (2011) 214 FCR 82

Pannizutti v Trask (1987) 10 NSWLR 531

Public Services Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656

Realestate.com.au Pty Ltd v Hardingham [2022] HCA 39; (2022) 406 ALR 678

Secretary, Attorney-General’s Dept v O’Dwyer [2022] FCA 1183; (2022) 177 ALD 113

Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247

Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 13

Toogood v Gott [2023] FCA 1521

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588

Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531

Waterways Authority v Fitzgibbon [2005] HCA 57; (2005) 221 ALR 402

WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2021] HCA 23; (2021) 271 CLR 456

ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2;

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Details
AGLC
Rizk v Basseal [2024] FCA 647
Case
[2024] FCA 647
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Rizk v Basseal was an appeal against a determination that the appellant, Mr Rizk, was not an employee of the respondents, Mr Basseal and Mr Boustany, formerly of BB Dundas Pty Ltd, a now deregistered company. The case was heard by a single judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia sitting in its appellate jurisdiction. Mr Rizk sought to overturn the primary judge’s finding that he was not an employee of BB Dundas, while Mr Basseal and Mr Boustany filed an interlocutory application for summary dismissal of the appeal. The court heard the appeal and the interlocutory application concurrently on 27 May 2024.

The legal issues addressed by the court included the appropriate standard of review for appeals involving the determination of employment status, the principles applicable when no written contract exists between the parties, and the status of the multifactorial test derived from the case of Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd. The court had to determine whether the primary judge had erred in applying these principles and whether the appeal should be dismissed or allowed.

The court found that the primary judge had correctly applied the principles and the multifactorial test, and there was no error in the primary judge’s reasoning or findings. The court held that the primary judge had correctly identified the contractual rights and obligations between the parties and had properly characterised the relationship. The court also noted the importance of considering all relevant circumstances, including the parties' words and conduct at the time of contract formation, to ascertain the terms of the contract. The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed and that the interlocutory application for summary dismissal should also be dismissed, with no order as to costs.

In summary, the court dismissed Mr Rizk’s appeal and the interlocutory application filed by Mr Basseal and Mr Boustany, affirming the primary judge's decision that Mr Rizk was not an employee of BB Dundas. The court found no merit in the appeal and made no order as to costs for either party.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with no order as to costs.

2. The respondents’ interlocutory application filed on 14 March 2024 be dismissed with no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

By the time the proceedings were heard by the primary judge, BB Dundas had been deregistered. Accordingly, the case proceeded only as against Mr Basseal and Mr Boustany. In the result, the primary judge was not satisfied that Mr Rizk was an employee of BB Dundas and dismissed the proceedings: see Rizk v BB Dundas Pty Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 583 at [6], [51]-[53] (Primary Judgment or PJ). By way of a notice of appeal filed on 28 August 2023, Mr Rizk seeks to set aside the orders made by the primary judge and have the matter remitted for determination by a different judge of the Court below. In response to the appeal, Mr Basseal and Mr Boustany filed an interlocutory application on 14 March 2024 seeking summary dismissal of the appeal pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FC Act) and, variously, rr 26.01(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FC Rules), as well as an order for costs on an indemnity basis. I heard the application for summary dismissal and the appeal concurrently on 27 May 2024, as a single judge sitting in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to ss 24(1)(d) and 25(1AA)(a) of the FC Act. For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be dismissed, as should the interlocutory application filed by Mr Basseal and Mr Boustany. B. A PRELIMINARY MATTER Notwithstanding that BB Dundas had been and remained deregistered as at the date of filing, Mr Rizk instituted his appeal in this Court identifying BB Dundas as the first respondent to the appeal. This occurred despite the primary judge noting in the PJ at [4] that BB Dundas had been deregistered. By an order made by a Registrar of this Court on 17 January 2024, BB Dundas was removed as a party to the appeal. The matter was thereafter listed before me for hearing on 30 April 2024. Mr Rizk’s legal representatives did not comply with orders made by the Registrar and by me for the filing and service of appeal books and submissions. Instead, shortly before the hearing of the appeal, Mr Rizk’s legal representative, Mr Kyle Kutasi, applied to adjourn the hearing on the basis that he: (a) had not procured a copy of the transcript of the proceedings below; and (b) would be making an application to rejoin BB Dundas as a party to the appeal on the basis that it was in the process of being reregistered. Both developments were unsatisfactory. I was provided with scant evidence as to the actual attempts made by Mr Kutasi to obtain the transcript of the proceedings below and the application to rejoin BB Dundas was inutile in circumstances where Mr Rizk did not proceed against that entity in the proceedings below as it had been deregistered: see PJ [4]. I reluctantly granted the adjournment (over the objection of Mr Basseal and Mr Boustany) on the basis that I could not determine the appeal without proper appeal books and submissions, and that Mr Rizk should not be placed at a disadvantage due to the conduct of his legal representatives. I indicated to Mr Kutasi that I would not expect his client, Mr Rizk, to have to bear the costs of and associated with the delays and adjournment.C. MR RIZK’S GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge was not satisfied that an employment relationship existed and, as a result, the application failed: PJ [51]. The primary judge noted that “no alternative contractual matter” had been pleaded by Mr Rizk, meaning the Court could not determine whether or not in fact there may have been work performed in respect of which payment was not made: PJ [51]. The primary judge further stated that, even if he had been satisfied that an employee-employer relationship existed, there would have been considerable difficulty in finding accessorial liability on the part of Mr Boustany: PJ [52]. E. CONSIDERATIONE.1 Overview of Mr Rizk’s arguments on appeal Mr Rizk’s arguments in support of his grounds of appeal proceeded with scant regard to the principles applicable to the determination of an employment relationship. The arguments proceeded on an application of the “multifactorial test” said to arise from Hollis. In particular, as is apparent from each of Grounds 1 and 2, Mr Rizk’s arguments sought to give prominence to the indicia of control and the alleged absence of certain documentary and taxation arrangements between the parties as being determinative. In dealing with these arguments, it is first necessary to deal with questions of principle and the contractual relationship between the parties before turning to the determination of Mr Rizk’s grounds of appeal.E.1 The principles for determining whether there is an employment relationship The decisions of the High Court in Personnel Contracting and ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek[2022] HCA 2; (2022) 275 CLR 254 have laid down the principles to be applied in the determination of the existence of an employment relationship where the rights and duties of the parties are “comprehensively committed to a written contract” and that contract is not a sham: Personnel Contracting at [43]-[44]. However, it does not follow that in cases where there is no written contract, or it is partly written, that the identification of the contract and its terms have no role to play in the determination of the essential question as to whether the relationship is one of employment. As Lee J stated in EFEX Group at [52], the decisions of the High Court in WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2021] HCA 23; (2021) 271 CLR 456, Personnel Contracting and Jamsek make plain that the “key determinant of the character of any given work relationship is to be found in the terms of the contract between the parties”. Where there is no written contract, the identification of the parties’ contractual rights and duties must proceed somewhat differently but the fundamental task remains the same as where a written contract exists: the parties’ contractual rights and obligations are to be ascertained and characterised: EFEX Group at [7] (Katzmann and Bromwich J) citing Personnel Contracting at [177] (Gordon J, with Steward J agreeing) and Chiodo v Silk Contract Logistics [2023] FCA 1047 at [9] (Kennett J); see also EFEX Group at [52]-[56] (Lee J). The terms of such a contract must be determined on the application of orthodox principles. The terms may be inferred from all the circumstances, including by reference to the parties’ words and conduct at the time of the formation of the contract, a course of dealing or implied where necessary by reason of business efficacy: EFEX Group at [9] (Katzmann and Bromwich J) and at [56]-[59] (Lee J), both citing Realestate.com.au Pty Ltd v Hardingham [2022] HCA 39; (2022) 406 ALR 678 at [21]-[22] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J). In certain circumstances, it may be permissible, within limits, to have regard to post-contractual conduct where it is admissible in seeking to resolve what was said in the formation of the contract, to infer the existence of the contract from the acts and conduct of the parties, or to identify its necessary terms: EFEX Group at [56]-[59] (Lee J).