Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2021] FCA 459

File number: NSD 544 of 2019
Judgment of: LEE  J
Date of judgment: 23 April 2021
Catchwords: REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS – open class consumer class action – half a million group members – settlement approved – applications for late opt out – consideration of the finality of settlements achieved by s 33ZB orders – superficial attraction of making orders pursuant to s 33ZF contrary to a principled approach to dealing with settlements – regime must work not only for the benefit of the applicant and group members but also for the respondent – importance of certainty – consideration of s 33KA of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) – no power to make orders allowing for late opt out under Pt IVA – where group member evinced an intention to opt out before the settlement approval hearing – whether orders could be made pursuant to the slip rule – consideration of the slip rule – question of whether group member could opt out a matter of independent discretion – slip rule not engaged where there is any room for debate as to the outcome of the exercise of discretion
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 33E, 33V, 33ZB

Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33KA

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05

Cases cited:

Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] FCA 1885

BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45; (2019) 374 ALR 627

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1404; (2012) 209 FCR 123

Dillon v RBS Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 896; (2017) 252 FCR 150

Dyczynski v Gibson [2020] FCAFC 120; (2020) 381 ALR 1

Endresz v Commonwealth [2019] FCAFC 197; (2019) 273 FCR 286

Flint v Richard Busuttil & Company Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 131; (2013) 216 FCR 375

LShaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Parramatta (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590

Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2018] FCAFC 102; (2018) 265 FCR 304

Murray v Great Southern Managers Australia Ltd (Receivers and Mangers Appointed) (in liq) [2018] VSC 416

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub Area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 30
Date of hearing: 12 March; 23 April 2021
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Hochroth and Mr R Pietriche
Solicitor for the Applicant: Johnson Winter & Slattery
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr D Thomas SC
Solicitor for the Respondents: King & Wood Mallesons
Interested Person: Mr M Holland appeared in person
Interested Person: Mr D Hancock appeared in person
Interested Person: Mr G Meller appeared in person
Interested Person: Ms R Bell appeared in person

ORDERS

NSD 544 of 2019
BETWEEN:

JONES ASIRIFI-OTCHERE

Applicant

AND:

SWANN INSURANCE (AUST) PTY LTD ABN 80 000 886 680

First Respondent

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 459
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 4), the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining applications from a group of consumers seeking to opt out of a class action settlement after the settlement had been approved. The case involved a large group of approximately half a million consumers who had been party to a representative proceeding against Swann Insurance, an insurance company. The primary legal issue before the court was whether it had the authority to permit late opt-outs from the settlement, particularly in light of the finality intended by such settlements and the potential implications for the respondent company.

The court considered the statutory framework governing such matters, including sections 33ZB and 33ZF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, which pertain to the approval of class action settlements and the finality of such settlements. The court also examined section 33KA of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), which it concluded did not provide the power to make orders allowing for late opt-outs under Part IVA. The court was particularly attentive to the principle of finality in litigation, as underscored in previous decisions such as Endresz v Commonwealth. It noted that the slip rule, or rule 39.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, while intended to correct accidental slips or omissions, could not be invoked when there was any room for debate regarding the exercise of independent discretion. The court held that it could not exercise its discretion under the slip rule to permit a late opt-out where there was any uncertainty about the outcome of such a discretionary decision.

The court ultimately dismissed the applications for late opt-out, reaffirming the importance of finality in class action settlements. It noted that the regime must work not only for the benefit of the applicant and group members but also for the respondent. The court emphasised that the slip rule was not engaged in this context due to the presence of debate over the outcome of the discretionary exercise. Consequently, the court's decision upheld the approved settlement, ensuring that the interests of all parties, including the respondent, were protected by maintaining the finality of the litigation process.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applications for late opt out be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The slip rule is a convenient shorthand expression for r 39.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR), which is relevantly in the following terms:39 Varying or setting aside judgment or order after it has been enteredThe Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if:…(e) it does not reflect the intention of the Court; or…(h)there is an error arising in a judgment or order from an accidental slip or omission. The rule was recently considered by the Full Court (Rares, Markovic and Charlesworth JJ) in Endresz v Commonwealth [2019] FCAFC 197; (2019) 273 FCR 286. As the parties correctly submitted in an agreed note, five principles inform the principled application of the rule:(1)The starting point is that the slip rule is available to vary an order to address an accidental slip or omission arising from the inadvertence of the Court or a party. The purpose of the rule is to avoid injustice to the parties by ensuring the Court’s orders reflect its intention at the time the orders were made or reflect the intention that the Court would have had but for the accidental slip or omission: Endresz (at 312 [73]).(2)The Court retains a discretion to refuse to make an order by invoking the slip rule if something has intervened which would mean that it is “inexpedient or inequitable that it be made”: Endresz (at 312 [73]), citing LShaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Parramatta (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590 (at 597 per Mason ACJ, Wilson and Deane JJ). (3)Courts have been careful to ensure that the application of the slip rule is kept within principled constraints, given the public interest in the finality of litigation: Endresz (at 312 [74]). (4)Particular complexity arises where it is sought to rely on the slip rule to vary or add an order that is the product of an independent discretion: Endresz (at [74]). In such cases, the question of how the discretion would have been exercised but for the suggested slip or omission becomes the relevant factor: Endresz (at [74]).(5)Depending upon the circumstances of the case, hindsight reasoning may not enable an inference to be drawn as to the intention of the Court at the time of the making of the relevant order: Endresz (at [87]); see also Flint v Richard Busuttil & Company Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 131; (2013) 216 FCR 375 (at 384 [46] per Allsop CJ, Katzmann and Perry JJ). It is unnecessary for me to wade into the issue of whether the intention in FCR 39.05(e) is confined to the Court’s actual intention, save as to note that the balance of the authorities support the position that the “intention” is that which the Court actually had, as well as the intention that the Court would have had but for a failure caused by inadvertence on the part of the Court or a party: see Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2018] FCAFC 102; (2018) 265 FCR 304 (at 314–5 [56] per Mortimer J, with whom Logan J generally agreed at 306 [3]); Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1404; (2012) 209 FCR 123 (at 126 [10] per Gilmour J).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established