Federal Court—Claim for damages—Order preventing dissipation of assets—Injunction—Mareva injunction—Power to order provision of security for satisfaction of any judgment—Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s. 23.
Decisions
MASON C.J.: Subject to some additional comments, I am in agreement with the reasons for judgment prepared by Deane J.
2. My additional comments relate to the question whether the orders requiring the appellant to "provide security in the sum of $3,000,000" might be a nullity. As presently advised, I consider that the making of the orders amounted to an error in principle, rather than a jurisdictional error. The Federal Court had jurisdiction to grant the final relief sought in the action by the respondent. There is no analogy with The Queen v. Ross-Jones; Ex parte Green (1984) 156 CLR 185, where the Family Court was held to have no jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction in a proceeding where there was no semblance of jurisdiction to grant the permanent injunction claimed.
3. Here the issue was whether the form of interlocutory relief granted by Sheppard J. was appropriate to keep the matter in statu quo pending a determination of the claim to final relief. I do not regard the making of the orders as transcending such jurisdictional limits as may be implied in the authority which s.23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) confers to make orders "as the Court thinks appropriate". Generally speaking, other things being equal, when matters of principle are invoked to confine the making of orders by a superior court, pursuant to a power given to it by statute, it is preferable to regard those matters as regulating the exercise of the power, than to regard them as going to the existence of jurisdiction to make the orders.
4. In the result I would allow the appeal.
WILSON AND DAWSON JJ.: We agree with Deane J. Since the first appearance of the remedy, the power to grant a Mareva injunction has been a matter of debate. It was initially seen to be derived from the power of the English High Court to "grant ... an injunction ... by an interlocutory order in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient so to do": s.45(1) Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (U.K.); Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis (1975) 1 WLR 1093; (1975) 3 All ER 282; Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A. (1975) 2 Lloyd's Rep 509. Section 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) gives to the Federal Court a comparable power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, "to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders ... as the Court thinks appropriate".
2. It is not without difficulty that reliance has been placed upon statutory provisions of…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23
Case
[1987] HCA 23
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal concerning the interpretation of a clause in a deed of settlement. The appellant, Mr. Jackson, sought to recover damages from the respondent, Sterling Industries Ltd, under a deed of settlement that had been entered into following earlier litigation. The core of the dispute revolved around whether Sterling Industries Ltd had breached its obligations under the deed by failing to make certain payments.
The central legal issue before the High Court was the proper construction of clause 4(b) of the deed of settlement. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the obligation to pay a sum of money was conditional upon the occurrence of a future event, or whether it constituted a present, unconditional obligation to pay. This involved an analysis of the language used in the clause and the surrounding circumstances at the time the deed was executed.
The Court, in a joint judgment, held that the language of clause 4(b) indicated a present and unconditional obligation to pay. They reasoned that the phrase "shall be entitled to receive" referred to a right that had already accrued, rather than a future entitlement dependent on a condition. The Court applied principles of contractual interpretation, emphasizing that the plain meaning of the words used in the deed, read in context, was paramount. The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for further proceedings consistent with the High Court's judgment.