Dillon v RBS Group (Australia) Pty Limited (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dillon v RBS Group (Australia) Pty Limited (No 2) [2018] FCA 395  

File number: NSD 1016 of 2014
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 20 March 2018
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – s 33V application – proper role of applicants to deal only with the claims the subject of the class action and not with other ‘claims’ – issue of whether orders made pursuant to s 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) are sufficient to quell the entire controversy between the applicants, group members and the respondents – where respondents submitted that there was ‘uncertainty’ regarding the binding of participating group members to a settlement as approved by order of the Court – where settlement agreement included provision for the execution of a deed poll by participating group members as a condition of participating in the settlement distribution scheme – observations as to why there is no reasonable basis for uncertainty upon a proper construction of Part IVA – discussion as to why obtaining deed poll releases from group members is superfluous

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – settlement distribution schemes – solicitors ought not assume that they will be appointed administrators of settlement distribution schemes approved by the Court

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), Pts IVA, VAA, ss 4, 33A, 33J, 33V, 33X(5), 33ZB, 37AE, 37AG(1)(a), 37AG(1)(b), 37AG(1)(c), 37AG(1)(d), 54A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 28.67(1)

Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), Pt 4A

Cases cited:

Blairgowrie Trading Ltd v Allco Financial Group Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq) (No 3) [2017] FCA 330; (2017) 118 ACSR 614

Camilleri v The Trust Company (Nominees) Limited [2015] FCA 1468

Collin v Aspen Pharmacare Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 952

Dillon v RBS Group (Australia) Pty Limited [2017] FCA 896; (2017) 252 FCR 150

Farey v National Australia Bank Ltd [2016] FCA 340

Harrison v Sandhurst Trustees Ltd [2011] FCA 541

Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; (2010) 240 CLR 651

Lee v Westpac Banking Corporation [2017] FCA 1553

Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Limited v S&P Global Inc (Formerly McGraw-Hill Financial, Inc) (A Company Incorporated in New York) [2018] FCA 379

Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) v Collins [2016] HCA 44; (2016) 259 CLR 212

Date of hearing: 20 March 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 84
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr D Campbell QC and Mr Q Rares
Solicitor for the Applicants: Shine Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr DFC Thomas and Mr PJH Holmes
Solicitor for the Respondents: King & Wood Mallesons
Table of Corrections
3 May 2018 In [49], the word “work” has been inserted after the word “otherwise”, and the word “ground” after the word “whereby” has been replaced with the word “group”
3 May 2018 In [15], [37] and [38], reference to the reported version of the judgment has been added.
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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 395
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dillon v RBS Group (Australia) Pty Limited (No 2) is a case involving a representative proceeding under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act). The applicants, representing a group of investors, sought approval of a settlement with the respondents, RBS Group (Australia) Pty Limited and others. The dispute centred on the terms of the settlement, particularly a provision requiring group members to execute a deed poll as a condition of participating in the settlement distribution scheme. The respondents argued there was uncertainty regarding the binding of participating group members to the settlement, as approved by the Court. The applicants contended that the settlement terms were necessary to quell the entire controversy between the parties.

The court was required to determine whether the orders made under section 33V of the Act were sufficient to quell the entire controversy between the applicants, group members, and the respondents. Additionally, the court had to consider whether it was necessary to obtain deed poll releases from group members as a condition of participating in the settlement distribution scheme. The court also addressed whether solicitors could assume they would be appointed administrators of settlement distribution schemes approved by the Court.

The court found that the settlement orders, which included the requirement for group members to sign a deed poll, were sufficient to quell the entire controversy between the parties. The court emphasised that under section 33ZB of the Act, a judgment in a representative proceeding binds all group members who have not opted out of the proceeding. Therefore, if the Court makes an order binding all remaining group members, those persons are, by force of that order, bound. The court further explained that the statutory agency created by Part IVA of the Act is limited in scope, and applicants have no role in representing group members in respect of individual claims other than the claim that is the subject of the representative proceeding. The court concluded that obtaining deed poll releases from group members was superfluous and not required to bind them to the settlement terms.

The court approved the settlement on the terms set out in the Settlement Deed and the Settlement Scheme, appointed Shine Lawyers as the administrator of the Settlement Scheme, and dismissed the second amended originating application and the third amended statement of claim. The court also made orders regarding costs, confidentiality, and the administration of the Settlement Scheme.

Orders

Orders of the court

In these Orders:

Administration Costs has the same meaning as it does in the Settlement Deed.

Applicants’ Costs has the same meaning as it does in the Settlement Deed.

Group Member/s means the persons described in paragraph 2 of the third amended statement of claim as amended on 14 February 2018, other than any such person who has opted out of the proceedings

Settlement Deed means the Deed of Settlement executed on 16 February 2018 which is tab 2 of Exhibit CVA 1 to the confidential affidavit of Vicky Antzoulatos sworn 8 March 2018.

Settlement Scheme means the document which is annexure B to the Settlement Deed.

1. Pursuant to s 33X of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act), group members Mr Gregory Edward Hancock and Mrs Jutka Suzanne Mavromatis be emailed a copy of the notice annexed to these Orders.

2. Pursuant to s 33V of the Act, the settlement of the representative proceeding and the claims of the applicants and of each Group Member be approved on terms set out in the Settlement Deed; and the Settlement Scheme including, payment in accordance with the Settlement Scheme of: (a) the applicants’ Costs in the amount of $4,486,787.96; (b) the Administration Costs in the amount of a maximum of $250,000; and (c) the additional applicants’ Costs associated with the approval application in the amount of $169,000.

3. Shine Lawyers be appointed administrator of the Settlement Scheme.

4. The second amended originating application and the third amended statement of claim be dismissed.

5. The administrator and any participating Group Member have leave to approach the Court to seek directions in relation to the administration of the Settlement Scheme.

6. Forthwith upon the conclusion of the administration of the Settlement Scheme, the administrator is to file a report including confirmation of the amount that has been charged in relation to the administration of the Settlement Scheme.

7. All previous costs orders in the proceedings be vacated.

8. There be no order as to the costs of the proceedings.

9. Pursuant to ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Act, until further order of the Court, in order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, paragraphs 15-19, 22-33, 36, 39-47, 48-51 and tabs 1,2,5,6,7 and 9 of Exhibit CVA1 of the confidential affidavit of Vicky Antzoulatos sworn 8 March 2018 is not be published or made available and not be disclosed to any person or entity.

10. Other than order 1 (which binds the applicants) and order 9 (which applies generally), pursuant to s 33ZB of the Act, the persons affected and bound by the balance of these orders, including the s 33V order, are the applicants, the respondents and the Group Members who have not opted out of the proceedings.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Annexure

Dear [insert name]

You are presently a Group Member in the matter of Dillon & Anor v RBS Group (Australia) Pty Ltd & Ors (NSD1016/2014) in the Federal Court of Australia.

The case has settled for $12.58 million, inclusive of the applicants’ legal costs of approximately $5 million.

On 20 March 2018 the Court made orders that you be informed of two options which are available to you, namely:

1) Opt out; and

2) Not opt out (and remain a Group Member).

As a Group Member you will be entitled to a payment as a result of the settlement of the matter. We estimate that your payment would be about [insert amount].

If you opt out, you will not be able to receive any payment from the settlement.

We would appreciate it if, within 7 days, you would email Vicky Antzoulatos at vantzoulatos@shine.com.au and indicate whether you would like to opt out of this action or remain as a Group Member and participate in the settlement and be paid an amount of approximately [insert amount]. In exchange for participating in the settlement as a Group Member you will have to sign a Deed Poll releasing the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) from liability in respect of the claims the subject of this action.

If you do not respond to this email within 7 days, you will be deemed to be a “Non-participating Group Member” which will mean that you will be bound by the settlement but will not receive any settlement payment.

Yours sincerely

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 33ZB is perhaps the single most important provision in Part IVA of the Act. When read together with the relevant definitions in s 4 of the Act, s 33ZB provides:Effect of judgmentA [judgment, decree or order, whether final or interlocutory] given in a representative proceeding:(a) must describe or otherwise identify the group members who will be affected by it; and(b) binds all such persons other than any person who has opted out of the proceeding under section 33J.(Emphasis added) It follows that if the Court makes an order which is said to bind all remaining group members, then those persons are, by force of that order, so bound. Part IVA would not otherwise work. In Timbercorp at 235 [52], reference was made to the process whereby group members “are bound by the determination of the claims giving rise to the common questions”. But this does not speak directly in terms of settlement of proceedings. In circumstances where the matter proceeds to determination, following identification of the common questions (or questions of commonality), s 33ZB will operate in that way; but that is not the extent of its reach. The importance of what their Honours say at 235-236 [53] ought not be understated. There is a need to focus on the foundational notion that the representative person, or applicant, only represents group members with respect to the claim which is the subject of the proceeding, and no further. Put another way, the applicants have no role whatsoever in purporting to represent group members in respect of individual claims other than the claim of the individual group member that is the subject of the representative proceeding. This is the whole point of Timbercorp, which makes it clear that (to use a potentially misleading expression) the statutory ‘agency’ created by Part IVA of the Act is limited in scope. What, then, is one to do with a provision of a proposed settlement in which the applicants have purported to bind the group members to something that goes beyond the limit of this statutory agency? On one level, the issue does not arise in this proceeding as it may do in some others. That is because the definition of ‘Claims’ in the Deed Poll provides as follows: Claims means any and all claims, whether arising at common law, equity, under statute or otherwise, for any form of relief (present and future and including any claim for costs or interest) of the Releasor arising out of, or in connection with, any part of the subject matter of the Proceeding or arising out of, or in connection with, any allegation that RBS is liable for losses incurred by people who invested in Claim Warrants.(Bolding in original) In this sense at least, the release here is connected with the subject matter of the proceeding. Textually, the release seems to reflect an attempt to limit the scope of the release to the claim of the group member (to use that expression in the statutory sense). Mr Thomas provided me with examples where the Court has approved – on my examination, without any considered argument – releases which have, or may have, gone beyond dealing with the claim the subject of the settled proceeding: Harrison v Sandhurst Trustees Ltd [2011] FCA 541, Collin v Aspen Pharmacare Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 952 and Lee v Westpac Banking Corporation [2017] FCA 1553.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The principles to be applied in considering any settlement of a representative proceeding are well known and do not require, yet again, extensive repetition. It suffices, for present purposes, for me to refer to the principles summarised by Moshinsky J in Camilleri v The Trust Company (Nominees) Limited [2015] FCA 1468 at [5] and [40]-[51], and by Beach J in Blairgowrie Trading Ltd v Allco Financial Group Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq) (No 3) [2017] FCA 330; (2017) 118 ACSR 614 at 638 [82]-[85]. C CONSIDERATION OF FAIRNESS AND REASONABLENESS OF SETTLEMENT SUM GENERALLY As is usual on s 33V approval applications, I have had the benefit of confidential material put before the Court by the applicants’ legal representatives, including an opinion prepared by Mr Campbell QC, Mr Pike SC, Mr Rares and Mr Olsen. The opinion is comprehensive and expresses cogent reasons for the conclusion that the overall settlement sum is fair, reasonable and adequate. Although it does not do so in terms, the opinion has regard to the matters set out in the Class Actions Practice Note (GPN-CA) and, in particular, paragraph [14.4], which relevantly provides that a party applying for the Court’s approval of a proposed settlement will usually be required to address:(a)the complexity and likely duration of the litigation;(b)the reaction of the class to the settlement;(c)the stage of the proceedings;(d)the risks of establishing liability;(e)the risks of establishing loss or damage;(f)the risks of maintaining a class action;(g)the ability of the respondent to withstand a greater judgment;(h)the range of reasonableness of the settlement in the light of the best recovery; and(i)the range of reasonableness for settlement in light of all the attended risks of litigation. The fact that the opinion has not addressed these matters in some sort of formulaic way is not intended, in any respect, to be a criticism. Indeed, there is a certain artificiality in addressing some of these matters in the context of individual cases. A good example is presented by this proceeding, where the ability of the respondents to withstand a greater judgment is hardly a relevant consideration. I should add that the submissions filed by the applicants and the respondents (RBS) do address the matters in the Practice Note (but only to the extent that they can be said to be material). It is fair to say that this proceeding is not straightforward. It is complex, both factually and legally. By way of illustration, the current iteration of the pleadings run to a remarkable 360 pages, and a plethora of causes of action are relied upon. The RBS parties have joined issue with a number of positive defences, including limitation defences and proportionate liability defences. Similarly, as is common in litigation of this type, the evidence is lengthy, dense, and complex. Again by way of illustration, the expert reports filed by the applicants run to approximately 700 pages, and RBS’ expert reports in response run to approximately 600 pages. Additionally, eight lay witnesses were proposed to be called to give evidence.