Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] FCA 1885

File number: NSD 544 of 2019
Judgment of: LEE  J
Date of judgment: 17 December 2020
Date of publication of reasons: 28 January 2021
Catchwords: REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS – application for approval of settlement of open class consumer class action – claims that first respondent sold, through dealers, “add on” insurance products alleged to have had no material value – where applicant claimed respondents engaged in misleading and deceptive and unconscionable conduct – where restitution sought by reason that products purchased by mistake – where settlement reached in amount of $138 million – where litigation funder intervened in hearing – where amicus curiae appointed in absence of contradictor – where applicant and litigation funder sought approval of settlement pursuant to s 33V(1) and (2) of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and/or in equity – settlement fair and reasonable and in interests of group members – where common fund order (CFO) sought at rate of 25% of gross settlement sum – consideration of principles concerning factors relevant in fixing CFO rates – consideration of other areas of law where reasonable remuneration fixed by Court – where evidence disclosed that commission rate sought was within range awarded in similar proceedings – CFO granted – where litigation funder further sought payment of costs associated with “after the event” insurance policy – payment of insurance costs rejected – consideration of equitable basis for granting of CFOs at settlement
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 5, 22, Pt IVA, ss 33V, 33ZB

Statute of Elizabeth (29 Eliz c4)   

Cases cited:

BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45; (2019) 94 ALJR 51

Brewster v BMW Australia Ltd [2020] NSWCA 272

Davaria Pty Ltd v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 183; (2020) 384 ALR 650

IMF (Australia) Ltd v Meadow Springs Fairway Resort Ltd (in liq) [2009] FCAFC 9; (2009) 253 ALR 240

In Re Timbercorp Securities Ltd (applications for the approval of compromises) [2012] VSC 590

In Re Universal Distributing Co Ltd (In Liq) (1933) 48 CLR 171

Klemweb Nominees Pty Ltd v BHP Group Ltd [2019] FCAFC 107; (2019) 369 ALR 583

Money Max Int Pty Ltd (Trustee) v QBE Insurance Ltd [2016] FCAFC 148; (2016) 245 FCR 191

National Bolivian Navigation Company v William Millar Wilson (1880) 5 App Cas 176

Nissen v Grunden (1912) 14 CLR 297

Pearson v State of Queensland (No 2) [2020] FCA 619

Perera v GetSwift Limited [2018] FCA 732; (2018) 263 FCR 1

Re Masters [1953] 1 WLR 81

Re Moore [1956] VLR 132

Smith v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2020] FCA 837

Stewart v Atco Controls Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] HCA 15; (2014) 252 CLR 307

Thackray (in their personal capacity and as receivers and managers of Great Southern Managers Australia Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq)) v Gunns Plantations Ltd [2011] VSC…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1885
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the case of Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) involves an application for the approval of a settlement of an open class consumer class action. The applicant, Asirifi-Otchere, alleged that the respondents sold "add on" insurance products through dealers, which had no material value, and claimed that the respondents engaged in misleading and deceptive and unconscionable conduct. The applicant sought restitution as the products were purchased by mistake. The settlement reached was for an amount of $138 million. A litigation funder intervened in the hearing, and an amicus curiae was appointed in the absence of a contradictor. The applicant and the litigation funder sought approval of the settlement under section 33V(1) and (2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and/or in equity. The court had to consider whether the settlement was fair, reasonable and in the interests of the group members and whether a common fund order (CFO) at a rate of 25% of the gross settlement sum was appropriate. The court also had to consider other areas of law where reasonable remuneration was fixed by the court.

The court found that the settlement was fair, reasonable and in the interests of the group members and that a CFO at a rate of 25% of the gross settlement sum was appropriate. The court found that the amount of remuneration sought by the litigation funder (25% of the gross settlement sum) was towards the middle of the range of rates offered or accepted by funders for class actions in Australia. The court also found that the commission rate sought was within the range awarded in similar proceedings. The court granted the CFO and rejected the litigation funder's request for payment of costs associated with an "after the event" insurance policy. The court considered the equitable basis for granting CFOs at settlement and found that the settlement was appropriate.

The court approved the terms of the settlement and the Settlement Distribution Scheme. The court also approved the release of the Released Parties from each Claim made by or on behalf of the applicant or any Bound Group Member in this proceeding. The court deemed certain group members as having opted out and appointed George Georges and John Lindholm of KPMG as Administrators of the Settlement Distribution Scheme. The court dismissed the proceeding with effect upon completion of administration of the Settlement Distribution Scheme. The court also ordered that the $30,000 security paid into the Federal Court Investment Account be returned to the Funder and that certain documents remain confidential until 21 December 2025. The court vacated order 13(g) of the orders made on 5 November 2020 and ordered that Bannister Law will bear 25% of the fees of Ms Liz Harris as Referee in the amount of $10,999.99 and that the balance of those costs shall become part of the Applicant's Legal Costs, as defined in the Settlement Distribution Scheme.

Orders

Orders of the court

Settlement approval

1. Pursuant to s 33V(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act):

(a) the terms of the settlement of the proceeding (Settlement) as recorded in the Settlement Deed executed by the applicant, the respondents and Balance Legal Capital I UK Limited (Funder) and other parties on 5 October 2020 (Settlement Deed) be approved (save for any substantive provision of the Settlement Deed which relates to the release of any Claim of each of the Released Parties (as defined in the Settlement Deed) which is to be provided for by order 3 below); and

(b) the terms of the Settlement Distribution Scheme (SDS) appearing as the annexure to the orders made on 17 December 2020 is approved.

2. Pursuant to s 33ZB(a) of the Act, the persons affected and bound by the Settlement (including order 3 below) be the applicant, the respondents and the "Bound Group Members", being all group members other than who have (or are deemed by these orders to have) opted out.

3. Pursuant to s 33ZF of the Act, each of the Released Parties (as defined in the Settlement Deed) is released by the applicant and each of the Bound Group Members (including the Sample Group Members (as defined in the Settlement Deed)), from each Claim (as defined in the Settlement Deed) made by or on behalf of the applicant or any Bound Group Member in this proceeding.

Opt out notices

4. The group members who did not provide opt out notices to the Court but rather provided opt out notices to the applicant's solicitors on or before 2 September 2020 (being those opt out notices contained in annexures "PAR-3" and "PAR-5") are to be deemed as having opted out on the date fixed for opt out.

5. Pursuant to s 33ZF of the Act, Mr Glen Wayne Lacy and Mr Nigel Haywood are to be deemed as having opted out on the date fixed for opt out.

Administration of settlement

6. Pursuant to s 33ZF of the Act, George Georges and John Lindholm of KPMG be appointed as Administrators of the SDS (Settlement Administrators).

7. The Settlement Administrators be granted liberty to relist upon notice to the Associate to Justice Lee.

8. The Settlement Administrators must, within two business days of the final distribution of the Resolution Sum (as defined in the SDS), are to inform the Court and the parties in writing that this has occurred.

Dismissal

9. The Proceeding is dismissed with such dismissal to take effect upon completion of administration of the SDS, being the date of receipt and notation by the Court of the final distribution of the Resolution Sum (as defined in the SDS) in accordance with order 8.

Return of security for costs

10. The $30,000 security paid into the Federal Court Investment Account pursuant to order 1 made on 4 September 2019, and any interest accrued on that amount, be returned to the Funder.

Confidentiality

11. Pursuant to ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Act in order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the following documents remain confidential until 21 December 2025:

(a) Annexures PAR-1, PAR-3, PAR-4, PAR-5, PAR-6, PAR-7, PAR-8 and PAR-9 to the Confidential Affidavit of Paul Andrew Reidy sworn on 2 December 2020;

(b) Annexure PAR-10 to the supplementary Confidential Affidavit of Paul Andrew Reidy sworn on 15 December 2020;

(c) paragraphs 44(b), 50 to 51, 55 to 57, 67 to 68, 76 to 82, 83 to 86 of the affidavit of Simon Robert Burnett sworn 1 December 2020 (Burnett affidavit); and

(d) pages 1 to 69, 219 to 224 and 225 to 287 of Exhibit Confidential SB-2 to the Burnett affidavit.

Costs referee fees

12. Order 13(g) of the orders made on 5 November 2020 be vacated.

13. Pursuant to s 54A of the Act, without affecting the power of the Court as to costs, in respect of the fees of Ms Liz Harris as Referee in the amount of $43,999.96:

(a) Bannister Law will bear 25% of those costs, in the amount of $10,999.99; and

(b) the balance of those costs shall become part of the Applicant's Legal Costs, as defined in the SDS.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Although the order that I made approving the payments was pursuant to s 33V(1) of the Act, I would have made the order in any event relying on s 33V(2) or in equity. It is necessary to explain why in some detail.D.2 Power, the Principled Approach and the Evidence Generally The Full Court of this Court and the New South Wales Court of Appeal have determined that no dicta of a majority of judges of the High Court can be identified in BMW v Brewster for the proposition that there is a want of power to make a Settlement CFO: Davaria (at 661 [41] per Lee J, Middleton and Moshinsky JJ agreeing); Brewster v BMW Australia Ltd [2020] NSWCA 272 (at [28], [30], [41]–[43] per Bell P, Bathurst CJ and Payne JA agreeing). Thus, as the contradictor submitted, the prevailing orthodoxy is that the Court has power to make a Settlement CFO on the basis that: (a) it is fair, reasonable and in the interests of all group members (s 33V(1)); or (b) within the conception of a just order “with respect to the distribution of any money” (s 33V(2)). It follows that at this time and in the light of the clear statements by the Full Court and the New South Wales Court of Appeal as to the effect and extent of Brewster, it cannot be that the prevailing orthodoxy is plainly wrong so as to preclude the principled application of s 33V in making a Settlement CFO. Indeed, I am of the view that there is ample power to make a Settlement CFO, the question is rather one of discretion as to the whether a proposed form of order should be made in all the circumstances of the case. Before proceeding further, it is worth saying something about the way in which the Court should approach this assessment of fairness or justness. At a minimum it must extend to the Court’s role in recognizing existing legal and equitable rights and obligations, but is not properly to be regarded as confined to merely recognising and adjudicating on legal rights and equities. This must be right because contextually the discretion is exercised at a stage when there are no adjudged legal and equitable rights. A settlement of a class action is a compromise of what may well be quite disparate underlying claims, where some claimants could (if litigation persisted to finality) win, and some might lose. Upon approval of a settlement the underlying claims of group members generally merge in the settlement, and they receive substituted rights to receive that for which the settlement approved under s 33V(1) provides, or which the Court otherwise provides. In a similar way, when the s 33V discretion is exercised, the Court is unable to adjudge the legal and equitable rights as they arise between group members in any precise way, as those rights would depend upon, or may be informed by, the prior determination of their individual rights. As Mr Edwards, counsel for Balance, put it, the very purpose of the settlement is to avoid the need for these rights to be adjudged, and to save the cost of doing so (which, for small consumer claims in particular, are likely to be entirely disproportionate). Such an exercise would be not only impossible, but self-defeating. Some rough justice in settlements is not only permissible; it is desirable.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Secondly, in this case detailed evidence and other materials have been made available to the Court. As touched upon above, expert material has been adduced showing that the amount of remuneration sought by Balance (25% of the gross settlement sum) is towards the middle of the range of rates offered or accepted by funders for class actions in Australia, The relevant data concerning rates is in evidence from 1997 to present, and is collected in the Expert Report of Greg Houston dated 1 December 2020 (at [16], [20], Appendix A1). Further in evidence is a study authored by Professor Vince Morabito entitled “An Evidence-Based Approach to Class Action Reform in Australia: Common Fund Orders, Funding Fees and Reimbursement Payment” (January 2019) and a further study by Professor Morabito entitled “Remuneration to Litigation Funders in the Post-Money Max Era (14 October 2020). It is unnecessary to wade into the specifics which can be seen from this helpful material, but speaking very generally, it shows a generally consistent pattern of CFOs being made at around this level.D.3 Consideration The contradictor, Mr R G Craig QC (whose submissions were, with respect, both helpful and balanced), accepted that having regard to the principles explained in Money Max, the making of a Settlement CFO was appropriate, particularly in circumstances where only the applicant entered into a funding agreement and no group members did so, hence a funding equalisation order would neither be just nor fair The contradictor further submitted, however, that the proposed commission sought by Balance (being 25% of the gross settlement sum or approximately 27.57% of the net settlement sum) is too high and that the following matters militate in favour of a lower commission rate of, say, 21%: (a) Balance only executed one funding agreement and there is accordingly no cost attributable to the conducting of a book build to be factored into the commission rate; (b) the commission was not accepted or agreed to by a sophisticated class of investors and hence 25% is, without more, an arbitrary starting point; (c) the current “tariff” (albeit in the securities class actions context) includes funding commission percentages in the low 20s; in other areas, this sort of figure accords with the 20% funding commission awarded in the stolen wages litigation (see Pearson v State of Queensland (No 2) [2020] FCA 619) and, while the funding commission in the toxic foam litigation (see Smith v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2020] FCA 837) was in the 24–25% range, the figures recorded reveal a return on investment to the funder of between 1.07 and 2.37 (which is to be contrasted with the figure of 3.6 if a 25% commission was applied); (d) there was a reasonable basis to conclude that the level of risk undertaken by Balance was towards the lower end of the spectrum in the present proceeding; and (e) there was a relatively quick return on investment achieved in this proceeding. All of these points, although well made, can be dealt with relatively shortly. I am satisfied this was a relatively risky case when compared to a “run of the mill” securities class action. Even assuming liability issues broadly in favour of the applicant at an initial trial (and that outcome was not assured by any means), there were real difficulties in identifying common issues which would form the basis of s 33ZB orders (and hence avoid the necessity for a large number of individual cases). I am satisfied for a case of this type, a percentage return of 25% is fair given the comparables (such as they are) and particularly given this is a “legacy case” where a judge of the Court, looking at the matter from an ex ante perspective, was content to make a Commencement CFO of “not more than 25%” of gross recovery. Although the error of making such orders has now been corrected, at least the preliminary indication of a cap in such an order was done without any hindsight bias. The return is one which although a good result for the funder, is not a windfall.