Crown Resorts Limited v Zantran Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Crown Resorts Limited v Zantran Pty Limited [2020] FCAFC 1

Appeal from: Zantran Pty Limited v Crown Resorts Limited [2019] FCA 641
File number: VID 553 of 2019
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, WHITE AND LEE JJ
Date of judgment: 22 January 2020
Catchwords:

CONTRACTS – express obligations of confidence allegedly preventing voluntary communications with the solicitors for opposing party in litigation  – primary judge followed AS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Ruling No 6) [2016] VSC 774; 53 VR 631 in exercising a discretion to relieve persons owing otherwise enforceable obligations of confidence to facilitate the overarching purpose of civil litigation rather than considering whether the provisions were void at law because they had a tendency to interfere adversely with the administration of justice or were enforceable by way of injunction in equity – held that the approach in AS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Ruling No 6) is contrary to principle leading to error in the making of the primary judge’s order

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – consideration of the sources of obligations of confidence  

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – consideration of orthodox approaches to enforcing obligations of confidence and obtaining information from potential witnesses in advance of trial

Legislation: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) Pt 6, div 1
Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 7, 48, 49
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 5, 21, 33V, 33ZF, 37M, 37N, 37P, Pt VB
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) Pt 21
Cases cited:

A v Hayden [1984] HCA 67; 156 CLR 532
AG Australia Holdings Ltd v Burton [2002] NSWSC 170; 58 NSWLR 464
AS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Ruling No 6) [2016] VSC 774; 53 VR 631

Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2019] FCA 1284

AWB Ltd v Cole (No 2) [2006] FCA 913; 253 FCR 288 at 299 [45]
British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096
Cactus Imaging Pty Ltd v Peters [2006] NSWSC 717; 71 NSWLR 9
Castrol Australia Pty Ltd v EmTech Associates Pty Ltd (1980) 51 FLR 184
Church of Scientology of California  v Kaufman [1973] RPC 627
Church of Scientology of California v Kaufman [1973] RPC 635
Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41
Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] HCA 44; 147 CLR 39
Commonwealth of Australia v Sanofi (formerly Sanofi-Aventis) [2017] FCA 382
Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 187; 156 FCR 380
Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) [1987] FCA 266; 14 FCR 434

Dalgety Wine Estates Proprietary Limited v Rizzon (1979) 141 CLR 552

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Dillon v RBS Group (Australia) Pty Limited [2017] FCA 896; 252 FCR 150
Egerton v Brownlow (1853) 4 HL Cas 1;

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Crown Resorts Limited has appealed a decision of Lee J, who had exercised a discretion under section 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to relieve Crown of an otherwise enforceable obligation of confidence. This obligation was contained in documents executed by employees of Crown. The relief sought was to allow voluntary communications between Zantran’s solicitors and Crown’s employees in relation to the conduct of Crown in, or involving, China. The Court of Appeal was required to decide whether the primary judge had erred in exercising his discretion under section 37M to relieve Crown of the otherwise enforceable obligation of confidence. The Court of Appeal held that the primary judge had erred in exercising his discretion. The Court held that the primary judge had followed a decision of Forrest J in AS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Ruling No 6) [2016] VSC 774; 53 VR 631 to relieve a party of an obligation of confidence. The Court held that this approach was contrary to principle and had led to error in the making of the primary judge’s order. The Court held that the primary judge should have considered whether the confidentiality provisions were void at law because they had a tendency to interfere adversely with the administration of justice or were enforceable by way of injunction in equity. The Court held that the approach in AS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Ruling No 6) was contrary to principle. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the primary judge. In lieu thereof, the Court ordered that the interlocutory application filed by Zantran Pty Limited on 3 October 2018 be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent be refused leave to file and rely upon the proposed notice of contention provided to the Court on 2 September 2019.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. Order 1 made by the primary judge on 8 May 2019 be set aside and in lieu thereof there be an order that the interlocutory application filed by Zantran Pty Limited on 3 October 2018 be dismissed.

4. Within seven days of publication of reasons, each of the parties file and serve an outline of submissions, limited to two pages, setting out the nature of the order as to costs for which it contends as to the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, and by reference to the reasoning of Lee J, such an approach was contrary to principle. THE BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT TO THE DISPUTE The respondent to the appeal (Zantran) has commenced representative proceedings under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act against the appellant (Crown) for relief including damages arising from alleged contraventions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act2001 (Cth), and the Australian Consumer Law set out in Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) by failing to notify the Australian Securities Exchange of certain matters and by making certain representations. The matters that it is said should have been notified and the asserted misleading character of the representations arise from how Crown conducted its business in, or involving citizens of, the People’s Republic of China. The relevant information and risk said to be known to Crown was set out in paras 34 to 36 of the Statement of Claim, as follows:34.On and from 6 February 2015 (or in the alternative on and from 19 June 2015) by reason of the matters pleaded in paragraphs 17 to 33:(a) Crown's China Operations were in breach of Chinese law (China Operations Illegal Information); and/or(b) Crown's China Operations possessed characteristics which were a target of the Chinese Gambling Crackdown (China Operations Crackdown Information);35. On and from 6 February 2015 (or in the alternative on and from 19 June 2015) by reason of the matters pleaded in paragraphs 17 to 34 above, there existed a risk that:(a) Crown employees would be charged, arrested, detained, prosecuted or convicted by Chinese authorities for commission of crimes in contravention of Chinese laws in relation to gambling (Employee Detention Risk);(b) in circumstances where Crown employees were charged, arrested, detained, prosecuted or convicted by Chinese authorities for commission of crimes in contravention of Chinese laws in relation to gambling, Crown would be forced to terminate its China Operations (China Operations Enforcement Risk);(c) in circumstances where Crown terminated its China Operations, Crown would suffer a significant reduction in Crown's Chinese VIP Revenue (Chinese VIP Revenue Risk); and/or(d) in circumstances where Crown suffered a significant reduction in Crown's Chinese VIP Revenue, it would suffer a significant reduction in Crown's total revenue (Revenue Risk).36. On and from 6 February 2015 (or in the alternative on and from 19 June 2015) Crown was aware (within the meaning of the ASX Listing Rule 19.12) of:(a) the China Operations Illegal Information;(b) the China Operations Crackdown Information;(c) the Employee Detention Risk;(d) the China Operations Enforcement Risk;(e) the Chinese VIP Revenue Risk; and/or(f) the Revenue Risk. The alleged misleading representations were to the effect that Crown had in place adequate risk policies concerning its business and operations in China, and that its marketing as a luxury brand to Chinese “VIP gamblers” would continue.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Though these paragraphs are not an exhaustive statement of the balancing exercise undertaken, they reveal with clarity the nature of the discretionary exercise. CONCLUSION As I have sought earlier to emphasise, there can be no doubt as to the importance of the over-arching purpose and case management considerations to be found in Pt VB, and like provisions. They do not, however, form an adequate foundation for a conclusion that it is against public policy for a party in litigation to seek to enforce a valid contractual confidentiality clause when to do so would or might impede the conduct of private civil litigation. This is especially so when there are pre-trial interlocutory procedures that may be availed of to extract the information from prospective witnesses prior to, or at an early and separate stage of, the trial. As Mason J said in A v Hayden at 559, courts “should use extreme reserve in holding… a contract to be void as against public policy, and only do so when the contract is incontestably and on any view inimical to the public interest.” The approach of the primary judge was to follow that of Forrest J in AS v Minister. For the above reasons, that approach was impermissible and contrary to principle. As is perhaps apparent from what I have already said, nothing in these reasons should be taken as support for the proposition that the provisions in question before the primary judge are not capable of being shown to be unenforceable. The matter was not approached, nor disposed of, on the basis of asserted iniquity or criminality as the foundation for public policy making the relevant provisions or contracts void or unenforceable. I refer to what Campbell J said in AG v Burton, set out at [34] above. It is unnecessary to comment on the width or terms of the principle expressed by his Honour and its relationship with conduct which amounts to a systematic engagement in conduct which is a criminal offence by a law of a foreign country. Nor was the matter approached on the basis that a substantial purpose and/or the effect of the Finalisation Deeds and Separation Deed was to impede or hinder the prosecution of any action of the kind that has been brought: cf Commonwealth of Australia v Sanofi (formerly Sanofi-Aventis) [2017] FCA 382 at [51] and [82]. It may be that it is for the applicants to show a prima facie case that Crown engaged in a systematic course of conduct contrary to, and known to be contrary to, the laws of China, or that the purpose and effect of the Finalisation Deeds and Separation Deed was to impede or hinder litigation in a court, or in this Court. If the facts are sufficient to demonstrate such a prima facie case, it may be open to seek a declaration that the deeds and contracts, or their relevant provisions, were either void or unenforceable on that account as seeking to keep secret a course of criminal conduct by the laws of China which were the foundation of civil wrongs or of contravention of statute in Australia: cf Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (1980) 55 FLR 108, or as seeking to impede or interfere with litigation in this or another Court. If doubt existed about the availability of sufficient evidence for the successful prosecution of such declaratory proceedings, it may be that preliminary discovery would be available. This is not how the matter has proceeded to this point.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As is evident from both fundamental principle and the emphasised words of the relevant confidentiality provisions (see [72] and [73] above), nothing about the express obligations could prevent the Court, on application, invoking its compulsory power to compel disclosure by Crown or the employees of information relevant to Crown’s China Operations if it was otherwise thought to be necessary or appropriate. For example, Zantran may have been entitled to an order that Crown be required to provide written and verified answers to interrogatories under Pt 21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) relevant to Crown’s China Operations. Moreover, there was nothing preventing Zantran seeking an order under ss 33ZF or 37P(2) of the Act on the basis that it was appropriate in the interests of justice that an order be made requiring (or, perhaps more appropriately in the circumstances, allowing) some or all of the employees to attend the Court for the purposes of being examined in advance of the initial trial by adopting a form of deposition procedure before a Registrar or the docket judge. The possibility that such an order for pre-trial oral discovery directed to a third party could be made was adverted to by the Full Court (Gilmour, Foster and Beach JJ) in Jones v Treasury Wine Estates Limited [2016] FCAFC 59; (2016) 241 FCR 111 at 115 [24] after the Court referred to the “dramatic transformation” wrought by the introduction of Pt VB into the Act. This is not surprising, and the prospect of oral discovery is not new nor wholly unprecedented. It was discussed favourably in Chapter 10 of the Australian Law Reform Commission’s Report, Managing Discovery: Discovery of Documents in Federal Courts (Report No 115, March 2011). It might also be thought to have historical antecedents in the interrogating part of the equity bill for relief or bill of discovery developed by the Court of Chancery: see Pomeroy, N J, Equity Jurisprudence (3rd ed, 1905) at [83], [193] and [209]. If any such application had been made, it would be determined in accordance with the dictates of s 37M(3) of the Act which requires practice and procedure discretions to be exercised in a way which best promotes the overarching purpose: for a recent example see Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2019] FCA 1284 (Allsop CJ), where oral examination or oral discovery under the control of the Court was regarded as potentially appropriate. II Options which involved consideration of the enforceability of the Provisions Additionally, even if the above interlocutory options were not embraced, there were other options open which would have involved consideration of the validity and enforceability of the confidentiality provisions in an orthodox way. Issue could have been joined by the solicitors for Zantran sending a letter to Crown’s solicitors apprising them of the intention of Zantran’s solicitors to discuss with the employees information relating to Crown’s China Operations, explaining why they considered it was open for them to do so, and noting that they would do so after a specified date unless enjoined. It would then have been for Crown to consider whether it should seek an injunction in equity’s auxiliary jurisdiction to prevent its employees from breaching its contractual obligations of confidence or to prevent Zantran or its solicitors seeking to procure such a breach. Apart from anything else, it would have been necessary for Crown to prove its legal rights with admissible evidence including, no doubt, placing the documents which were said to give rise to those rights into evidence. It would also have been necessary for Crown, in framing relief, to be able to identify with specificity, and not merely in global terms, the precise information it contended was unable to be discussed: see Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co (1948) 65 RPC 203 at 215; Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434 at 443 (Gummow J); Rosewood Advertising Pty Ltd v Hannah Marketing Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1034. As Brereton J explained in Cactus Imaging Pty Ltd v Peters [2006] NSWSC 717; (2006) 71 NSWLR 9 at 15 [14], although the three cases mentioned above were concerned with the circumstances in which equity imposed an obligation of confidence, the requirement for specificity is no less where a contractual obligation is sought to be enforced. One reason for this is that an injunction in general terms restraining a former employee from using the employer’s “confidential information”, would inappropriately leave, “to an application for contempt, determination of whether particular information was or was not confidential”. Hence there would have been specificity in what the employees could and could not disclose relevant to Crown’s China Operations, even where a prohibitory injunction was granted.